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Endogenous Timing In Cournot Duopoly
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Book Synopsis Endogenous Timing in a Duopoly Model with Incomplete Information by : Hans-Theo Normann
Download or read book Endogenous Timing in a Duopoly Model with Incomplete Information written by Hans-Theo Normann and published by . This book was released on 1996 with total page 56 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Endogenous Timing in Cournot Duopoly by : Toshihiro Matsumura
Download or read book Endogenous Timing in Cournot Duopoly written by Toshihiro Matsumura and published by . This book was released on 1994 with total page 26 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Playing Cournot Although They Shouldn't - Endogenous Timing in Experimental Duopolies with Asymmetric Cost by : Miguel Alexandre Fonseca
Download or read book Playing Cournot Although They Shouldn't - Endogenous Timing in Experimental Duopolies with Asymmetric Cost written by Miguel Alexandre Fonseca and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In this note, we experimentally investigate the extended game with action commitment in a Cournot duopoly with asymmetric cost. Risk dominance considerations allow to select a unique equilibrium in which the low-cost firm is the Stackelberg leader. The data, however, do not support the theory as simultaneous-move play is modal. Average output choices are in line with the Cournot equilibrium. This suggests that Cournot is a much more robust predictor for competition in markets than theory suggests.
Book Synopsis Endogenous Timing in Duopoly Games by : Jonathan H. Hamilton
Download or read book Endogenous Timing in Duopoly Games written by Jonathan H. Hamilton and published by . This book was released on 1988 with total page 32 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Endogenous Timing and Strategic Choice by : Victor J. Tremblay
Download or read book Endogenous Timing and Strategic Choice written by Victor J. Tremblay and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Cournot establishes a Nash equilibrium to a duopoly game under output competition; Bertrand finds a different Nash equilibrium under price competition. Both treat the strategic choice variable (output versus price) and the timing of play as exogenous. We investigate Cournot-Bertrand models where one firm competes in output and the other competes in price in both static and dynamic settings. We also develop a general model where both the timing of play and the strategic choice variables are endogenous. Consistent with the conduct of Honda and Scion, we show that Cournot-Bertrand behaviour can be a Nash equilibrium outcome.
Book Synopsis Endogenous Timing in a Duopoly Model with Incomplete Formation by : Hans-Theo Normann
Download or read book Endogenous Timing in a Duopoly Model with Incomplete Formation written by Hans-Theo Normann and published by . This book was released on 1996 with total page 36 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Endogenous Timing in a Duopoly Model with Incomplet Informationa by : Hans-Theo Normann
Download or read book Endogenous Timing in a Duopoly Model with Incomplet Informationa written by Hans-Theo Normann and published by . This book was released on 1996 with total page 36 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Endogenous Timing with Free Entry by : Antonio Tesoriere
Download or read book Endogenous Timing with Free Entry written by Antonio Tesoriere and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 23 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Strategic Complementarities and Endogenous Heterogeneity in Oligopolistic Markets by : Malgorzata Knauff
Download or read book Strategic Complementarities and Endogenous Heterogeneity in Oligopolistic Markets written by Malgorzata Knauff and published by Presses univ. de Louvain. This book was released on 2006 with total page 168 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The thesis consists of five chapters. The first of them contains introduction. Chapter 2 considers a broad class of two player symmetric games, which display a fundamental non-concavity when actions of both players are about to be the same. This implies that no symmetric equilibrium is possible. We distinguish different properties of the payoff functions, like strategic substitutes, complements and quasi-concavity, which are not necessarily imposed globally on the joint action space. A number of applications from industrial organization and applied microeconomics literature are provided. In Chapter 3 we generalize to the extent possible the known results for the case of games with one-dimensional action sets to the general case of games with action spaces that are complete lattices. We find that in the general case the scope for asymmetric equilibrium behavior is definitely broader than in the one-dimensional case, though still quite limited. Moreover, we investigate under which sufficient conditions asymmetric pure strategy Nash equilibria are always Pareto dominated by symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibria. In Chapter 4 we deal with the effects of market transparency on prices in the Bertrand duopoly model. We consider two types of strategic interaction between firms in an industry - strategic complementarities and substitutabilities. In the first case, the results are close to conventional wisdom, especially, when in the same time products are substitutes. Namely, equilibrium prices and profits are always decreasing in transparency level, while the consumer’s surplus is increasing. Considering price competition with strategic substitutes, an ambiguity in the direction of change of prices appears. This leads to ambiguity concerning equilibrium profits and surplus changes caused by increasing transparency. In Chapter 5 we provide general conditions for Cournot oligopoly with product differentiation to have monotonic reaction correspondences. We give a proof for the conditions stated by Vives (1999). Moreover we elaborate more general requirements. They allow for identifying increasing best responses even in case inverse demand is submodular, and similarly, decreasing best responses in case of supermodular inverse demand. Examples illustrating the scope of applicability of these results are provided.
Book Synopsis Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly with Endogenous Vertical Differentiation by : Lin Liu
Download or read book Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly with Endogenous Vertical Differentiation written by Lin Liu and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We consider a game of endogenous timing with observable delay in a mixed duopoly with endogenous vertical differentiation in the context of sequential quality and price choice. We find that a simultaneous play in the first opportunity at each stage turns out to be the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, which contrasts with the endogenous timing in a purely private duopoly.
Book Synopsis Endougenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly by : Rabah Amir
Download or read book Endougenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly written by Rabah Amir and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 34 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper applies the framework of endogenous timing in games to mixed quantity duopoly, wherein a private - domestic or foreign - firm competes with a public, welfare maximizing firm. We show that simultaneous play never emerges as a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the extended game, in sharp contrast to private duopoly games. We provide sufficient conditions for the emergence of public and/or private leadership equilibrium. In all cases, private profits and social welfare are higher than under the corresponding Cournot equilibrium. From a methodological viewpoint we make extensive use of the basic results from the theory of supermodular games in order to avoid common extraneous assumptions such as concavity, existence and uniqueness of the different equilibria, whenever possible. Some policy implications are drawn, in particular those relating to the merits of privatization.
Book Synopsis Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly and Private Duopoly - 'Capacity-then-Quantity' Game by : Yuanzhu Lu
Download or read book Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly and Private Duopoly - 'Capacity-then-Quantity' Game written by Yuanzhu Lu and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We consider a game of endogenous timing of sequential choice of capacity and quantity with observable delay in a mixed duopoly and a private duopoly. In mixed duopoly, we find that a simultaneous play at the capacity stage or at the quantity stage can never be supported as subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE); whereas a simultaneous play at each stage turns out to be the unique SPNE in a private duopoly. In mixed duopoly there is multiplicity of equilibria and all SPNEs require sequentiality at the capacity as well as quantity stage.
Book Synopsis Endogenous R&D Symmetry in Linear Duopoly with One-way Spillovers by : Antonio Tesoriere
Download or read book Endogenous R&D Symmetry in Linear Duopoly with One-way Spillovers written by Antonio Tesoriere and published by . This book was released on 2005 with total page 31 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis On the Endogenous Choice of Bertrand Vs. Cournot Equilibrium in a Duopoly by : Flavio Delbono
Download or read book On the Endogenous Choice of Bertrand Vs. Cournot Equilibrium in a Duopoly written by Flavio Delbono and published by . This book was released on 1990 with total page 12 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Endogenous Timing in Mixed Duopolies with Externality by : Toshihiro Matsumura
Download or read book Endogenous Timing in Mixed Duopolies with Externality written by Toshihiro Matsumura and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We investigate endogenous timing in a mixed duopoly with a negative externality. We find that quantity (price) competition yields a simultaneous-move (sequential-move) outcome under a significant negative externality. These results indicate that mixed duopolies yield the same results as private duopolies under a significant negative externality, which is in sharp contrast to the results in mixed duopolies without a negative externality. Unless the negative externality is insignificant, public leadership yields greater welfare than private leadership, and public leadership is more robust than the private leadership as equilibrium. If optimal environmental tax policy is introduced, however, private leadership yields the greatest welfare and this an equilibrium outcome in the endogenous timing game under quantity competition.
Book Synopsis Endogenous Timing in Duopoly: Experimental Evidence by : Miguel A. Fonseca
Download or read book Endogenous Timing in Duopoly: Experimental Evidence written by Miguel A. Fonseca and published by . This book was released on 2005 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly with Capacity Choice by : Juan Carlos Barcena Ruiz
Download or read book Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly with Capacity Choice written by Juan Carlos Barcena Ruiz and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: An endogenous order of moves is analyzed in a mixed duopoly where firms first strategically choose their capacity levels and then compete at price level. In equilibrium, firms are shown to set prices simultaneously while capacities are chosen sequentially. This result is in contrast to the assumption of simultaneous order of moves for capacities choice made by Bárcena-Ruiz and Garzón (Economics Bulletin, Vol. 12 (2007), pp. 1-7) in a mixed duopoly. Besides, we find that there are two equilibria: in one of them the public firm is the leader in capacities and, in the other, the follower.