An Example of Multi-unit Auctions with Atypically Many Equilibria

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Total Pages : 0 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (246 download)

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Book Synopsis An Example of Multi-unit Auctions with Atypically Many Equilibria by : Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans

Download or read book An Example of Multi-unit Auctions with Atypically Many Equilibria written by Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans and published by . This book was released on 1999 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Equilibria in multi-unit auctions

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ISBN 13 : 9788086286198
Total Pages : 48 pages
Book Rating : 4.2/5 (861 download)

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Book Synopsis Equilibria in multi-unit auctions by : Michal Břeský

Download or read book Equilibria in multi-unit auctions written by Michal Břeský and published by . This book was released on 1999 with total page 48 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Monotone Equilibrium in Multi-unit Auctions

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ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 30 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (531 download)

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Book Synopsis Monotone Equilibrium in Multi-unit Auctions by : David McAdams

Download or read book Monotone Equilibrium in Multi-unit Auctions written by David McAdams and published by . This book was released on 2002 with total page 30 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In a large class of multi-unit auctions of identical objects that includes the uniform-price, as-bid (or discriminatory), and Vickrey auctions, a Bayesian Nash equilibrium exists in monotone pure strategies whenever there is a finite price / quantity grid and each bidder's interim expected payoff function satisfies single-crossing in own bid and type. A stronger condition, non-decreasing differences in own bid and type, is satisfied in this class of auctions given (a) independent types and (b) risk-neutral bidders with marginal values that are (c) nondecreasing in own type and have (d) non-increasing differences in own type and others' quantities. A key observation behind this analysis is that each bidder's valuation for what he wins is always modular in own bid in any multi-unit auction in which the allocation is determined by market-clearing. This paper also provides the first proof of pure strategy equilibrium existence in the uniform-price auction when bidders have multi-unit demand and values that are not private. Keywords: Autions, Multi-unit Auctions, Uniform-price Auction, Vickrey Auctions Bidders, Bayesian Nash Equilibrium.

Pure Equilibrium Strategies in Multi-unit Auctions with Private Value Bidders

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ISBN 13 : 9788073431778
Total Pages : 44 pages
Book Rating : 4.4/5 (317 download)

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Book Synopsis Pure Equilibrium Strategies in Multi-unit Auctions with Private Value Bidders by : Michal Břeský

Download or read book Pure Equilibrium Strategies in Multi-unit Auctions with Private Value Bidders written by Michal Břeský and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 44 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Multi-unit Auctions with Uncertain Supply and Single-unit Demand

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Total Pages : 0 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (138 download)

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Book Synopsis Multi-unit Auctions with Uncertain Supply and Single-unit Demand by : Edward J. Anderson

Download or read book Multi-unit Auctions with Uncertain Supply and Single-unit Demand written by Edward J. Anderson and published by . This book was released on 2023 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We study multi-unit auctions where bidders have single-unit demand and asymmetric information. For symmetric equilibria, we identify circumstances where uniform-pricing is better for the auctioneer than pay-as-bid pricing, and where transparency improves the revenue of the auctioneer. An issue with the uniform-price auction is that seemingly collusive equilibria can exist. We show that such outcomes are less likely if the traded volume of the auctioneer is uncertain. But if bidders are asymmetric ex-ante, then both a price áoor and a price cap are normally needed to get a unique equilibrium, which is well behaved.

Existence of Market Equilibrium in Multi-Unit Auctions With Emission Constraint

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ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 16 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (129 download)

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Book Synopsis Existence of Market Equilibrium in Multi-Unit Auctions With Emission Constraint by : Somdeb Lahiri

Download or read book Existence of Market Equilibrium in Multi-Unit Auctions With Emission Constraint written by Somdeb Lahiri and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page 16 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We obtain a computable necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of market equilibrium for multi-unit auctions with an emission constraint.

Bidding Lower with Higher Values in Multi-object Auctions

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ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 22 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (531 download)

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Book Synopsis Bidding Lower with Higher Values in Multi-object Auctions by : David McAdams

Download or read book Bidding Lower with Higher Values in Multi-object Auctions written by David McAdams and published by . This book was released on 2002 with total page 22 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Multi-object auctions differ in an important way from single-object auctions. When bidders have multi-object demand, equilibria can exist in which bids decrease as values increase! Consider a model with n bidders who receive affiliated one-dimensional types t and whose marginal values are non-decreasing in t and strictly increasing in own type ti. In the first-price auction of a single object, all equilibria are monotone (over the range of types that win with positive probability) in that each bidder's equilibrium bid is non-decreasing in type. On the other hand, some or all equilibria may be non-monotone in many multi-object auctions. In particular, examples are provided for the as-bid and uniform-price auctions of identical objects in which (i) some bidder reduces his bids on all units as his type increases in all equilibria and (ii) symmetric bidders all reduce their bids on some units in all equilibria, and for the as-bid auction of non-identical objects in which (iii) bidders have independent types and some bidder reduces his bids on some packages in all equilibria. Fundamentally, this difference in the structure of equilibria is due to the fact that payoffs fail to satisfy strategic complementarity and/or modularity in these multi-object auctions.

Equilibria and Efficiency of Sequential Multiunit Auctions

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Book Synopsis Equilibria and Efficiency of Sequential Multiunit Auctions by : Mete Ahunbay

Download or read book Equilibria and Efficiency of Sequential Multiunit Auctions written by Mete Ahunbay and published by . This book was released on 2021 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: "We study the equilibrium and efficiency of sequential multiunit auctions with complete information, both under no constraints on buyers' bidding strategies and when buyers are constrained to not bid above their valuation for an additional item in each individual auction. When buyers may not overbid we give a complete characterisation of the equilibrium of the auction when only two buyers are present and show that efficiency of an outcome allocation is at least (1-1/e) with respect to welfare. When buyers may overbid and two buyers are present we restore the (1-1/e) efficiency result of (Bae et al. 2008, 2009). We also inspect the setting when arbitrarily many buyers are present, showing conditional constant-factor efficiency results"--

Multi-unit, Multi-period Auctions, Supply Uncertainity, and the Efficiency of Symmetric Equilibria

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ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 38 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (263 download)

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Book Synopsis Multi-unit, Multi-period Auctions, Supply Uncertainity, and the Efficiency of Symmetric Equilibria by : Jeroen M. Swinkels

Download or read book Multi-unit, Multi-period Auctions, Supply Uncertainity, and the Efficiency of Symmetric Equilibria written by Jeroen M. Swinkels and published by . This book was released on 1990 with total page 38 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Multi-Unit Auctions with Uniform Prices

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ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 0 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (137 download)

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Book Synopsis Multi-Unit Auctions with Uniform Prices by : Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans

Download or read book Multi-Unit Auctions with Uniform Prices written by Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans and published by . This book was released on 1998 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Auctions in which individuals can purchase more than one unit of the good being sold differ in striking ways from multi-unit auctions in which individuals may purchase only one unit. The uniform price auction in particular frequently yields Nash equilibria in which bidders underbid for their second unit and therefore pay very low prices for the good. This paper characterizes equilibria for the uniform price auction.

Multiple Unit Auctions

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ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 260 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (328 download)

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Book Synopsis Multiple Unit Auctions by : Arupratan Daripa

Download or read book Multiple Unit Auctions written by Arupratan Daripa and published by . This book was released on 1995 with total page 260 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Multi-unit Auctions with Complementarities

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ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 232 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (34 download)

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Book Synopsis Multi-unit Auctions with Complementarities by : Wedad Jasmine Elmaghraby

Download or read book Multi-unit Auctions with Complementarities written by Wedad Jasmine Elmaghraby and published by . This book was released on 1998 with total page 232 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Properties of Equilibrium Strategies in Multiple-unit, Uniform-price Auctions

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ISBN 13 : 9788073441432
Total Pages : 34 pages
Book Rating : 4.4/5 (414 download)

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Book Synopsis Properties of Equilibrium Strategies in Multiple-unit, Uniform-price Auctions by : Michal Břeský

Download or read book Properties of Equilibrium Strategies in Multiple-unit, Uniform-price Auctions written by Michal Břeský and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 34 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Multi-unit, Multi-period Auctions, Supply Uncertainty and the Efficiency of Symmetric Equilibria

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ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 31 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (445 download)

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Book Synopsis Multi-unit, Multi-period Auctions, Supply Uncertainty and the Efficiency of Symmetric Equilibria by : Jeroen M. Swinkels

Download or read book Multi-unit, Multi-period Auctions, Supply Uncertainty and the Efficiency of Symmetric Equilibria written by Jeroen M. Swinkels and published by . This book was released on 1990 with total page 31 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

The Multiple Unit Auction with Variable Supply

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ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 28 pages
Book Rating : 4.E/5 ( download)

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Book Synopsis The Multiple Unit Auction with Variable Supply by : Yvan Lengwiler

Download or read book The Multiple Unit Auction with Variable Supply written by Yvan Lengwiler and published by . This book was released on 1998 with total page 28 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Ascending-price Multiple-object Auctions

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ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 38 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (318 download)

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Book Synopsis Ascending-price Multiple-object Auctions by : Flavio M. Menezes

Download or read book Ascending-price Multiple-object Auctions written by Flavio M. Menezes and published by . This book was released on 1993 with total page 38 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Allocating Multiple Units

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ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 0 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (137 download)

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Book Synopsis Allocating Multiple Units by : Kala Krishna

Download or read book Allocating Multiple Units written by Kala Krishna and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper studies the allocation and rent distribution in multi-unit, combinatorial bid auctions under complete information. We focus on the natural multi-unit analogue of the first-price auction, where buyers bid total payments, pay their bids, and where the seller allocates goods to maximize his revenue. While there are many equilibria in this auction, only efficient equilibria remain when the truthful equilibrium restriction of the menu-auction literature is used. Focusing on these equilibria we first show that the first-price auction just described is revenue and outcome equivalent to a Vickrey auction, which is the multi unit analogue of a second-price auction. Furthermore, we characterize these equilibria when valuations take a number of different forms: diminishing marginal valuations, increasing average valuations, and marginal valuations with single turning points.