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Essays On Central Bank Communication
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Book Synopsis Essays on Central Bank Communication by : Sherry Wu
Download or read book Essays on Central Bank Communication written by Sherry Wu and published by . This book was released on 2021 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In this thesis, I study several topics about central bank communication. I first formalize Blinder's (2004) conjecture that modern central banks may have become too market-friendly. In equilibrium, the central bank optimally displays excess dependency on financial market signals, beyond the level that a social planner concerned with ensuring financial stability. This result suggests that the central bank is better off committing to a set of norms and an institutional culture that is more market-insensitive. Second, I explore the debate among policymakers whether central banks should publish their policy rate forecasts. My analysis shows that releasing those forecasts is always loss-reducing for the central bank, provided its information is at least as precise as that of market forecasters. Finally, I prove that disclosing information to select audiences between scheduled monetary policy meetings facilitates gradualism. Not only does the model provide a formalization of Cieslak et al. (2019), but it also identifies conditions under which information leakage by the central bank improves societal well-being.
Book Synopsis Essays on Central Bank Communication by : Frederico Carneiro Mira Godinho
Download or read book Essays on Central Bank Communication written by Frederico Carneiro Mira Godinho and published by . This book was released on 2023 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation consists in three chapters addressing the relationship between central bank communication and the transmission of monetary policy to a range of different audiences. In the first chapter, I show that once one incorporates country-specific yields into the identification of monetary factors for the European Central Bank, a new factor arises which plays a quantitatively important role in explaining the end of the sovereign debt crisis and the resulting convergence in economic outcomes across the Euro block. Specifications that exclude this novel factor instead imply that the central bank played little role in ending the crisis. I argue that this new factor reflects ECB communications that respond to certain countries’ conditions beyond their share of Euro area activity, mostly during the crisis period. In the second and third chapters, I address how the complexity in the language used in policy statements affects economic outcomes. More specifically, in the second chapter I look at the textual information in monetary policy announcements to show that complex language reduces the effects of monetary policy shocks on asset prices. Finally, in the third chapter I look at how the general public, a non-specialized audience, reacts to distinct policy statements that only differ in the complexity of the words used, by making use of a novel Randomized Control Trial experiment with new survey data. For this audience, a simpler message is more effective in shaping households’ expectations and enhancing understanding, but it reduces the credibility of the Federal Reserve relative to more complex, and less easily understood, communication
Book Synopsis Essays on the European Central Bank's Communication by : Armando Marozzi
Download or read book Essays on the European Central Bank's Communication written by Armando Marozzi and published by . This book was released on 2022 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Essays on Central Bank Communication by : Sathya Mellina
Download or read book Essays on Central Bank Communication written by Sathya Mellina and published by . This book was released on 2021 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Central Bank Communication, Decision Making, and Governance by : Pierre L. Siklos
Download or read book Central Bank Communication, Decision Making, and Governance written by Pierre L. Siklos and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 2013 with total page 327 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Experts analyze the recent emphasis on central communication as an additional policy and accountability device.
Book Synopsis Essays on Central Banks Communication and Decisions by : Hamza Bennani
Download or read book Essays on Central Banks Communication and Decisions written by Hamza Bennani and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This thesis focuses on the link between central banks' communication and their decision-making processes. Due to the fact that the recent empirical literature has not used central banks' communication policy to understand their inner working, and notably their interest rate setting behavior, because of the boundaries of economic tools; the different chapters of this thesis propose to fill the gap of this literature. In a first step, we unveil the issues that some central banks face (like, e.g., the European Central Bank or the Federal Reserve), such as the heterogeneity in terms of monetary policy preferences between committee members, or the disagreements in terms of economic policy preferences in the context of the euro debt crisis. In a second step, we explain the determinants and the consequences of these disagreements and heterogeneity, using non standard analytical tools, along with theoretical and econometric models. Therefore, we consider the methodologies used in other social sciences, like sociology, psychology, or political science, to analyze the prolific communication policy of central banks, with the aim to unveil their decision-making processes.
Book Synopsis Imperfect Central Bank Communication - Information Versus Distraction by : Pär Österholm
Download or read book Imperfect Central Bank Communication - Information Versus Distraction written by Pär Österholm and published by International Monetary Fund. This book was released on 2008-03 with total page 36 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Much of the information communicated by central banks is noisy or imperfect. This paper considers the potential benefits and limitations of central bank communications in a model of imperfect knowledge and learning. It is shown that the value of communicating imperfect information is ambiguous. There is a risk that the central bank can distract the public; this means that the central bank may prefer to focus its communication policies on the information it knows most about. Indeed, conveying more certain information may improve the public's understanding to the extent that it "crowds out" a role for communicating imperfect information.
Book Synopsis The Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Central Banking by : David G. Mayes
Download or read book The Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Central Banking written by David G. Mayes and published by Oxford Handbooks. This book was released on 2019-03-15 with total page 809 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: "The Handbook reflects the state of the art in the theory and practice of central banking. It covers all the essential areas that have come under scrutiny since the global financial crisis of 2007-9"--
Book Synopsis Essays on Central Bank Communication by : Eunmi Ko (Economist)
Download or read book Essays on Central Bank Communication written by Eunmi Ko (Economist) and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page 121 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: "In the first chapter of my dissertation, I show existence of a stationary Bayesian Markov equilibrium in Bayesian stochastic games with periodic revelation. I consider a class of dynamic Bayesian games in which players can have asymmetric information about the state of the world, which is captured by players' types. Types evolve stochastically according to a first-order Markov process over time. Actions are monitored perfectly, and the types are revealed with actions (periodic revelation). In this environment, I show that there exists a stationary Bayesian Markov equilibrium in which a player's strategy maps the same tuple of the previous type profile, the previous action profile, and the player's current type to the same current mixed action. Type revelation ensures that the dimension of the support of a player's beliefs has an upper bound so that equilibrium analysis is computationally tractable. I offer a dynamic duopoly example that analyzes equilibrium pricing and R&D investment strategies of two pharmaceutical companies when their consumer base consists of asymmetric information that is revealed with a delay and when there is an innovation race between them to colonize the other's consumer base. The second chapter analyzes the optimal tone of central bank forward guidance when the state of the economy is realized stochastically. Assuming that monetary policy is exogenously given, I investigate the optimal management of the private sector's expected inflation through the tone of forward guidance to maximize social welfare. The analysis is based on the Bayesian persuasion model (Kamenica and Gentzkow 2011). I assume that the central bank has private information to forecast the state of the economy, but the forecast is probabilistic. Additionally, I assume that a monetary policy plan is exogenously imposed in a dovish or hawkish way and that the central bank is pre-committed to a forward guidance policy plan. In this environment, the optimal forward guidance is threefold. First, given a dovish monetary policy and an environment in which forecasting a future weak economy would be unlikely, communication should be overly pessimistic. Second, under a dovish monetary policy and an environment in which forecasting of a future weak economy would be highly likely, communication should be truthful. Third, if a hawkish monetary policy is imposed, the central bank should be uninformative when it communicates its economic forecast. The third chapter is a joint study with Professor Narayana Kocherlakota. We analyze what degree of discretion society should accord to a central bank when the central bank privately observes the state of the economy before making its monetary policy choice, with the state revealed at the end of each period (periodic revelation). In the same environment without periodic revelation, Athey, Atkeson, and Kehoe (2005) conclude that constrained discretion with an inflation cap is optimal. We examine the robustness of their result assuming periodic revelation. We show that if the central bank is sufficiently patient, an equilibrium exists in which the central bank's choice at each date conforms with the ex ante optimum. In this sense, with periodic revelation, it becomes optimal to grant a sufficiently patient central bank full discretion (as opposed to imposing an inflation cap)"--Pages viii-ix.
Book Synopsis The Long Journey of Central Bank Communication by : Otmar Issing
Download or read book The Long Journey of Central Bank Communication written by Otmar Issing and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 2019-09-24 with total page 103 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A leading economist and former central banker discusses the evolution of central bank communication from secretiveness to transparency and accountability. Central bank communication has evolved from secretiveness to transparency and accountability—from a reluctance to give out any information at all to the belief in communication as a panacea for effective policy. In this book, Otmar Issing, himself a former central banker, discusses the journey toward transparency in central bank communication. Issing traces the development of transparency, examining the Bank of England as an example of extreme reticence and European Central Bank's President Mario Draghi as a practitioner of effective communication. He argues that the ultimate goal of central bank communication is to make monetary policy more effective, and describes the practice and theory of communication as an evolutionary process. For a long time, the Federal Reserve never made its monetary policy decisions public; the European Central Bank, on the other hand, had to adopt a modern communication strategy from the outset. Issing discusses the importance of guiding expectations in central bank communication, and points to financial markets as the most important recipients of this communication. He discusses the obligations of accountability and transparency, although he notes that total transparency is a “mirage.” Issing argues that the central message to the public must always be that the stability of a nation's currency is the bank's priority.
Book Synopsis The Political Economy of Central Banking by : Gerald Epstein
Download or read book The Political Economy of Central Banking written by Gerald Epstein and published by Edward Elgar Publishing. This book was released on 2019 with total page 576 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Central banks are among the most powerful government economic institutions in the world. This volume explores the economic and political contours of the struggle for influence over the policies of central banks such as the Federal Reserve, and the implications of this struggle for economic performance and the distribution of wealth and power in society.
Book Synopsis Crafting Consensus by : Nicole Baerg
Download or read book Crafting Consensus written by Nicole Baerg and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 2020-07-01 with total page 224 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In a world dependent on the constant sharing of information, central bankers increasingly communicate their policies to the mass public. Central bank communications are drafted in monetary policy committee meetings composed of policymakers with differing interests. Despite their differences, committee members must come together, write, and agree to an official policy statement. Once released to the public, central bank communications then affect citizens' actions and ultimately, the economy. But how exactly does this work? In Crafting Consensus, Nicole Baerg explains how the transparency of central bank communication depends on the configuration of committee members' preferences. Baerg argues that monetary policy committees composed of members with differing preferences over inflation are better suited to communicating precise information with the public. These diverse committees produce central bank statements of higher quality and less uncertainty than those from more homogeneous committees. Additionally, she argues that higher quality statements more effectively shape individuals' inflation expectations and move the economy in ways that policymakers intend. Baerg demonstrates that central bankers are not impartial technocrats and that their preferences and the institutional rules where they work matter for understanding the politics of monetary policy and variations in economic performance over time. Conducting empirical analysis from historical archival data, textual analysis, machine-learning, survey experiments, and cross-sectional time-series data, Crafting Consensus offers a new theory of committee decision making and a battery of empirical tests to provide a rich understanding of modern-day central banking.
Book Synopsis How Do Central Banks Talk? by : Alan S. Blinder
Download or read book How Do Central Banks Talk? written by Alan S. Blinder and published by Centre for Economic Policy Research. This book was released on 2001 with total page 150 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Not long ago, secrecy was the byword in central banking circles, but now the unmistakable trend is towards greater openness and transparency. This, the third Geneva Report on the World Economy, describes and evaluates some of the changes in how central banks talk to the markets, to the press, and to the public. The report first assesses the case for transparency ? defined as providing sufficient information for the public to understand the policy regime ? and concludes that it is very strong, based on both policy effectiveness and democratic accountability. It then examines what should be the content of communication and argues that central banks ought to spell out their long-run objectives and methods. It then investigates the link between the decision-making process and central bank communication, drawing a distinction between individualistic and collegial committees. The report concludes with a review of the communications strategies of some of the main central banks.
Book Synopsis Clarity of Central Bank Communication About Inflation by : Aleš Bulíř
Download or read book Clarity of Central Bank Communication About Inflation written by Aleš Bulíř and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 26 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper examines whether the clarity of central bank communication about inflation has changed with the economic environment. We use readability statistics and content analysis to study the clarity of communication on the inflation outlook by seven central banks between 1997 and 2010. Overall, we find no strong indications that central banks were less clear in explaining their policies when faced with higher uncertainty or a less favorable inflation outlook. The global financial crisis, however, did have a negative impact on clarity of central bank communication.
Book Synopsis Central Bank Communication and Policy Effectiveness by : Michael Woodford
Download or read book Central Bank Communication and Policy Effectiveness written by Michael Woodford and published by . This book was released on 2005 with total page 65 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A notable change in central banking over the past 15 years has been a world-wide movement toward increased communication by central banks about their policy decisions, the targets that they seek to achieve through those decisions, and the central bank's view of the economy's likely future evolution. This paper considers the role of such communication in the successful conduct of monetary policy, with a particular emphasis on an issue that remains controversial: to what extent is it desirable for central banks to comment on the likely path of short-term interest rates? After reviewing general arguments for and against central-bank transparency, the paper considers two specific contexts in which central banks have been forced to consider how much they are willing to say about the future path of interest rates. The first is the experiment with policy signaling by the FOMC in the U.S., using the statement released following each Committee meeting, since August 2003. The second is the need to make some assumption about future policy when producing the projections (for future inflation and other variables) that are central to inflation-forecast targeting procedures, of the kind used by the Bank of England, the Swedish Riksbank, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, and others. In both cases, it is argued that increased willingness to share the central bank's own assumptions about future policy with the public has increased the predictability of policy, in ways that are likely to have improved central bank's ability to achieve their stabilization objectives.
Book Synopsis Talking about Monetary Policy by : Alan S. Blinder
Download or read book Talking about Monetary Policy written by Alan S. Blinder and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 48 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Central Bank Communication with Non-experts by : Michael Ehrmann
Download or read book Central Bank Communication with Non-experts written by Michael Ehrmann and published by . This book was released on 2021 with total page 59 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Central banks have intensified their communication with non-experts -- an endeavour which some have argued is bound to fail. This paper studies English and German Twitter traffic about the ECB to understand whether its communication is received by non-experts and how it affects their views. It shows that Twitter traffic is responsive to ECB communication, also for non-experts. For several ECB communication events, Twitter constitutes primarily a channel to relay information: tweets become more factual and the views expressed more moderate and homogeneous. Other communication events, such as former President Draghi's "Whatever it takes" statement, trigger persistent traffic and a divergence in views. Also, ECB-related tweets are more likely to get retweeted or liked if they express stronger or more subjective views. Thus, Twitter also serves as a platform for controversial discussions. The findings suggest that central banks manage to reach non-experts, i.e. their communication is not a road to nowhere.
