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Subgame Perfect Implementation
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Book Synopsis Subgame perfect implementation with almost perfect information and the hold-up problem by : Philippe Aghion
Download or read book Subgame perfect implementation with almost perfect information and the hold-up problem written by Philippe Aghion and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 43 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The foundations of incomplete contracts have been questioned using or extending the subgame perfect implementation approach of Moore and Repullo (1988). We consider the robustness of subgame perfect implementation to the introduction of small amounts of asymmetric information. We show that Moore- Repullo mechanisms may not yield (even approximately) truthful revelation in pure or totally mixed strategies as the amount of asymmetric information goes to zero. Moreover, we argue that a wide class of extensive-form mechanisms are subject to this fragility.
Book Synopsis Subgame Perfect Implementation by : John Moore
Download or read book Subgame Perfect Implementation written by John Moore and published by . This book was released on 1986 with total page 68 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Subgame perfect equilibrium of repeated games with cost of implementation by : Alejandro Neme
Download or read book Subgame perfect equilibrium of repeated games with cost of implementation written by Alejandro Neme and published by . This book was released on 1990 with total page 16 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation by : Philippe Aghion
Download or read book The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation written by Philippe Aghion and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 49 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In this paper we conduct a laboratory experiment to test the extent to which Moore and Repullo's subgame perfect implementation mechanism induces truth-telling in practice, both in a setting with perfect information and in a setting where buyers and sellers face a small amount of uncertainty regarding the good's value. We find that Moore-Repullo mechanisms fail to implement truth-telling in a substantial number of cases even under perfect information about the valuation of the good. This failure to implement truth-telling is due to beliefs about the irrationality of one's trading partner. Therefore, although the mechanism should - in theory - provide incentives for truth-telling, many buyers in fact believe that they can increase their expected monetary payoff by lying. The deviations from truth-telling become significantly more frequent and more persistent when agents face small amounts of uncertainty regarding the good's value. Our results thus suggest that both beliefs about irrational play and small amounts of uncertainty about valuations may constitute important reasons for the absence of Moore-Repullo mechanisms in practice.
Book Synopsis The Theory of Implementation of Socially Optimal Decisions in Economics by : L. Corchon
Download or read book The Theory of Implementation of Socially Optimal Decisions in Economics written by L. Corchon and published by Springer. This book was released on 1996-10-11 with total page 177 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Since the early seventies, following the pioneering work by Leo Hurwicz, economists have been studying the relationship between socially optimal goals and private self-interest. The task was to reconcile the Utopian and Hobbesian traditions, using game theory to find ways to organise the society that are both socially optimal and incentive compatible. This book provides a succinct and up-to-date account of this vast literature and will be welcomed by students, lecturers and anyone wishing to update their knowledge of the field.
Book Synopsis Subgame Perfect Implementation and the Walrasian Correspondence by : Olivier Bochet
Download or read book Subgame Perfect Implementation and the Walrasian Correspondence written by Olivier Bochet and published by . This book was released on 2005 with total page 22 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Contract Theory written by Patrick Bolton and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 2004-12-10 with total page 746 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A comprehensive introduction to contract theory, emphasizing common themes and methodologies as well as applications in key areas. Despite the vast research literature on topics relating to contract theory, only a few of the field's core ideas are covered in microeconomics textbooks. This long-awaited book fills the need for a comprehensive textbook on contract theory suitable for use at the graduate and advanced undergraduate levels. It covers the areas of agency theory, information economics, and organization theory, highlighting common themes and methodologies and presenting the main ideas in an accessible way. It also presents many applications in all areas of economics, especially labor economics, industrial organization, and corporate finance. The book emphasizes applications rather than general theorems while providing self-contained, intuitive treatment of the simple models analyzed. In this way, it can also serve as a reference for researchers interested in building contract-theoretic models in applied contexts.The book covers all the major topics in contract theory taught in most graduate courses. It begins by discussing such basic ideas in incentive and information theory as screening, signaling, and moral hazard. Subsequent sections treat multilateral contracting with private information or hidden actions, covering auction theory, bilateral trade under private information, and the theory of the internal organization of firms; long-term contracts with private information or hidden actions; and incomplete contracts, the theory of ownership and control, and contracting with externalities. Each chapter ends with a guide to the relevant literature. Exercises appear in a separate chapter at the end of the book.
Book Synopsis Subgame Perfect Implementation of the Deserving Winner of a Competition with Natural Mechanisms by : Pablo Amorós
Download or read book Subgame Perfect Implementation of the Deserving Winner of a Competition with Natural Mechanisms written by Pablo Amorós and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis On Non-Cooperative Foundation and Implementation of the Nash Solution in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium Via Rubinstein's Game by : Papatya Duman
Download or read book On Non-Cooperative Foundation and Implementation of the Nash Solution in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium Via Rubinstein's Game written by Papatya Duman and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page 16 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In their seminal article ...
Book Synopsis Bayesian Implementation by : Thomas R. Palfrey
Download or read book Bayesian Implementation written by Thomas R. Palfrey and published by CRC Press. This book was released on 2020-08-26 with total page 126 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The implementation problem lies at the heart of a theory of institutions. Simply stated, the aim of implementation theory is to investigate in a rigorous way the relationships between outcomes in a society and how those outcomes arise. The first part of "Bayesian Implementation" presents a basic model of the Bayesian implementation problem and summarizes and explains recent developments in this branch of implementation theory. Substantive problems of interest such as public goods provision, auctions and bargaining are special cases of the model, and these are addressed in subsequent chapters.
Book Synopsis The Theory of Incentives by : Jean-Jacques Laffont
Download or read book The Theory of Incentives written by Jean-Jacques Laffont and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 2009-12-27 with total page 436 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Economics has much to do with incentives--not least, incentives to work hard, to produce quality products, to study, to invest, and to save. Although Adam Smith amply confirmed this more than two hundred years ago in his analysis of sharecropping contracts, only in recent decades has a theory begun to emerge to place the topic at the heart of economic thinking. In this book, Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort present the most thorough yet accessible introduction to incentives theory to date. Central to this theory is a simple question as pivotal to modern-day management as it is to economics research: What makes people act in a particular way in an economic or business situation? In seeking an answer, the authors provide the methodological tools to design institutions that can ensure good incentives for economic agents. This book focuses on the principal-agent model, the "simple" situation where a principal, or company, delegates a task to a single agent through a contract--the essence of management and contract theory. How does the owner or manager of a firm align the objectives of its various members to maximize profits? Following a brief historical overview showing how the problem of incentives has come to the fore in the past two centuries, the authors devote the bulk of their work to exploring principal-agent models and various extensions thereof in light of three types of information problems: adverse selection, moral hazard, and non-verifiability. Offering an unprecedented look at a subject vital to industrial organization, labor economics, and behavioral economics, this book is set to become the definitive resource for students, researchers, and others who might find themselves pondering what contracts, and the incentives they embody, are really all about.
Book Synopsis Cooperation: Game-Theoretic Approaches by : Sergiu Hart
Download or read book Cooperation: Game-Theoretic Approaches written by Sergiu Hart and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2012-12-06 with total page 331 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Issues relating to the emergence, persistence, and stability of cooperation among social agents of every type are widely recognized to be of paramount importance. They are also analytically difficult and intellectually challenging. This book, arising from a NATO Advanced Study Institute held at SUNY in 1994, is an up-to-date presentation of the contribution of game theory to the subject. The contributors are leading specialists who focus on the problem from the many different angles of game theory, including axiomatic bargaining theory, the Nash program of non-cooperative foundations, game with complete information, repeated and sequential games, bounded rationality methods, evolutionary theory, experimental approaches, and others. Together they offer significant progress in understanding cooperation.
Book Synopsis Subgame Perfect Equilibria Under the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm by : Yasushi Kawase
Download or read book Subgame Perfect Equilibria Under the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm written by Yasushi Kawase and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page 57 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We analyze a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) of an extensive game with perfect information induced by the firm-oriented deferred acceptance (DA) algorithm in a one-to-one matching market between firms and workers. When no agents are strategic, the resulting outcome is the firm-optimal stable matching. We show that the worker-optimal stable matching is the unique SPE outcome when only workers are strategic. By contrast, multiple SPE outcomes may exist, possibly including unstable matchings when only firms are strategic. We show that every firm weakly prefers any SPE outcome to the worker-optimal stable matching and that the matching induced by Kesten's efficiency-adjusted DA algorithm can be achieved as a SPE. When both workers and firms are strategic, we also show that the worker-optimal stable matching is still the unique SPE outcome. Hence, the strategic behavior of workers yields the worker-optimal stable matching in a dynamic implementation of the firm-oriented DA algorithm. Our results reveal that the workers strategic behavior yields a reversal property in a dynamic implementation of the firm-oriented DA algorithm.
Book Synopsis Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare by : Kenneth Joseph Arrow
Download or read book Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare written by Kenneth Joseph Arrow and published by Gulf Professional Publishing. This book was released on 2002 with total page 686 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare presents, in two volumes, essays on past and on-going work in social choice theory and welfare economics. The first volume consists of four parts. In Part 1 (Arrovian Impossibility Theorems), various aspects of Arrovian general impossibility theorems, illustrated by the simple majority cycle first identified by Condorcet, are expounded and evaluated. It also provides a critical survey of the work on different escape routes from impossibility results of this kind. In Part 2 (Voting Schemes and Mechanisms), the operation and performance of voting schemes and cost-sharing mechanisms are examined axiomatically, and some aspects of the modern theory of incentives and mechanism design are expounded and surveyed. In Part 3 (structure of social choice rules), the positional rules of collective decision-making (the origin of which can be traced back to a seminal proposal by Borda), the game-theoretic aspects of voting in committees, and the implications of making use of interpersonal comparisons of welfare (with or without cardinal measurability) are expounded, and the status of utilitarianism as a theory of justice is critically examined. It also provides an analytical survey of the foundations of measurement of inequality and poverty. In order to place these broad issues (as well as further issues to be discussed in the second volume of the Handbook) in perspective, Kotaro Suzumura has written an extensive introduction, discussing the historical background of social choice theory, the vistas opened by Arrow's Social Choice and Individual Values, the famous "socialist planning" controversy, and the theoretical and practical significance of social choice theory. The primary purpose of this Handbook is to provide an accessible introduction to the current state of the art in social choice theory and welfare economics. The expounded theory has a strong and constructive message for pursuing human well-being and facilitating collective decision-making. *Advances economists' understanding of recent advances in social choice and welfare *Distills and applies research to a wide range of social issues *Provides analytical material for evaluating new scholarship *Offers consolidated reviews and analyses of scholarship in a framework that encourages synthesis--
Book Synopsis University of Chicago Law Review: Symposium - Revelation Mechanisms and the Law by : University of Chicago Law Review
Download or read book University of Chicago Law Review: Symposium - Revelation Mechanisms and the Law written by University of Chicago Law Review and published by Quid Pro Books. This book was released on 2014-03-23 with total page 387 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The first issue of 2014 features articles and essays from internationally recognized legal and economics scholars, including an extensive Symposium on "Revelation Mechanisms and the Law." Topics include voting options and strategies to reveal preferences, corporate governance, regulatory intensity, tort calculations of risk, mandatory disclosure of choices, partitioning interests in land, and shopping for expert witnesses. In addition, Issue 1 includes an article, "Libertarian Paternalism, Path Dependence, and Temporary Law," by Tom Ginsburg, Jonathan S. Masur & Richard H. McAdams. Applications include smoking bans and seat belt laws. Also included is a student Comment, "Too Late to Stipulate: Reconciling Rule 68 with Summary Judgments," by Channing J. Turner; and a Book Review, "Common Good and Common Ground: The Inevitability of Fundamental Disagreement," by Rebecca L. Brown, reviewing Ordered Liberty: Rights, Responsibilities, and Virtues. The issue serves, in effect, as a new and extensive book on cutting-edge issues of revelation mechanisms, strategies, prompts, nudges, and effects. The Symposium's contents are: * "Governing Communities by Auction," by Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky * "Partition and Revelation," by Yun-chien Chang & Lee Anne Fennell * "Savage Tables and Tort Law: An Alternative to the Precaution Model," by Janet M. Currie & W. Bentley MacLeod * "Revelation and Suppression of Private Information in Settlement-Bargaining Models," by Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum * "The Use and Limits of Self-Valuation Systems," by Richard A. Epstein * "Expert Mining and Required Disclosure," by Jonah B. Gelbach * "Renegotiation Design by Contract," by Richard Holden & Anup Malani * "Audits as Signals," by Maciej H. Kotowski, David A. Weisbach & Richard J. Zeckhauser * "Irreconcilable Differences: Judicial Resolution of Business Deadlock," by Claudia M. Landeo & Kathryn E. Spier * "From Helmets to Savings and Inheritance Taxes: Regulatory Intensity, Information Revelation, and Internalities," by Saul Levmore * "Quadratic Voting as Efficient Corporate Governance," by Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl * "The Efficiency of Bargaining under Divided Entitlements," by Ilya Segal & Michael D. Whinston Quality ebook formatting includes active TOC, linked notes, active URLs in notes, and all the charts, tables, and formulae found in the original print version.
Book Synopsis FUNDAMENTAL ECONOMICS – Volume I by : Mukul Majumdar
Download or read book FUNDAMENTAL ECONOMICS – Volume I written by Mukul Majumdar and published by EOLSS Publications. This book was released on 2010-12-12 with total page 514 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Fundamental Economics in two volumes is a component of Encyclopedia of Social Sciences and Humanities in the global Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems (EOLSS), which is an integrated compendium of twenty one Encyclopedias. The Theme discusses on Fundamental Economics, Walrasian and Non-Walrasian Microeconomics, Strategic Behavior, The Economics of Bargaining, Economic Exernalities, Public Goods, Macroeconomics, Decision Making Under Uncertainty, Development Economics and many other related topics. These two volumes are aimed at the following five major target audiences: University and College Students Educators, Professional Practitioners, Research Personnel and Policy Analysts, Managers, and Decision Makers, NGOs and GOs.
Book Synopsis On Implementation Via Demand Commitment Games by : Ani Dasgupta
Download or read book On Implementation Via Demand Commitment Games written by Ani Dasgupta and published by . This book was released on 1998 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A simple version of the Demand Commitment Game is shown to implement the Shapley value as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome for any n-person characteristic function game. This improves upon previous models devoted to this implementation problem in terms of one or more of the following: a) the range of characteristic function games addressed, b) the simplicity of the underlying noncooperative game (it is a finite horizon game where individuals make demands and form coalitions rather than make comprehensive allocation proposals and c) the general acceptability of the noncooperative equilibrium concept. A complete characterization of an equilibrium strategy generating the Shapley value outcomes is provided. Furthermore, for 3 player games, it is shown that the Demand Commitment Game can implement the core for games which need not be convex but have cores with nonempty interiors.
