Three Essays On Corporate Debt And Ceo Compensation

Author : Patrick Bernard Washington
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 138 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (951 download)

DOWNLOAD NOW!

Download or read book Essays on Corporate Governance and Executive Compensation written by Patrick Bernard Washington and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page 138 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation is composed of three essays that study the interconnections between blockholders and CEO power, and the link between deferred compensation (inside debt) and financial performance/firm behavior. In the first chapter, I consider agency theory's prediction that a large shareholder, "blockholder," can serve as an effective governance mechanism when monitoring man- agers by reducing CEO dominance. However, not all blockholders are created equally. Inside blockholders with large equity stakes may be subject to CEO influence. Outside blockholders may not fear the same career concerns. Using a novel approach, I sepa- rate blockholders into insiders (officers & directors) and outsiders when considering their relationship to CEO power, which is proxied by the CEO Pay Slice (CPS). However, separating blockholders into outside and officer specifications reveals that director block- holders reduce CEO power. Economic theory suggests that firms with multiple classes of shares have weak governance structures. A significant difference in CEO dominance inside dual class share firms versus single class share firms has been documented. This paper expounds on previous research and shed's light on the effect of insiders' differential shareholder rights in dual class share firms. Evidence is provided that shows as insiders' percentage of voting rights increase then CEO power (CPS) decreases. Also, the results reveal that as insiders' percentage of cash flow rights increase then CEO power (CPS) increases. In the second chapter, I study recent literature's documentation that inside debt is widely used in executive compensation contracts. Prior research has only focused on the CEO's level of inside debt. However, the inner workings of the top executive team, and their importance for firm performance are difficult to observe and measure. In this essay, I aim to contribute to the subject by introducing new measures pertaining to the rela- tionship between the CEO and the other members of the top executive team, as well as studying the relation between these measures and the value, performance, and behavior of public firms. My novel measure is the Slice of CEO Inside Debt (SCID) -- the frac- tion of the aggregate deferred compensation (inside debt) of the top-five executive team captured by the CEO. The effects of total deferred compensation account balances, firm contributions, executive contributions, and earnings on deferred compensation accounts are examined with respect to SCID. This research provides evidence of increased CEO tenure (entrenchment) in relation to the earnings measure of SCID, reduced spending on research and development in relation to the earnings measure of SCID, increased spend- ing on capital expenditures in relation to the executive contributions measure of SCID, and a lower probability of bankruptcy in relation to the executive contributions measure of SCID. Also, this paper shows that as the CEO's slice of deferred compensation from firm contributions and executive contributions increases then firm liquidity, i.e. working capital, decreases. In the final chapter, I consider prior research that has shown firms with CEOs who have less power take less risk. Thus, theory suggests that reducing CEO power through the use of deferred compensation, "inside debt," should motivate executives to become more risk averse. This essay investigates the relationship between the Slice of CEO Inside- Debt (SCID) — the fraction of the aggregate deferred compensation (inside debt) of the top-five executive team captured by the CEO — and CEO power (CPS--CEO Pay Slice) and corporate social responsibility (CSR). The effects of firm contributions, executive contributions, and earnings on deferred compensation accounts are examined with respect to SCID in relation to CPS and CSR. This research provides evidence of increased CEO power by showing that firms with CEOs who contribute more money to their deferred compensation accounts relative to the total amount deferred by the top five executives, including the CEO, have CEOs with greater power in the following year. Additionally, this essay studies firms use of inside debt and its effect on corporate social responsibility. Empirical evidence is provided that firms with CEOs who experience increased earnings on their deferred compensation accounts relative to the account earnings of top five executives are positively correlated with being more socially responsible.