An Analysis Of Ceo Equity Compensation In An Incomplete Contracting Framework

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An Analysis of CEO Equity Compensation in an Incomplete Contracting Framework

Author : Matthias Kiefer
Publisher : Matthias Kiefer
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 262 pages
Book Rating : 4./5 ( download)

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Book Synopsis An Analysis of CEO Equity Compensation in an Incomplete Contracting Framework by : Matthias Kiefer

Download or read book An Analysis of CEO Equity Compensation in an Incomplete Contracting Framework written by Matthias Kiefer and published by Matthias Kiefer. This book was released on 2015-01-01 with total page 262 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: I investigate whether equity grants increase the costs of CEO dismissal or departure (Oyer, 2004; Almazan and Suarez, 2003). I argue that costs of dismissal are increased because equity grants become exercisable upon forced departure. Equity grants can increase the costs of leaving because voluntarily departing CEOs forfeit equity compensation upon departure. I follow Rajgopal, Shevlin and Zamora (2006) in linking CEO equity compensation to a measure of labor market competition in a sample of S&P1500 companies from 1996 to 2010. I find that the intensity of labor market competition measured by a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index across industries and states affects equity grants and that the correlation is reversed in the penultimate year of forced CEO departure. This is consistent with the view that CEOs are concerned about being replaced in competitive labor markets and therefore demand more compensation that converts into severance pay. Conversely, when a dismissal is anticipated, I argue that CEOs are concerned about finding new employment and are then insured against a lack of outside opportunities. In addition, I conduct an empirical investigation of the relationship between stock options, restricted stock grants and other long-term compensation between 2001 and 2006. I argue that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act did not increase managerial accountability (see for example Cohen, Dey and Lys, 2005) and that new accounting rules did not increase accounting costs of stock options (see for example Hayes, Lemmon and Qiu, 2012). Instead, I suggest that the effective prohibition of executive loans from firms and brokers made it prohibitively costly for CEOs to exercise stock options. I find that stock options began to be replaced with other long-term compensation as early as 2004. CEOs began to accumulate vested but unexercised stock options. I do not find evidence that CEOs sold vested stock to raise funds.In the final empirical chapter, I consider whether a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index across industries and states can be interpreted as a proxy for labor market competition. Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) argue that it is product market competition that affects CEO equity grants. My results are consistent with Rajgopal, Shevlin and Zamora (2006) who do not find evidence that product market competition has any significant impact on equity grants. Instead, I find that labor market competition retains a significant and positive impact in our tests, and notably holds for the largest single product market. The principal limitations of the project were found to be the difficulty of collecting data of intended turnover and classifying it into forced and voluntary turnover. With respect to loans to executives, loans by brokers are usually not disclosed. This study is the first to analyze equity compensation as severance arrangement. CEO cash constraints in exercising options is an unexplored explanation for their disappearance.

Shareholders and managers as principal-agent hierarchies and cooperative teams

Author : Matthias Kiefer, PhD
Publisher : Matthias Kiefer
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 46 pages
Book Rating : 4./5 ( download)

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Book Synopsis Shareholders and managers as principal-agent hierarchies and cooperative teams by : Matthias Kiefer, PhD

Download or read book Shareholders and managers as principal-agent hierarchies and cooperative teams written by Matthias Kiefer, PhD and published by Matthias Kiefer. This book was released on 2017-02-01 with total page 46 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Purpose– Shareholders and managers can work in a hierarchy in which principals attempt to control the actions of agents to achieve the wealth objective. Alternatively, shareholders and managers can work together as a cooperative team in which shareholders provide financial capital and managers provide human capital. The authors aim to examine the different implications for value creation provided by the two approaches. Design/methodology/approach– By comparing the literature on the value implications of the incomplete contracting framework and control arrangements in principal-agent hierarchies, the authors identify deviations from optimal outcomes and suggest solutions. Findings– The review indicates that a cooperative framework has some advantages over the hierarchical model. The stability of human capital and the relationship between managers and shareholders can be enhanced when shareholders provide capital in increments which vest over time and latitude for renegotiation of agreements is built into contracts. Practical implications– By surrendering control using stock options programmes, managers are free to invest in relationship-specific assets. Shareholders can control the provision of capital by withdrawing investment if insufficient returns are realized, i.e. if stock options do not meet vesting requirements. The market can then be left to do its work. Originality/value– This paper provides an original review of literature on cooperation and hierarchies in the shareholder–manager relationship and proposes solutions to identified deviations from optimal outcomes. Keywords- Agency theory, Corporate governance, M&A, Executive compensation, Contracting theory, Share options policy

THREE STUDIES ON THE USE OF CEO EQUITY COMPENSATION

Author : JANG WOOK LEE
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 116 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (128 download)

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Book Synopsis THREE STUDIES ON THE USE OF CEO EQUITY COMPENSATION by : JANG WOOK LEE

Download or read book THREE STUDIES ON THE USE OF CEO EQUITY COMPENSATION written by JANG WOOK LEE and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page 116 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation contains three studies relating to executive equity compensation. In the first study (Chapter 2), I investigate whether firms adjust CEO's equity incentives in response to the firms' prior earnings management. I find that the risk-taking incentives from new equity grants are lower for firms with higher prior real earnings management (REM), but not for firms with higher accruals-based earnings management (AEM). My finding suggests that boards perceive the consequences of REM are more value-reducing than AEM and that they take stronger actions against REM by reducing the CEO's risk-taking incentives arising from equity incentives. In addition, I this result is driven by firms with higher institutional ownership, suggesting that institutional investors play an important monitoring role in structuring executive compensation contracts to limit the CEOs' value-reducing behaviors. In the second study (Chapter 3), I investigate how the firm's downside risk and upside potential differentially affect the choice between cash and equity compensation and the choice between stock options and restricted stock compensation. First, I find that, as downside risk (upside potential) increases, boards grant more cash compensation (more equity compensation) and less equity compensation (less cash compensation). This is consistent with the idea that, when downside risk increases, a CEO requires a higher risk premium for equity compensation and, thus, the board shifts compensation away from equity compensation to cash compensation. The reverse is true for the increased upside potential. When upside potential increases, the observed compensation contract will contain less cash and more equity compensation. Second, I find that the proportion of CEO option compensation increases with downside risk and decreases with upside potential. This is because, when downside risk increases, the probability of a stock option finishing out of the money (i.e., zero intrinsic value) increases but restricted stock has positive value as long as the stock price is positive. In contrast, when upside potential increases, because of stock options' leverage effect, a CEO will prefer stock options to restricted stock. In the third study (Chapter 4), I study how executive stock options differentially affect the firm's systematic and idiosyncratic risk by exploiting the passage of Financial Accounting Standard (FAS) 123R as an exogenous shock to CEO option compensation. I find that option-based compensation and the proportion of idiosyncratic risk in total risk is negatively associated. This is consistent with the idea that since, unlike risk-neutral investors, risk-averse CEOs have limited ability to eliminate firm specific idiosyncratic, idiosyncratic risk is unwanted by under-diversified CEOs. Thus, CEO option compensation creates incentives to increase the firm's systematic risk relative to the firm's idiosyncratic risk.

CEO Pay and Firm Performance

Author : Paul L. Joskow
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 56 pages
Book Rating : 4.3/5 ( download)

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Book Synopsis CEO Pay and Firm Performance by : Paul L. Joskow

Download or read book CEO Pay and Firm Performance written by Paul L. Joskow and published by . This book was released on 1994 with total page 56 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This study explores the dynamic structure of the pay-for- performance relationship in CEO compensation and quantifies the effect of introducing a more complex model of firm financial performance on the estimated performance sensitivity of executive pay. The results suggest that current compensation responds to past performance outcomes, but that the effect decays considerably within two years. This contrasts sharply with models of infinitely persistent performance effects implicitly assumed in much of the empirical compensation literature. We find that both accounting and market performance measures influence compensation and that the salary and bonus component of pay as well as total compensation have become more sensitive to firm financial performance over the past two decades. There is no evidence that boards fail to penalize CEOs for poor financial performance or reward them disproportionately well for good performance. Finally, the data suggest that boards may discount extreme performance outcomes -both high and low - relative to performance that lies within some `normal' band in setting compensation.

The structure of CEO pay : pay-for-luck and stock-options

Author : Pierre Chaigneau
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 33 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (815 download)

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Book Synopsis The structure of CEO pay : pay-for-luck and stock-options by : Pierre Chaigneau

Download or read book The structure of CEO pay : pay-for-luck and stock-options written by Pierre Chaigneau and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page 33 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Market Structure, Compensation and Incentives

Author : Marc Colin Charles Chopin
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 334 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (27 download)

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Book Synopsis Market Structure, Compensation and Incentives by : Marc Colin Charles Chopin

Download or read book Market Structure, Compensation and Incentives written by Marc Colin Charles Chopin and published by . This book was released on 1991 with total page 334 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Pay Equity in CEO Compensation and Agency Problems

Author : Jeongil Seo
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 180 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (89 download)

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Book Synopsis Pay Equity in CEO Compensation and Agency Problems by : Jeongil Seo

Download or read book Pay Equity in CEO Compensation and Agency Problems written by Jeongil Seo and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page 180 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Anticipated Incentives in CEO Compensation Contracts

Author : Ian Michael Tarrant
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (11 download)

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Book Synopsis Anticipated Incentives in CEO Compensation Contracts by : Ian Michael Tarrant

Download or read book Anticipated Incentives in CEO Compensation Contracts written by Ian Michael Tarrant and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Extant empirical research has largely overlooked the incentives that arise when CEOs can reasonably anticipate future awards and liquidations of equity-based compensation. In this study, I use past patterns of stock and option awards, exercises, and sales to estimate future awards, exercises, and sales, which I argue are anticipated by the CEO and act as an important incentive. The anticipated incentives I estimate are large in magnitude and provide information that is incremental to the CEOs existing portfolio of equity incentives disclosed in the annual proxy statement. In empirical analyses, I find that anticipated incentives are negatively (positively) associated with proxies for real (accruals-based) earnings management even in the presence of existing measures of CEO incentives. My findings suggest that the ex ante measure of anticipated incentives introduced in this study captures a new source of information that is decision-relevant for CEOs but currently omitted from existing empirical proxies.

Recent Competitive Developments in U.S. Equity Markets

Author : James E. Shapiro
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 478 pages
Book Rating : 4.F/5 ( download)

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Book Synopsis Recent Competitive Developments in U.S. Equity Markets by : James E. Shapiro

Download or read book Recent Competitive Developments in U.S. Equity Markets written by James E. Shapiro and published by . This book was released on 1993 with total page 478 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Capital Choices

Author : Michael E. Porter
Publisher :
ISBN 13 : 9780071034272
Total Pages : pages
Book Rating : 4.0/5 (342 download)

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Book Synopsis Capital Choices by : Michael E. Porter

Download or read book Capital Choices written by Michael E. Porter and published by . This book was released on 1994-12-01 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

The Handbook of the Economics of Corporate Governance

Author : Benjamin Hermalin
Publisher : Elsevier
ISBN 13 : 0444635408
Total Pages : 762 pages
Book Rating : 4.4/5 (446 download)

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Book Synopsis The Handbook of the Economics of Corporate Governance by : Benjamin Hermalin

Download or read book The Handbook of the Economics of Corporate Governance written by Benjamin Hermalin and published by Elsevier. This book was released on 2017-09-18 with total page 762 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The Handbook of the Economics of Corporate Governance, Volume One, covers all issues important to economists. It is organized around fundamental principles, whereas multidisciplinary books on corporate governance often concentrate on specific topics. Specific topics include Relevant Theory and Methods, Organizational Economic Models as They Pertain to Governance, Managerial Career Concerns, Assessment & Monitoring, and Signal Jamming, The Institutions and Practice of Governance, The Law and Economics of Governance, Takeovers, Buyouts, and the Market for Control, Executive Compensation, Dominant Shareholders, and more. Providing excellent overviews and summaries of extant research, this book presents advanced students in graduate programs with details and perspectives that other books overlook. Concentrates on underlying principles that change little, even as the empirical literature moves on Helps readers see corporate governance systems as interrelated or even intertwined external (country-level) and internal (firm-level) forces Reviews the methodological tools of the field (theory and empirical), the most relevant models, and the field’s substantive findings, all of which help point the way forward

journal of financial economics

Author :
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 806 pages
Book Rating : 4./5 ( download)

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Book Synopsis journal of financial economics by :

Download or read book journal of financial economics written by and published by . This book was released on 1995 with total page 806 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

International Corporate Governance

Author : Kose John
Publisher : Emerald Group Publishing
ISBN 13 : 0857249150
Total Pages : 210 pages
Book Rating : 4.8/5 (572 download)

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Book Synopsis International Corporate Governance by : Kose John

Download or read book International Corporate Governance written by Kose John and published by Emerald Group Publishing. This book was released on 2011-03-31 with total page 210 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Presents research on corporate governance from a number of countries across the world, including the United States, Spain, Malaysia, Israel and others. This title examines many important corporate governance mechanisms, such as board characteristics, ownership structure, legal protection of shareholders, and annual general meetings.

Pay Without Performance

Author : Lucian A. Bebchuk
Publisher : Harvard University Press
ISBN 13 : 9780674020634
Total Pages : 308 pages
Book Rating : 4.0/5 (26 download)

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Book Synopsis Pay Without Performance by : Lucian A. Bebchuk

Download or read book Pay Without Performance written by Lucian A. Bebchuk and published by Harvard University Press. This book was released on 2004 with total page 308 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The company is under-performing, its share price is trailing, and the CEO gets...a multi-million-dollar raise. This story is familiar, for good reason: as this book clearly demonstrates, structural flaws in corporate governance have produced widespread distortions in executive pay. Pay without Performance presents a disconcerting portrait of managers' influence over their own pay--and of a governance system that must fundamentally change if firms are to be managed in the interest of shareholders. Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried demonstrate that corporate boards have persistently failed to negotiate at arm's length with the executives they are meant to oversee. They give a richly detailed account of how pay practices--from option plans to retirement benefits--have decoupled compensation from performance and have camouflaged both the amount and performance-insensitivity of pay. Executives' unwonted influence over their compensation has hurt shareholders by increasing pay levels and, even more importantly, by leading to practices that dilute and distort managers' incentives. This book identifies basic problems with our current reliance on boards as guardians of shareholder interests. And the solution, the authors argue, is not merely to make these boards more independent of executives as recent reforms attempt to do. Rather, boards should also be made more dependent on shareholders by eliminating the arrangements that entrench directors and insulate them from their shareholders. A powerful critique of executive compensation and corporate governance, Pay without Performance points the way to restoring corporate integrity and improving corporate performance.

The Recurrent Crisis in Corporate Governance

Author : Paul W. MacAvoy
Publisher : Stanford University Press
ISBN 13 : 9780804750868
Total Pages : 196 pages
Book Rating : 4.7/5 (58 download)

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Book Synopsis The Recurrent Crisis in Corporate Governance by : Paul W. MacAvoy

Download or read book The Recurrent Crisis in Corporate Governance written by Paul W. MacAvoy and published by Stanford University Press. This book was released on 2004 with total page 196 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Taking a close look at American corporate governance, the authors show what is missing in today's corporate governance, and support a case for activating the board of directors to put new controls on management and take responsibility for the result.

Management Science

Author :
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 650 pages
Book Rating : 4.3/5 (91 download)

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Book Synopsis Management Science by :

Download or read book Management Science written by and published by . This book was released on 2002 with total page 650 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Issues for Feb. 1965-Aug. 1967 include Bulletin of the Institute of Management Sciences.

Executive Compensation and Shareholder Value

Author : Jennifer Carpenter
Publisher : Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN 13 : 1475751923
Total Pages : 159 pages
Book Rating : 4.4/5 (757 download)

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Book Synopsis Executive Compensation and Shareholder Value by : Jennifer Carpenter

Download or read book Executive Compensation and Shareholder Value written by Jennifer Carpenter and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2013-04-17 with total page 159 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Executive compensation has gained widespread public attention in recent years, with the pay of top U.S. executives reaching unprecedented levels compared either with past levels, with the remuneration of top executives in other countries, or with the wages and salaries of typical employees. The extraordinary levels of executive compensation have been achieved at a time when U.S. public companies have realized substantial gains in stock market value. Many have cited this as evidence that U.S. executive compensation works well, rewarding managers who make difficult decisions that lead to higher shareholder values, while others have argued that the overly generous salaries and benefits bear little relation to company performance. Recent conceptual and empirical research permits for the first time a truly rigorous debate on these and related issues, which is the subject of this volume.