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Managerial Incentives And Corporate Performance
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Book Synopsis Symposium on Managerial Incentives and Corporate Performance: Effects of Executive Compensation, Organzational Structure, Takeovers, and Government Policy by : Ray Ball
Download or read book Symposium on Managerial Incentives and Corporate Performance: Effects of Executive Compensation, Organzational Structure, Takeovers, and Government Policy written by Ray Ball and published by . This book was released on 1993 with total page 380 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Managerial Incentives and Corporate Performance by : Ray Ball
Download or read book Managerial Incentives and Corporate Performance written by Ray Ball and published by . This book was released on 1993 with total page 380 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Managerial Incentives and Corporate Governance by : Musbau Kolawole Kayode
Download or read book Managerial Incentives and Corporate Governance written by Musbau Kolawole Kayode and published by GRIN Verlag. This book was released on 2015-08-26 with total page 18 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Research Paper (undergraduate) from the year 2015 in the subject Business economics - Accounting and Taxes, grade: A, ( Atlantic International University ) (SCHOOL OF BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS), language: English, abstract: Corporate governance involves different checks and balances with the ability to influence the incentives and monitoring of a firm’s management. Sound corporate governance is predominantly essential when a firm’s management is different from its ownership. Randall (2009) argued that in the absence of appropriate corporate governance, managers who are separate from a company’s ownership may not be incentivized to work hard towards achieving shareholders’ goal of maximizing profits. Instead, non-owner managers might end up lavishly spending money and other resources in ways that directly benefits themselves, for example on perks, and living an expensive life. Surprisingly, some other managers may be tempted to spend firm’s money to accumulate personal wealth through frauds or theft.
Book Synopsis Investment, Dividends, Firm Performance and Managerial Incentives by : Mahmoud Agha
Download or read book Investment, Dividends, Firm Performance and Managerial Incentives written by Mahmoud Agha and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We combine the incentive schemes offered to managers in practice into a single incentive package and construct a governance index to analyze the role of governance and the incentive package in addressing the agency costs of free cash flow. Using US based data, we find empirical evidence that managers in practice do not consume perks but make a tradeoff when they allocate the cash flows of the firm between investment and dividends. In general, managers in practice underinvest and overpay dividends; an increase in their incentive package would retract both investment and dividends toward the optimal levels; hence, firm performance would improve. We also find that governance is used as a control mechanism rather than as a substitute for the incentive package. Principals employ governance to slow down investment and increase dividends when there is a high informational asymmetry between the manager and the investors, and set these variables close to the optimal levels otherwise. Moreover, we find that firms in practice do not use dividends as a substitute for governance. Furthermore, we find monotone relations between investment, firm performance and dividends on the one hand, and governance and the incentive package on the other hand.
Book Synopsis Agency Problems and Financial Contracting by : Amir Barnea
Download or read book Agency Problems and Financial Contracting written by Amir Barnea and published by Prentice Hall. This book was released on 1985 with total page 184 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Managerial Incentives, Corporate Investment, and Economic Performance by : Francisco Covas
Download or read book Managerial Incentives, Corporate Investment, and Economic Performance written by Francisco Covas and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page 118 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Enhancing Managerial Incentives and Value Creation by : Unyong Pyo
Download or read book Enhancing Managerial Incentives and Value Creation written by Unyong Pyo and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 37 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: I study changes in CEO compensation and pay-performance relations to examine how corporate spinoffs affect managerial incentive compensation and whether the changes in management compensation can explain the value enhancement and operating performance improvements that occur following spinoffs. Analyzing a sample of 124 non-taxable spinoffs during 1990-1997, I find that changes in managerial compensation are a significant motive for spinoffs. Changes in managerial incentives alone are consistent with the post-spinoff changes in operating performance, while changes in business focus are not. Spinoffs that are not accompanied by enhanced pay-performance relations do not improve operating performance even with increased business focus.
Book Synopsis Managerial Incentives, Corporate Investment, and Economic Preference by : Francisco Covas
Download or read book Managerial Incentives, Corporate Investment, and Economic Preference written by Francisco Covas and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page 268 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Pay without Performance by : Lucian Bebchuk
Download or read book Pay without Performance written by Lucian Bebchuk and published by Harvard University Press. This book was released on 2006-09-30 with total page 293 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The company is under-performing, its share price is trailing, and the CEO gets...a multi-million-dollar raise. This story is familiar, for good reason: as this book clearly demonstrates, structural flaws in corporate governance have produced widespread distortions in executive pay. Pay without Performance presents a disconcerting portrait of managers' influence over their own pay--and of a governance system that must fundamentally change if firms are to be managed in the interest of shareholders. Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried demonstrate that corporate boards have persistently failed to negotiate at arm's length with the executives they are meant to oversee. They give a richly detailed account of how pay practices--from option plans to retirement benefits--have decoupled compensation from performance and have camouflaged both the amount and performance-insensitivity of pay. Executives' unwonted influence over their compensation has hurt shareholders by increasing pay levels and, even more importantly, by leading to practices that dilute and distort managers' incentives. This book identifies basic problems with our current reliance on boards as guardians of shareholder interests. And the solution, the authors argue, is not merely to make these boards more independent of executives as recent reforms attempt to do. Rather, boards should also be made more dependent on shareholders by eliminating the arrangements that entrench directors and insulate them from their shareholders. A powerful critique of executive compensation and corporate governance, Pay without Performance points the way to restoring corporate integrity and improving corporate performance.
Book Synopsis Advances in Economic Theory by : Truman Fassett Bewley
Download or read book Advances in Economic Theory written by Truman Fassett Bewley and published by CUP Archive. This book was released on 1989-07-28 with total page 452 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: These articles should be helpful to anyone with training in economics.
Book Synopsis Managerial Incentives and Corporate Acquisitions by : Athanasios Tsekeris
Download or read book Managerial Incentives and Corporate Acquisitions written by Athanasios Tsekeris and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This thesis examines the impact of executive compensation on the quality of corporate acquisition decisions. A number of different issues are empirically investigated. The analysis begins with the examination of the relation between the incentives managers are provided with via their compensation contracts and the riskiness of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) investigating whether this relation is affected by the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002. The study then focuses on the performance of acquiring firms exploring how and whether managerial incentives can induce value-increasing acquisitions conditional on the intensity of M&A activity. The final part of the empirical analysis examines whether the legal status of the target firm has any implications for the effectiveness of incentive compensation to mitigate managerial risk-aversion and increase shareholder value. The thesis contributes both to academic literature and to practice by identifying areas of inefficiencies of equity-based compensation contracts to mitigate agency costs. More specifically, new evidence is provided on the effectiveness of incentive compensation to induce risk-taking activity under the impact of stricter regulation. While compensation-related incentives are positively associated with the riskiness of acquisition decisions before 2002, managers have become considerably less responsive to such incentives after the enactment of SOX. Moreover, although incentive compensation can improve deal performance and overcome adverse selection concerns by inducing managers to acquire when it is optimal to do, it is not related to value-increasing decisions when acquisitions are initiated during periods of merger waves. It is further found that equity-based compensation can be rendered ineffective to mitigate agency costs when a publicly listed firm is acquired. Given these inefficiencies, a number of recommendations are made for the improvement of the design of executive compensation contracts that could provide valuable guidelines to remuneration committees to reduce excessive compensation costs and benefit shareholders.
Book Synopsis Managerial Incentives in Nonprofit Organizations by : R. Lawrence Van Horn
Download or read book Managerial Incentives in Nonprofit Organizations written by R. Lawrence Van Horn and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper examines the incentives of CEOs in a large sample of nonprofit hospitals. The evidence indicates that both turnover and compensation of these CEOs are significantly related to financial performance (return on assets). We find no evidence that nonprofit hospitals provide explicit incentives for their CEOs to focus on altruistic activities. The turnover/performance relation appears stronger in nonprofit hospitals than in for-profit hospitals and other for-profit corporations (our data do not allow us to compare compensation incentives). Past research suggests that there is little distinction between the outputs and behaviors of private nonprofit and for-profit hospitals. Consistent with these findings, our study suggests that managers face incentives to concentrate on financial performance in both types of organizations.
Book Synopsis Corporate Payout Policy by : Harry DeAngelo
Download or read book Corporate Payout Policy written by Harry DeAngelo and published by Now Publishers Inc. This book was released on 2009 with total page 215 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Corporate Payout Policy synthesizes the academic research on payout policy and explains "how much, when, and how". That is (i) the overall value of payouts over the life of the enterprise, (ii) the time profile of a firm's payouts across periods, and (iii) the form of those payouts. The authors conclude that today's theory does a good job of explaining the general features of corporate payout policies, but some important gaps remain. So while our emphasis is to clarify "what we know" about payout policy, the authors also identify a number of interesting unresolved questions for future research. Corporate Payout Policy discusses potential influences on corporate payout policy including managerial use of payouts to signal future earnings to outside investors, individuals' behavioral biases that lead to sentiment-based demands for distributions, the desire of large block stockholders to maintain corporate control, and personal tax incentives to defer payouts. The authors highlight four important "carry-away" points: the literature's focus on whether repurchases will (or should) drive out dividends is misplaced because it implicitly assumes that a single payout vehicle is optimal; extant empirical evidence is strongly incompatible with the notion that the primary purpose of dividends is to signal managers' views of future earnings to outside investors; over-confidence on the part of managers is potentially a first-order determinant of payout policy because it induces them to over-retain resources to invest in dubious projects and so behavioral biases may, in fact, turn out to be more important than agency costs in explaining why investors pressure firms to accelerate payouts; the influence of controlling stockholders on payout policy --- particularly in non-U.S. firms, where controlling stockholders are common --- is a promising area for future research. Corporate Payout Policy is required reading for both researchers and practitioners interested in understanding this central topic in corporate finance and governance.
Book Synopsis Pay Without Performance by : Lucian A. Bebchuk
Download or read book Pay Without Performance written by Lucian A. Bebchuk and published by Harvard University Press. This book was released on 2004 with total page 308 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The company is under-performing, its share price is trailing, and the CEO gets...a multi-million-dollar raise. This story is familiar, for good reason: as this book clearly demonstrates, structural flaws in corporate governance have produced widespread distortions in executive pay. Pay without Performance presents a disconcerting portrait of managers' influence over their own pay--and of a governance system that must fundamentally change if firms are to be managed in the interest of shareholders. Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried demonstrate that corporate boards have persistently failed to negotiate at arm's length with the executives they are meant to oversee. They give a richly detailed account of how pay practices--from option plans to retirement benefits--have decoupled compensation from performance and have camouflaged both the amount and performance-insensitivity of pay. Executives' unwonted influence over their compensation has hurt shareholders by increasing pay levels and, even more importantly, by leading to practices that dilute and distort managers' incentives. This book identifies basic problems with our current reliance on boards as guardians of shareholder interests. And the solution, the authors argue, is not merely to make these boards more independent of executives as recent reforms attempt to do. Rather, boards should also be made more dependent on shareholders by eliminating the arrangements that entrench directors and insulate them from their shareholders. A powerful critique of executive compensation and corporate governance, Pay without Performance points the way to restoring corporate integrity and improving corporate performance.
Download or read book Pay for Results written by Mercer, LLC and published by John Wiley & Sons. This book was released on 2009-03-17 with total page 288 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The numerous incentive approaches and combinations and their implications can be dizzying even to the compensation professional. Pay for Results provides a road map for developing and implementing executive incentives that drive business needs and strategy. It is filled with specific analytic tools, including tables, exhibits, forms, checklists. In addition, it uncovers myths in performance measurement strategy and design. Timely and thorough, this book expertly shows businesses how to drive their specific needs and strategy. Human resources and compensation officers will discover how to apply performance metrics that align with shareholder investment.
Book Synopsis Firm Value and Managerial Incentives by : Michel Habib
Download or read book Firm Value and Managerial Incentives written by Michel Habib and published by . This book was released on 2000 with total page 60 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Managerial Incentives and Value Creation by : Phillip Leslie
Download or read book Managerial Incentives and Value Creation written by Phillip Leslie and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 58 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We analyze the differences between companies owned by private equity (PE) investors and similar public companies. We document that PE-owned companies use much stronger incentives for their top executives and have substantially higher debt levels. However, we find little evidence that PE-owned firms outperform public firms in profitability or operational efficiency. We also show that the compensation and debt differences between PE-owned companies and public companies disappear over a very short period (one to two years) after the PE-owned firm goes public. Our results raise questions about whether and how PE firms and the incentives they put in place create value.
