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Game Theoretic Analysis Of Voting In Committees
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Book Synopsis Game Theoretic Analysis of Voting in Committees by : Bezalel Peleg
Download or read book Game Theoretic Analysis of Voting in Committees written by Bezalel Peleg and published by . This book was released on 1984 with total page 200 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book is a theoretical and completely rigorous analysis of voting in committees that provides mathematical proof of the existence of democratic voting systems, which are immune to the manipulation of preferences of coalitions of voters. The author begins by determining the power distribution among voters that is induced by a voting rule, giving particular consideration to choice by plurality voting and Borda's rule. He then constructs, for all possible committees, well-behaved representative voting procedures which are not distorted by strategic voting, giving complete solutions for certain important classes of committees. The solution to the problem of mass elections is fully characterised.
Author :Nicola Friederike Maaser Publisher :Springer Science & Business Media ISBN 13 :3642041531 Total Pages :141 pages Book Rating :4.6/5 (42 download)
Book Synopsis Decision-Making in Committees by : Nicola Friederike Maaser
Download or read book Decision-Making in Committees written by Nicola Friederike Maaser and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2010-01-22 with total page 141 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Political and economic institutions are typically governed by committees that face the challenge to reconcile the preferences of their members. How should decision rules be designed to generate fair and sustainable agreements, for example if committee members represent groups of different sizes? This book uses game-theoretic concepts and models to address the issue of political decision-making processes. In addition to providing a survey on basic game-theoretic tools in the analysis of political decisions, the author looks at specific issues such as two-tiered voting systems or the influence of lobbyists on legislative committees, and shows how the models can be applied to real-world contexts such as the EU decision-making institutions.
Book Synopsis Game Theoretic Analysis of Voting in Committees by : Bezalel Peleg
Download or read book Game Theoretic Analysis of Voting in Committees written by Bezalel Peleg and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2008-10-14 with total page 180 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book is a theoretical and completely rigorous analysis of voting in committees that provides mathematical proof of the existence of democratic voting systems, which are immune to the manipulation of preferences of coalitions of voters. The author begins by determining the power distribution among voters that is induced by a voting rule, giving particular consideration to choice by plurality voting and Borda's rule. He then constructs, for all possible committees, well-behaved representative voting procedures which are not distorted by strategic voting, giving complete solutions for certain important classes of committees. The solution to the problem of mass elections is fully characterised.
Book Synopsis The Theory of Committees and Elections by Duncan Black and Committee Decisions with Complementary Valuation by Duncan Black and R.A. Newing by : Iain S. McLean
Download or read book The Theory of Committees and Elections by Duncan Black and Committee Decisions with Complementary Valuation by Duncan Black and R.A. Newing written by Iain S. McLean and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2013-03-09 with total page 492 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: R. H. Coase Duncan Black was a close and dear friend. A man of great simplicity, un worldly, modest, diffident, with no pretensions, he was devoted to scholarship. In his single-minded search for the truth, he is an example to us all. Black's first degree at the University of Glasgow was in mathematics and physics. Mathematics as taught at Glasgow seems to have been designed for engineers and did not excite him and he switched to economics, which he found more congenial. But it was not in a lecture in economics but in one on politics that he found his star. One lecturer, A. K. White, discussed the possibility of constructing a pure science of politics. This question caught his imagination, perhaps because of his earlier training in physics, and it came to absorb his thoughts for the rest of his life. But almost certainly nothing would have come of it were it not for his appointment to the newly formed Dundee School of Economics where the rest of the. teaching staff came from the London School of Economics. At Glasgow, economics, as in the time of Adam Smith, was linked with moral philosophy. At Dundee, Black was introduced to the analytical x The Theory o/Committees and Elections approach dominant at the London School of Economics. This gave him the approach he used in his attempt to construct a pure science of politics.
Book Synopsis Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare by : Kenneth J. Arrow
Download or read book Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare written by Kenneth J. Arrow and published by Elsevier. This book was released on 2010-10-13 with total page 985 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This second part of a two-volume set continues to describe economists' efforts to quantify the social decisions people necessarily make and the philosophies that those choices define. Contributors draw on lessons from philosophy, history, and other disciplines, but they ultimately use editor Kenneth Arrow's seminal work on social choice as a jumping-off point for discussing ways to incentivize, punish, and distribute goods. - Develops many subjects from Volume 1 (2002) while introducing new themes in welfare economics and social choice theory - Features four sections: Foundations, Developments of the Basic Arrovian Schemes, Fairness and Rights, and Voting and Manipulation - Appeals to readers who seek introductions to writings on human well-being and collective decision-making - Presents a spectrum of material, from initial insights and basic functions to important variations on basic schemes
Book Synopsis Game Theory: A Nontechnical Introduction To The Analysis Of Strategy (Fourth Edition) by : Roger A Mccain
Download or read book Game Theory: A Nontechnical Introduction To The Analysis Of Strategy (Fourth Edition) written by Roger A Mccain and published by World Scientific. This book was released on 2023-05-29 with total page 548 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: As with the previous editions, this fourth edition relies on teaching by example and the Karplus Learning Cycle to convey the ideas of game theory in a way that is approachable, intuitive, and interdisciplinary. Noncooperative equilibrium concepts such as Nash equilibrium, mixed strategy equilibria, and subgame perfect equilibrium are systematically introduced in the first half of the book. Bayesian Nash equilibrium is briefly introduced. The subsequent chapters discuss cooperative solutions with and without side payments, rationalizable strategies and correlated equilibria, and applications to elections, social mechanism design, and larger-scale games. New examples include panic buying, supply-chain shifts in the pandemic, and global warming.
Book Synopsis Game Theory: A Nontechnical Introduction To The Analysis Of Strategy (3rd Edition) by : Roger A Mccain
Download or read book Game Theory: A Nontechnical Introduction To The Analysis Of Strategy (3rd Edition) written by Roger A Mccain and published by World Scientific Publishing Company. This book was released on 2014-04-29 with total page 599 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The objective of the third edition of Game Theory: A Nontechnical Introduction to the Analysis of Strategy is to introduce the ideas of game theory in a way that is approachable, intuitive, and interdisciplinary. Relying on the Karplus Learning Cycle, the book is intended to teach by example. Noncooperative equilibrium concepts such as Nash equilibrium play the central role. In this third edition, increased stress is placed on the concept of rationalizable strategies, which has proven in teaching practice to assist students in making the bridge from intuitive to more formal concepts of noncooperative equilibrium.The Instructor Manual and PowerPoint Slides for the book are available upon request for all instructors who adopt this book as a course text. Please send your request to [email protected].
Book Synopsis A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Coalition Formation by : Debraj Ray
Download or read book A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Coalition Formation written by Debraj Ray and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 2007-11 with total page 336 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Drawing upon and extending his inaugural Lipsey Lectures, Debraj Ray looks at coalition formation from the perspective of game theory. Ray brings together developments in both cooperative and noncooperative game theory to study the analytics of coalition formation and binding agreements.
Book Synopsis Political Game Theory by : Nolan McCarty
Download or read book Political Game Theory written by Nolan McCarty and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2014-10-30 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Political Game Theory is a self-contained introduction to game theory and its applications to political science. The book presents choice theory, social choice theory, static and dynamic games of complete information, static and dynamic games of incomplete information, repeated games, bargaining theory, mechanism design and a mathematical appendix covering, logic, real analysis, calculus and probability theory. The methods employed have many applications in various disciplines including comparative politics, international relations and American politics. Political Game Theory is tailored to students without extensive backgrounds in mathematics, and traditional economics, however there are also many special sections that present technical material that will appeal to more advanced students. A large number of exercises are also provided to practice the skills and techniques discussed.
Book Synopsis Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications by : R.J. Aumann
Download or read book Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications written by R.J. Aumann and published by Elsevier. This book was released on 1992 with total page 824 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This is the second of three volumes surveying the state of the art in Game Theory and its applications to many and varied fields, in particular to economics. The chapters in the present volume are contributed by outstanding authorities, and provide comprehensive coverage and precise statements of the main results in each area. The applications include empirical evidence. The following topics are covered: communication and correlated equilibria, coalitional games and coalition structures, utility and subjective probability, common knowledge, bargaining, zero-sum games, differential games, and applications of game theory to signalling, moral hazard, search, evolutionary biology, international relations, voting procedures, social choice, public economics, politics, and cost allocation. This handbook will be of interest to scholars in economics, political science, psychology, mathematics and biology. For more information on the Handbooks in Economics series, please see our home page on http://www.elsevier.nl/locate/hes
Download or read book GAME THEORY written by Roger B. Myerson and published by Harvard University Press. This book was released on 2013-03-01 with total page 585 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Eminently suited to classroom use as well as individual study, Roger Myerson's introductory text provides a clear and thorough examination of the models, solution concepts, results, and methodological principles of noncooperative and cooperative game theory. Myerson introduces, clarifies, and synthesizes the extraordinary advances made in the subject over the past fifteen years, presents an overview of decision theory, and comprehensively reviews the development of the fundamental models: games in extensive form and strategic form, and Bayesian games with incomplete information.
Book Synopsis Introducing Game Theory and its Applications by : Elliott Mendelson
Download or read book Introducing Game Theory and its Applications written by Elliott Mendelson and published by CRC Press. This book was released on 2016-02-03 with total page 272 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The mathematical study of games is an intriguing endeavor with implications and applications that reach far beyond tic-tac-toe, chess, and poker to economics, business, and even biology and politics. Most texts on the subject, however, are written at the graduate level for those with strong mathematics, economics, or business backgrounds. In
Book Synopsis Collected Papers by : Robert J. Aumann
Download or read book Collected Papers written by Robert J. Aumann and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 2000 with total page 818 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Robert Aumann's career in game theory has spanned over research - from his doctoral dissertation in 1956 to papers as recent as January 1995. Threaded through all of Aumann's work (symbolized in his thesis on knots) is the study of relationships between different ideas, between different phenomena, and between ideas and phenomena. "When you look closely at one scientific idea", writes Aumann, "you find it hitched to all others. It is these hitches that I have tried to study". The papers are organized in several categories: general, knot theory, decision theory (utility and subjective probability), strategic games, coalitional games, and mathematical methods. Aumann has written an introduction to each of these groups that briefly describes the content and background of each paper, including the motivation and the research process, and relates it to other work in the collection and to work by others. There is also a citation index that allows readers to trace the considerable body of literature which cites Aumann's own work.
Download or read book Game Theory written by Michael Maschler and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2020-06-25 with total page 1053 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This new edition is unparalleled in breadth of coverage, thoroughness of technical explanations and number of worked examples.
Book Synopsis Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare by : Kenneth Joseph Arrow
Download or read book Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare written by Kenneth Joseph Arrow and published by Gulf Professional Publishing. This book was released on 2002 with total page 686 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare presents, in two volumes, essays on past and on-going work in social choice theory and welfare economics. The first volume consists of four parts. In Part 1 (Arrovian Impossibility Theorems), various aspects of Arrovian general impossibility theorems, illustrated by the simple majority cycle first identified by Condorcet, are expounded and evaluated. It also provides a critical survey of the work on different escape routes from impossibility results of this kind. In Part 2 (Voting Schemes and Mechanisms), the operation and performance of voting schemes and cost-sharing mechanisms are examined axiomatically, and some aspects of the modern theory of incentives and mechanism design are expounded and surveyed. In Part 3 (structure of social choice rules), the positional rules of collective decision-making (the origin of which can be traced back to a seminal proposal by Borda), the game-theoretic aspects of voting in committees, and the implications of making use of interpersonal comparisons of welfare (with or without cardinal measurability) are expounded, and the status of utilitarianism as a theory of justice is critically examined. It also provides an analytical survey of the foundations of measurement of inequality and poverty. In order to place these broad issues (as well as further issues to be discussed in the second volume of the Handbook) in perspective, Kotaro Suzumura has written an extensive introduction, discussing the historical background of social choice theory, the vistas opened by Arrow's Social Choice and Individual Values, the famous "socialist planning" controversy, and the theoretical and practical significance of social choice theory. The primary purpose of this Handbook is to provide an accessible introduction to the current state of the art in social choice theory and welfare economics. The expounded theory has a strong and constructive message for pursuing human well-being and facilitating collective decision-making. *Advances economists' understanding of recent advances in social choice and welfare *Distills and applies research to a wide range of social issues *Provides analytical material for evaluating new scholarship *Offers consolidated reviews and analyses of scholarship in a framework that encourages synthesis--
Book Synopsis Game Theory for the Social Sciences by : Herve Moulin
Download or read book Game Theory for the Social Sciences written by Herve Moulin and published by NYU Press. This book was released on 1986-10-01 with total page 291 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The second edition of Herve Moulin's highly successful book outlines the fundamental concepts of game theory—one of the most provocative and fruitful applications of mathematics to the human sciences—and demonstrates its uses in economic and political discourse. Thoroughly revised, and now published with an accompanying workbook of 89 exercises, this rigorous yet accessible test explains the uses of game theory in largely nontechnical terms. Moulin carefully discusses the behavioral scenarios underlying the various equilibrium concepts. He provides a self-contained exposition of basic equilibrium concepts for strategic games: perfect (sophisticated) equilibrium, Nash's noncooperative example, Aumann's strong and correlated example, and several versions of the core. The author is concerned less with mathematical refinements than with helping the reader understand the strategic stories backing these concepts. HIs examples therefore give a fair account of the current game models used in economics, politics, and sociology. Addressed here are oligopoly theory, the provision of public gtoods, auctions, voting procedures, and cost allocation problems, as well as the classic prisoner's dilemma, tic-tac-toe, and Marienbad games. Extremely popular in its original French edition and in its first English version, Moulin's excellent introductory text is now, more than ever, the book to answer the essential questions about the application of game theory to the social sciences.
Book Synopsis Social Choice Mechanisms by : Vladimir I. Danilov
Download or read book Social Choice Mechanisms written by Vladimir I. Danilov and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2012-11-02 with total page 193 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The theory of social choice deals with both the processes and results of col lective decision making. In this book, we explore some issues in the theory of social choice and mechanism design. We examine the premises of this theory, the axiomatic approach, and the mechanism design approach. The main questions are what is collective interest, how is it related to individuals' interests, how should one design social interactions, laws, and in stitutions? These questions are not new. Philosophers, social scientists have indeed pondered upon them for years. And, in fact, the organizational struc tures of many social institutions -courts, parliaments, committees and reg ulatory boards -often lack a sound theoretical base. This is not surprising, as it is, indeed, difficult to provide for a comprehensive formalization of the activities of such organizations. Nevertheless, there has been a definite trend towards providing clear and unambiguous rules for collective decision mak ing. These very rules constitute the body of social choice theory and its main object. The basic problem of social choice We explain here more precisely what a problem of social choice is, what approaches might be used to tackle it, and what kind of solutions it leads to. We introduce a few basic notions in preliminarily fashion and, in doing so, we stress both motivations and explanations.
