Subgame Perfect Equilibrium In Games With Almost Perfect Information

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Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium in Games with Almost Perfect Information

Author : Paulo Barelli
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 26 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (13 download)

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Book Synopsis Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium in Games with Almost Perfect Information by : Paulo Barelli

Download or read book Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium in Games with Almost Perfect Information written by Paulo Barelli and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page 26 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Harris, Reny, and Robson (Econometrica, 1995) add a public randomization device to dynamic games with almost perfect information to ensure existence of subgame perfect equilibria (SPE). We show that when nature's moves are atomless in the original game, SPE obtained via this channel can be "de-correlated" to produce a payoff-equivalent SPE of the original game; thus, public randomization is in a sense without loss of generality. As a corollary, we provide an alternative route to a result of He and Sun (2016) on existence of SPE without public randomization, which in turn yields an equilibrium existence result for stochastic games with weakly continuous state transitions.

Game Theory 101

Author : William Spaniel
Publisher :
ISBN 13 : 9781492728153
Total Pages : 273 pages
Book Rating : 4.7/5 (281 download)

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Book Synopsis Game Theory 101 by : William Spaniel

Download or read book Game Theory 101 written by William Spaniel and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 273 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Game Theory 101: The Complete Textbook is a no-nonsense, games-centered introduction to strategic form (matrix) and extensive form (game tree) games. From the first lesson to the last, this textbook introduces games of increasing complexity and then teaches the game theoretical tools necessary to solve them. Quick, efficient, and to the point, Game Theory 101: The Complete Textbook is perfect for introductory game theory, intermediate microeconomics, and political science.

Individual Upper Semicontinuity and Subgame Perfect Ε-Equilibria in Games with Almost Perfect Information

Author : János Flesch
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 27 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (13 download)

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Book Synopsis Individual Upper Semicontinuity and Subgame Perfect Ε-Equilibria in Games with Almost Perfect Information by : János Flesch

Download or read book Individual Upper Semicontinuity and Subgame Perfect Ε-Equilibria in Games with Almost Perfect Information written by János Flesch and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page 27 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Rationality in Extensive Form Games

Author : Andrés Perea
Publisher : Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN 13 : 9780792375401
Total Pages : 256 pages
Book Rating : 4.3/5 (754 download)

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Book Synopsis Rationality in Extensive Form Games by : Andrés Perea

Download or read book Rationality in Extensive Form Games written by Andrés Perea and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2001-10-31 with total page 256 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book is concerned with situations in which several persons reach decisions independently and the final consequence depends, potentially, upon each of the decisions taken. Such situations may be described formally by an extensive form game: a mathematical object which specifies the order in which decisions are to be taken, the information available to the decision makers at each point in time, and the consequence that results for each possible combination of decisions. A necessary requirement for rational behavior in such games is that each decision maker should reach a decision that is optimal, given his preferences over his own decisions. This requirement is far from sufficient, however, since every decision maker should in addition base his preferences upon the conjecture that his opponents will act optimally as well. It is this principle that distinguishes noncooperative game theory from one-person decision theory. The main purpose of Rationality in Extensive Form Games is to discuss different formalizations of this principle in extensive form games, such as backward induction, Nash equilibrium, forward induction and rationalizability, under the assumption that the decision makers' preferences are given by subjective expected utility functions. The various formalizations, or rationality criteria, are illustrated by examples, and the relationships among the different criteria are explored.

Strategies and Games, second edition

Author : Prajit K. Dutta
Publisher : MIT Press
ISBN 13 : 0262368501
Total Pages : 713 pages
Book Rating : 4.2/5 (623 download)

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Book Synopsis Strategies and Games, second edition by : Prajit K. Dutta

Download or read book Strategies and Games, second edition written by Prajit K. Dutta and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 2022-08-09 with total page 713 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The new edition of a widely used introduction to game theory and its applications, with a focus on economics, business, and politics. This widely used introduction to game theory is rigorous but accessible, unique in its balance between the theoretical and the practical, with examples and applications following almost every theory-driven chapter. In recent years, game theory has become an important methodological tool for all fields of social sciences, biology and computer science. This second edition of Strategies and Games not only takes into account new game theoretical concepts and applications such as bargaining and matching, it also provides an array of chapters on game theory applied to the political arena. New examples, case studies, and applications relevant to a wide range of behavioral disciplines are now included. The authors map out alternate pathways through the book for instructors in economics, business, and political science. The book contains four parts: strategic form games, extensive form games, asymmetric information games, and cooperative games and matching. Theoretical topics include dominance solutions, Nash equilibrium, Condorcet paradox, backward induction, subgame perfection, repeated and dynamic games, Bayes-Nash equilibrium, mechanism design, auction theory, signaling, the Shapley value, and stable matchings. Applications and case studies include OPEC, voting, poison pills, Treasury auctions, trade agreements, pork-barrel spending, climate change, bargaining and audience costs, markets for lemons, and school choice. Each chapter includes concept checks and tallies end-of-chapter problems. An appendix offers a thorough discussion of single-agent decision theory, which underpins game theory.

Existence of Equilibria in Incomplete Information Games with Disturbed Payoffs

Author : Brian John Crone
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 212 pages
Book Rating : 4.E/5 ( download)

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Book Synopsis Existence of Equilibria in Incomplete Information Games with Disturbed Payoffs by : Brian John Crone

Download or read book Existence of Equilibria in Incomplete Information Games with Disturbed Payoffs written by Brian John Crone and published by . This book was released on 1990 with total page 212 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Axiomatic Theory of Equilibrium Selection for Games with Two Players, Perfect Information, and Generic Payoffs

Author : Srihari Govindan
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 38 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (317 download)

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Book Synopsis Axiomatic Theory of Equilibrium Selection for Games with Two Players, Perfect Information, and Generic Payoffs by : Srihari Govindan

Download or read book Axiomatic Theory of Equilibrium Selection for Games with Two Players, Perfect Information, and Generic Payoffs written by Srihari Govindan and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 38 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Oligopoly and the Theory of Games

Author : James W. Friedman
Publisher : North-Holland
ISBN 13 : 9780720405057
Total Pages : 334 pages
Book Rating : 4.4/5 (5 download)

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Book Synopsis Oligopoly and the Theory of Games by : James W. Friedman

Download or read book Oligopoly and the Theory of Games written by James W. Friedman and published by North-Holland. This book was released on 1977 with total page 334 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

The Existence of Subgame-perfect Equilibrium in Games with Simultaneous Moves

Author : Christopher Harris
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 62 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (234 download)

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Book Synopsis The Existence of Subgame-perfect Equilibrium in Games with Simultaneous Moves by : Christopher Harris

Download or read book The Existence of Subgame-perfect Equilibrium in Games with Simultaneous Moves written by Christopher Harris and published by . This book was released on 1990 with total page 62 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Subgame Perfect Equilibria and Communication in Stage Games

Author : Alejandro Manelli
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 0 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (137 download)

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Book Synopsis Subgame Perfect Equilibria and Communication in Stage Games by : Alejandro Manelli

Download or read book Subgame Perfect Equilibria and Communication in Stage Games written by Alejandro Manelli and published by . This book was released on 2000 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Any stage-game with infinite choice sets can be approximated by finite games obtained as increasingly finer discretizations of the infinite game. The subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of the finite games converge to a limit distribution. We prove that (i) if the limit distribution is feasible in the limit game, then it is also a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the limit game; and (ii) if the limit distribution prescribes sufficiently diffused behavior for first-stage players, then it is a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the limit game. These results are potentially useful in determining the existence of subgame perfect equilibria in applications. As an illustration of this potential, it is shown that the addition of cheap talk to the games considered restores" the existence of subgame perfect equilibria.

A Long-run Collaboration on Long-run Games

Author : Drew Fudenberg
Publisher : World Scientific
ISBN 13 : 9812818464
Total Pages : 417 pages
Book Rating : 4.8/5 (128 download)

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Book Synopsis A Long-run Collaboration on Long-run Games by : Drew Fudenberg

Download or read book A Long-run Collaboration on Long-run Games written by Drew Fudenberg and published by World Scientific. This book was released on 2009 with total page 417 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book brings together the joint work of Drew Fudenberg and David Levine (through 2008) on the closely connected topics of repeated games and reputation effects, along with related papers on more general issues in game theory and dynamic games. The unified presentation highlights the recurring themes of their work.

A Simple Proof of the Existence of Subgame Perfect Equilibria in Infinite-action Games of Perfect Information

Author : Philip J. Reny
Publisher : London : Centre for Decision Sciences and Econometrics, University of Western Ontario
ISBN 13 : 9780771409240
Total Pages : 16 pages
Book Rating : 4.4/5 (92 download)

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Book Synopsis A Simple Proof of the Existence of Subgame Perfect Equilibria in Infinite-action Games of Perfect Information by : Philip J. Reny

Download or read book A Simple Proof of the Existence of Subgame Perfect Equilibria in Infinite-action Games of Perfect Information written by Philip J. Reny and published by London : Centre for Decision Sciences and Econometrics, University of Western Ontario. This book was released on 1987 with total page 16 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

An Introduction to Game Theory

Author : Martin J. Osborne
Publisher : Oxford University Press, USA
ISBN 13 : 9780195322484
Total Pages : 533 pages
Book Rating : 4.3/5 (224 download)

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Book Synopsis An Introduction to Game Theory by : Martin J. Osborne

Download or read book An Introduction to Game Theory written by Martin J. Osborne and published by Oxford University Press, USA. This book was released on 2009-01 with total page 533 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This text emphasizes the ideas behind modern game theory rather than their mathematical expression, but defines all concepts precisely. It covers strategic, extensive and coalitional games and includes the topics of repeated games, bargaining theory and evolutionary equilibrium.

Epistemic Game Theory

Author : Andrés Perea
Publisher : Cambridge University Press
ISBN 13 : 1107008913
Total Pages : 581 pages
Book Rating : 4.1/5 (7 download)

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Book Synopsis Epistemic Game Theory by : Andrés Perea

Download or read book Epistemic Game Theory written by Andrés Perea and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2012-06-07 with total page 581 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The first textbook to explain the principles of epistemic game theory.

Scissors and Rock

Author : Manfred J. Holler
Publisher : Springer Nature
ISBN 13 : 3030448231
Total Pages : 268 pages
Book Rating : 4.0/5 (34 download)

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Book Synopsis Scissors and Rock by : Manfred J. Holler

Download or read book Scissors and Rock written by Manfred J. Holler and published by Springer Nature. This book was released on 2020-04-22 with total page 268 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book introduces readers to basic game theory as a tool to deal with strategic decision problems, helping them to understand the complexity of such problems – to extract a solution, if possible – and to manage the complexity by revising the game if appropriate. The authors discuss basic decision situations modeled as Prisoners’ Dilemma, Chicken Game, and Stag Hunt Game, as well as concepts like the Nash equilibrium, Trembling Hand Perfectness, Rationalizable Strategies and the Theory of Moves to introduce game theoretic thinking. Further, the book presents pioneers of strategic thinking, e.g., Sun Tzu, Machiavelli, Adam Smith, and Goethe, and includes cases of conflict and cooperation to illustrate practical applications. Readers learn to apply game theory in business and in daily life – to manage their decision problems and to better understand the decision problems of others.

The Theory of Extensive Form Games

Author : Carlos Alós-Ferrer
Publisher : Springer
ISBN 13 : 3662499444
Total Pages : 251 pages
Book Rating : 4.6/5 (624 download)

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Book Synopsis The Theory of Extensive Form Games by : Carlos Alós-Ferrer

Download or read book The Theory of Extensive Form Games written by Carlos Alós-Ferrer and published by Springer. This book was released on 2016-07-08 with total page 251 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book treats extensive form game theory in full generality. It provides a framework that does not rely on any finiteness assumptions at all, yet covers the finite case. The presentation starts by identifying the appropriate concept of a game tree. This concept represents a synthesis of earlier approaches, including the graph-theoretical and the decision-theoretical ones. It then provides a general model of sequential, interpersonal decision making, called extensive decision problems. Extensive forms are a special case thereof, which is such that all strategy profiles induce outcomes and do so uniquely. Requiring the existence of immediate predecessors yields discrete extensive forms, which are still general enough to cover almost all applications. The treatment culminates in a characterization of the topologies on the plays of the game tree that admit equilibrium analysis.

Refinements of the Nash Equilibrium Concept

Author : E. van Damme
Publisher : Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN 13 : 3642499708
Total Pages : 161 pages
Book Rating : 4.6/5 (424 download)

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Book Synopsis Refinements of the Nash Equilibrium Concept by : E. van Damme

Download or read book Refinements of the Nash Equilibrium Concept written by E. van Damme and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2012-12-06 with total page 161 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In this monograph, noncooperative games are studied. Since in a noncooperative game binding agreements are not possible, the solution of such a game has to be self enforcing, i. e. a Nash equilibrium (NASH [1950,1951J). In general, however, a game may possess many equilibria and so the problem arises which one of these should be chosen as the solution. It was first pointed out explicitly in SELTEN [1965J that I not all Nash equilibria of an extensive form game are qualified to be selected as the solution, since an equilibrium may prescribe irrational behavior at unreached parts of the game tree. Moreover, also for normal form games not all Nash equilibria are eligible, since an equilibrium need not be robust with respect to slight perturba tions in the data of the game. These observations lead to the conclusion that the Nash equilibrium concept has to be refined in order to obtain sensible solutions for every game. In the monograph, various refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept are studied. Some of these have been proposed in the literature, but others are presented here for the first time. The objective is to study the relations between these refine ments;to derive characterizations and to discuss the underlying assumptions. The greater part of the monograph (the chapters 2-5) is devoted to the study of normal form games. Extensive form games are considered in chapter 6.