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Sponsored Search Auctions
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Book Synopsis Sponsored Search Auctions by : Song Yao
Download or read book Sponsored Search Auctions written by Song Yao and published by Now Publishers Inc. This book was released on 2009 with total page 66 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Sponsored Search Auctions reviews current academic research on this nascent topic with a focus on future practical and research opportunities
Book Synopsis Internet and Network Economics by : Christos Papadimitriou
Download or read book Internet and Network Economics written by Christos Papadimitriou and published by Springer. This book was released on 2008-12-11 with total page 748 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, WINE 2008, held in Shanghai, China, in December 2008. The 68 revised full papers presented together with 10 invited talks were carefully reviewed and selected from 126 submissions. The papers are organized in topical sections on market equilibrium, congestion games, information markets, nash equilibrium, network games, solution concepts, algorithms and optimization, mechanism design, equilibrium, online advertisement, sponsored search auctions, and voting problems.
Book Synopsis Budget Constraints and Optimization in Sponsored Search Auctions by : Yanwu Yang
Download or read book Budget Constraints and Optimization in Sponsored Search Auctions written by Yanwu Yang and published by Elsevier. This book was released on 2013-11-23 with total page 213 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The Intelligent Systems Series publishes reference works and handbooks in three core sub-topic areas: Intelligent Automation, Intelligent Transportation Systems, and Intelligent Computing. They include theoretical studies, design methods, and real-world implementations and applications. The series' readership is broad, but focuses on engineering, electronics, and computer science. Budget constraints and optimization in sponsored search auctions takes into account consideration of the entire life cycle of campaigns for researchers and developers working on search systems and ROI maximization. The highly experienced authors compiled their knowledge and experience to provide insight, algorithms and development techniques for successful optimized/constrained systems. The book presents a cutting-edge budget optimization approach that embraces three-level budget decisions in the life cycle of search auctions: allocation across markets at the system level, distribution over temporal slots at the campaign level, and real-time adjustment at the keyword level. Delivers a systematic overview and technique for understanding budget constraints and ROI optimization in sponsored search auction systems, including algorithms and developer guides for a range of scenarios Explores effects of constraints on mechanisms, bidding and keyword strategies, and the strategies for budget optimization that developers can employ An informative reference source for both software and systems developers working in the search auctions, marketing and sales strategy optimization, services development for online marketing and advertisement, e-commerce, social and economic networking
Book Synopsis Exclusive Display in Sponsored Search Advertising by : Kinshuk Jerath
Download or read book Exclusive Display in Sponsored Search Advertising written by Kinshuk Jerath and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 41 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: As sponsored search becomes increasingly important as an advertising medium for firms, search engines are exploring more advanced bidding and ranking mechanisms to increase their revenue from auctions for sponsored search advertising. For instance, Google, Yahoo! and Bing are experimenting with auction mechanisms in which each advertiser can bid to be displayed exclusively. In such an auction, each advertiser submits two bids: one bid for the standard display format in which multiple advertisers are displayed, and one bid for being shown exclusively. The search engine decides the outcome as non-exclusive or exclusive based on revenue generated -- if the exclusive-placement bid by an advertiser is high enough then only that advertiser is displayed, otherwise multiple advertisers are displayed and ranked based on their multiple-placement bids. We find that allowing advertisers to bid for exclusivity has two countervailing effects for search engine revenue. First, competition is heightened because bidders can express their display preferences more flexibly and compete not only for positions in the non-exclusive outcome but also compete for the outcome to be exclusive or non-exclusive; this is good for search engine revenue. Second, competition between non-exclusive and exclusive outcomes gives bidders the incentive to reduce their bids for their non- preferred outcome; this is bad for search engine revenue. Under different parametric conditions, either force can prevail and search engine revenue may increase or decrease accordingly. We also find counterintuitive results on the bidding strategies of advertisers; for instance, we find that, under certain conditions, advertisers have the incentive to bid above their true valuations.
Book Synopsis Networks, Crowds, and Markets by : David Easley
Download or read book Networks, Crowds, and Markets written by David Easley and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2010-07-19 with total page 745 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Are all film stars linked to Kevin Bacon? Why do the stock markets rise and fall sharply on the strength of a vague rumour? How does gossip spread so quickly? Are we all related through six degrees of separation? There is a growing awareness of the complex networks that pervade modern society. We see them in the rapid growth of the internet, the ease of global communication, the swift spread of news and information, and in the way epidemics and financial crises develop with startling speed and intensity. This introductory book on the new science of networks takes an interdisciplinary approach, using economics, sociology, computing, information science and applied mathematics to address fundamental questions about the links that connect us, and the ways that our decisions can have consequences for others.
Book Synopsis Essays on Optimal Bidding Strategies in Sponsored Search Advertising Auctions by : Prabirendra Chatterjee
Download or read book Essays on Optimal Bidding Strategies in Sponsored Search Advertising Auctions written by Prabirendra Chatterjee and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 102 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In this dissertation, I model generalized second price (GSP) auction for keyword search to analyze the optimal bidding strategies of the participating advertisers. The results also apply to a more general setting where multiple goods are being auctioned off. The study in chapter 3 examines the bidding strategies of the advertisers in a complete information static GSP auction. The results show that unlike in standard second price auction, truthful bidding is never a dominant strategy in general second price auction. In chapter 4, I have developed a model of static incomplete information GSP auction. I characterize all possible pure strategy Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the game and show that the consideration of the click through rates ratio plays a key role in determining the equilibrium bidding strategies for the advertisers. Specifically, I find that when the click through rates ratio exceeds a critical value, there will be no pure strategy Bayes-Nash equilibrium. The analysis also reveals that in a game of static incomplete information no asymmetric bidding equilibrium would prevail. The study in chapter 5 analyzes a model of incomplete information dynamic GSP auction. I find that in a dynamic game, the existence of both separating strategy equilibrium and pooling strategy equilibrium would depend upon critical values of click through rates ratio. I also prove that the advertisers with high valuation for a keyword will either reveal their identities at the very beginning or at the very end of this dynamic game. The results also show that when search engines do not publish the bidding history (i.e. there is 'minimum disclosure of information'), the advertisers will never try to mimic each other or in other words, there will be no pooling strategy equilibrium.
Book Synopsis Simplified Mechanisms With Applications To Sponsored Search and Package Auctions by : Paul R. Milgrom
Download or read book Simplified Mechanisms With Applications To Sponsored Search and Package Auctions written by Paul R. Milgrom and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A simplified mechanism is a direct mechanism modified by restricting the set of reports or bids. An example is the auction used to place ads on Internet search pages, in which each advertiser bids a single price to determine the allocation of eight or more ad positions on a page. If a simplified mechanism satisfies the quot;best-reply-closurequot; property, then all Nash equilibria of the simplified mechanism are also equilibria of the original direct mechanism. For search advertising auctions, suitable simplifications eliminate inefficient, low-revenue equilibria that are favored in the original direct mechanism when bidding costs are positive.
Book Synopsis Market Effects of Sponsored Search Auctions by : Massimo Motta
Download or read book Market Effects of Sponsored Search Auctions written by Massimo Motta and published by . This book was released on 2022 with total page 38 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We investigate the market effects of brand search advertising, within a model where two firms simultaneously choose the price of their (differentiated) product and the bids for the advertising auction which is triggered by own and rival's brand keywords search; and where there exist sophisticated/attentive consumers (who look for any available information on their screen) and naive/inattentive consumers (who only look at the top link of their screen), both aware of either brand's characteristics and price. Relative to a benchmark where only organic search exists, in any symmetric equilibrium each firm wins its own brand auction, and advertising has detrimental effects on welfare: (i) the sponsored link crowds out the rival's organic link, thus reducing competition and choice, and leading to price increases; (ii) the payment of the rival's bid (may) raise marginal cost, also contributing to raise market prices. Under extreme asymmetry (there is an incumbent and an unknown new entrant), we do find that the market effect of brand bidding might be beneficial, if the search engine does not list the entrant's link in organic search, and the share of the sophisticated consumers in the economy is large enough for an equilibrium in which the entrant wins the advertising auction on the search for the incumbent's brand to exist.
Book Synopsis Bid Coordination in Sponsored Search Auctions by : Francesco Decarolis
Download or read book Bid Coordination in Sponsored Search Auctions written by Francesco Decarolis and published by . This book was released on 2023 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Bid delegation to specialized intermediaries is common in the auction systems used to sell internet advertising. When the same intermediary concentrates the demand for ad space from competing advertisers, its incentive to coordinate client bids might alter the functioning of the auctions. This study develops a methodology to detect bid coordination, and presents a strategy to estimate a bound on the search engine revenue losses imposed by coordination relative to a counterfactual benchmark of competitive bidding. Using proprietary data from auctions held on a major search engine, coordination is detected in 55 percent of the cases of delegated bidding that we observed, and the associated upper bound on the search engine’s revenue loss ranges between 5.3 and 10.4 percent.
Book Synopsis Understanding Sponsored Search by : Jim Jansen
Download or read book Understanding Sponsored Search written by Jim Jansen and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2011-07-25 with total page 299 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book addresses the underlying foundational elements, both theoretical and methodological, of sponsored search. As such, the contents are less affected by the ever-changing implementation aspects of technology. Rather than focusing on the how, this book examines what causes the how. Why do certain keywords work, while others do not? Why does that ad work well, when others that are similar do not? Why does a key phrase cost a given amount? Why do we measure what we do in keyword advertising? This book speaks to that curiosity to understand why we do what we do in sponsored search. The content flows through the major components of any sponsored search effort, regardless of the underlying technology or client or product. The book addresses keywords, ads, consumers, pricing, competitors, analytics, branding, marketing and advertising, integrating these separate components into an incorporated whole. The focus is on the critical elements, with ample illustrations and with enough detail to lead the interested reader to further inquiry.
Book Synopsis Common Agency and Coordinated Bids in Sponsored Search Auctions by : Francesco Decarolis
Download or read book Common Agency and Coordinated Bids in Sponsored Search Auctions written by Francesco Decarolis and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 19 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: As auctions are becoming the main mechanism for selling advertisement space on the web, marketing agencies specialized in bidding in online auctions are proliferating. We analyze theoretically how bidding delegation to a common marketing agency can undermine both revenues and efficiency of the generalized second price auction, the format used by Google and Microsoft-Yahoo!. Our characterization allows us to quantify the revenue losses relative to both the case of full competition and the case of agency bidding under an alternative auction format (specifically, the VCG mechanism). We propose a simple algorithm that a search engine can use to reduce efficiency and revenue losses.
Book Synopsis To Sponsor Or Not to Sponsor by : Michael A. Arnold
Download or read book To Sponsor Or Not to Sponsor written by Michael A. Arnold and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Sponsored search advertisements are an essential component of e-marketing strategies and a substantial source of revenue for search engines. Most sponsored ads are sold through keyword auctions. We analyze a game-theoretic model to explore the impact of organic links (links generated by the search engine algorithm) on ጿirms' ᑫidding strategies in sponsored link keyword auctions. In contrast to results in earlier literature, we find that with organic links the firm with the highest value per click does not necessarily win the ጿirst sponsored position, it may be optimal for a ጿirm to bid an amount greater than the expected value (or sale) from a click, and ጿirms may choose not to bid even if they would incur no cost for the sponsored link.
Book Synopsis A 'Position Paradox' in Sponsored Search Auctions by : Kinshuk Jerath
Download or read book A 'Position Paradox' in Sponsored Search Auctions written by Kinshuk Jerath and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We study the bidding strategies of vertically differentiated firms that bid for sponsored search advertisement positions for a keyword at a search engine. We explicitly model how consumers navigate and click on sponsored links based on their knowledge and beliefs about firm qualities. Our model yields several interesting insights and a main counter-intuitive result we focus on is the position paradox." The paradox is that a superior firm may bid lower than an inferior firm and obtain a position below it, yet still obtain more clicks than the inferior firm. Under a pay-per- impression mechanism, the inferior firm wants to be at the top where more consumers click on its link, while the superior firm is better off by placing its link at a lower position as it pays a smaller advertising fee but some consumers will still reach it in the search of a higher-quality firm. Under a pay-per-click mechanism, the inferior firm has an even stronger incentive to be at the top since now it only has to pay for the consumers who do not know the firms' reputations and, therefore, can bid more aggressively. Interestingly, as the quality premium for the superior firm increases, and/or if more consumers know the identity of the superior firm, the incentive for the inferior firm to be at the top may increase. Contrary to conventional belief, we find that the search engine may have the incentive to over-weight the inferior firm's bid and strategically create the position paradox to increase overall clicks by consumers. To validate our model, we analyze a dataset from a popular Korean search engine firm and find that: (i) a large proportion of auction outcomes in the data show the position paradox, and (ii) sharp predictions from our model are validated in the data.
Book Synopsis To Score Or Not to Score? Estimates of a Sponsored Search Auction Model by : Yu-Wei Hsieh
Download or read book To Score Or Not to Score? Estimates of a Sponsored Search Auction Model written by Yu-Wei Hsieh and published by . This book was released on 2018 with total page 27 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Using data from "WebsiteX", one of the largest online marketplaces in the world, we estimate a structural model of sponsored search auctions where bidders have heterogeneous click-through curves. Unlike earlier studies, our model accommodates two stylized empirical facts: the advertiser prominence eff ect and the position paradox. Using our estimates, we simulate the e ffects of introducing bid-scoring to the auctions. We fi nd that scoring reduces equilibrium per-click prices, but boosts the number of clicks by sorting prestigious merchants to the top positions. Overall there is only a very modest reduction in total revenues from introducing bid-scoring, despite the intent to reward high-quality merchants with price discounts. Methodologically, this paper also illustrates an application of a novel "approximate Bayesian" estimation method to a structural multi-item auction model.
Book Synopsis Twenty Lectures on Algorithmic Game Theory by : Tim Roughgarden
Download or read book Twenty Lectures on Algorithmic Game Theory written by Tim Roughgarden and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2016-08-30 with total page 356 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Computer science and economics have engaged in a lively interaction over the past fifteen years, resulting in the new field of algorithmic game theory. Many problems that are central to modern computer science, ranging from resource allocation in large networks to online advertising, involve interactions between multiple self-interested parties. Economics and game theory offer a host of useful models and definitions to reason about such problems. The flow of ideas also travels in the other direction, and concepts from computer science are increasingly important in economics. This book grew out of the author's Stanford University course on algorithmic game theory, and aims to give students and other newcomers a quick and accessible introduction to many of the most important concepts in the field. The book also includes case studies on online advertising, wireless spectrum auctions, kidney exchange, and network management.
Book Synopsis Sponsored Search and Sequential Auctions by : Emmanuel Lorenzon
Download or read book Sponsored Search and Sequential Auctions written by Emmanuel Lorenzon and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This thesis is a collection of three essays in theoretical auction analysis. Chapter 1 considersbid delegation in the GSP auction mechanism. In a game involving side-contracts and a compensationpolicy set by an agency, the first-best collusive outcome is achieved. We offer a characterization of the implementablebid profiles for the two-position game with three players. Chapter 2 considers the sequentialsale of an object to two buyers: one knows his private information and the other buyer does not. Buyershave a multi-unit demand and private valuations for each unit are perfectly correlated. An asymmetricequilibrium exists when the uninformed player adopts an aggressive bidding strategy. Conversely, hisinformed opponent behaves more conservatively by using bid shading. The bidding behaviour of theuninformed bidder is driven by the opportunity to learn his private valuation for free. This dynamic is atthe root of the decline in the equilibrium price across both sales. In chapter 3, information is observableduring the first-stage auction in a sequential-move game in which the first-mover bidder is observed byhis opponent. A separating equilibrium exists in which the informed bidder bids aggressively when he isthe first-mover which entails a non-participation strategy from his uninformed competitor. Conversely,the latter adopts a conservative behaviour when he is the first-mover. A pooling equilibrium in which theinformed bidder blurs his valuation can only exist if his uninformed opponent adopts a non-participatingstrategy.
Book Synopsis Putting Auction Theory to Work by : Paul Milgrom
Download or read book Putting Auction Theory to Work written by Paul Milgrom and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2004-01-12 with total page 378 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.
