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A Model Of Endogenous Payoff Motives And Endogenous Timing In A Mixed Duopoly
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Book Synopsis A Model of Endogenous Payoff Motives and Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly by : Kangsik Choi
Download or read book A Model of Endogenous Payoff Motives and Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly written by Kangsik Choi and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A model of endogenous payoff motives and endogenous order of moves is analysed in a mixed duopoly. We find that, when a non-negative price constraint is imposed on public and private firms' quantity choice, both firms always choose to be relative-payoff-maximisers, and both simultaneous move and sequential move can be sustained in equilibrium. In contrast, when non-negative absolute profit constraint is imposed, public and private firms always choose to be absolute-payoff-maximisers, and only sequential move can be sustained in equilibrium.
Book Synopsis Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly with Endogenous Vertical Differentiation by : Lin Liu
Download or read book Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly with Endogenous Vertical Differentiation written by Lin Liu and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We consider a game of endogenous timing with observable delay in a mixed duopoly with endogenous vertical differentiation in the context of sequential quality and price choice. We find that a simultaneous play in the first opportunity at each stage turns out to be the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, which contrasts with the endogenous timing in a purely private duopoly.
Book Synopsis Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly with Capacity Choice by : Juan Carlos Barcena Ruiz
Download or read book Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly with Capacity Choice written by Juan Carlos Barcena Ruiz and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: An endogenous order of moves is analyzed in a mixed duopoly where firms first strategically choose their capacity levels and then compete at price level. In equilibrium, firms are shown to set prices simultaneously while capacities are chosen sequentially. This result is in contrast to the assumption of simultaneous order of moves for capacities choice made by Bárcena-Ruiz and Garzón (Economics Bulletin, Vol. 12 (2007), pp. 1-7) in a mixed duopoly. Besides, we find that there are two equilibria: in one of them the public firm is the leader in capacities and, in the other, the follower.
Book Synopsis Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly and Private Duopoly - 'Capacity-then-Quantity' Game by : Yuanzhu Lu
Download or read book Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly and Private Duopoly - 'Capacity-then-Quantity' Game written by Yuanzhu Lu and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We consider a game of endogenous timing of sequential choice of capacity and quantity with observable delay in a mixed duopoly and a private duopoly. In mixed duopoly, we find that a simultaneous play at the capacity stage or at the quantity stage can never be supported as subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE); whereas a simultaneous play at each stage turns out to be the unique SPNE in a private duopoly. In mixed duopoly there is multiplicity of equilibria and all SPNEs require sequentiality at the capacity as well as quantity stage.
Book Synopsis Endogenous Timing in a Duopoly Model with Incomplete Information by : Hans-Theo Normann
Download or read book Endogenous Timing in a Duopoly Model with Incomplete Information written by Hans-Theo Normann and published by . This book was released on 1996 with total page 56 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Endogenous Timing in Mixed Duopolies with Externality by : Toshihiro Matsumura
Download or read book Endogenous Timing in Mixed Duopolies with Externality written by Toshihiro Matsumura and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We investigate endogenous timing in a mixed duopoly with a negative externality. We find that quantity (price) competition yields a simultaneous-move (sequential-move) outcome under a significant negative externality. These results indicate that mixed duopolies yield the same results as private duopolies under a significant negative externality, which is in sharp contrast to the results in mixed duopolies without a negative externality. Unless the negative externality is insignificant, public leadership yields greater welfare than private leadership, and public leadership is more robust than the private leadership as equilibrium. If optimal environmental tax policy is introduced, however, private leadership yields the greatest welfare and this an equilibrium outcome in the endogenous timing game under quantity competition.
Book Synopsis Endogenous Timing in a Duopoly Model with Incomplet Informationa by : Hans-Theo Normann
Download or read book Endogenous Timing in a Duopoly Model with Incomplet Informationa written by Hans-Theo Normann and published by . This book was released on 1996 with total page 36 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Endogenous Timing in a Duopoly Model with Incomplete Formation by : Hans-Theo Normann
Download or read book Endogenous Timing in a Duopoly Model with Incomplete Formation written by Hans-Theo Normann and published by . This book was released on 1996 with total page 36 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Endougenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly by : Rabah Amir
Download or read book Endougenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly written by Rabah Amir and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 34 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper applies the framework of endogenous timing in games to mixed quantity duopoly, wherein a private - domestic or foreign - firm competes with a public, welfare maximizing firm. We show that simultaneous play never emerges as a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the extended game, in sharp contrast to private duopoly games. We provide sufficient conditions for the emergence of public and/or private leadership equilibrium. In all cases, private profits and social welfare are higher than under the corresponding Cournot equilibrium. From a methodological viewpoint we make extensive use of the basic results from the theory of supermodular games in order to avoid common extraneous assumptions such as concavity, existence and uniqueness of the different equilibria, whenever possible. Some policy implications are drawn, in particular those relating to the merits of privatization.
Book Synopsis Endogenous Timing in Multi-stage Duopoly Games by : Toshihiro Matsumura
Download or read book Endogenous Timing in Multi-stage Duopoly Games written by Toshihiro Matsumura and published by . This book was released on 1994 with total page 16 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Endogenous Timing in Duopoly: Experimental Evidence by : Miguel A. Fonseca
Download or read book Endogenous Timing in Duopoly: Experimental Evidence written by Miguel A. Fonseca and published by . This book was released on 2005 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Endogenous Timing in Cournot Duopoly by : Toshihiro Matsumura
Download or read book Endogenous Timing in Cournot Duopoly written by Toshihiro Matsumura and published by . This book was released on 1994 with total page 26 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Making Sense of the Experimental Evidence on Endogenous Timing in Duopoly Markets by : Luís Santos-Pinto
Download or read book Making Sense of the Experimental Evidence on Endogenous Timing in Duopoly Markets written by Luís Santos-Pinto and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page 30 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The prediction of asymmetric equilibria with Stackelberg outcomes is clearly the most frequent result in the endogenous timing literature. Several experiments have tried to validate this prediction empirically, but failed to find support for it. By contrast, the experiments find that simultaneous-move outcomes are modal and that behavior in endogenous timing games is quite heterogeneous. This paper generalizes Saloner's (1987) and Hamilton and Slutsky's (1990) endogenous timing games by assuming that players are averse to inequality in payoffs. We explore the theoretical implications of inequity aversion and compare them to the empirical evidence. We find that this explanation is able to organize most of the experimental evidence on endogenous timing games. However, inequity aversion is not able to explain delay in Hamilton and Slutsky's endogenous timing games.
Book Synopsis A Two-stage Price-setting Duopoly with Endogenous Timing by : Toshihiro Matsumura
Download or read book A Two-stage Price-setting Duopoly with Endogenous Timing written by Toshihiro Matsumura and published by . This book was released on 1994 with total page 23 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games by : John C. Harsanyi
Download or read book A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games written by John C. Harsanyi and published by Mit Press. This book was released on 1988 with total page 378 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The authors, two of the most prominent game theorists of this generation, have devoted a number of years to the development of the theory presented here, and to its economic applications. They propose rational criteria for selecting one particular uniformly perfect equilibrium point as the solution of any noncooperative game. And, because any cooperative game can be remodelled as a noncooperative bargaining game, their theory defines a one-point solution for any cooperative game as well.By providing solutions - based on the same principles of rational behavior - for all classes of games, both cooperative and noncooperative, both those with complete and with incomplete information, Harsanyi and Selten's approach achieves a remarkable degree of theoretical unification for game theory as a whole and provides a deeper insight into the nature of game-theoretic rationality.The book applies this theory to a number of specific game classes, such as unanimity games; bargaining with transaction costs; trade involving one seller and several buyers; two-person bargaining with incomplete information on one side, and on both sides. The last chapter discusses the relationship of the authors' theory to other recently proposed solution concepts, particularly the Kohberg-Mertens stability theory.John C. Harsanyi is Flood Research Professor in Business Administration and Professor of Economics, University of California, Berkeley. Reinhard Selten is Professor of Economics Institute of Social and Economic Sciences: University of Bonn, Federal Republic of Germany.
Book Synopsis Differential Games in Economics and Management Science by : Engelbert Dockner
Download or read book Differential Games in Economics and Management Science written by Engelbert Dockner and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2000-11-16 with total page 398 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A comprehensive, self-contained survey of the theory and applications of differential games, one of the most commonly used tools for modelling and analysing economics and management problems which are characterised by both multiperiod and strategic decision making. Although no prior knowledge of game theory is required, a basic knowledge of linear algebra, ordinary differential equations, mathematical programming and probability theory is necessary. Part One presents the theory of differential games, starting with the basic concepts of game theory and going on to cover control theoretic models, Markovian equilibria with simultaneous play, differential games with hierarchical play, trigger strategy equilibria, differential games with special structures, and stochastic differential games. Part Two offers applications to capital accumulation games, industrial organization and oligopoly games, marketing, resources and environmental economics.
Book Synopsis Partition Function Form Games by : László Á. Kóczy
Download or read book Partition Function Form Games written by László Á. Kóczy and published by Springer. This book was released on 2018-04-13 with total page 320 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book presents a systematic overview on partition function form games: a game form in cooperative game theory to integrate externalities for various applications. Cooperative game theory has been immensely useful to study a wide range of issues, but the standard approaches ignore the side effects of cooperation. Recently interest shifted to problems where externalities play the main roles such as models of cooperation in market competition or the shared use of public resources. Such problems require richer models that can explicitly evaluate the side-effects of cooperation. In partition function form games the value of cooperation depends on the outsiders' actions. A recent surge of interest driven by applications has made results very fragmented. This book offers an accessible, yet comprehensive and systematic study of properties, solutions and applications of partition function games surveying both theoretical results and their applications. It assembles a survey of existing research and smaller original results as well as original interpretations and comparisons. The book is self-contained and accessible for readers with little or no knowledge of cooperative game theory.
