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On The Existence Of Subgame Perfect Equlibrium In Infinite Action Games Of Perfect Information
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Author :Philip J. Reny Publisher :London : Centre for Decision Sciences and Econometrics, University of Western Ontario ISBN 13 :9780771409240 Total Pages :16 pages Book Rating :4.4/5 (92 download)
Book Synopsis A Simple Proof of the Existence of Subgame Perfect Equilibria in Infinite-action Games of Perfect Information by : Philip J. Reny
Download or read book A Simple Proof of the Existence of Subgame Perfect Equilibria in Infinite-action Games of Perfect Information written by Philip J. Reny and published by London : Centre for Decision Sciences and Econometrics, University of Western Ontario. This book was released on 1987 with total page 16 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis On the Existence of Subgame-perfect Equlibrium in Infinite-action Games of Perfect Information by : Martin Hellwig
Download or read book On the Existence of Subgame-perfect Equlibrium in Infinite-action Games of Perfect Information written by Martin Hellwig and published by . This book was released on 1985 with total page 27 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium in Games with Almost Perfect Information by : Paulo Barelli
Download or read book Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium in Games with Almost Perfect Information written by Paulo Barelli and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page 26 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Harris, Reny, and Robson (Econometrica, 1995) add a public randomization device to dynamic games with almost perfect information to ensure existence of subgame perfect equilibria (SPE). We show that when nature's moves are atomless in the original game, SPE obtained via this channel can be "de-correlated" to produce a payoff-equivalent SPE of the original game; thus, public randomization is in a sense without loss of generality. As a corollary, we provide an alternative route to a result of He and Sun (2016) on existence of SPE without public randomization, which in turn yields an equilibrium existence result for stochastic games with weakly continuous state transitions.
Book Synopsis A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games by : John C. Harsanyi
Download or read book A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games written by John C. Harsanyi and published by Mit Press. This book was released on 1988 with total page 378 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The authors, two of the most prominent game theorists of this generation, have devoted a number of years to the development of the theory presented here, and to its economic applications. They propose rational criteria for selecting one particular uniformly perfect equilibrium point as the solution of any noncooperative game. And, because any cooperative game can be remodelled as a noncooperative bargaining game, their theory defines a one-point solution for any cooperative game as well.By providing solutions - based on the same principles of rational behavior - for all classes of games, both cooperative and noncooperative, both those with complete and with incomplete information, Harsanyi and Selten's approach achieves a remarkable degree of theoretical unification for game theory as a whole and provides a deeper insight into the nature of game-theoretic rationality.The book applies this theory to a number of specific game classes, such as unanimity games; bargaining with transaction costs; trade involving one seller and several buyers; two-person bargaining with incomplete information on one side, and on both sides. The last chapter discusses the relationship of the authors' theory to other recently proposed solution concepts, particularly the Kohberg-Mertens stability theory.John C. Harsanyi is Flood Research Professor in Business Administration and Professor of Economics, University of California, Berkeley. Reinhard Selten is Professor of Economics Institute of Social and Economic Sciences: University of Bonn, Federal Republic of Germany.
Book Synopsis The Theory of Extensive Form Games by : Carlos Alós-Ferrer
Download or read book The Theory of Extensive Form Games written by Carlos Alós-Ferrer and published by Springer. This book was released on 2016-07-08 with total page 251 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book treats extensive form game theory in full generality. It provides a framework that does not rely on any finiteness assumptions at all, yet covers the finite case. The presentation starts by identifying the appropriate concept of a game tree. This concept represents a synthesis of earlier approaches, including the graph-theoretical and the decision-theoretical ones. It then provides a general model of sequential, interpersonal decision making, called extensive decision problems. Extensive forms are a special case thereof, which is such that all strategy profiles induce outcomes and do so uniquely. Requiring the existence of immediate predecessors yields discrete extensive forms, which are still general enough to cover almost all applications. The treatment culminates in a characterization of the topologies on the plays of the game tree that admit equilibrium analysis.
Book Synopsis Existence of Equilibria in Incomplete Information Games with Disturbed Payoffs by : Brian John Crone
Download or read book Existence of Equilibria in Incomplete Information Games with Disturbed Payoffs written by Brian John Crone and published by . This book was released on 1990 with total page 212 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis The Existence of Subgame-perfect Equilibrium in Games with Simultaneous Moves by : Christopher Harris
Download or read book The Existence of Subgame-perfect Equilibrium in Games with Simultaneous Moves written by Christopher Harris and published by . This book was released on 1990 with total page 62 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis An Introduction to Game Theory by : Martin J. Osborne
Download or read book An Introduction to Game Theory written by Martin J. Osborne and published by Oxford University Press, USA. This book was released on 2009-01 with total page 533 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This text emphasizes the ideas behind modern game theory rather than their mathematical expression, but defines all concepts precisely. It covers strategic, extensive and coalitional games and includes the topics of repeated games, bargaining theory and evolutionary equilibrium.
Book Synopsis Game Theory, Alive by : Anna R. Karlin
Download or read book Game Theory, Alive written by Anna R. Karlin and published by American Mathematical Soc.. This book was released on 2017-04-27 with total page 400 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We live in a highly connected world with multiple self-interested agents interacting and myriad opportunities for conflict and cooperation. The goal of game theory is to understand these opportunities. This book presents a rigorous introduction to the mathematics of game theory without losing sight of the joy of the subject. This is done by focusing on theoretical highlights (e.g., at least six Nobel Prize winning results are developed from scratch) and by presenting exciting connections of game theory to other fields such as computer science (algorithmic game theory), economics (auctions and matching markets), social choice (voting theory), biology (signaling and evolutionary stability), and learning theory. Both classical topics, such as zero-sum games, and modern topics, such as sponsored search auctions, are covered. Along the way, beautiful mathematical tools used in game theory are introduced, including convexity, fixed-point theorems, and probabilistic arguments. The book is appropriate for a first course in game theory at either the undergraduate or graduate level, whether in mathematics, economics, computer science, or statistics. The importance of game-theoretic thinking transcends the academic setting—for every action we take, we must consider not only its direct effects, but also how it influences the incentives of others.
Download or read book Game Theory written by Drew Fudenberg and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 1991-08-29 with total page 616 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This advanced text introduces the principles of noncooperative game theory in a direct and uncomplicated style that will acquaint students with the broad spectrum of the field while highlighting and explaining what they need to know at any given point. This advanced text introduces the principles of noncooperative game theory—including strategic form games, Nash equilibria, subgame perfection, repeated games, and games of incomplete information—in a direct and uncomplicated style that will acquaint students with the broad spectrum of the field while highlighting and explaining what they need to know at any given point. The analytic material is accompanied by many applications, examples, and exercises. The theory of noncooperative games studies the behavior of agents in any situation where each agent's optimal choice may depend on a forecast of the opponents' choices. "Noncooperative" refers to choices that are based on the participant's perceived selfinterest. Although game theory has been applied to many fields, Fudenberg and Tirole focus on the kinds of game theory that have been most useful in the study of economic problems. They also include some applications to political science. The fourteen chapters are grouped in parts that cover static games of complete information, dynamic games of complete information, static games of incomplete information, dynamic games of incomplete information, and advanced topics.
Book Synopsis Subgame Perfect Equilibria and Communication in Stage Games by : Alejandro Manelli
Download or read book Subgame Perfect Equilibria and Communication in Stage Games written by Alejandro Manelli and published by . This book was released on 2000 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Any stage-game with infinite choice sets can be approximated by finite games obtained as increasingly finer discretizations of the infinite game. The subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of the finite games converge to a limit distribution. We prove that (i) if the limit distribution is feasible in the limit game, then it is also a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the limit game; and (ii) if the limit distribution prescribes sufficiently diffused behavior for first-stage players, then it is a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the limit game. These results are potentially useful in determining the existence of subgame perfect equilibria in applications. As an illustration of this potential, it is shown that the addition of cheap talk to the games considered restores" the existence of subgame perfect equilibria.
Book Synopsis Epistemic Game Theory by : Andrés Perea
Download or read book Epistemic Game Theory written by Andrés Perea and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2012-06-07 with total page 581 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The first textbook to explain the principles of epistemic game theory.
Book Synopsis The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Science by : Paul Humphreys
Download or read book The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Science written by Paul Humphreys and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 2016-08-04 with total page 945 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This handbook provides both an overview of state-of-the-art scholarship in philosophy of science, as well as a guide to new directions in the discipline. Section I contains broad overviews of the main lines of research and the state of established knowledge in six principal areas of the discipline, including computational, physical, biological, psychological and social sciences, as well as general philosophy of science. Section II covers what are considered to be the traditional topics in the philosophy of science, such as causation, probability, models, ethics and values, and explanation. Section III identifies new areas of investigation that show promise of becoming important areas of research, including the philosophy of astronomy and astrophysics, data, complexity theory, neuroscience, simulations, post-Kuhnian philosophy, post-empiricist epistemology, and emergence. Most chapters are accessible to scientifically educated non-philosophers as well as to professional philosophers, and the contributors - all leading researchers in their field -- bring diverse perspectives from the North American, European, and Australasian research communities. This volume is an essential resource for scholars and students.
Book Synopsis Repeated Games with Incomplete Information by : Robert J. Aumann
Download or read book Repeated Games with Incomplete Information written by Robert J. Aumann and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 1995 with total page 372 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The basic model studied throughout the book is one in which players ignorant about the game being played must learn what they can from the actions of the others.
Download or read book Game Theory written by Drew Fudenberg and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 1991-08-29 with total page 616 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This advanced text introduces the principles of noncooperative game theory in a direct and uncomplicated style that will acquaint students with the broad spectrum of the field while highlighting and explaining what they need to know at any given point. This advanced text introduces the principles of noncooperative game theory—including strategic form games, Nash equilibria, subgame perfection, repeated games, and games of incomplete information—in a direct and uncomplicated style that will acquaint students with the broad spectrum of the field while highlighting and explaining what they need to know at any given point. The analytic material is accompanied by many applications, examples, and exercises. The theory of noncooperative games studies the behavior of agents in any situation where each agent's optimal choice may depend on a forecast of the opponents' choices. "Noncooperative" refers to choices that are based on the participant's perceived selfinterest. Although game theory has been applied to many fields, Fudenberg and Tirole focus on the kinds of game theory that have been most useful in the study of economic problems. They also include some applications to political science. The fourteen chapters are grouped in parts that cover static games of complete information, dynamic games of complete information, static games of incomplete information, dynamic games of incomplete information, and advanced topics.
Book Synopsis Oligopoly and the Theory of Games by : James W. Friedman
Download or read book Oligopoly and the Theory of Games written by James W. Friedman and published by North-Holland. This book was released on 1977 with total page 334 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria by : Eric van Damme
Download or read book Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria written by Eric van Damme and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2012-12-06 with total page 331 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The last decade has seen a steady increase in the application of concepts from noncooperative game theory to such diverse fields as economics, political science, law, operations research, biology and social psychology. As a byproduct of this increased activity, there has been a growing awareness of the fact that the basic noncooperative solution concept, that of Nash equilibrium, suffers from severe drawbacks. The two main shortcomings of this concept are the following: (i) In extensive form games, a Nash strategy may prescribe off the equilibrium path behavior that is manifestly irrational. (Specifically, Nash equilibria may involve incredible threats), (ii) Nash equilibria need not be robust with respect to small perturbations in the data of the game. Confronted with the growing evidence to the detriment of the Nash concept, game theorists were prompted to search for more refined equilibrium notions with better properties and they have come up with a wide array of alternative solution concepts. This book surveys the most important refinements that have been introduced. Its objectives are fourfold (i) to illustrate desirable properties as well as drawbacks of the various equilibrium notions by means of simple specific examples, (ii) to study the relationships between the various refinements, (iii) to derive simplifying characterizations, and (iv) to discuss the plausibility of the assumptions underlying the concepts.
