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Fairness In Incomplete Information Bargaining
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Book Synopsis Fairness in Incomplete Information Bargaining by : Daniel Keniston
Download or read book Fairness in Incomplete Information Bargaining written by Daniel Keniston and published by . This book was released on 2021 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper uses detailed data on sequential offers from seven vastly different real-world bargaining settings to document a robust pattern: agents favor offers that split the difference between the two most recent offers on the table. Our settings include negotiations for used cars, insurance injury claims, a TV game show, auto rickshaw rides, housing, international trade tariffs, and online retail. We demonstrate that this pattern can arise in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of an alternating-offer game with two-sided incomplete information, but this equilibrium is far from unique. We then provide a robust-inference argument to explain why agents may view the two most recent offers as corresponding to the potential surplus. Split-the-difference offers under this weaker, robust inference can then be viewed as fair. We present a number of other patterns in each data setting that point to split-the-difference offers as a strong social norm, whether in high-stakes or low-stakes negotiations.
Book Synopsis Advances in Negotiation Theory by : Carlo Carraro
Download or read book Advances in Negotiation Theory written by Carlo Carraro and published by World Bank Publications. This book was released on 2005 with total page 55 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Abstract: Bargaining is ubiquitous in real life. It is a major dimension of political and business activities. It appears at the international level, when governments negotiate on matters ranging from economic issues (such as the removal of trade barriers), to global security (such as fighting against terrorism) to environmental and related issues (such as climate change control). What factors determine the outcomes of such negotiations? What strategies can help reach an agreement? How should the parties involved divide the gains from cooperation? With whom will one make alliances? The authors address these questions by focusing on a noncooperative approach to negotiations, which is particularly relevant for the study of international negotiations. By reviewing noncooperative bargaining theory, noncooperative coalition theory, and the theory of fair division, they try to identify the connections among these different facets of the same problem in an attempt to facilitate progress toward a unified framework.
Book Synopsis Fairness in Bargaining and Markets by : Christian Korth
Download or read book Fairness in Bargaining and Markets written by Christian Korth and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2009-07-25 with total page 175 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book focuses on economic bargaining theory. Economic bargaining theory seeks to predict the outcomes of bargaining situations. In such situations, govern ments, ?rms, or individuals share a mutual interest in cooperation; however, they also have con?icting interests regarding the terms of an agreement. A classic ex ample of such a situation is wage bargaining between unions and employers. More commonplace examples also exist. For instance, a discussion between partners on how to spend an evening can be understood as a bargaining situation. Economic bargaining theory explores the relationship between bargaining situ ations and the outcomes of the bargaining. Economists have two primary reasons to show interest in this relationship. The ?rst reason is that many important human interactions, including economic interactions, are bargaining situations. The second reason is that the understanding of these situations may inform the economic theory of markets. The tool utilized in this study is the mathematical theory of games. Predictions for bargaining outcomes are developed by modeling the bargaining situation as a strategic game and using game theoretic equilibrium concepts in order to solve the game. In this approach, the speci?c identi?ed bargaining outcome depends on the assumptions underlying the model. The neoclassical and fundamental assumption is that of rational agents—called economic men—who strive to maximize their utility based on stable preferences.
Book Synopsis Bargaining with Incomplete Information by : Peter B. Linhart
Download or read book Bargaining with Incomplete Information written by Peter B. Linhart and published by . This book was released on 1992 with total page 576 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: These 22 contributions to the economic theory of non co-operative bargaining show how incomplete information, small numbers of agents, and the rules governing negotiation interact to cause inefficiency, indeterminacy and delay in bargaining outcomes.
Book Synopsis Bargaining Under Incomplete Information, Fairness, and the Hold-Up Problem by : Ferdinand von Siemens
Download or read book Bargaining Under Incomplete Information, Fairness, and the Hold-Up Problem written by Ferdinand von Siemens and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In the hold-up problem incomplete contracts cause the proceeds of relationship-specific investments to be allocated by bargaining. This paper investigates the corresponding investment incentives if individuals have heterogeneous fairness preferences. Individual preferences are taken to be private information. Investments can then signal preferences and thereby influence beliefs and bargaining behavior. In consequence, individuals might choose high investments in order not to signal information that is unfavorable in the ensuing bargaining.
Book Synopsis Bargaining Under Incomplete Information by : Allan Richard Young
Download or read book Bargaining Under Incomplete Information written by Allan Richard Young and published by . This book was released on 1983 with total page 218 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Bargaining Under Incomplete Information, Fairness, and the Hold-up Problem by : Ferdinand A. von Siemens
Download or read book Bargaining Under Incomplete Information, Fairness, and the Hold-up Problem written by Ferdinand A. von Siemens and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Abstract: "In the hold-up problem incomplete contracts cause the proceeds of relationship-specific investments to be allocated by bargaining. This paper investigates the corresponding investment incentives if individuals have heterogeneous fairness preferences and thus differ in their bargaining behavior. Individual preferences are taken to be private information. Investments can then signal preferences and thereby influence beliefs and bargaining behavior. In consequence, individuals might choose high investments in order not to signal information that is unfavorable in the ensuing bargaining." [author's abstract]
Book Synopsis Bargaining Theory and Fairness by : Arwed Crüger
Download or read book Bargaining Theory and Fairness written by Arwed Crüger and published by . This book was released on 2002 with total page 173 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Two new bargaining games, called "Freedom to Punish (FTP)" and "Right and Choice to Punish (RAP)", are developed, analyzed and tested by means of an experimental implementation. Hypotheses about behavior are developed, discussed and tested. The central hypotheses are aimed at the importance of freedom of choice, on the difference between the FTP game and the RAP game, and on the crowding-out of intrinsic motivation. As might have been expected, fairness plays a role in both games, represented by the frequent appearances of equal splits as well as by the frequent rejections of unfair offers.In addition to that, fairness was crowded out by the new Institution of a veto power decision, confirming the importance of the institutional setting for behavior. Contrary to the few veto power sales in the RAP game, an amazingly high number of receivers refrained from veto power in the FTP game. This significant difference has clearly been attributed to the different information conditions and the existence of a bonus. This bonus can be interpreted in terms of freedom of choice, and exploits a value for the freedom to choose for the first time in experimental economics.
Book Synopsis Incomplete Information Two Person Bargaining with a Finite Set of Possible Agreements by : Clara Ponsati-Obiols
Download or read book Incomplete Information Two Person Bargaining with a Finite Set of Possible Agreements written by Clara Ponsati-Obiols and published by . This book was released on 1988 with total page 158 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Two-person Bargaining Experiments with Incomplete Information by : Bettina Kuon
Download or read book Two-person Bargaining Experiments with Incomplete Information written by Bettina Kuon and published by Springer. This book was released on 1994 with total page 312 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Think of the following situation: A project yielding a gross profit of 100 is offered to two firms. The project can only be conducted by a cooperation of the two firms. No firm is able to conduct the project alone. In order to receive the project the firms have to agree on the allocation of the gross profit. Each of both firms has an alternative project it conducts in case the joint project is not realized. The profitability of an allocation of the joint gross profit for a firm depends on the gross profit from its alternative project. The gross profit from an alternative project can be either 0 (low alternative value) or O.
Book Synopsis Fairness and Transparency in One-to-Many Bargaining Behavior by : Vincent Mak
Download or read book Fairness and Transparency in One-to-Many Bargaining Behavior written by Vincent Mak and published by . This book was released on 2023 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We report an experiment designed to study one-to-many bargaining behavior and how it is influenced by fairness concern and information transparency. We base our setup on a structured alternating-offer bargaining model in which a buyer procures complementary items from two heterogeneous sellers with endogenous choice of the order of bargaining. In addition, we implemented an information transparency manipulation regarding whether the sellers were informed about each other's offers/counteroffers with the buyer. Experimental behavior exhibited deviations from equilibrium predictions that did not differ significantly by information condition, suggesting that sellers were not significantly influenced by direct social comparison between each other. Further analysis suggests that each seller demanded splitting the value of the deal approximately half-half with the buyer as a normative fairness benchmark. The buyers, on the other hand, did not have a demand for fairness that was based on a fairness benchmark.
Book Synopsis Bargaining, Interdependence, and the Rationality of Fair Division by : Giuseppe Lopomo
Download or read book Bargaining, Interdependence, and the Rationality of Fair Division written by Giuseppe Lopomo and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We consider two-person bargaining games with interdependent preferences and bilateral incomplete information. We show that in both the ultimatum game and the two-stage alternating-offers game, our equilibrium predictions are consistent with a number of robust experimental regularities that falsify the standard game theoretic model: occurrence of disagreements, disadvantageous counteroffers, and outcomes that come close to the equal split of the pie. In the context of infinite-horizon bargaining, the implications of the model pertaining to fair outcomes are even stronger. In particular, the Coase property in our case generates "almost" 50-50 splits of the pie, almost immediately. The present approach thus provides a positive theory for the frequently encountered phenomenon of the 50-50 division of the gains from trade.
Book Synopsis Two-Person Bargaining Experiments with Incomplete Information by : Bettina Kuon
Download or read book Two-Person Bargaining Experiments with Incomplete Information written by Bettina Kuon and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2012-12-06 with total page 305 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Think of the following situation: A project yielding a gross profit of 100 is offered to two firms. The project can only be conducted by a cooperation of the two firms. No firm is able to conduct the project alone. In order to receive the project the firms have to agree on the allocation of the gross profit. Each of both firms has an alternative project it conducts in case the joint project is not realized. The profitability of an allocation of the joint gross profit for a firm depends on the gross profit from its alternative project. The gross profit from an alternative project can be either 0 (low alternative value) or O
Book Synopsis Information, Strategic Behavior and Fairness in Ultimatum Bargaining by : Werner Güth
Download or read book Information, Strategic Behavior and Fairness in Ultimatum Bargaining written by Werner Güth and published by . This book was released on 1994 with total page 32 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Bargaining, Fairness and the Labor Allocation Problem by :
Download or read book Bargaining, Fairness and the Labor Allocation Problem written by and published by . This book was released on 2002 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Bilateral bargaining is used extensively in the assignment of Navy billets. This report is an experimental study of bilateral bargaining in a stylized setting. It examines the role of fairness in bilateral negotiations, and in the efficient allocation of resources. A total of 160 subjects participated in two separate experiments. The findings of the study are twofold. First, the strictly rational model aggregates the data better than two models of fairness, but fairness clearly plays a role in the actions of both parties in the bilateral negotiation. Second, fairness plays a greater role when there exists asymmetric information between the two parties in the negotiation. The practical implication of this stylized study for the assignment of Navy billets is that while detailers might expect fairness to play a small role when negotiating with sailors, ignoring fairness significantly increases the risk of bargaining failure. In a Naval context, the subsequent misallocation of resources is unfilled billets and low retention rates.
Book Synopsis A Model of Bargaining with Incomplete Information by : Shmuel Zamir
Download or read book A Model of Bargaining with Incomplete Information written by Shmuel Zamir and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 11 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Nash Bargaining and Incomplete Information by : Kenneth George Binmore
Download or read book Nash Bargaining and Incomplete Information written by Kenneth George Binmore and published by . This book was released on 1981 with total page 66 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
