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The Effect Of Equity Compensation On Voluntary Executive Turnover
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Book Synopsis The Effect of Equity Compensation on Voluntary Executive Turnover by : Steven Balsam
Download or read book The Effect of Equity Compensation on Voluntary Executive Turnover written by Steven Balsam and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Equity compensation provides incentives for executives to remain with the firm to avoid forfeiture of restricted shares and some or all of the value of stock options held. Empirically we show that the intrinsic value of unexercisable in-the-money options, the time value of unexercised options, and the value of restricted shares are inversely related to voluntary executive turnover. These findings which are most pronounced for strong performers, hold for CEOs and non-CEOs alike. While paying excess cash compensation also reduces turnover, the effect is less pronounced than that of equity compensation.
Book Synopsis An Analysis of CEO Equity Compensation in an Incomplete Contracting Framework by : Matthias Kiefer
Download or read book An Analysis of CEO Equity Compensation in an Incomplete Contracting Framework written by Matthias Kiefer and published by Matthias Kiefer. This book was released on 2015-01-01 with total page 262 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: I investigate whether equity grants increase the costs of CEO dismissal or departure (Oyer, 2004; Almazan and Suarez, 2003). I argue that costs of dismissal are increased because equity grants become exercisable upon forced departure. Equity grants can increase the costs of leaving because voluntarily departing CEOs forfeit equity compensation upon departure. I follow Rajgopal, Shevlin and Zamora (2006) in linking CEO equity compensation to a measure of labor market competition in a sample of S&P1500 companies from 1996 to 2010. I find that the intensity of labor market competition measured by a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index across industries and states affects equity grants and that the correlation is reversed in the penultimate year of forced CEO departure. This is consistent with the view that CEOs are concerned about being replaced in competitive labor markets and therefore demand more compensation that converts into severance pay. Conversely, when a dismissal is anticipated, I argue that CEOs are concerned about finding new employment and are then insured against a lack of outside opportunities. In addition, I conduct an empirical investigation of the relationship between stock options, restricted stock grants and other long-term compensation between 2001 and 2006. I argue that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act did not increase managerial accountability (see for example Cohen, Dey and Lys, 2005) and that new accounting rules did not increase accounting costs of stock options (see for example Hayes, Lemmon and Qiu, 2012). Instead, I suggest that the effective prohibition of executive loans from firms and brokers made it prohibitively costly for CEOs to exercise stock options. I find that stock options began to be replaced with other long-term compensation as early as 2004. CEOs began to accumulate vested but unexercised stock options. I do not find evidence that CEOs sold vested stock to raise funds.In the final empirical chapter, I consider whether a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index across industries and states can be interpreted as a proxy for labor market competition. Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) argue that it is product market competition that affects CEO equity grants. My results are consistent with Rajgopal, Shevlin and Zamora (2006) who do not find evidence that product market competition has any significant impact on equity grants. Instead, I find that labor market competition retains a significant and positive impact in our tests, and notably holds for the largest single product market. The principal limitations of the project were found to be the difficulty of collecting data of intended turnover and classifying it into forced and voluntary turnover. With respect to loans to executives, loans by brokers are usually not disclosed. This study is the first to analyze equity compensation as severance arrangement. CEO cash constraints in exercising options is an unexplored explanation for their disappearance.
Book Synopsis Essays on Executive Compensation by : Timothy C. Carpenter
Download or read book Essays on Executive Compensation written by Timothy C. Carpenter and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 77 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation examines the effects resultant from compensation committees' decisions on the structure and magnitude of executive compensation packages. Executive compensation has long been a contentious topic, both in the U.S. and abroad. Specifically, equity-based pay (eg. options and stock grants) has been increasing in popularity and met with mixed reactions. This form of remuneration aims to properly align the goals of executives with those of their shareholders; however, the use of equity based-pay tends to result in larger pay packages. Thus, the potential reasons for its recent popularity range from a forthright belief in its optimality to more Machiavellian motives. Moreover, incentive compensation has a number of secondary effects which must be accounted for, including effects on executive retention and accounting quality among many others. This line of research aims to improve our understanding of executive pay so compensation committees can better serve their shareholders by crafting more appropriate pay packages and better understanding the potential benefits and consequences therefrom. In Chapter One, I analyze the effect of cumulative wealth and unvested equity compensation on voluntary CEO turnover. I find that wealthier CEOs are less likely to retire or resign. This suggests that the CEO vetting process is able to sort out those individuals who would substitute high wealth for additional leisure. Consistent with Balsam and Miharjo (2007), CEOs with more unvested equity are significantly less likely to leave their position. However, I find that unvested equity is less effective as a retention device if the CEO has high existing wealth. In contrast to prior results, my results show no significant relation between existing CEO wealth and incentive compensation. In Chapter Two, I analyze the structure of compensation packages awarded in the United Kingdom compared to their U.S. counterparts. I consider the asymmetric relationship between CEO pay and firm performance in the U.S. and test for similar relations in the U.K. My findings confirm that asymmetry exists in the U.S. in that pay is more strongly associated with upside risk than downside risk. In contrast, U.K. CEO pay is more symmetrically associated with risk. Therefore, while U.S. CEOs face greater risk as a result of compensation with more equity-based pay, their pay to performance is asymmetrical. This suggests an additional component that risk-based arguments must consider before concluding that higher pay in the U.S. is structural and, thus, rational. Finally, in Chapter Three, I examine the effect of executive wealth on accounting quality. Results indicate that firms with wealthier CEOs are significantly more likely to restate earnings. To some extent this effect may be mitigated by compensation committees through the use of unvested compensation components, but this reduction is minimal. Firms with wealthier CEOs also exhibit greater levels of earnings management. Consistent with SEC auditors being aware of this, firms with wealthier CEOs are more likely to face an enforcement action, suggesting that these firms are both targeted and, ultimately, found in violation of accounting requirements. Chief Financial Officers' wealth shows a similar (and even stronger) relationship, increasing the likelihood of an earnings restatement as well as the magnitude of earnings management, but SEC enforcement actions do not reflect this relationship. My results suggest that SEC auditors may be able to improve governance by targeting firms that employ wealthy CFOs, and particularly those with recent large gains.
Book Synopsis Executives Out-of-the-money by : Benjamin B. Dunford
Download or read book Executives Out-of-the-money written by Benjamin B. Dunford and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page 282 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis An Introduction to Executive Compensation by : Steven Balsam
Download or read book An Introduction to Executive Compensation written by Steven Balsam and published by Academic Press. This book was released on 2002 with total page 410 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: General readers have no idea why people should care about what executives are paid and why they are paid the way they are. That's the reason that The Wall Street Journal, Fortune, Forbes, and other popular and practitioner publications have regular coverage on them. This book not only proposes a reason - executives need incentives in order to maximize firm value (economists call this agency theory) - it also describes the nature and design of executive compensation practices. Those incentives can take the form of benefits (salary, stock options), or prerquisites (reflecting the status of the executive within the organizational culture.
Book Synopsis The Impact of the Likelihood of Turnover on Executive Compensation by : Jay C. Hartzell
Download or read book The Impact of the Likelihood of Turnover on Executive Compensation written by Jay C. Hartzell and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 53 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This study analyzes the role of three incentive devices in managerial compensation: pay for performance, termination, and career concerns. A model is derived which shows that the three incentives are substitutes; where the termination (or career concerns) incentive is low, the optimal contract contains stronger pay-for-performance incentives. The empirical implication, then, is that the pay-for-performance sensitivity of managers should be decreasing (increasing) in the probability of termination (retirement). To test the model s predictions, I first use a sample of CEOs to estimate the probabilities of forced and voluntary turnover. Then, these estimated probabilities are compared to the CEOs estimated pay-for-performance sensitivity. The evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that boards consider the likelihood of termination when setting the compensation contract; the relationship between changes in CEO compensation and firm performance is decreasing in the estimated probability of forced turnover. While CEOs nearing retirement do not appear to have compensation that is increasingly sensitive to performance, their wealth does have increased sensitivity. Consistent with the model s intuition, the sensitivity of total CEO firm-related wealth to performance is positively related to the probability of voluntary turnover.
Book Synopsis Consider Your Options by : Kaye A. Thomas
Download or read book Consider Your Options written by Kaye A. Thomas and published by Fairmark Press Inc.. This book was released on 2005 with total page 290 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This is the 2005 edition of the most popular book on employee stock options. It's a major revision from the previous edition, with new design, content and organization to make it even easier for employees to learn what they need to know about their equity compensation.
Book Synopsis The Real Effects of CEO Compensation by : Jing Luo
Download or read book The Real Effects of CEO Compensation written by Jing Luo and published by Open Dissertation Press. This book was released on 2017-01-27 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation, "The Real Effects of CEO Compensation: Evidence From Equity and Bonus Incentive Plans" by Jing, Luo, 羅婧, was obtained from The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong) and is being sold pursuant to Creative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License. The content of this dissertation has not been altered in any way. We have altered the formatting in order to facilitate the ease of printing and reading of the dissertation. All rights not granted by the above license are retained by the author. Abstract: This thesis consists of two essays exploring the effects of executive compensation contracts on the real economy. Evidence from equity incentive schemes and annual bonus plans are provided separately in the two essays. The first essay examines the relation between CEO option compensation and bank risk-taking, and the role of CEO option compensation in affecting bank performance during the 2007-2008 financial crisis. Through panel regressions, I find that over the sample period (1993-2011), option awards received by bank CEO and CEO option holdings lead to higher bank risk which is not rewarded by better performance. Bank CEOs take more risk by engaging more in financial innovation and maintaining more risky loan portfolios. Institutional investors favor high option compensation in their own interests of pursuing short-term stock price upswing, while a larger board corrects this excessive risk-taking by providing bank CEOs with less option compensation. Cross-sectional evidence shows that during the crisis period, the effect of option compensation in increasing risk-taking and worsening performance comes from exercisable option holdings. In addition to the findings regarding option compensation, stock awards are shown to affect bank risk and performance, while stock holdings play no role. In the second essay, using a hand collected sample of 1491 firm-years spanning 2006-2011, for which I have been able to gather from annual incentive schemes performance measures and two levels of corresponding targets which represent board directors' performance expectations on chief executive officers (CEOs), I discover that the probability of CEO turnover significantly increases when a firm fails to meet its performance targets, and the likelihood of CEO replacement becomes even higher when minimum performance targets are missed. In a horse race of various financial measures used, failure to meet earnings targets most significantly increases the likelihood of CEO dismissal, and cash flow matters most when minimum targets are considered. Further, the effect varies with firm characteristics in that failing to meet revenue targets lead to turnover only in growth firms, while only in distressed firms CEOs are more likely to lose the job because of missing cash flow targets. Results are robust to the control of possible selection issues related to performance target disclosure and the choice of financial measures. Subjects: Executives - Salaries, etc
Book Synopsis Performance, Compensation and Turnover by : Anthony J. Nyberg
Download or read book Performance, Compensation and Turnover written by Anthony J. Nyberg and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 108 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Broad-based Equity Compensation, Employee Turnover, and Unit Performance by : Marshall D. Vance
Download or read book Broad-based Equity Compensation, Employee Turnover, and Unit Performance written by Marshall D. Vance and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 8 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Pay Without Performance by : Lucian A. Bebchuk
Download or read book Pay Without Performance written by Lucian A. Bebchuk and published by Harvard University Press. This book was released on 2004 with total page 308 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The company is under-performing, its share price is trailing, and the CEO gets...a multi-million-dollar raise. This story is familiar, for good reason: as this book clearly demonstrates, structural flaws in corporate governance have produced widespread distortions in executive pay. Pay without Performance presents a disconcerting portrait of managers' influence over their own pay--and of a governance system that must fundamentally change if firms are to be managed in the interest of shareholders. Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried demonstrate that corporate boards have persistently failed to negotiate at arm's length with the executives they are meant to oversee. They give a richly detailed account of how pay practices--from option plans to retirement benefits--have decoupled compensation from performance and have camouflaged both the amount and performance-insensitivity of pay. Executives' unwonted influence over their compensation has hurt shareholders by increasing pay levels and, even more importantly, by leading to practices that dilute and distort managers' incentives. This book identifies basic problems with our current reliance on boards as guardians of shareholder interests. And the solution, the authors argue, is not merely to make these boards more independent of executives as recent reforms attempt to do. Rather, boards should also be made more dependent on shareholders by eliminating the arrangements that entrench directors and insulate them from their shareholders. A powerful critique of executive compensation and corporate governance, Pay without Performance points the way to restoring corporate integrity and improving corporate performance.
Book Synopsis Ethics, Equity, and Regulation by : Cheryl R. Lehman
Download or read book Ethics, Equity, and Regulation written by Cheryl R. Lehman and published by Emerald Group Publishing. This book was released on 2010-05-18 with total page 254 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: How can we account for continuing inequalities in an era promoting enlightened social and economic connections? What mechanisms of perceptions and politics will enable policy makers and scholars to advance significant progressive change? This title examines accounting's contribution to these challenges given the profession's multifaceted roles.
Book Synopsis Executive Compensation and Financial Accounting by : David Aboody
Download or read book Executive Compensation and Financial Accounting written by David Aboody and published by Now Publishers Inc. This book was released on 2010 with total page 98 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Executive Compensation and Financial Accounting provides research perspectives on the interface between financial reporting and disclosure policies and executive compensation. In particular, it focuses on two important dimensions: - the effects of compensation-based incentives on executives' financial accounting and disclosure choices, and - the role of financial reporting and income tax regulations in shaping executive compensation practices. Executive Compensation and Financial Accounting examines the key dimensions of the relation between financial accounting and executive compensation. Specifically, the authors examine the extent to which compensation plans create incentives for executives to make particular financial reporting and disclosure choices. They also examine the extent to which accounting regulation creates incentives for firms to design particular compensation plans for their executives.
Book Synopsis Too Much Is Not Enough by : Robert W. Kolb
Download or read book Too Much Is Not Enough written by Robert W. Kolb and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 2012-08-02 with total page 231 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The scholarly literature on executive compensation is vast. As such, this literature provides an unparalleled resource for studying the interaction between the setting of incentives (or the attempted setting of incentives) and the behavior that is actually adduced. From this literature, there are several reasons for believing that one can set incentives in executive compensation with a high rate of success in guiding CEO behavior, and one might expect CEO compensation to be a textbook example of the successful use of incentives. Also, as executive compensation has been studied intensively in the academic literature, we might also expect the success of incentive compensation to be well-documented. Historically, however, this has been very far from the case. In Too Much Is Not Enough, Robert W. Kolb studies the performance of incentives in executive compensation across many dimensions of CEO performance. The book begins with an overview of incentives and unintended consequences. Then it focuses on the theory of incentives as applied to compensation generally, and as applied to executive compensation particularly. Subsequent chapters explore different facets of executive compensation and assess the evidence on how well incentive compensation performs in each arena. The book concludes with a final chapter that provides an overall assessment of the value of incentives in guiding executive behavior. In it, Kolb argues that incentive compensation for executives is so problematic and so prone to error that the social value of giving huge incentive compensation packages is likely to be negative on balance. In focusing on incentives, the book provides a much sought-after resource, for while there are a number of books on executive compensation, none focuses specifically on incentives. Given the recent fervor over executive compensation, this unique but logical perspective will garner much interest. And while the literature being considered and evaluated is technical, the book is written in a non-mathematical way accessible to any college-educated reader.
Book Synopsis Pay Equity in CEO Compensation and Agency Problems by : Jeongil Seo
Download or read book Pay Equity in CEO Compensation and Agency Problems written by Jeongil Seo and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page 180 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis THREE STUDIES ON THE USE OF CEO EQUITY COMPENSATION by : JANG WOOK LEE
Download or read book THREE STUDIES ON THE USE OF CEO EQUITY COMPENSATION written by JANG WOOK LEE and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page 116 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation contains three studies relating to executive equity compensation. In the first study (Chapter 2), I investigate whether firms adjust CEO's equity incentives in response to the firms' prior earnings management. I find that the risk-taking incentives from new equity grants are lower for firms with higher prior real earnings management (REM), but not for firms with higher accruals-based earnings management (AEM). My finding suggests that boards perceive the consequences of REM are more value-reducing than AEM and that they take stronger actions against REM by reducing the CEO's risk-taking incentives arising from equity incentives. In addition, I this result is driven by firms with higher institutional ownership, suggesting that institutional investors play an important monitoring role in structuring executive compensation contracts to limit the CEOs' value-reducing behaviors. In the second study (Chapter 3), I investigate how the firm's downside risk and upside potential differentially affect the choice between cash and equity compensation and the choice between stock options and restricted stock compensation. First, I find that, as downside risk (upside potential) increases, boards grant more cash compensation (more equity compensation) and less equity compensation (less cash compensation). This is consistent with the idea that, when downside risk increases, a CEO requires a higher risk premium for equity compensation and, thus, the board shifts compensation away from equity compensation to cash compensation. The reverse is true for the increased upside potential. When upside potential increases, the observed compensation contract will contain less cash and more equity compensation. Second, I find that the proportion of CEO option compensation increases with downside risk and decreases with upside potential. This is because, when downside risk increases, the probability of a stock option finishing out of the money (i.e., zero intrinsic value) increases but restricted stock has positive value as long as the stock price is positive. In contrast, when upside potential increases, because of stock options' leverage effect, a CEO will prefer stock options to restricted stock. In the third study (Chapter 4), I study how executive stock options differentially affect the firm's systematic and idiosyncratic risk by exploiting the passage of Financial Accounting Standard (FAS) 123R as an exogenous shock to CEO option compensation. I find that option-based compensation and the proportion of idiosyncratic risk in total risk is negatively associated. This is consistent with the idea that since, unlike risk-neutral investors, risk-averse CEOs have limited ability to eliminate firm specific idiosyncratic, idiosyncratic risk is unwanted by under-diversified CEOs. Thus, CEO option compensation creates incentives to increase the firm's systematic risk relative to the firm's idiosyncratic risk.
Book Synopsis The Complete Guide to Employee Stock Options by : Frederick D. Lipman
Download or read book The Complete Guide to Employee Stock Options written by Frederick D. Lipman and published by Prima Lifestyles. This book was released on 2001 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Numerous private and public companies offer stock option plans every year to motivate, retain, and reward employees. But implementing the right stock option plan can be a complex and daunting undertaking, without the proper guidance.The Complete Guide to Employee Stock Optionsunravels the mystery of creating a meaningful equity compensation plan for employees that is favorable for the business. Author and attorney Frederick D. Lipman describes in complete detail the legal, operational, and motivational aspects of developing a stock option program, whether it's for the new start-up looking to attract top talent or the venerable company looking for ways to reward its best performing employees. Readers will discover how to: * Understand the pros and cons of different option plans* Implement the right plan to meet the company's future plans* Motivate key employees with equity compensation* Minimize the risk of losing equity in a volatile market* And much moreThis book also includes useful information for employees who want to understand what their stock options mean and how to maximize their profitability. Complete wi
