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Testing For Evidence Of Adverse Selection In The Automobile Insurance Market
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Book Synopsis Testing for Evidence of Adverse Selection in the Automobile Insurance Market by : Georges Dionne
Download or read book Testing for Evidence of Adverse Selection in the Automobile Insurance Market written by Georges Dionne and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We analyze jointly the distribution of automobile accidents and the choice of deductible. One prediction in the literature is that high risk individuals will choose small deductibles within risk classes, when there is asymmetrical information. We show, however, that risk classification is sufficient, in the sense that there is no residual adverse selection on risk types in the automobile insurance portfolio studied.
Book Synopsis Testing Adverse Selection with Two-Dimensional Information by : Peng Shi
Download or read book Testing Adverse Selection with Two-Dimensional Information written by Peng Shi and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This article examines adverse selection in insurance markets within a two-dimensional information framework, where policyholders differ in both their riskiness and degree of risk aversion. Using this setup, we first build a theoretical model to make equilibrium predictions on competitive insurance screening. We study several variations on the pattern of information asymmetry. The outcomes range from full risk separation, to partial separation, to complete pooling of different risk types. Next, we examine results of this construction with an empirical investigation using a cross sectional observation from a major automobile insurer in Singapore. To test for evidence of adverse selection, we propose a copula regression model to jointly examine the relationship between policyholders' coverage choice and accident occurrence. The association parameter in copula provides evidence of asymmetric information. Furthermore, we invoke the theory to identify subgroups of policyholders for whom one may expect the risk-coverage correlation and adverse selection to arise. The empirical findings are largely consistent with theoretical predictions.
Author :Dionne, Georges Publisher :Montréal : École des hautes études commerciales, Chaire de gestion des risques ISBN 13 : Total Pages :66 pages Book Rating :4.:/5 (399 download)
Book Synopsis Evidence of Adverse Selection in Automobile Insurance Markets by : Dionne, Georges
Download or read book Evidence of Adverse Selection in Automobile Insurance Markets written by Dionne, Georges and published by Montréal : École des hautes études commerciales, Chaire de gestion des risques. This book was released on 1998 with total page 66 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Asymmetric Information and Learning by : Alma Cohen
Download or read book Asymmetric Information and Learning written by Alma Cohen and published by . This book was released on 2005 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper tests the predictions of adverse selection models using data from the automobile insurance market. I find that, in contrast to what recent research has suggested, the evidence is consistent with the presence of informational asymmetries in this market: new customers choosing higher insurance coverage are associated with more accidents. Consistent with the presence of learning by policyholders about their risk type, such a coverage-accident correlation exists only for policyholders with three or more years of driving experience prior to joining their insurer. The informational advantage that new customers with driving experience have over the insurer appears to arise in part from under-reporting of past claim history. I find evidence that policyholders switching to new insurers are disproportionately ones with a poor claims history and that new customers under-report their past claims history when joining a new insurer.
Book Synopsis Separating Moral Hazard from Adverse Selection and Learning in Automobile Insurance by : Georges Dionne
Download or read book Separating Moral Hazard from Adverse Selection and Learning in Automobile Insurance written by Georges Dionne and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The identification of information problems in different markets is a challenging issue in the economic literature. This paper performs tests of residual asymmetric information in the French automobile insurance market for the 1995-1997 period. This market is characterized by the presence of a regulated experience-rating scheme (bonus-malus). Contract choices are strongly associated with the bonus-malus of policyholders. We have access to longitudinal survey data with dynamic information both on claims and accidents. We propose a causality test to distinguish pathways through which a positive correlation arises between contract choice and accidents. We find evidence of moral hazard among a sub-group of policyholders with significant driving experience (5-15 years). We distinguish this moral hazard estimate from adverse selection and learning. Policyholders with less experience have a combination of learning and moral hazard, whereas no residual information problem is found for policyholders with more than 15 years of experience.
Book Synopsis Automobile Insurance: Road Safety, New Drivers, Risks, Insurance Fraud and Regulation by : Georges Dionne
Download or read book Automobile Insurance: Road Safety, New Drivers, Risks, Insurance Fraud and Regulation written by Georges Dionne and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 1999 with total page 388 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Motor vehicle accidents are still a leading cause of death, even if the trend has somewhat declined over the past 20 years. Indeed, motor vehicle accidents are a significant cause of death in comparison with air and space transport accidents, homicides and even HIV infections, causes which are more often highlighted in the media. As shown in this book, motor vehicle accidents are particularly damaging to very young drivers. The assessment of driving risks is a common concern for road transportation safety and the automobile insurance industry. In both cases, there is an awareness of the great losses resulting from the deaths, injuries and property damage caused by traffic accidents. Research is essential to counteract this public health threat, to assess the success or failure of countermeasures, and to solve the problems it generates in the insurance industry. This book is for people concerned about road crashes (prevention and compensation) and about the insurance problems they pose - namely private and public institutional authorities, consultants, administrators, practitioners, and researchers interested in sharing the authors' experience in this domain. The book presents original contributions related to motor vehicle insurance and road safety. All papers have been evaluated by external referees. Four subjects are covered: 1) Automobile Insurance Pricing, Risks and Asymmetric Information; 2) Insurance Fraud; 3) Young Drivers: Licensing Policies, Evaluation and Risks; and 4) Road Insurance Regulation.
Book Synopsis Testing Exogeneity by : Neil R. Ericsson
Download or read book Testing Exogeneity written by Neil R. Ericsson and published by . This book was released on 1994 with total page 436 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book discusses the nature of exogeneity, a central concept in standard econometrics texts, and shows how to test for it through numerous substantive empirical examples from around the world, including the UK, Argentina, Denmark, Finland, and Norway. Part I defines terms and provides the necessary background; Part II contains applications to models of expenditure, money demand, inflation, wages and prices, and exchange rates; and Part III extends various tests of constancy and forecast accuracy, which are central to testing super exogeneity. About the Series Advanced Texts in Econometrics is a distinguished and rapidly expanding series in which leading econometricians assess recent developments in such areas as stochastic probability, panel and time series data analysis, modeling, and cointegration. In both hardback and affordable paperback, each volume explains the nature and applicability of a topic in greater depth than possible in introductory textbooks or single journal articles. Each definitive work is formatted to be as accessible and convenient for those who are not familiar with the detailed primary literature.
Book Synopsis Handbook of Insurance by : Georges Dionne
Download or read book Handbook of Insurance written by Georges Dionne and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2013-12-02 with total page 1133 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This new edition of the Handbook of Insurance reviews the last forty years of research developments in insurance and its related fields. A single reference source for professors, researchers, graduate students, regulators, consultants and practitioners, the book starts with the history and foundations of risk and insurance theory, followed by a review of prevention and precaution, asymmetric information, risk management, insurance pricing, new financial innovations, reinsurance, corporate governance, capital allocation, securitization, systemic risk, insurance regulation, the industrial organization of insurance markets and other insurance market applications. It ends with health insurance, longevity risk, long-term care insurance, life insurance financial products and social insurance. This second version of the Handbook contains 15 new chapters. Each of the 37 chapters has been written by leading authorities in risk and insurance research, all contributions have been peer reviewed, and each chapter can be read independently of the others.
Book Synopsis Testing for Adverse Selection with "unused Observables" by : Amy Finkelstein
Download or read book Testing for Adverse Selection with "unused Observables" written by Amy Finkelstein and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 35 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper proposes a new test for adverse selection in insurance markets based on observable characteristics of insurance buyers that are not used in setting insurance prices. The test rejects the null hypothesis of symmetric information when it is possible to find one or more such "unused observables" that are correlated both with the claims experience of the insured and with the quantity of insurance purchased. Unlike previous tests for asymmetric information, this test is not confounded by heterogeneity in individual preference parameters, such as risk aversion, that affect insurance demand. Moreover, it can potentially identify the presence of adverse selection, while most alternative tests cannot distinguish adverse selection from moral hazard. We apply this test to a new data set on annuity purchases in the United Kingdom, focusing on the annuitant's place of residence as an "unused observable." We show that the socio-economic status of the annuitant's place of residence is correlated both with annuity purchases and with the annuitant's prospective mortality. Annuity buyers in different communities therefore face different effective insurance prices, and they make different choices accordingly. This is consistent with the presence of adverse selection. Our findings also raise questions about how insurance companies select the set of buyer attributes that they use in setting policy prices. We suggest that political economy concerns may figure prominently in decisions to forego the use of some information that could improve the risk classification of insurance buyers.
Download or read book Loss Coverage written by Guy Thomas and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2017-05-02 with total page 285 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Most academic and policy commentary represents adverse selection as a severe problem in insurance, which should always be deprecated, avoided or minimised. This book gives a contrary view. It details the exaggeration of adverse selection in insurers' rhetoric and insurance economics, and presents evidence that in many insurance markets, adverse selection is weaker than most commentators suggest. A novel arithmetical argument shows that from a public policy perspective, 'weak' adverse selection can be a good thing. This is because a degree of adverse selection is needed to maximise 'loss coverage', the expected fraction of the population's losses which is compensated by insurance. This book will be valuable for those interested in public policy arguments about insurance and discrimination: academics (in economics, law and social policy), policymakers, actuaries, underwriters, disability activists, geneticists and other medical professionals.
Book Synopsis Handbook of Insurance by : Georges Dionne
Download or read book Handbook of Insurance written by Georges Dionne and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2012-12-06 with total page 980 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In the 1970's, the research agenda in insurance was dominated by optimal insurance coverage, security design, and equilibrium under conditions of imperfect information. The 1980's saw a growth of theoretical developments including non-expected utility, price volatility, retention capacity, the pricing and design of insurance contracts in the presence of multiple risks, and the liability insurance crisis. The empirical study of information problems, financial derivatives, and large losses due to catastrophic events dominated the research agenda in the 1990's. The Handbook of Insurance provides a single reference source on insurance for professors, researchers, graduate students, regulators, consultants, and practitioners, that reviews the research developments in insurance and its related fields that have occurred over the last thirty years. The book starts with the history and foundations of insurance theory and moves on to review asymmetric information, risk management and insurance pricing, and the industrial organization of insurance markets. The book ends with life insurance, pensions, and economic security. Each chapter has been written by a leading authority in insurance, all contributions have been peer reviewed, and each chapter can be read independently of the others.
Book Synopsis Moral Hazard in Health Insurance by : Amy Finkelstein
Download or read book Moral Hazard in Health Insurance written by Amy Finkelstein and published by Columbia University Press. This book was released on 2014-12-02 with total page 161 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Addressing the challenge of covering heath care expenses—while minimizing economic risks. Moral hazard—the tendency to change behavior when the cost of that behavior will be borne by others—is a particularly tricky question when considering health care. Kenneth J. Arrow’s seminal 1963 paper on this topic (included in this volume) was one of the first to explore the implication of moral hazard for health care, and Amy Finkelstein—recognized as one of the world’s foremost experts on the topic—here examines this issue in the context of contemporary American health care policy. Drawing on research from both the original RAND Health Insurance Experiment and her own research, including a 2008 Health Insurance Experiment in Oregon, Finkelstein presents compelling evidence that health insurance does indeed affect medical spending and encourages policy solutions that acknowledge and account for this. The volume also features commentaries and insights from other renowned economists, including an introduction by Joseph P. Newhouse that provides context for the discussion, a commentary from Jonathan Gruber that considers provider-side moral hazard, and reflections from Joseph E. Stiglitz and Kenneth J. Arrow. “Reads like a fireside chat among a group of distinguished, articulate health economists.” —Choice
Book Synopsis Strategic Adverse Selection by : Kevin Shaver
Download or read book Strategic Adverse Selection written by Kevin Shaver and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A key feature of insurance markets is that the cost of selling insurance policies is contingent upon not only the number of policies sold but to whom they are sold. This differentiates insurance markets from conventional markets and admits novel strategies, such as segmentation strategies, through which firms may project market power. This paper clarifies how segmentation strategies differ from simple increases in pricing precision, details the implications of their use, gives an explanation for the divergence of firms' ability to segment, and provides evidence of their effective utilization. To these ends, a two stage spatial model of Bertrand price competition is specified, with an endogenously determined rule for sharing demand, to illustrate the consequences of the strategic use of information asymmetries between competing firms. Two implications of the model's equilibrium are tested against an original dataset that provides comprehensive pricing and categorization data for the Washington state non-standard private passenger automobile liability insurance market. This unique data set provides the first opportunity to test for segmentation strategies where regulation and the development of a market have not constrained the evolution of categorization strategies.
Book Synopsis "Expanding Consumer Choice and Addressing 'adverse Selection' Concerns in Health Insurance" by : United States. Congress. Joint Economic Committee
Download or read book "Expanding Consumer Choice and Addressing 'adverse Selection' Concerns in Health Insurance" written by United States. Congress. Joint Economic Committee and published by . This book was released on 2005 with total page 62 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Dynamic econometric analysis of insurance markets with imperfect information by : Tibor Zavadil
Download or read book Dynamic econometric analysis of insurance markets with imperfect information written by Tibor Zavadil and published by Rozenberg Publishers. This book was released on 2008 with total page 228 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Testing for Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Consumer Loan Markets by : Wendy Edelberg
Download or read book Testing for Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Consumer Loan Markets written by Wendy Edelberg and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page 62 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Care Without Coverage by : Institute of Medicine
Download or read book Care Without Coverage written by Institute of Medicine and published by National Academies Press. This book was released on 2002-06-20 with total page 213 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Many Americans believe that people who lack health insurance somehow get the care they really need. Care Without Coverage examines the real consequences for adults who lack health insurance. The study presents findings in the areas of prevention and screening, cancer, chronic illness, hospital-based care, and general health status. The committee looked at the consequences of being uninsured for people suffering from cancer, diabetes, HIV infection and AIDS, heart and kidney disease, mental illness, traumatic injuries, and heart attacks. It focused on the roughly 30 million-one in seven-working-age Americans without health insurance. This group does not include the population over 65 that is covered by Medicare or the nearly 10 million children who are uninsured in this country. The main findings of the report are that working-age Americans without health insurance are more likely to receive too little medical care and receive it too late; be sicker and die sooner; and receive poorer care when they are in the hospital, even for acute situations like a motor vehicle crash.
