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Author : Joel Watson
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (13 download)
Download or read book Theoretical Foundations of Relational Incentive Contracts written by Joel Watson and published by . This book was released on 2021 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : David Frydlinger
Publisher : Palgrave Macmillan
ISBN 13 : 9783030651015
Total Pages : 0 pages
Book Rating : 4.6/5 (51 download)
Download or read book Contracting in the New Economy written by David Frydlinger and published by Palgrave Macmillan. This book was released on 2022-05-26 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Today’s business environment is constantly evolving, filled with volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity and driven by digital transformation, globalization, and the need to creating value through innovation. These shifts demand that organizations view contracting through a different lens. Since it is impossible to predict every what-if scenario in a transactional contract, organizations in strategic and complex partnerships must shift to a mindset of shared goals and objectives built upon a strong foundation of transparency and trust, working together to mitigate risk much better than merely shifting risk to the weaker party. Contracting in the New Economy helps you to not only develop this mindset – but also offers the practical tools needed to embrace the social side of contracting, enabling your organization to harness the value creating potential of formal relational contracts. Briefly sharing the theoretical foundations that prove relational contracting works, it goes well beyond theory by providing powerful examples of relational contracting principles in practice. In addition, the authors provide a practical and proven approach for helping you to put relational contracting theory into practice for your own relationships. First by providing a framework for approaching any contracting situation and helping organizations finding the best contract model for each situation. And then by sharing five proven steps you can take to create an effective relational contract for you own strategic and complex business relationships. For anyone involved in developing contracts —lawyers, in-house counsels, contract managers, C-level managers, procurement officers, and so on — this book will empower you to create powerful cooperative alliances that will help you reach —and surpass — your business goals in today’s dynamic new environment.
Author : Robert S. Gibbons
Publisher : Princeton University Press
ISBN 13 : 0691132798
Total Pages : 1248 pages
Book Rating : 4.6/5 (911 download)
Download or read book The Handbook of Organizational Economics written by Robert S. Gibbons and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 2013 with total page 1248 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: (E-book available via MyiLibrary) In even the most market-oriented economies, most economic transactions occur not in markets but inside managed organizations, particularly business firms. Organizational economics seeks to understand the nature and workings of such organizations and their impact on economic performance. The Handbook of Organizational Economics surveys the major theories, evidence, and methods used in the field. It displays the breadth of topics in organizational economics, including the roles of individuals and groups in organizations, organizational structures and processes, the boundaries of the firm, contracts between and within firms, and more.
Author : Jean-Jacques Laffont
Publisher : Princeton University Press
ISBN 13 : 1400829453
Total Pages : 436 pages
Book Rating : 4.4/5 (8 download)
Download or read book The Theory of Incentives written by Jean-Jacques Laffont and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 2009-12-27 with total page 436 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Economics has much to do with incentives--not least, incentives to work hard, to produce quality products, to study, to invest, and to save. Although Adam Smith amply confirmed this more than two hundred years ago in his analysis of sharecropping contracts, only in recent decades has a theory begun to emerge to place the topic at the heart of economic thinking. In this book, Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort present the most thorough yet accessible introduction to incentives theory to date. Central to this theory is a simple question as pivotal to modern-day management as it is to economics research: What makes people act in a particular way in an economic or business situation? In seeking an answer, the authors provide the methodological tools to design institutions that can ensure good incentives for economic agents. This book focuses on the principal-agent model, the "simple" situation where a principal, or company, delegates a task to a single agent through a contract--the essence of management and contract theory. How does the owner or manager of a firm align the objectives of its various members to maximize profits? Following a brief historical overview showing how the problem of incentives has come to the fore in the past two centuries, the authors devote the bulk of their work to exploring principal-agent models and various extensions thereof in light of three types of information problems: adverse selection, moral hazard, and non-verifiability. Offering an unprecedented look at a subject vital to industrial organization, labor economics, and behavioral economics, this book is set to become the definitive resource for students, researchers, and others who might find themselves pondering what contracts, and the incentives they embody, are really all about.
Author : James M. Malcomson
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (697 download)
Download or read book Relational Incentive Contracts written by James M. Malcomson and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : James M. Malcomson
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (931 download)
Download or read book Relational Incentive Contracts with Private Information written by James M. Malcomson and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Aikaterini Florou
Publisher : BRILL
ISBN 13 : 9004407472
Total Pages : 261 pages
Book Rating : 4.0/5 (44 download)
Download or read book Contractual Renegotiations and International Investment Arbitration written by Aikaterini Florou and published by BRILL. This book was released on 2020-03-02 with total page 261 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In Contractual Renegotiations and International Investment Arbitration, Aikaterini Florou explores the complex phenomenon of the renegotiation of investor-state contracts. The author reconstructs the relationship between those contracts and the overarching investment treaties using an original interpretative methodology based on transaction cost economics and relational contract theory.
Author : Chang-Koo Chi
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 35 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (13 download)
Download or read book Relational Incentive Contracts and Performance Measurement written by Chang-Koo Chi and published by . This book was released on 2018 with total page 35 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper analyzes relational contracts under moral hazard. We first show that if the available information (signal) about effort satisfies a generalized monotone likelihood ratio property, then irrespective of whether the first-order approach (FOA) is valid or not, the optimal bonus scheme takes a simple form. The scheme rewards the agent a fixed bonus if his performance index xceeds a threshold, like the FOA contract of Levin (2003), but the threshold can be set differently. We next derive a sufficient and necessary condition for non-verifiable information to improve a relational contract. Our new informativeness criterion sheds light on the nature of an ideal performance measure in relational contracting.
Author : Joseph L. Midler
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 356 pages
Book Rating : 4.F/5 ( download)
Download or read book Optimal Incentive Contracting written by Joseph L. Midler and published by . This book was released on 1970 with total page 356 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Several versions of the negotiation of the parameters of incentive contracts between a government and private contractors are formulated as game theoretical models. This framework permits one focus upon a number of aspects that have previously been overlooked such as the interaction of the participants, the lack of domination by one side or the other, constraints upon the player's strategies, and the possible joint interests of the one party in the other player's outcome. Computational methods of solution are suggested. (Author).
Author : James M. Malcomson
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 33 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (13 download)
Download or read book Relational Incentive Contracts with Persistent Private Information written by James M. Malcomson and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 33 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper investigates relational incentive contracts with continuous, privately-observed agent types that are persistent over time. With fixed agent types, full separation is not possible when continuation equilibrium payoffs following revelation are on the Pareto frontier of attainable payoffs. This result is related to the ratchet effect in that: (1) a type imitating a less productive type receives an information rent and (2) with full separation, one imitating a more productive type receives the same future payoff as that more productive type. However, the reason for (2) is fundamentally different than with the ratchet effect. It arises from the dynamic enforcement requirement in relational contracts, not from the principal having all the bargaining power, and applies whatever the distribution between principal and agent of the future gains from the relationship (that is, whatever the point on the Pareto frontier). This result extends to sufficiently persistent types under certain conditions.
Author : George Pierce Baker
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 35 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (131 download)
Download or read book From Incentives to Control to Adaptation written by George Pierce Baker and published by . This book was released on 2022 with total page 35 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In 1991 we began to model interactions between formal and relational incentive contracts. We were motivated by a case study on compensation, and we saw this work as a contribution to agency theory. By the time the paper was published (QJE, 1994), we had begun to view the research agenda more broadly -- with connections to organizational culture (Kreps, 1990), the theory of firms' boundaries (Coase, 1937), and more. Eventually, we built from this initial work, analyzing delegation within organizations as necessarily informal (JLEO, 1999), and moving beyond relational agency (where a principal motivates an agent through various promises, not limited to compensation) to structuring relationships (where parties choose their formal governance structure to facilitate their relational contract). The latter led to our relational analysis of when classic buyer-supplier interactions should be governed under integration and when under non-integration (QJE, 2002) and to our working paper (last revised in 2011) on how formal contracts between firms might facilitate "relational adaptation" as events unfold. In this essay we sketch theoretical, empirical, and methodological lessons we learned during this twenty-year journey.
Author : Jonathan David Levin
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 133 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (438 download)
Download or read book Relational Contracts, Incentives and Information written by Jonathan David Levin and published by . This book was released on 1999 with total page 133 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Birger Wernerfelt
Publisher : Cambridge University Press
ISBN 13 : 1316798917
Total Pages : 329 pages
Book Rating : 4.3/5 (167 download)
Download or read book Adaptation, Specialization, and the Theory of the Firm written by Birger Wernerfelt and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2016-10-27 with total page 329 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This invaluable book provides the foundations for a new theory of the firm, drawing on Birger Wernerfelt's landmark work on economic theory and the resource-based view of the firm. It addresses a vigorous and long-standing academic debate over what exactly a 'firm' is, both in the field of management and economics. Wernerfelt revisits his classic articles, including an extensively revised 'A Resource-Based View of the Firm' (1984), which have been updated and synthesized to provide precise and accessible concepts and predictions. By offering future directions for research and practice, this book will be of interest to students and scholars of management and economics alike.
Author : Ola Kvaløy
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 0 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (141 download)
Download or read book Relational Incentive Contracts for Teams of Multitasking Agents written by Ola Kvaløy and published by . This book was released on 2023 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Ching-to Albert Ma
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 190 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (536 download)
Download or read book Incentive Contracts and Organisation Theory written by Ching-to Albert Ma and published by . This book was released on 1988 with total page 190 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Jenny Kragl
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 196 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (68 download)
Download or read book The Impact of Inequity Aversion on Relational Incentive Contracts written by Jenny Kragl and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 196 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Ian R. MacNeil
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 412 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (755 download)
Download or read book The Relational Theory of Contract written by Ian R. MacNeil and published by . This book was released on 2001 with total page 412 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
