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Mixed Equilibria In Games Of Strategic Complementarities
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Book Synopsis Mixed Equilibria in Games of Strategic Complements Are Unstable by : Federico Echenique
Download or read book Mixed Equilibria in Games of Strategic Complements Are Unstable written by Federico Echenique and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In games with strict strategic complementarities, properly mixed Nash equilibria - equilibria that are not in pure strategies - are unstable for a broad class of learning dynamics.
Book Synopsis Mixed Equilibria in Games of Strategic Complementarities by : Federico Echenique
Download or read book Mixed Equilibria in Games of Strategic Complementarities written by Federico Echenique and published by . This book was released on 2000 with total page 16 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis On the Learning and Stability of Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria in Games of Strategic Substitutes by : Eric Hoffmann
Download or read book On the Learning and Stability of Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria in Games of Strategic Substitutes written by Eric Hoffmann and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Essays in Monotone Comparative Statics and the Theory of Games with Strategic Complementarities by : Federico Manuel Echenique
Download or read book Essays in Monotone Comparative Statics and the Theory of Games with Strategic Complementarities written by Federico Manuel Echenique and published by . This book was released on 2000 with total page 224 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Contests written by Michael Landsberger and published by . This book was released on 2001 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Actions in games that address economic environments such as auctions and oligopoly games are typically costly, and signals are interdependent. Consequently, such games may not have equilibria supported by monotone strategies (monotone equilibria, see Landsberger and Tsirelson (1999)and (2000)). Derivation of pure strategy non-monotone equilibria when signals are interdependent and continuously distributed has not been explored in the literature, and it is certainly a non trivial matter; mixed strategy equilibria pose additional problems. We address these issues by considering a contest game that can be interpreted as competition for research funds or jobs. Assuming a multinormal distribution of signals, we were able to establish a mixed strategy equilibrium and prove that this is the only equilibrium in the class of all equilibria. Various properties of this equilibrium were established. We showed some pitfalls one may encounter when trying to impose a-priori (reasonable) restrictions on strategies, or trying to conduct the analysis assuming a general class of signal distribution.
Book Synopsis Refinements of the Nash Equilibrium Concept by : Eric van Damme
Download or read book Refinements of the Nash Equilibrium Concept written by Eric van Damme and published by Springer. This book was released on 1983 with total page 164 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Unique Solutions for Strategic Games by : Werner Güth
Download or read book Unique Solutions for Strategic Games written by Werner Güth and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2012-12-06 with total page 211 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book develops a general solution concept for strategic games which resolves strategic uncertainty completely. The concept is described by a mathematically formulated solution procedure and illustrated by applying it to many interesting examples. A long nontechnical introduction tries to survey and to discuss the more technical parts of the book. The book and especially the introduction provide firm and consistent guidance for scholars of game theory. There are many open problems which could inspire further research efforts.
Book Synopsis On the Existence of Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria by : Pavlo Prokopovych
Download or read book On the Existence of Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria written by Pavlo Prokopovych and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 35 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The focus of this paper is on developing geometric sufficient conditions for the existence of a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium for both diagonally transfer continuous and better-reply secure games. First, we show that employing the concept of diagonal transfer continuity in place of better-reply security might be advantageous when the existence of a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium is concerned. Then, we study equilibrium existence in better-reply secure games possessing a payoff secure mixed extension. With the aid of an example we show that such games need not have mixed strategy Nash equilibria. We provide some easily verifiable conditions for the mixed extension of a two-person game that is reciprocally upper semicontinuous and uniformly payoff secure to be better-reply secure.
Book Synopsis The Berge Equilibrium: A Game-Theoretic Framework for the Golden Rule of Ethics by : Mindia E. Salukvadze
Download or read book The Berge Equilibrium: A Game-Theoretic Framework for the Golden Rule of Ethics written by Mindia E. Salukvadze and published by Springer Nature. This book was released on 2020-02-18 with total page 290 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The goal of this book is to elaborate on the main principles of the theory of the Berge equilibrium by answering the following two questions: What are the basic properties of the Berge equilibrium? Does the Berge equilibrium exist, and how can it be calculated? The Golden Rule of ethics, which appears in Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Buddhism, Confucianism and other world religions, states the following: “Behave towards others as you would like them to behave towards you." In any game, each party of conflict seeks to maximize some payoff. Therefore, for each player, the Golden Rule is implemented through the maximization of his/her payoff by all other players, which matches well with the concept of the Berge equilibrium. The approach presented here will be of particular interest to researchers (including undergraduates and graduates) and economists focused on decision-making under complex conflict conditions. The peaceful resolution of conflicts is the cornerstone of the approach: as a matter of fact, the Golden Rule precludes military clashes and violence. In turn, the new approach requires new methods; in particular, the existence problems are reduced to saddle point design for the Germeier convolution of payoff functions, with further transition to mixed strategies in accordance with the standard procedure employed by E. Borel, J. von Neumann, J. Nash, and their followers. Moreover, this new approach has proven to be efficient and fruitful with regard to a range of other important problems in mathematical game theory, which are considered in the Appendix.
Book Synopsis Game Equilibrium Models III by : Reinhard Selten
Download or read book Game Equilibrium Models III written by Reinhard Selten and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2013-03-09 with total page 292 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The four volumes of Game Equilibrium Models present applications of non-cooperative game theory. Problems of strategic interaction arising in biology, economics, political science and the social sciences in general are treated in 42 papers on a wide variety of subjects. Internationally known authors with backgrounds in various disciplines have contributed original research. The reader finds innovative modelling combined with advanced methods of analysis. The four volumes are the outcome of a research year at the Center for Interdisciplinary Studies of the University of Bielefeld. The close interaction of an international interdisciplinary group of researchers has produced an unusual collection of remarkable results of great interest for everybody who wants to be informed on the scope, potential, and future direction of work in applied game theory. Volume III Strategic Bargaining contains ten papers on game equilibrium models of bargaining. All these contributions look at bargaining situations as non-cooperative games. General models of two-person and n-person bargaining are explored.
Book Synopsis Strategic Social Choice and Mixed-strategy Equilibria in Two-person Games by : Manfred Joseph Holler
Download or read book Strategic Social Choice and Mixed-strategy Equilibria in Two-person Games written by Manfred Joseph Holler and published by . This book was released on 1988 with total page 19 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis On the Existence of Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibriai by : Pavlo Prokopovych
Download or read book On the Existence of Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibriai written by Pavlo Prokopovych and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The focus of this paper is on developing verifiable sufficient conditions for the existence of a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium for both diagonally transfer continuous and better-reply secure games. First, we show that employing the concept of diagonal transfer continuity in place of better-reply security might be advantageous when the existence of a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium is concerned. Then, we study equilibrium existence in better-reply secure games possessing a payoff secure mixed extension. With the aid of an example, we show that such games need not have mixed strategy Nash equilibria. We provide geometric conditions for the mixed extension of a two-person game that is reciprocally upper semicontinuous and uniformly payoff secure to be better-reply secure.
Book Synopsis Mixed-Strategy Equilibria in the Nash Demand Game by : David A. Malueg
Download or read book Mixed-Strategy Equilibria in the Nash Demand Game written by David A. Malueg and published by . This book was released on 2005 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In the Nash Demand Game each of two players announces the share he demands of an amount of money that may be split between them. If the demands can be satisfied, they are; otherwise, neither player receives any money. This game has many pure-strategy Nash equilibria. This note characterizes mixed-strategy Nash equilibria. The condition critical for existence of an equilibrium is that players' sets of possible demands be balanced. Two sets of demands are balanced if each demand in one set can be matched with a demand in the other set such that they sum to one. For Nash's original game, a complete characterization is given of the equilibria in which both players' expected payoffs are strictly positive.
Book Synopsis Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume I by : Luis C. Corchón
Download or read book Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume I written by Luis C. Corchón and published by Edward Elgar Publishing. This book was released on 2018-02-23 with total page 567 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The first volume of this wide-ranging Handbook contains original contributions by world-class specialists. It provides up-to-date surveys of the main game-theoretic tools commonly used to model industrial organization topics. The Handbook covers numerous subjects in detail including, among others, the tools of lattice programming, supermodular and aggregative games, monopolistic competition, horizontal and vertically differentiated good models, dynamic and Stackelberg games, entry games, evolutionary games with adaptive players, asymmetric information, moral hazard, learning and information sharing models.
Book Synopsis On Strategic Complementarities in Discontinuous Games with Totally Ordered Strategies by : Pavlo Prokopovych
Download or read book On Strategic Complementarities in Discontinuous Games with Totally Ordered Strategies written by Pavlo Prokopovych and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page 18 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper studies the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in games with strategic complementarities where the strategy sets are totally ordered. By relaxing the conventional conditions related to upper semicontinuity and single crossing, we enlarge the class of games to which monotone techniques are applicable. The results are illustrated with a number of economics-related examples.
Book Synopsis Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria in Boolean Games by : Han Dongge
Download or read book Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria in Boolean Games written by Han Dongge and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page 84 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis A Characterization of Strategic Complementarities by : Federico Echenique
Download or read book A Characterization of Strategic Complementarities written by Federico Echenique and published by . This book was released on 2005 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: I characterize games for which there is an order on strategies such that the game has strategic complementarities. I prove that, with some qualifications, games with a unique equilibrium have complementarities if and only if Cournot best-response dynamics has no cycles; and that all games with multiple equilibria have complementarities. As applications of my results, I show: 1. That generic 2X2 games either have no pure-strategy equilibria, or have complementarities. 2. That generic two-player finite ordinal potential games have complementarities.
