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Author : Jin-Soo Yoo
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 198 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (33 download)
Download or read book Three Essays on Dynamic Games in Industrial Organization written by Jin-Soo Yoo and published by . This book was released on 1990 with total page 198 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Hyung Bae
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 374 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (89 download)
Download or read book Three Essays in Industrial Organization Theory written by Hyung Bae and published by . This book was released on 1985 with total page 374 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Fanyin Zheng
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (914 download)
Download or read book Essays in Industrial Organization and Econometrics written by Fanyin Zheng and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation consists of three essays, two on estimating dynamic entry games and one on the inference for misspecified models with fixed regressors.
Author : Asaf Plan
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 70 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (769 download)
Download or read book Three Essays on Dynamic Games written by Asaf Plan and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 70 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Chapter 1: This chapter considers a new class of dynamic, two-player games, where a stage game is continuously repeated but each player can only move at random times that she privately observes. A player's move is an adjustment of her action in the stage game, for example, a duopolist's change of price. Each move is perfectly observed by both players, but a foregone opportunity to move, like a choice to leave one's price unchanged, would not be directly observed by the other player. Some adjustments may be constrained in equilibrium by moral hazard, no matter how patient the players are. For example, a duopolist would not jump up to the monopoly price absent costly incentives. These incentives are provided by strategies that condition on the random waiting times between moves; punishing a player for moving slowly, lest she silently choose not to move. In contrast, if the players are patient enough to maintain the status quo, perhaps the monopoly price, then doing so does not require costly incentives. Deviation from the status quo would be perfectly observed, so punishment need not occur on the equilibrium path. Similarly, moves like jointly optimal price reductions do not require costly incentives. Again, the tempting deviation, to a larger price reduction, would be perfectly observed. This chapter provides a recursive framework for analyzing these games following Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1990) and the continuous time adaptation of Sannikov (2007). For a class of stage games with monotone public spillovers, like differentiated-product duopoly, I prove that optimal equilibria have three features corresponding to the discussion above: beginning at a "low" position, optimal, upward moves are impeded by moral hazard; beginning at a "high" position, optimal, downward moves are unimpeded by moral hazard; beginning at an intermediate position, optimally maintaining the status quo is similarly unimpeded. Corresponding cooperative dynamics are suggested in the older, non-game-theoretic literature on tacit collusion. Chapter 2: This chapter shows that in finite-horizon games of a certain class, small perturbations of the overall payoff function may yield large changes to unique equilibrium payoffs in periods far from the last. Such perturbations may tie together cooperation across periods in equilibrium, allowing substantial cooperation to accumulate in periods far from the last. Chapter 3: A dynamic choice problem faced by a time-inconsistent individual is typically modeled as a game played by a sequence of her temporal selves, solved by SPNE. It is recognized that this approach yields troublesomely many solutions for infinite-horizon problems, which is often attributed to the existence of implausible equilibria based on self-reward and punishment. This chapter presents a refinement applicable within the special class of strategically constant (SC) problems, which are those where all continuation problems are isomorphic. The refinement requires that each self's strategy be invariant, here that implies history-independence under the isomorphism. I argue that within the class of SC problems, this refinement does little more than rule out self-reward and punishment. The refinement substantially narrows down the set of equilibria in SC problems, but in some cases allows plausible equilibria that are excluded by other refinement approaches. The SC class is limited, but broader than it might seem at first.
Author : Ngo Van Long
Publisher : World Scientific
ISBN 13 : 981446595X
Total Pages : 290 pages
Book Rating : 4.8/5 (144 download)
Download or read book A Survey Of Dynamic Games In Economics written by Ngo Van Long and published by World Scientific. This book was released on 2010-09-23 with total page 290 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book provides readers with a comprehensive survey of models of dynamic games in economics, including an extensive coverage of numerous fields of applications. It will also discuss and explain main concepts and techniques used in dynamic games, and inform readers of its major developments while equipping them with tools and ideas that will aid in the formulation of solutions for problems. A Survey of Dynamic Games in Economics will interest those who wish to study more about the conceptions, approaches and models that are applied in the domain of dynamic games.
Author : Justin Kai-Jen Ho
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 264 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (657 download)
Download or read book Essays on Industrial Organization and Game Theory written by Justin Kai-Jen Ho and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 264 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Our simulations indicate that their choices of which contracts to offer are profit-maximizing. However, many retailers prefer to utilize linear pricing contracts even when our model indicates that this may not be profit-maximizing. The third chapter incorporates positive feedback reciprocity in a repeated moral hazard game In this environment, buyers observe feedback left for them before reporting feedback to the mechanism. Buyer feedback reports depend jointly on feedback received and the actual outcome of the transaction. Reciprocal preferences influence buyers and lead to inaccurate feedback reports that deviate from actual outcomes. Contrary to intuition, inaccurate feedback does not always harm equilibrium payoffs. If the feedback remains sufficiently informative, positive reciprocity increases the efficiency of the mechanism by reducing the amount of punishment that occurs in equilibrium.
Author : John M. Gale
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 396 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (89 download)
Download or read book Three Essays in Industrial Organization written by John M. Gale and published by . This book was released on 1997 with total page 396 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Victor Aguirregabiria
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 0 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (127 download)
Download or read book Dynamic Games in Empirical Industrial Organization written by Victor Aguirregabiria and published by . This book was released on 2021 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This survey is organized around three main topics: models, econometrics, and empirical applications. Section 2 presents the theoretical framework, introduces the concept of Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium, discusses existence and multiplicity, and describes the representation of this equilibrium in terms of conditional choice probabilities. We also discuss extensions of the basic framework, including models in continuous time, the concepts of oblivious equilibrium and experience-based equilibrium, and dynamic games where firms have non-equilibrium beliefs. In section 3, we first provide an overview of the types of data used in this literature, before turning to a discussion of identification issues and results, and estimation methods. We review different methods to deal with multiple equilibria and large state spaces. We also describe recent developments for estimating games in continuous time and incorporating serially correlated unobservables, and discuss the use of machine learning methods to solving and estimating dynamic games. Section 4 discusses empirical applications of dynamic games in IO. We start describing the first empirical applications in this literature during the early 2000s. Then, we review recent applications dealing with innovation, antitrust and mergers, dynamic pricing, regulation, product repositioning, advertising, uncertainty and investment, airline network competition, dynamic matching, and natural resources. We conclude with our view of the progress made in this literature and the remaining challenges.
Author : Thomas G. Wollmann
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (914 download)
Download or read book Essays on Industrial Organization written by Thomas G. Wollmann and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation comprises three essays on industrial organization. The first essay studies how product-level entry and exit decisions impact business and public policy analysis. It provides an empirical model that incorporates these decisions and then estimates it in the context of the commercial vehicle segment of the US automotive industry. Finally, it demonstrates the importance of accounting for product-level changes using the $85 billion decision to rescue two US automakers in 2009. The second essay studies how two period strategies perform relative to Markov perfect strategies in discrete dynamic games. In particular, it considers a simple entry/exit game and shows that agents sacrifice very little in terms of expected discounted payoffs when they employ these simpler strategies. It also shows this result is robust to varying the underlying market characteristics. The third essay estimates the causal impact of research expenditures on scientific output. Unexpected college football outcomes provide exogenous variation to university funds, and in turn, research expenditures in the subsequent year. Using this variation, it estimates the dollar elasticity of scholarly articles, new patent applications, and the citations that accrue to each.
Author : Di Pei (Ph. D.)
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 189 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (15 download)
Download or read book Essays on Dynamic Games and Reputations written by Di Pei (Ph. D.) and published by . This book was released on 2018 with total page 189 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This thesis consists of three essays on dynamic games with incomplete information. In Chapter 1, I study reputation effects when individuals have persistent private information that matters for their opponents' payoffs. I examine a repeated game between a patient informed player and a sequence of myopic uninformed players. The informed player privately observes a persistent state, and is either a strategic type who can flexibly choose his actions or is one of the several commitment types that mechanically plays the same action in every period. Unlike the canonical models on reputation effects, the uninformed players' payoffs depend on the state. This interdependence of values introduces new challenges to reputation building, namely, the informed player could face a tradeo between establishing a reputation for commitment and signaling favorable information about the state. My results address the predictions on the informed player's payoff and behavior that apply across all Nash equilibria. When the stage game payoffs satisfy a monotone-supermodularity condition, I show that the informed long-run player can overcome the lack-of-commitment problem and secure a high payoff in every state and in every equilibrium. Under a condition on the distribution over states, he will play the same action in every period and maintain his reputation for commitment in every equilibrium. If the payoff structure is unrestricted and the probability of commitment types is small, then the informed player's return to reputation building can be low and can provide a strict incentive to abandon his reputation. In Chapter 2, I study the dynamics of an agent's reputation for competence when the labor market's information about his performance is disclosed by an intermediary who cannot commit. I show that this game admits a unique Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE). When the agent is patient, his effort is inverse U-shaped, while the rate of information disclosure is decreasing over time. I illustrate the inefficiencies of the unique MPE by comparing it with the equilibrium in the benchmark scenario where the market automatically observes all breakthroughs. I characterize a tractable subclass of non-Markov Equilibria and explain why allowing players to coordinate on payoff-irrelevant events can improve eciency on top of the unique MPE and the exogenous information benchmark. When the intermediary can commit, her optimal Markov disclosure policy has a deadline, after which no breakthrough will be disclosed. However, deadlines are not incentive compatible in the game without commitment, illustrating a time inconsistency problem faced by the intermediary. My model can be applied to professional service industries, such as law and consulting. My results provide an explanation to the observed wage and promotion patterns in Baker, Gibbs and Holmström (1994). In Chapter 3, I study repeated games in which a patient long-run player (e.g. a rm) wishes to win the trust of some myopic opponents (e.g. a sequence or a continuum of consumers) but has a strict incentive to betray them. Her benet from betrayal is persistent over time and is her private information. I examine the extent to which persistent private information can overcome this lack-of-commitment problem. My main result characterizes the set of payoffs a patient long-run player can attain in equilibrium. Interestingly, every type's highest equilibrium payoff only depends on her true benet from betrayal and the lowest possible benet in the support of her opponents' prior belief. When this lowest possible benet vanishes, every type can approximately attain her Stackelberg commitment payoff. My finding provides a strategic foundation for the (mixed) Stackelberg commitment types in the reputation models, both in terms of the highest attainable payoff and in terms of the commitment behaviors. Compared to the existing approaches that rely on the existence of crazy types that are either irrational or have drastically dierent preferences, there is common knowledge of rationality in my model, and moreover, players' ordinal preferences over stage game outcomes are common knowledge.
Author : Juan Escobar
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 130 pages
Book Rating : 4.F/5 ( download)
Download or read book Essays in Dynamic Games written by Juan Escobar and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 130 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Limin Fang
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (133 download)
Download or read book Three Essays in Industrial Organization written by Limin Fang and published by . This book was released on 2018 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: My thesis includes three chapters that examine the dynamics of competition in the retail industry. Chapter One of the thesis demonstrates that online review platforms help consumers learn faster about product quality and improve consumer welfare as a result. To examine this, I use a novel dataset containing the universe of full-service restaurants in Texas, consumer search interest on major online review platforms and their online review information. I illustrate that online review platforms' effects on learning show up in restaurant revenues and survival probabilities. Specifically, doubling consumers' exposure to Yelp, the dominant platform, increases the revenue of a high-quality new independent restaurant by 8-20% and decreases that of a low-quality restaurant by about the same amount. Doubling Yelp exposure also raises the survival rate of a new high-quality independent restaurant by 7-19 basis points and reduces that of a low-quality restaurant by a similar level. Other platforms, especially Google, have similar effects but in smaller magnitude. In contrast, online platforms do not affect the revenues or survival rates of chains and old independent restaurants. Counterfactual analysis based on a structural demand model with consumer learning shows that online review platforms speed up the learning process by 0.5 to 2.5 years, increase consumer welfare by 5.4% and the total industry revenue by 5.9% during the period of 2005-2015. Chapters Two and Three deal with the entry and exit dynamics of the retail industry, in particular, how chain retailers can pre-empt the entry of competitors by densely packing a geographic area with their outlets. Chapter Two develops a measure for preemptive motives in dynamic oligopoly games with entry and exit, and applies the measure in both theoretical and empirical studies. Chapter Three uses this measure in the fast casual dining industry in Texas to investigate if there is a trade-off between preemptive entry and survival of firms. The results show that under some conditions, preemption in fact helps the incumbent firm survive, while in other cases, preemption harms survival.
Author : Benjamin Shiller
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 139 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (793 download)
Download or read book Three Essays in Empirical Industrial Organization written by Benjamin Shiller and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page 139 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Ruitian Lang
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 161 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (89 download)
Download or read book Essays on Dynamic Games and Mechanism Design written by Ruitian Lang and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 161 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The dissertation considers three topics in dynamic games and mechanism design. In both problems, asymmetric information causes inefficiency in production and allocation. The first chapter considers the inefficiency from the principal's inability to observes the agent's effort or cost of effort, and explores its implication to the principal's response to the combination of the output and the signal about the cost of effort. For example, the principal may punish the agent more harshly for low output when signals suggest that cost of effort is high when the effort is of high value for the principal. This chapter also classifies the long-run behavior of the relationship between the principal and the agent. Depending on whether the agent is strictly risk-averse and whether he is protected by limited liability, the state of the relationship may or may not converge to a stationary state and the stationary state may nor may not depend on the initial condition. The second chapter considers the re-allocation of assets among entrepreneurs with different matching qualities, which contributes to the growth of the whole economy. Due to reasons that are not explicitly modeled, assets are not automatically allocated to entrepreneurs who are best at operating them from the beginning, and this inefficiency is combined with inefficiency in the asset market and potential imperfection of labor contracting. When asset re-allocation can become a main source of economic growth, this chapter argues that imperfection in the labor contracting environment may boost the economic growth. The third chapter assumes that the agent's output is contractible but he can privately acquire more information about his cost of production prior to contracting. Compared to the optimal screening contract, the principal's contract in this case must not only induce the agent to "tell the truth", but also to give the agent the incentive to acquire appropriate amount of information. This may create distortion of allocation to the most efficient type and whether this happens is related to the marginal loss incurred by the principal from the cost of information acquisition.
Author : Alain Haurie
Publisher : Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN 13 : 0817645012
Total Pages : 421 pages
Book Rating : 4.8/5 (176 download)
Download or read book Advances in Dynamic Games written by Alain Haurie and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2007-04-03 with total page 421 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book, an outgrowth of the 10th International Symposium on Dynamic Games, presents current developments of the theory of dynamic games and its applications. The text uses dynamic game models to approach and solve problems pertaining to pursuit-evasion, marketing, finance, climate and environmental economics, resource exploitation, as well as auditing and tax evasions. It includes chapters on cooperative games, which are increasingly drawing dynamic approaches to their classical solutions.
Author : Tamer Basar
Publisher :
ISBN 13 : 9783319273358
Total Pages : pages
Book Rating : 4.2/5 (733 download)
Download or read book Handbook of Dynamic Game Theory written by Tamer Basar and published by . This book was released on 19?? with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Résumé : "This will be a two-part handbook on Dynamic Game Theory and part of the Springer Reference program. Part I will be on the fundamentals and theory of dynamic games. It will serve as a quick reference and a source of detailed exposure to topics in dynamic games for a broad community of researchers, educators, practitioners, and students. Each topic will be covered in 2-3 chapters with one introducing basic theory and the other one or two covering recent advances and/or special topics. Part II will be on applications in fields such as economics, management science, engineering, biology, and the social sciences."
Author : Yaroslav Kryukov
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 186 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (951 download)
Download or read book Dynamic Games in Industrial Organization written by Yaroslav Kryukov and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 186 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
