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Three Essays On Collusion In English Auctions
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Book Synopsis Three Essays on Collusion in English Auctions by : Uma Kaplan
Download or read book Three Essays on Collusion in English Auctions written by Uma Kaplan and published by . This book was released on 2018 with total page 109 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This thesis is composed of three chapters that examine topics related to collusion in English auctions. In the first chapter, we develop a fully nonparametric identification framework and a test of collusion in ascending bid auctions. Assuming efficient collusion, we show that the underlying distributions of values can be identified despite collusive behavior when there is at least one known competitive bidder. We propose a nonparametric estimation procedure for the distributions of values and a bootstrap test of the null hypothesis of competitive behavior against the alternative of collusion. In the second chapter, we adopt a copula-based approach to identification. We succeed in showing that joint distribution function of private valuations is identifiable under certain conditions. Finally, we propose a semiparametric strategy, based on Archimedean copulas, to identify and estimate the model primitives and analyze the dependence relation between bids in English auctions. One advantage this approach has is that it allows us to separate the estimation of the marginal distribution from the estimation of the joint distribution of underlying bidder values. The third chapter is an empirical study of the municipal GIC auctions, motivated by the theoretical frameworks developed in the first two chapters.
Book Synopsis Essays on the Economics of Collusion by : Chaohai Shen
Download or read book Essays on the Economics of Collusion written by Chaohai Shen and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The present dissertation consists of three essays on the economics of collusion. The first essay examines bidding in U.S. Forest Service first price timber auctions in the Northern Region, where the potential for collusive bidding has been recognized. I modify the empirical methods in Porter and Zona (1993) and find a group of potentially cooperative (PC) bidders, who can submit complementary bids. Benefiting from a striking feature of data, where sealed bid auctions and ascending bid auctions were used side by side, I find further corroboration for my findings by analyzing PC bidders bids in ascending bid auctions.The second essay, joint with Shigeki Isogai, follows the empirical regularity noted by Marshall and Marx (2015). We present a reputation model in which a long-lived multi-product firm that is sequentially engaged in explicit collusion with short-lived single product firms can exploit the cartel leniency policy offered byantitrust enforcement authorities. The long-lived firm may have incentive to seek leniency to build and protect its reputation as a tough firm, who never tolerates any deviant conduct. This may help the long-lived firm deter deviations in the cartels. Our model provides a new insight on cartel firms incentive to report their own cartel, a potential counterproductive effect of the leniency policy, and important policy implications to the design of the amnesty program.The third essay analyzes the effect of an antitrust leniency program on the decision to merge or, alternatively, explicitly collude. Buyers use procurements but the procurement will be re-conducted when the buyer is dissatisfied with the bids of the incumbent sellers or a cartel is discovered. Additionally, production costs ofthe sellers may change in each round of the procurement. If the production cost states in the first round are unprofitable, the sellers may switch to the re-conducted procurement by reporting the existence of the cartel and committing to act noncollusively through leniency applications. Thus, sellers that were indifferent between merging and forming a cartel with no leniency program may prefer colluding in the first round procurement in the presence of a leniency program. So a leniency program may induce both more discovery of cartels as well as more cartel formation.
Book Synopsis Three Essays on Auctions and Bargaining by : Yumiko Baba
Download or read book Three Essays on Auctions and Bargaining written by Yumiko Baba and published by . This book was released on 1997 with total page 214 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Befreiung zum Widerstand : Aufsatze uber Feminismus, Psychoanalyse und Politik by :
Download or read book Befreiung zum Widerstand : Aufsatze uber Feminismus, Psychoanalyse und Politik written by and published by . This book was released on 1987 with total page 304 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Collusion, Reputation and Communication, Three Essays in Economic Theory by : Alfredo Marcos Kofman
Download or read book Collusion, Reputation and Communication, Three Essays in Economic Theory written by Alfredo Marcos Kofman and published by . This book was released on 1990 with total page 470 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis The Evolution of Collusion by : Paolo Lupi
Download or read book The Evolution of Collusion written by Paolo Lupi and published by . This book was released on 2000 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Three Essays on Collusion by : Emanuel Holler
Download or read book Three Essays on Collusion written by Emanuel Holler and published by . This book was released on 2023 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Three Essays on Collusion by : Paul Johnson
Download or read book Three Essays on Collusion written by Paul Johnson and published by . This book was released on 1999 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Best Practices for Online Procurement Auctions by : Parente, Diane H.
Download or read book Best Practices for Online Procurement Auctions written by Parente, Diane H. and published by IGI Global. This book was released on 2007-12-31 with total page 402 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Offers a systematic approach to the examination of online procurement auctions. Growth in online auctions reinforces the need for understanding the factors important in auctions and the caveats that both researchers and practitioners need to know in order to effectively study and use the auction tool.
Book Synopsis Essays on Collusive Behavior in Auctions by : Jinkeun Yu
Download or read book Essays on Collusive Behavior in Auctions written by Jinkeun Yu and published by . This book was released on 1998 with total page 302 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Three Essays on Auctions and Innovations by : Thomas Giebe
Download or read book Three Essays on Auctions and Innovations written by Thomas Giebe and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 89 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Three Essays on Auctions and Innovation by : Thomas Giebe
Download or read book Three Essays on Auctions and Innovation written by Thomas Giebe and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Three Essays in the Theory of Auctions by : Jörg Nikutta
Download or read book Three Essays in the Theory of Auctions written by Jörg Nikutta and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page 99 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Identifying Collusion in English Auctions by : Vadim Marmer
Download or read book Identifying Collusion in English Auctions written by Vadim Marmer and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page 49 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We develop a fully nonparametric identification framework and a test of collusion in ascending bid auctions. Assuming efficient collusion, we show that the underlying distributions of values can be identified despite collusive behaviour when there is at least one bidder outside the cartel. We propose a nonparametric estimation procedure for the distributions of values and a bootstrap test of the null hypothesis of competitive behaviour against the alternative of collusion. Our framework allows for asymmetric bidders, and the test can be performed on individual bidders. The test is applied to the Guaranteed Investment Certificate auctions conducted by US municipalities over the Internet. Despite the fact that there have been allegations of collusion in this market, our test does not detect deviations from competition. A plausible explanation of this finding is that the Internet auction design involves very limited information disclosure.
Book Synopsis Three Essays on Auctions by : Itzhak Rasooly
Download or read book Three Essays on Auctions written by Itzhak Rasooly and published by . This book was released on 2022 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Collusion with Three Bidders at First-price Auctions by : Andrew Born
Download or read book Collusion with Three Bidders at First-price Auctions written by Andrew Born and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 94 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Bids as a Vehicle of (Mis)Information by : Marco Pagnozzi
Download or read book Bids as a Vehicle of (Mis)Information written by Marco Pagnozzi and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In an English auction, a bidder's strategy depends on the prices at which his competitors drop out, because these convey information on the value of the object on sale. A ring of colluding bidders can strategically manipulate the information transmitted through its members' bids, in order to mislead other bidders into bidding less aggressively and thus allow a designated bidder to bid more aggressively. Collusion increases the probability that the ring wins the auction and reduces the price it pays. The presence of a ring harms other bidders (as well as the seller) and reduces efficiency.
