Read Books Online and Download eBooks, EPub, PDF, Mobi, Kindle, Text Full Free.
Download Simple Efficient Rank Order Contracts Under Moral Hazard And Adverse Selection full books in PDF, epub, and Kindle. Read online Simple Efficient Rank Order Contracts Under Moral Hazard And Adverse Selection ebook anywhere anytime directly on your device. Fast Download speed and no annoying ads. We cannot guarantee that every ebooks is available!
Author : Jungyoll Yun
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 41 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (63 download)
Download or read book Simple Efficient Rank-order Contracts Under Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection written by Jungyoll Yun and published by . This book was released on 1990 with total page 41 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Nicole Petrick
Publisher : GRIN Verlag
ISBN 13 : 3640394127
Total Pages : 25 pages
Book Rating : 4.6/5 (43 download)
Download or read book Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Contract Law written by Nicole Petrick and published by GRIN Verlag. This book was released on 2009 with total page 25 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Essay aus dem Jahr 2005 im Fachbereich BWL - Recht, Note: 1,7, Higher School of Economics Moscow, Russia, Sprache: Deutsch, Abstract: Legal and economical interpretations of contract, contract law and contract theory, asymmetric information, adverse selection and moral hazard. Paper explains negative effects of adverse selection and moral hazard for the case of transaction costs and incomplete contracts and describes incentives to avoid adverse selection and moral hazard, such as signaling and deductibles as well as indemnity contracts and valued contracts.
Author : Daniel Gottlieb
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 0 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (137 download)
Download or read book Simple Contracts with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard written by Daniel Gottlieb and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We study a principal-agent model with both moral hazard and adverse selection. Risk-neutral agents with limited liability have arbitrary private information about the distribution of outputs and the cost of effort. We obtain conditions under which the optimal mechanism offers a single contract to all types. These conditions are always satisfied, for example, if output is binary or if the distribution of outputs is multiplicatively separable and ordered by FOSD (if it is not ordered, the optimal mechanism offers at most two contracts). If, in addition, the marginal distribution satisfies the monotone likelihood ratio property, this single contract is a debt contract. Our model suggests that offering a single contract may be optimal in environments with adverse selection and moral hazard, where offering flexible menus of contracts provides gaming opportunities to the agent.
Author : Bernd Theilen
Publisher :
ISBN 13 : 9783890125077
Total Pages : 179 pages
Book Rating : 4.1/5 (25 download)
Download or read book Optimal Contract and Organizational Design Under Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection written by Bernd Theilen and published by . This book was released on 1996 with total page 179 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : John Eatwell
Publisher : Springer
ISBN 13 : 1349202150
Total Pages : 321 pages
Book Rating : 4.3/5 (492 download)
Download or read book Allocation, Information and Markets written by John Eatwell and published by Springer. This book was released on 1989-09-21 with total page 321 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This is an extract from the 4-volume dictionary of economics, a reference book which aims to define the subject of economics today. 1300 subject entries in the complete work cover the broad themes of economic theory. This volume concentrates on the topic of allocation information and markets.
Author : James C. Cox
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 19 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (535 download)
Download or read book Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection in Procurement Contracting written by James C. Cox and published by . This book was released on 1995 with total page 19 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Alex Gershkov
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (838 download)
Download or read book Dynamic Contracts with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection written by Alex Gershkov and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Optimal Contracts Under Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard written by and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This article presents a continuous-time agency model in the presence of adverse selection and moral hazard with a risk-averse agent and a risk-neutral principal. Under the model setup, we show that the optimal controls are constant over time, and thus the optimal menu consists of contracts that are linear in the final outcome. We also show that when a moral hazard problem adds to an adverse selection problem, the monotonicity condition well known in the pure adverse selection literature needs to be modified to ensure the incentive compatibility for information revelation. The model is applied to a few managerial compensation problems involving managerial project selection and capital budgeting decisions. We argue that in the third-best world, the relationship between the volatility of the outcome and the sensitivity of the contract depends on interactions between the managerial cost and the firm`s production functions. Contrary to conventional wisdom, sometimes the higher the volatility, the higher the sensitivity of the contract. The firm receiving good news sometimes chooses safer projects or invests less than it does with bad news. We also examine the effects of the observability of the volatility on corporate investment decisions.
Author : Christian At
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 0 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (137 download)
Download or read book Optimal Tenurial Contracts Under Both Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection written by Christian At and published by . This book was released on 2020 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper determines the optimal tenurial contract between a monopoly landlord and a tenant protected by limited liability under both adverse selection (based on the tenant's ability) and moral hazard (based on the tenant's choice of effort). We identify different optimal contracts depending on the tenant's outside option. For intermediate values, there is a threshold of tenant ability depending on the outside option level below which the optimal contract is a separating sharecropping contract, and a pooling one otherwise. We also find that an increase in the outside option does not monotonically increase the tenant's optimal effort.
Author : Jaeyoung Sung
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 51 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (129 download)
Download or read book Optimal Contracts Under Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection written by Jaeyoung Sung and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 51 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In spite of the importance of optimal contracting problems under moral hazard and adverse selection, current literature offers no optimal solutions to contracting problems under moral hazard and adverse selection with risk averse agents. The agent's risk aversion, however, appears to be critical for understanding managerial compensation problems. We present a continuous-time agency model with a risk-averse agent and a risk-neutral principal to show that moral hazard and adverse selection can be optimally resolved with a menu of linear contracts. In application, we discuss a few managerial compensation problems involving managerial project selection and capital budgeting decisions, and show that a flat-wage contract is sometimes optimal.
Author : Amy Finkelstein
Publisher : Columbia University Press
ISBN 13 : 0231538685
Total Pages : 161 pages
Book Rating : 4.2/5 (315 download)
Download or read book Moral Hazard in Health Insurance written by Amy Finkelstein and published by Columbia University Press. This book was released on 2014-12-02 with total page 161 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Addressing the challenge of covering heath care expenses—while minimizing economic risks. Moral hazard—the tendency to change behavior when the cost of that behavior will be borne by others—is a particularly tricky question when considering health care. Kenneth J. Arrow’s seminal 1963 paper on this topic (included in this volume) was one of the first to explore the implication of moral hazard for health care, and Amy Finkelstein—recognized as one of the world’s foremost experts on the topic—here examines this issue in the context of contemporary American health care policy. Drawing on research from both the original RAND Health Insurance Experiment and her own research, including a 2008 Health Insurance Experiment in Oregon, Finkelstein presents compelling evidence that health insurance does indeed affect medical spending and encourages policy solutions that acknowledge and account for this. The volume also features commentaries and insights from other renowned economists, including an introduction by Joseph P. Newhouse that provides context for the discussion, a commentary from Jonathan Gruber that considers provider-side moral hazard, and reflections from Joseph E. Stiglitz and Kenneth J. Arrow. “Reads like a fireside chat among a group of distinguished, articulate health economists.” —Choice
Author : Bernard Salanié
Publisher : MIT Press
ISBN 13 : 0262195259
Total Pages : 257 pages
Book Rating : 4.2/5 (621 download)
Download or read book The Economics of Contracts written by Bernard Salanié and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 2005-03-11 with total page 257 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A concise introduction to the theory of contracts, emphasizing basic tools that allow the reader to understand the main theoretical models; revised and updated throughout for this edition.
Author : Patrick Bolton
Publisher : MIT Press
ISBN 13 : 9780262025768
Total Pages : 746 pages
Book Rating : 4.0/5 (257 download)
Download or read book Contract Theory written by Patrick Bolton and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 2004-12-10 with total page 746 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A comprehensive introduction to contract theory, emphasizing common themes and methodologies as well as applications in key areas. Despite the vast research literature on topics relating to contract theory, only a few of the field's core ideas are covered in microeconomics textbooks. This long-awaited book fills the need for a comprehensive textbook on contract theory suitable for use at the graduate and advanced undergraduate levels. It covers the areas of agency theory, information economics, and organization theory, highlighting common themes and methodologies and presenting the main ideas in an accessible way. It also presents many applications in all areas of economics, especially labor economics, industrial organization, and corporate finance. The book emphasizes applications rather than general theorems while providing self-contained, intuitive treatment of the simple models analyzed. In this way, it can also serve as a reference for researchers interested in building contract-theoretic models in applied contexts.The book covers all the major topics in contract theory taught in most graduate courses. It begins by discussing such basic ideas in incentive and information theory as screening, signaling, and moral hazard. Subsequent sections treat multilateral contracting with private information or hidden actions, covering auction theory, bilateral trade under private information, and the theory of the internal organization of firms; long-term contracts with private information or hidden actions; and incomplete contracts, the theory of ownership and control, and contracting with externalities. Each chapter ends with a guide to the relevant literature. Exercises appear in a separate chapter at the end of the book.
Author :
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 772 pages
Book Rating : 4.E/5 ( download)
Download or read book Personnel Management Abstracts written by and published by . This book was released on 1997 with total page 772 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Jean Tirole
Publisher : Princeton University Press
ISBN 13 : 1400830222
Total Pages : 657 pages
Book Rating : 4.4/5 (8 download)
Download or read book The Theory of Corporate Finance written by Jean Tirole and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 2010-08-26 with total page 657 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: "Magnificent."—The Economist From the Nobel Prize–winning economist, a groundbreaking and comprehensive account of corporate finance Recent decades have seen great theoretical and empirical advances in the field of corporate finance. Whereas once the subject addressed mainly the financing of corporations—equity, debt, and valuation—today it also embraces crucial issues of governance, liquidity, risk management, relationships between banks and corporations, and the macroeconomic impact of corporations. However, this progress has left in its wake a jumbled array of concepts and models that students are often hard put to make sense of. Here, one of the world's leading economists offers a lucid, unified, and comprehensive introduction to modern corporate finance theory. Jean Tirole builds his landmark book around a single model, using an incentive or contract theory approach. Filling a major gap in the field, The Theory of Corporate Finance is an indispensable resource for graduate and advanced undergraduate students as well as researchers of corporate finance, industrial organization, political economy, development, and macroeconomics. Tirole conveys the organizing principles that structure the analysis of today's key management and public policy issues, such as the reform of corporate governance and auditing; the role of private equity, financial markets, and takeovers; the efficient determination of leverage, dividends, liquidity, and risk management; and the design of managerial incentive packages. He weaves empirical studies into the book's theoretical analysis. And he places the corporation in its broader environment, both microeconomic and macroeconomic, and examines the two-way interaction between the corporate environment and institutions. Setting a new milestone in the field, The Theory of Corporate Finance will be the authoritative text for years to come.
Author : Georges Dionne
Publisher : Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN 13 : 1461401550
Total Pages : 1133 pages
Book Rating : 4.4/5 (614 download)
Download or read book Handbook of Insurance written by Georges Dionne and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2013-12-02 with total page 1133 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This new edition of the Handbook of Insurance reviews the last forty years of research developments in insurance and its related fields. A single reference source for professors, researchers, graduate students, regulators, consultants and practitioners, the book starts with the history and foundations of risk and insurance theory, followed by a review of prevention and precaution, asymmetric information, risk management, insurance pricing, new financial innovations, reinsurance, corporate governance, capital allocation, securitization, systemic risk, insurance regulation, the industrial organization of insurance markets and other insurance market applications. It ends with health insurance, longevity risk, long-term care insurance, life insurance financial products and social insurance. This second version of the Handbook contains 15 new chapters. Each of the 37 chapters has been written by leading authorities in risk and insurance research, all contributions have been peer reviewed, and each chapter can be read independently of the others.
Author : Narayana R. Kocherlakota
Publisher : Princeton University Press
ISBN 13 : 1400835275
Total Pages : 230 pages
Book Rating : 4.4/5 (8 download)
Download or read book The New Dynamic Public Finance written by Narayana R. Kocherlakota and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 2010-07-01 with total page 230 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Optimal tax design attempts to resolve a well-known trade-off: namely, that high taxes are bad insofar as they discourage people from working, but good to the degree that, by redistributing wealth, they help insure people against productivity shocks. Until recently, however, economic research on this question either ignored people's uncertainty about their future productivities or imposed strong and unrealistic functional form restrictions on taxes. In response to these problems, the new dynamic public finance was developed to study the design of optimal taxes given only minimal restrictions on the set of possible tax instruments, and on the nature of shocks affecting people in the economy. In this book, Narayana Kocherlakota surveys and discusses this exciting new approach to public finance. An important book for advanced PhD courses in public finance and macroeconomics, The New Dynamic Public Finance provides a formal connection between the problem of dynamic optimal taxation and dynamic principal-agent contracting theory. This connection means that the properties of solutions to principal-agent problems can be used to determine the properties of optimal tax systems. The book shows that such optimal tax systems necessarily involve asset income taxes, which may depend in sophisticated ways on current and past labor incomes. It also addresses the implications of this new approach for qualitative properties of optimal monetary policy, optimal government debt policy, and optimal bequest taxes. In addition, the book describes computational methods for approximate calculation of optimal taxes, and discusses possible paths for future research.
