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Exclusive Dealing And Vertical Integration
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Book Synopsis Exclusive Dealing and Vertical Integration in Interlocking Relationships by : Volker Nocke
Download or read book Exclusive Dealing and Vertical Integration in Interlocking Relationships written by Volker Nocke and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 63 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We develop a model of interlocking bilateral relationships between upstream firms (manufacturers) that produce differentiated goods and downstream firms (retailers) that compete imperfectly for consumers. Contract offers and acceptance decisions are private information to the contracting parties. We show that both exclusive dealing and vertical integration between a manufacturer and a retailer lead to vertical foreclosure, to the detriment of consumers and society. Finally, we show that firms have indeed an incentive to sign such contracts or to integrate vertically.
Book Synopsis The Feasibility of Exclusive Dealing and Partial Vertical Integration by : Myung-Joong Kwon
Download or read book The Feasibility of Exclusive Dealing and Partial Vertical Integration written by Myung-Joong Kwon and published by . This book was released on 1994 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Law and Economics of Vertical Integration and Control by : Roger D. Blair
Download or read book Law and Economics of Vertical Integration and Control written by Roger D. Blair and published by Academic Press. This book was released on 2014-05-10 with total page 224 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Law and Economics of Vertical Integration and Control focuses on the processes, methodologies, and approaches involved in the law and economics of vertical integration and control. The publication first elaborates on transaction costs, fixed proportions and contractual alternatives, and variable proportions and contractual alternatives. Discussions focus on sales revenue royalties, ownership integration, output royalties, important product-specific services, successive monopoly, advantages and limitations of internal transfers, and transaction cost determinants. The text then examines vertical integration under uncertainty and vertical integration without contractual alternatives. The book ponders on legal treatment of ownership integration and per se illegal contractual controls. Topics include tying arrangements, public policy assessment, resale price maintenance, vertical integration and the Sherman Act, market foreclosure doctrine, and the 1982 Merger Guidelines. The text also takes a look at contractual controls that are not illegal per se, alternative legal rules, and antitrust policy. The publication is a dependable reference for researchers interested in the law and economics of vertical integration and control.
Book Synopsis Vertical Integration, Exclusive Dealing, and Ex Post Cartelization by : Yongmin Chen
Download or read book Vertical Integration, Exclusive Dealing, and Ex Post Cartelization written by Yongmin Chen and published by . This book was released on 2002 with total page 40 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Exclusive Dealing and Vertical Integration in Interlocking Realtionships by : Patrick Rey
Download or read book Exclusive Dealing and Vertical Integration in Interlocking Realtionships written by Patrick Rey and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 63 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Exclusive Dealing and Vertical Integration by : Edward C. Gallick
Download or read book Exclusive Dealing and Vertical Integration written by Edward C. Gallick and published by . This book was released on 1984 with total page 168 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Opportunism, Vertical Integration, and Exclusive Dealing Contracts Organisation by : Seung-cheol Lee
Download or read book Opportunism, Vertical Integration, and Exclusive Dealing Contracts Organisation written by Seung-cheol Lee and published by . This book was released on 1989 with total page 113 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Opportunism, Vertical Integration, and Exclusive Dealing Contracts in Cooperative Organization by : Seung-Cheol Lee
Download or read book Opportunism, Vertical Integration, and Exclusive Dealing Contracts in Cooperative Organization written by Seung-Cheol Lee and published by . This book was released on 1989 with total page 226 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Exclusive Dealing and Vertical Integration: the Efficiency of Contracts in the Tuna Industry by : Edward C. Gallick
Download or read book Exclusive Dealing and Vertical Integration: the Efficiency of Contracts in the Tuna Industry written by Edward C. Gallick and published by . This book was released on 1984 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Exclusive Dealing in Two-sided Markets by : Lei Shao (Ph. D.)
Download or read book Exclusive Dealing in Two-sided Markets written by Lei Shao (Ph. D.) and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page 398 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation explains new phenomena in platform industries such as wireless communication, video game, online video streaming, e-commerce, mobile app, and etc. It extends the frontier of economic studies in IT industry and gains new insights about classic industrial organization topics such as vertical integration, non-linear pricing, and product differentiation. The three chapters study platforms incentives to use exclusive contracts and the effects of exclusive dealings on consumer welfare in two-sided markets. Each focuses on a different aspect. The first chapter of my dissertation studies a different pro-competitive effect of exclusive contracts other than preventing free riding or inefficient contracting. In two-sided markets, when content providers have heterogeneous interaction benefits (i.e. some content providers benefits more from their interactions with consumers), platforms could use exclusive contracts in addition to non-exclusive contracts to "price discriminate" content providers. This could increase the number of participating content providers, which increases both consumer welfare and social welfare through the network effects. The second chapter of my dissertation investigates the effects of content heterogeneity on platforms' competition strategies and explains why many two-sided markets do not tip. Exclusive content appealing to the general public could enhance network effects. On the other hand, exclusive distinctive content could differentiate platforms. Thus, if there exists sufficiently contrasting content, both platforms would choose differentiation in equilibrium in order to soften competition and popular content would turn out to be non-exclusive so that the market does not tip. The third chapter of my dissertation explains why even though exclusive dealing has many benefits to firms, platforms in two-sided markets do not use "forced exclusivity" contracts. Instead, they negotiate both exclusive and non-exclusive contracts with content providers and let content providers decide which type of contract to sign. In addition, smaller bargaining power of platforms, difference in amounts of proprietary content, or consumer surplus per content makes content providers more willing to sign non-exclusive contracts.
Book Synopsis Essays on Vertical Restraints and Competition Policy by : Chia-Wen Chen
Download or read book Essays on Vertical Restraints and Competition Policy written by Chia-Wen Chen and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Vertical restraints between firms, such as exclusive dealing contracts that forbid a dealer from promoting other manufacturers' products, are controversial in competition policy because of their potential anticompetitive effects. This dissertation addresses three issues in competition policy and vertical relationships between firms: (1) what are the effects of exclusive dealing on competitiveness of brands? (2) does exclusive dealing foreclose new entrants out of a market? (3) what is the effect of retail competition on market price in a vertically integrated industry when upstream firms face capacity constraints? Chapter 1 examines the impact of allowing more brands access to exclusive distribution networks on brand and market level outcomes. In the U.S., Anheuser Busch is the dominant firm in the beer industry and has exclusive dealing arrangements with many of its distributors. I looked at a recent beer distribution deal between Anheuser Busch and InBev that moved InBev brands into Anheuser Busch distribution networks. I collected beer distributor data before and after the event and matched them with a panel scanner dataset from a major grocery chain in Northern California. Using a difference-in-differences approach, I compared the changes in InBev market shares in markets in which InBev switched to Anheuser Busch distributors, to the changes in market shares in markets in which InBev switched to Anheuser Busch exclusive distributors. The results suggest that exclusive dealing matters in the beer industry: I find InBev market shares to be higher once allowed access to Anheuser Busch exclusive distribution networks. In addition, I do not find overall market quantity to be larger when more brands have access to Anheuser Busch exclusive networks. Instead, the results show cannibalization effects on existing brands' market share when a distributor acquires more brands. These results are more consistent with an incentive-based explanation for firms preferring exclusive contracts. Chapter 2 examines the effect of exclusive dealing on rival firms' entry decisions. I estimated an entry model of specialty beer producers in Northern California and tested whether exclusive dealing raises a firm's fixed costs. I modeled each firm's entry decision as a static entry game of incomplete information that allows for strategic interactions and employed a new panel scanner dataset from a major grocery chain in Northern California. Given that both firm and location profitability are heterogeneous, I controlled for post-entry demand conditions by estimating the demand for beer using a discrete choice model. Using the demand estimates and the predicted entry probabilities, I recovered a firm's fixed costs using a two-step estimator. I find some spillover effects on specialty beer producers' entry decisions. After taking strategic interactions into account, the results indicate that a firm has higher fixed costs at locations with exclusive distributors. The estimates also show that a firm is less likely to enter a location that is farther from its brewery, has lower expected demand or is smaller in store size. Finally, I implemented counter-factual experiments to study the effect of banning exclusive dealing. The results show that the welfare improvement associated with banning exclusive contracts is very small. Chapter 3 (joint with Christopher R. Knittel) considers a model of oligopolistic competition when upstream firms face capacity constraints. We studied the optimality conditions of upstream firms under vertical separation and vertical integration when firms compete on quantity. We illustrated the properties of the equilibrium wholesale and retail prices when the downstream market becomes less competitive with a numerical example. Using data on gasoline demand and refineries' capacity levels in California, we generated equilibrium wholesale and retail prices when the number of downstream firms varies. We find that whether a higher degree of retail market concentration results in higher retail price depends on market structure and the effectiveness of the capacity constraints. When independent refineries' capacity constraints are binding, the effect of a decrease in the number of independent retailers on retail gasoline price is very small.
Book Synopsis Handbook of Industrial Organization by : Mark Armstrong
Download or read book Handbook of Industrial Organization written by Mark Armstrong and published by Elsevier. This book was released on 2007-10-05 with total page 943 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This is Volume 3 of the Handbook of Industrial Organization series (HIO). Volumes 1 & 2 published simultaneously in 1989 and many of the chapters were widely cited and appeared on graduate reading lists. Since the first volumes published, the field of industrial organization has continued to evolve and this volume fills the gaps. While the first two volumes of HIO contain much more discussion of the theoretical literature than of the empirical literature, it was representative of the field at that time. Since then, the empirical literature has flourished, while the theoretical literature has continued to grow, and this new volume reflects that change of emphasis. Thie volume is an excellent reference and teaching supplement for industrial organization or industrial economics, the microeconomics field that focuses on business behavior and its implications for both market structures and processes, and for related public policies. *Part of the renowned Handbooks in Economics series *Chapters are contributed by some of the leading experts in their fields *A source, reference and teaching supplement for industrial organizations or industrial economists
Book Synopsis Do Vertical Mergers Facilitate Upstream Collusion? by : Volker Nocke
Download or read book Do Vertical Mergers Facilitate Upstream Collusion? written by Volker Nocke and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page 48 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis The Antitrust Paradox by : Robert Bork
Download or read book The Antitrust Paradox written by Robert Bork and published by . This book was released on 2021-02-22 with total page 536 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The most important book on antitrust ever written. It shows how antitrust suits adversely affect the consumer by encouraging a costly form of protection for inefficient and uncompetitive small businesses.
Book Synopsis Exclusionary Vertical Restraints and Antitrust by : Claudia M. Landeo
Download or read book Exclusionary Vertical Restraints and Antitrust written by Claudia M. Landeo and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 59 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Vertical restraints, such as vertical integration, exclusive dealing contracts, and tying and bundling practices, have been subject of lively policy and academic discussions. Scholars associated with the Chicago School challenged early foreclosure doctrines by arguing that vertical restraints primarily reflected efficiency considerations. More recently, industrial organization economists have used the tools of game theory and information economics to show that these business practices might actually serve anticompetitive purposes. The complexity of the theoretical frameworks and the scarcity of empirical evidence have limited the influence of these new economic theories on antitrust law and policies.We argue that experimental law and economics might strengthen the contributions of economic theories of vertical restrains to the design and implementation of antitrust institutions. First, experimental law and economics provides empirical evidence of the robustness of economic theories of antitrust. Second, the combination of economic theory and experimental work represents the application of scientific research methods. As a result, the likelihood of admissibility in court of economic expert testimony might be strengthened. Third, experimental law and economics studies of antitrust involve the replication of complex and abstract economic theories using simple environments. These settings might facilitate policy-makers' understanding of economic theories of antitrust. We start our analysis by characterizing the legal environment in which vertical restraints operate. We then outline the main components of the methods of experimental economics applied to the study of law, and discuss the contributions of experimental law and economics. Finally, we assess the validity of our claims regarding the contributions of experimental law and economics by investigating the methodological characteristics of seminal experimental work on vertical restraints and the outcomes produced by these studies. Although the experimental literature on exclusionary vertical restraints is relatively recent, our analysis of this work provides support to our claims.
Download or read book Vertical Foreclosure written by and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 106 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis IP and Antitrust: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles Applied to Intellectual Property Law, 3rd Edition by : Hovenkamp, Janis, Lemley, Leslie, Carrier
Download or read book IP and Antitrust: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles Applied to Intellectual Property Law, 3rd Edition written by Hovenkamp, Janis, Lemley, Leslie, Carrier and published by Wolters Kluwer. This book was released on 2016-01-01 with total page 3280 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
