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Evolution Of Cooperation In Prisoners Dilemma Game With A Knowledgeable Mutant
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Book Synopsis Evolution of Cooperation in Prisoners' Dilemma Game with a Knowledgeable Mutant by : Chun-lei Yang
Download or read book Evolution of Cooperation in Prisoners' Dilemma Game with a Knowledgeable Mutant written by Chun-lei Yang and published by . This book was released on 1994 with total page 29 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis The Evolution of Cooperation by : Robert Axelrod
Download or read book The Evolution of Cooperation written by Robert Axelrod and published by Basic Books. This book was released on 2009-04-29 with total page 258 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A famed political scientist's classic argument for a more cooperative world We assume that, in a world ruled by natural selection, selfishness pays. So why cooperate? In The Evolution of Cooperation, political scientist Robert Axelrod seeks to answer this question. In 1980, he organized the famed Computer Prisoners Dilemma Tournament, which sought to find the optimal strategy for survival in a particular game. Over and over, the simplest strategy, a cooperative program called Tit for Tat, shut out the competition. In other words, cooperation, not unfettered competition, turns out to be our best chance for survival. A vital book for leaders and decision makers, The Evolution of Cooperation reveals how cooperative principles help us think better about everything from military strategy, to political elections, to family dynamics.
Book Synopsis Prisoner's Dilemma by : Anatol Rapoport
Download or read book Prisoner's Dilemma written by Anatol Rapoport and published by University of Michigan Press. This book was released on 1965 with total page 276 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: An account of many experiments in which the psychological game Prisoner's Dilemma was played
Book Synopsis The Complexity of Cooperation by : Robert Axelrod
Download or read book The Complexity of Cooperation written by Robert Axelrod and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 1997-08-18 with total page 247 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Robert Axelrod is widely known for his groundbreaking work in game theory and complexity theory. He is a leader in applying computer modeling to social science problems. His book The Evolution of Cooperation has been hailed as a seminal contribution and has been translated into eight languages since its initial publication. The Complexity of Cooperation is a sequel to that landmark book. It collects seven essays, originally published in a broad range of journals, and adds an extensive new introduction to the collection, along with new prefaces to each essay and a useful new appendix of additional resources. Written in Axelrod's acclaimed, accessible style, this collection serves as an introductory text on complexity theory and computer modeling in the social sciences and as an overview of the current state of the art in the field. The articles move beyond the basic paradigm of the Prisoner's Dilemma to study a rich set of issues, including how to cope with errors in perception or implementation, how norms emerge, and how new political actors and regions of shared culture can develop. They use the shared methodology of agent-based modeling, a powerful technique that specifies the rules of interaction between individuals and uses computer simulation to discover emergent properties of the social system. The Complexity of Cooperation is essential reading for all social scientists who are interested in issues of cooperation and complexity.
Book Synopsis The Evolution of Cooperation in One-Shot Prisoner's Dilemma Game by : Fernando Buendía
Download or read book The Evolution of Cooperation in One-Shot Prisoner's Dilemma Game written by Fernando Buendía and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Prisoner's Dilemma provides a formal representation of a ubiquitous type of situations that arises when individual interests undermine the collective welfare of the group. Essentially, the pessimistic result of this game is due to the fact that defecting is the dominating strategy for every player, and the “cooperative” strategy profile (R,R) for the one-shot game Pareto-dominates the “no-cooperative” strategy equilibrium (P,P), where the payoffs obey T>R>P>S. This paper suggests and formalizes a theoretical alternative to escape from the Prisoner Dilemma's non-cooperation trap. Specifically, it argues that if a critical mass of highly interested individuals with heterogeneous and interdependent preferences for a given public good and certain level of geographical, and social proximity among them are reached, full cooperation is achieved and collective action takes place which in turns leads to the acquisition of a specific public good.
Book Synopsis The Prisoner's Dilemma and the Evolution of Cooperation by : Jeffrey Philip Lorberbaum
Download or read book The Prisoner's Dilemma and the Evolution of Cooperation written by Jeffrey Philip Lorberbaum and published by . This book was released on 1986 with total page 310 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis The Evolution of Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma by : John H. Nachbar
Download or read book The Evolution of Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma written by John H. Nachbar and published by . This book was released on 1989 with total page 36 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis The Iterated Prisoners' Dilemma by : Graham Kendall
Download or read book The Iterated Prisoners' Dilemma written by Graham Kendall and published by World Scientific. This book was released on 2007 with total page 273 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In 1984, Robert Axelrod published a book, relating the story of two competitions which he ran, where invited academics entered strategies for the Iterated PrisonersOCO Dilemma. The book, almost 20 years on, is still widely read and cited by academics and the general public. As a celebration of that landmark work, we have recreated those competitions to celebrate its 20th anniversary, by again inviting academics to submit prisonersOCO dilemma strategies. The first of these new competitions was run in July 2004, and the second in April 2005. Iterated PrisonersOCO Dilemma: 20 Years On essentially provides an update of the AxelrodOCOs book. Specifically, it. OCo Presents the prisonersOCO dilemma, its history and variants. OCo Highlights original Axelrod's work and its impact. OCo Discusses results of new competitions. OCo Showcases selected papers that reflect the latest researches in the area."
Book Synopsis Evolution and Information in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game by : Phillip Johnson
Download or read book Evolution and Information in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game written by Phillip Johnson and published by . This book was released on 1998 with total page 50 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Aspiring to the Fittest and Promotion of Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game by : Zhen Wang
Download or read book Aspiring to the Fittest and Promotion of Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game written by Zhen Wang and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Strategy changes are an essential part of evolutionary games. Here we introduce a simple rule that, depending on the value of a single parameter w, influences the selection of players that are considered as potential sources of the new strategy. For positive w players with high payoffs will be considered more likely, while for negative w the opposite holds. Setting w equal to zero returns the frequently adopted random selection of the opponent. We find that increasing the probability of adopting the strategy from the fittest player within reach, i.e. setting w positive, promotes the evolution of cooperation. The robustness of this observation is tested against different levels of uncertainty in the strategy adoption process and for different interaction network. Since the evolution to widespread defection is tightly associated with cooperators having a lower fitness than defectors, the fact that positive values of w facilitate cooperation is quite surprising. We show that the results can be explained by means of a negative feedback effect that increases the vulnerability of defectors although initially increasing their survivability. Moreover, we demonstrate that the introduction of w effectively alters the interaction network and thus also the impact of uncertainty by strategy adoptions on the evolution of cooperation.
Book Synopsis Evolutionary Exploration of the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma - The Effect of Out-of-Equilibrium Play by : Kristian Lindgren
Download or read book Evolutionary Exploration of the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma - The Effect of Out-of-Equilibrium Play written by Kristian Lindgren and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The finitely repeated Prisoners' Dilemma is a good illustration of the discrepancy between the strategic behaviour suggested by a game-theoretic analysis and the behavior often observed among human players, where cooperation is maintained through most of the game. A game-theoretic reasoning based on backward induction eliminates strategies step by step until defection from the first round is the only remaining choice, reflecting the Nash equilibrium of the game. We investigate the Nash equilibrium solution for two different sets of strategies in an evolutionary context, using replicator-mutation dynamics. The first set consists of conditional cooperators, up to a certain round, while the second set in addition to these contains two strategy types that react differently on the first round action: The 'Convincer' strategies insist with two rounds of initial cooperation, trying to establish more cooperative play in the game, while the "Follower" strategies, although being first round defectors, have the capability to respond to an invite in the first round. For both of these strategy sets, iterated elimination of strategies shows that the only Nash equilibria are given by defection from the first round. We show that the evolutionary dynamics of the first set is always characterized by a stable fixed point, corresponding to the Nash equilibrium, if the mutation rate is sufficiently small (but still positive). The second strategy set is numerically investigated, and we find that there are regions of parameter space where fixed points become unstable and the dynamics exhibits cycles of different strategy compositions. The results indicate that, even in the limit of very small mutation rate, the replicator-mutation dynamics does not necessarily bring the system with Convincers and Followers to the fixed point corresponding to the Nash equilibrium of the game. We also perform a detailed analysis of how the evolutionary behavior depends on payoffs, game length, and mutation rate.
Book Synopsis The Origins of Unfairness by : Cailin O'Connor
Download or read book The Origins of Unfairness written by Cailin O'Connor and published by Oxford University Press, USA. This book was released on 2019 with total page 255 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In almost every human society some people get more and others get less. Why is inequity the rule in these societies? In The Origins of Unfairness, philosopher Cailin O'Connor firstly considers how groups are divided into social categories, like gender, race, and religion, to address this question. She uses the formal frameworks of game theory and evolutionary game theory to explore the cultural evolution of the conventions which piggyback on these seemingly irrelevant social categories. These frameworks elucidate a variety of topics from the innateness of gender differences, to collaboration in academia, to household bargaining, to minority disadvantage, to homophily. They help to show how inequity can emerge from simple processes of cultural change in groups with gender and racial categories, and under a wide array of situations. The process of learning conventions of coordination and resource division is such that some groups will tend to get more and others less. O'Connor offers solutions to such problems of coordination and resource division and also shows why we need to think of inequity as part of an ever evolving process. Surprisingly minimal conditions are needed to robustly produce phenomena related to inequity and, once inequity emerges in these models, it takes very little for it to persist indefinitely. Thus, those concerned with social justice must remain vigilant against the dynamic forces that push towards inequity.
Book Synopsis The Calculus of Selfishness by : Karl Sigmund
Download or read book The Calculus of Selfishness written by Karl Sigmund and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 2016-05-31 with total page 184 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This volume looks at social dilemmas where cooperative motivations are subverted and self-interest becomes self-defeating. Sigmund, a pioneer in evolutionary game theory, uses simple and well-known game theory models to examine the foundations of collective action and the effects of reciprocity and reputation.
Book Synopsis The Structure of Solutions in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma by : Bjørn Lomborg
Download or read book The Structure of Solutions in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma written by Bjørn Lomborg and published by . This book was released on 1993 with total page 38 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis The Impact of the Termination Rule on Cooperation in a Prisoner's Dilemma Experiment by : Hans-Theo Normann
Download or read book The Impact of the Termination Rule on Cooperation in a Prisoner's Dilemma Experiment written by Hans-Theo Normann and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page 18 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis The Cooperative Choice in a "Prisoner's Dilemma" Game by : Herbert M. Potash
Download or read book The Cooperative Choice in a "Prisoner's Dilemma" Game written by Herbert M. Potash and published by . This book was released on 1960 with total page 84 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Game Theory, Alive by : Anna R. Karlin
Download or read book Game Theory, Alive written by Anna R. Karlin and published by American Mathematical Soc.. This book was released on 2017-04-27 with total page 400 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We live in a highly connected world with multiple self-interested agents interacting and myriad opportunities for conflict and cooperation. The goal of game theory is to understand these opportunities. This book presents a rigorous introduction to the mathematics of game theory without losing sight of the joy of the subject. This is done by focusing on theoretical highlights (e.g., at least six Nobel Prize winning results are developed from scratch) and by presenting exciting connections of game theory to other fields such as computer science (algorithmic game theory), economics (auctions and matching markets), social choice (voting theory), biology (signaling and evolutionary stability), and learning theory. Both classical topics, such as zero-sum games, and modern topics, such as sponsored search auctions, are covered. Along the way, beautiful mathematical tools used in game theory are introduced, including convexity, fixed-point theorems, and probabilistic arguments. The book is appropriate for a first course in game theory at either the undergraduate or graduate level, whether in mathematics, economics, computer science, or statistics. The importance of game-theoretic thinking transcends the academic setting—for every action we take, we must consider not only its direct effects, but also how it influences the incentives of others.