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Repeated Games And Reputations
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Book Synopsis Repeated Games and Reputations by : George J. Mailath
Download or read book Repeated Games and Reputations written by George J. Mailath and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 2006-09-28 with total page 664 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Personalized and continuing relationships play a central role in any society. Economists have built upon the theories of repeated games and reputations to make important advances in understanding such relationships. Repeated Games and Reputations begins with a careful development of the fundamental concepts in these theories, including the notions of a repeated game, strategy, and equilibrium. Mailath and Samuelson then present the classic folk theorem and reputation results for games of perfect and imperfect public monitoring, with the benefit of the modern analytical tools of decomposability and self-generation. They also present more recent developments, including results beyond folk theorems and recent work in games of private monitoring and alternative approaches to reputations. Repeated Games and Reputations synthesizes and unifies the vast body of work in this area, bringing the reader to the research frontier. Detailed arguments and proofs are given throughout, interwoven with examples, discussions of how the theory is to be used in the study of relationships, and economic applications. The book will be useful to those doing basic research in the theory of repeated games and reputations as well as those using these tools in more applied research.
Book Synopsis Repeated Games and Reputations by : George Joseph Mailath
Download or read book Repeated Games and Reputations written by George Joseph Mailath and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 645 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Provides a complete treatment of the theory of repeated games and reputations, beginning with the elementary concepts required to work with repeated games and continuing to research frontier. This book is for those doing basic research in the theory of repeated games and reputations as well as those using these tools in more applied research.
Book Synopsis Repeated Games and Reputations by : Damien Eldridge
Download or read book Repeated Games and Reputations written by Damien Eldridge and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Reputations in Repeated Games by : George J. Mailath
Download or read book Reputations in Repeated Games written by George J. Mailath and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 86 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper, prepared for the Handbook of Game Theory, Volume 4 (Peyton Young and Shmuel Zamir, editors, Elsevier Press), surveys work on reputations in repeated games of incomplete information.
Book Synopsis Reputations in Repeated Games, Second Version by : George J. Mailath
Download or read book Reputations in Repeated Games, Second Version written by George J. Mailath and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 88 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper, prepared for the Handbook of Game Theory, volume 4 (Peyton Young and Shmuel Zamir, editors, Elsevier Press), surveys work on reputations in repeated games of incomplete information.
Download or read book Game Theory written by Steve Tadelis and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 2013-01-06 with total page 416 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The definitive introduction to game theory This comprehensive textbook introduces readers to the principal ideas and applications of game theory, in a style that combines rigor with accessibility. Steven Tadelis begins with a concise description of rational decision making, and goes on to discuss strategic and extensive form games with complete information, Bayesian games, and extensive form games with imperfect information. He covers a host of topics, including multistage and repeated games, bargaining theory, auctions, rent-seeking games, mechanism design, signaling games, reputation building, and information transmission games. Unlike other books on game theory, this one begins with the idea of rationality and explores its implications for multiperson decision problems through concepts like dominated strategies and rationalizability. Only then does it present the subject of Nash equilibrium and its derivatives. Game Theory is the ideal textbook for advanced undergraduate and beginning graduate students. Throughout, concepts and methods are explained using real-world examples backed by precise analytic material. The book features many important applications to economics and political science, as well as numerous exercises that focus on how to formalize informal situations and then analyze them. Introduces the core ideas and applications of game theory Covers static and dynamic games, with complete and incomplete information Features a variety of examples, applications, and exercises Topics include repeated games, bargaining, auctions, signaling, reputation, and information transmission Ideal for advanced undergraduate and beginning graduate students Complete solutions available to teachers and selected solutions available to students
Book Synopsis Multiple Reputations in Finitely Repeated Games by : Shaun Hargreaves-Heap
Download or read book Multiple Reputations in Finitely Repeated Games written by Shaun Hargreaves-Heap and published by . This book was released on 1989 with total page 24 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Essays on Repeated Games and Reputations by : Ayçca Özdoḡan
Download or read book Essays on Repeated Games and Reputations written by Ayçca Özdoḡan and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 135 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Modeling Strategic Behavior: A Graduate Introduction To Game Theory And Mechanism Design by : George J Mailath
Download or read book Modeling Strategic Behavior: A Graduate Introduction To Game Theory And Mechanism Design written by George J Mailath and published by World Scientific. This book was released on 2018-12-18 with total page 364 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: It is impossible to understand modern economics without knowledge of the basic tools of gametheory and mechanism design. This book provides a graduate-level introduction to the economic modeling of strategic behavior. The goal is to teach Economics doctoral students the tools of game theory and mechanism design that all economists should know.
Book Synopsis The Oxford Handbook of Gossip and Reputation by : Francesca Giardini
Download or read book The Oxford Handbook of Gossip and Reputation written by Francesca Giardini and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 2019-05-22 with total page 656 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Gossip and reputation are core processes in societies and have substantial consequences for individuals, groups, communities, organizations, and markets.. Academic studies have found that gossip and reputation have the power to enforce social norms, facilitate cooperation, and act as a means of social control. The key mechanism for the creation, maintenance, and destruction of reputations in everyday life is gossip - evaluative talk about absent third parties. Reputation and gossip are inseparably intertwined, but up until now have been mostly studied in isolation. The Oxford Handbook of Gossip and Reputation fills this intellectual gap, providing an integrated understanding of the foundations of gossip and reputation, as well as outlining a potential framework for future research. Volume editors Francesca Giardini and Rafael Wittek bring together a diverse group of researchers to analyze gossip and reputation from different disciplines, social domains, and levels of analysis. Being the first integrated and comprehensive collection of studies on both phenomena, each of the 25 chapters explores the current research on the antecedents, processes, and outcomes of the gossip-reputation link in contexts as diverse as online markets, non-industrial societies, organizations, social networks, or schools. International in scope, the volume is organized into seven sections devoted to the exploration of a different facet of gossip and reputation. Contributions from eminent experts on gossip and reputation not only help us better understand the complex interplay between two delicate social mechanisms, but also sketch the contours of a long term research agenda by pointing to new problems and newly emerging cross-disciplinary solutions.
Book Synopsis Game Theory by : Shaun Hargreaves Heap
Download or read book Game Theory written by Shaun Hargreaves Heap and published by Psychology Press. This book was released on 2004 with total page 392 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Requiring no more than basic arithmetic, this book provides a careful and accessible introduction to the basic pillars of Game Theory, tracing its intellectual origins and philosophical premises.
Book Synopsis The Evolution of Cooperation by : Robert Axelrod
Download or read book The Evolution of Cooperation written by Robert Axelrod and published by Basic Books. This book was released on 2009-04-29 with total page 258 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A famed political scientist's classic argument for a more cooperative world We assume that, in a world ruled by natural selection, selfishness pays. So why cooperate? In The Evolution of Cooperation, political scientist Robert Axelrod seeks to answer this question. In 1980, he organized the famed Computer Prisoners Dilemma Tournament, which sought to find the optimal strategy for survival in a particular game. Over and over, the simplest strategy, a cooperative program called Tit for Tat, shut out the competition. In other words, cooperation, not unfettered competition, turns out to be our best chance for survival. A vital book for leaders and decision makers, The Evolution of Cooperation reveals how cooperative principles help us think better about everything from military strategy, to political elections, to family dynamics.
Book Synopsis The Medieval Risk-Reward Society by : Will Hasty
Download or read book The Medieval Risk-Reward Society written by Will Hasty and published by . This book was released on 2016-04-13 with total page 274 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: "The Medieval Risk-Reward Society" offers a study of adventure and love in the European Middle Ages focused on the poetry of authors such as Marie de France, Chretien de Troyes, Wolfram von Eschenbach, and Gottfried von Strassburg-showing how a society based on sacrifice becomes one of wagers and investments. Will Hasty's sociological approach to medieval courtly literature, informed by the analytic tools of game theory, reveals the blossoming of a worldview in which outcomes are uncertain, such that the very self (of a character or an authorial persona) is contingent on success or failure in possessing the things it desires-and upon which its social identity and personal happiness depend. Drawing on a diverse selection of contrasting canonical works ranging from the "Iliad" to the biblical book of Joshua to High Medieval German political texts to the writings of Leibniz and Mark Twain, Hasty enables an appreciation of the distinctive contributions made in antiquity and the Middle Ages to the medieval emergence of a European society based on risks and rewards. "The Medieval Risk-Reward Society: Courts, Adventure, and Love in the European Middle Ages" takes a descriptive approach to the competitions in religion, politics, and poetry that are constitutive of medieval culture. Culture is considered always to be "happening, " and to be happening on the cultural cutting edge as competitions for rewards involving the element of chance. This study finds adventure and love--the principal concerns of medieval European romance poetry--to be cultural game changers, and thereby endeavors to make a humanist contribution to the development of a cultural game theory. Will Hasty is Professor of German and Medieval and Early Modern Studies at the University of Florida, Gainesville."
Book Synopsis Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications by : R.J. Aumann
Download or read book Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications written by R.J. Aumann and published by Elsevier. This book was released on 1992 with total page 824 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This is the second of three volumes surveying the state of the art in Game Theory and its applications to many and varied fields, in particular to economics. The chapters in the present volume are contributed by outstanding authorities, and provide comprehensive coverage and precise statements of the main results in each area. The applications include empirical evidence. The following topics are covered: communication and correlated equilibria, coalitional games and coalition structures, utility and subjective probability, common knowledge, bargaining, zero-sum games, differential games, and applications of game theory to signalling, moral hazard, search, evolutionary biology, international relations, voting procedures, social choice, public economics, politics, and cost allocation. This handbook will be of interest to scholars in economics, political science, psychology, mathematics and biology. For more information on the Handbooks in Economics series, please see our home page on http://www.elsevier.nl/locate/hes
Download or read book Game Theory written by Steven N. Durlauf and published by Springer. This book was released on 2016-07-14 with total page 391 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Specially selected from The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics 2nd edition, each article within this compendium covers the fundamental themes within the discipline and is written by a leading practitioner in the field. A handy reference tool.
Book Synopsis Essays on Dynamic Games and Reputations by : Di Pei (Ph. D.)
Download or read book Essays on Dynamic Games and Reputations written by Di Pei (Ph. D.) and published by . This book was released on 2018 with total page 189 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This thesis consists of three essays on dynamic games with incomplete information. In Chapter 1, I study reputation effects when individuals have persistent private information that matters for their opponents' payoffs. I examine a repeated game between a patient informed player and a sequence of myopic uninformed players. The informed player privately observes a persistent state, and is either a strategic type who can flexibly choose his actions or is one of the several commitment types that mechanically plays the same action in every period. Unlike the canonical models on reputation effects, the uninformed players' payoffs depend on the state. This interdependence of values introduces new challenges to reputation building, namely, the informed player could face a tradeo between establishing a reputation for commitment and signaling favorable information about the state. My results address the predictions on the informed player's payoff and behavior that apply across all Nash equilibria. When the stage game payoffs satisfy a monotone-supermodularity condition, I show that the informed long-run player can overcome the lack-of-commitment problem and secure a high payoff in every state and in every equilibrium. Under a condition on the distribution over states, he will play the same action in every period and maintain his reputation for commitment in every equilibrium. If the payoff structure is unrestricted and the probability of commitment types is small, then the informed player's return to reputation building can be low and can provide a strict incentive to abandon his reputation. In Chapter 2, I study the dynamics of an agent's reputation for competence when the labor market's information about his performance is disclosed by an intermediary who cannot commit. I show that this game admits a unique Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE). When the agent is patient, his effort is inverse U-shaped, while the rate of information disclosure is decreasing over time. I illustrate the inefficiencies of the unique MPE by comparing it with the equilibrium in the benchmark scenario where the market automatically observes all breakthroughs. I characterize a tractable subclass of non-Markov Equilibria and explain why allowing players to coordinate on payoff-irrelevant events can improve eciency on top of the unique MPE and the exogenous information benchmark. When the intermediary can commit, her optimal Markov disclosure policy has a deadline, after which no breakthrough will be disclosed. However, deadlines are not incentive compatible in the game without commitment, illustrating a time inconsistency problem faced by the intermediary. My model can be applied to professional service industries, such as law and consulting. My results provide an explanation to the observed wage and promotion patterns in Baker, Gibbs and Holmström (1994). In Chapter 3, I study repeated games in which a patient long-run player (e.g. a rm) wishes to win the trust of some myopic opponents (e.g. a sequence or a continuum of consumers) but has a strict incentive to betray them. Her benet from betrayal is persistent over time and is her private information. I examine the extent to which persistent private information can overcome this lack-of-commitment problem. My main result characterizes the set of payoffs a patient long-run player can attain in equilibrium. Interestingly, every type's highest equilibrium payoff only depends on her true benet from betrayal and the lowest possible benet in the support of her opponents' prior belief. When this lowest possible benet vanishes, every type can approximately attain her Stackelberg commitment payoff. My finding provides a strategic foundation for the (mixed) Stackelberg commitment types in the reputation models, both in terms of the highest attainable payoff and in terms of the commitment behaviors. Compared to the existing approaches that rely on the existence of crazy types that are either irrational or have drastically dierent preferences, there is common knowledge of rationality in my model, and moreover, players' ordinal preferences over stage game outcomes are common knowledge.
Book Synopsis Handbook of Game Theory by : Petyon Young
Download or read book Handbook of Game Theory written by Petyon Young and published by Elsevier. This book was released on 2014-10-01 with total page 1025 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The ability to understand and predict behavior in strategic situations, in which an individual’s success in making choices depends on the choices of others, has been the domain of game theory since the 1950s. Developing the theories at the heart of game theory has resulted in 8 Nobel Prizes and insights that researchers in many fields continue to develop. In Volume 4, top scholars synthesize and analyze mainstream scholarship on games and economic behavior, providing an updated account of developments in game theory since the 2002 publication of Volume 3, which only covers work through the mid 1990s. Focuses on innovation in games and economic behavior Presents coherent summaries of subjects in game theory Makes details about game theory accessible to scholars in fields outside economics
