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Cost Of Moral Hazard And Limited Liability In The Principal Agent Problem
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Book Synopsis Cost of Moral Hazard and Limited Liability in the Principal-agent Problem by :
Download or read book Cost of Moral Hazard and Limited Liability in the Principal-agent Problem written by and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis The Price of Unobservability by : Felipe Balmaceda
Download or read book The Price of Unobservability written by Felipe Balmaceda and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This article studies a principal-agent problem with discrete outcome and effort space. The principal and the agent are risk neutral and the latter is subject to limited liability. For a given monitoring technology, we consider the maximum possible ratio between the first best social welfare to the social welfare arising from the principal's optimal pay-for-performance contract (the price of unobservability). Our main results provide tight bounds for this price. Key parameters to these bounds are number of possible efforts, the likelihood ratio evaluated at the highest outcome, and the ratio between costs of the highest and the lowest efforts. The paper provides insights on how costly moral hazard and limited liability could be from the social point of view.
Book Synopsis Internet and Network Economics by : Amin Saberi
Download or read book Internet and Network Economics written by Amin Saberi and published by Springer. This book was released on 2010-12-06 with total page 590 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 6th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, WINE 2010, held in Stanford, USA, in December 2010. The 52 revised full papers presented were carefully reviewed and selected from 95 submissions. The papers are organized in 33 regular papers and 19 short papers.
Book Synopsis Moral Hazard with Limited Liability by : Wenbin Wang
Download or read book Moral Hazard with Limited Liability written by Wenbin Wang and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page 43 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper studies the optimal contract for a risk-neutral agency with limited liability. We introduce a novel formulation of the model, in which the contract design problem reduces to a problem of constructing the distribution function of a random variable. This formulation directly balances the principal's tradeoff between incentivizing the agent to exert proper effort and minimizing the cost of the agent's compensation. We show that the optimal contract may involve one or two tiers of performance-based bonuses. We obtain new sufficient conditions for the optimality of bonus contracts and provide new insights into the choice of contract parameters.
Book Synopsis Other-Regarding Principal and Moral Hazard by : Swapnendu Banerjee
Download or read book Other-Regarding Principal and Moral Hazard written by Swapnendu Banerjee and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Using the classic moral hazard problem with limited liability we characterize the optimal contracts when an other-regarding principal interacts with a self-regarding agent. The optimal contract differs considerably when the principal is 'inequity averse' vis-a-vis the self-regarding case. Also the agent is generally (weakly) better-off under an 'inequity- averse' principal compared to a 'status seeking' principal.
Book Synopsis Repeated Moral Hazard Under Limited Liability by : Jürgen Bierbaum
Download or read book Repeated Moral Hazard Under Limited Liability written by Jürgen Bierbaum and published by . This book was released on 2002 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper studies the incentives that arise in a two-period agency relationship with moral hazard when agents are subject to limited liability. Since the existence of limited liability creates rent the principal can motivate an agent by credibly threatening him to be fired. It is shown that a combination of a two-period contract, where the agent is fired after period one in case of poor performance and retained otherwise, and a one-period contract optimally implements high effort. In particular, this combination is strictly better than a two-period contract, where the agent is retained in period two for sure. Moreover, there is a combination of one-period contracts that is equivalent to the optimal combination. While the second-period contract is the same as the optimal contract in the static model, the first-period contract pays a lower bonus in case of success. In an extension of the model "learning by doing" is considered. It turns out that the ranking of contracts is reversed if the increase in revenues due to "learning by doing" is sufficiently strong. In addition, a commitment problem arises which makes short-term contracting strictly worse than long-term contracting.
Book Synopsis Moral Hazard by : Inés Macho-Stadler
Download or read book Moral Hazard written by Inés Macho-Stadler and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis The Theory of Incentives by : Jean-Jacques Laffont
Download or read book The Theory of Incentives written by Jean-Jacques Laffont and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 2009-12-27 with total page 436 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Economics has much to do with incentives--not least, incentives to work hard, to produce quality products, to study, to invest, and to save. Although Adam Smith amply confirmed this more than two hundred years ago in his analysis of sharecropping contracts, only in recent decades has a theory begun to emerge to place the topic at the heart of economic thinking. In this book, Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort present the most thorough yet accessible introduction to incentives theory to date. Central to this theory is a simple question as pivotal to modern-day management as it is to economics research: What makes people act in a particular way in an economic or business situation? In seeking an answer, the authors provide the methodological tools to design institutions that can ensure good incentives for economic agents. This book focuses on the principal-agent model, the "simple" situation where a principal, or company, delegates a task to a single agent through a contract--the essence of management and contract theory. How does the owner or manager of a firm align the objectives of its various members to maximize profits? Following a brief historical overview showing how the problem of incentives has come to the fore in the past two centuries, the authors devote the bulk of their work to exploring principal-agent models and various extensions thereof in light of three types of information problems: adverse selection, moral hazard, and non-verifiability. Offering an unprecedented look at a subject vital to industrial organization, labor economics, and behavioral economics, this book is set to become the definitive resource for students, researchers, and others who might find themselves pondering what contracts, and the incentives they embody, are really all about.
Book Synopsis Moral Hazard and Limited Liability by : Rohan Pitchford
Download or read book Moral Hazard and Limited Liability written by Rohan Pitchford and published by . This book was released on 1997 with total page 18 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Essays in Accounting Theory in Honour of Joel S. Demski by : Rick Antle
Download or read book Essays in Accounting Theory in Honour of Joel S. Demski written by Rick Antle and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2007-02-15 with total page 334 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The integration of accounting and the economics of information developed by Joel S. Demski and those he inspired has revolutionized accounting thought. This volume collects papers on accounting theory in honor of Professor Demski. The book also contains an extensive review of Professor Demski’s own contributions to the theory of accounting over the past four decades.
Book Synopsis Moral Hazard in Health Insurance by : Amy Finkelstein
Download or read book Moral Hazard in Health Insurance written by Amy Finkelstein and published by Columbia University Press. This book was released on 2014-12-02 with total page 161 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Addressing the challenge of covering heath care expenses—while minimizing economic risks. Moral hazard—the tendency to change behavior when the cost of that behavior will be borne by others—is a particularly tricky question when considering health care. Kenneth J. Arrow’s seminal 1963 paper on this topic (included in this volume) was one of the first to explore the implication of moral hazard for health care, and Amy Finkelstein—recognized as one of the world’s foremost experts on the topic—here examines this issue in the context of contemporary American health care policy. Drawing on research from both the original RAND Health Insurance Experiment and her own research, including a 2008 Health Insurance Experiment in Oregon, Finkelstein presents compelling evidence that health insurance does indeed affect medical spending and encourages policy solutions that acknowledge and account for this. The volume also features commentaries and insights from other renowned economists, including an introduction by Joseph P. Newhouse that provides context for the discussion, a commentary from Jonathan Gruber that considers provider-side moral hazard, and reflections from Joseph E. Stiglitz and Kenneth J. Arrow. “Reads like a fireside chat among a group of distinguished, articulate health economists.” —Choice
Book Synopsis Allocation, Information and Markets by : John Eatwell
Download or read book Allocation, Information and Markets written by John Eatwell and published by Springer. This book was released on 1989-09-21 with total page 321 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This is an extract from the 4-volume dictionary of economics, a reference book which aims to define the subject of economics today. 1300 subject entries in the complete work cover the broad themes of economic theory. This volume concentrates on the topic of allocation information and markets.
Book Synopsis The Continuous-time Principal-agent Problem with Moral Hazard and Recursive Preferences by : Sumit Kumar Sinha
Download or read book The Continuous-time Principal-agent Problem with Moral Hazard and Recursive Preferences written by Sumit Kumar Sinha and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page 135 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Handbook of Insurance by : Georges Dionne
Download or read book Handbook of Insurance written by Georges Dionne and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2013-12-02 with total page 1133 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This new edition of the Handbook of Insurance reviews the last forty years of research developments in insurance and its related fields. A single reference source for professors, researchers, graduate students, regulators, consultants and practitioners, the book starts with the history and foundations of risk and insurance theory, followed by a review of prevention and precaution, asymmetric information, risk management, insurance pricing, new financial innovations, reinsurance, corporate governance, capital allocation, securitization, systemic risk, insurance regulation, the industrial organization of insurance markets and other insurance market applications. It ends with health insurance, longevity risk, long-term care insurance, life insurance financial products and social insurance. This second version of the Handbook contains 15 new chapters. Each of the 37 chapters has been written by leading authorities in risk and insurance research, all contributions have been peer reviewed, and each chapter can be read independently of the others.
Book Synopsis Foundations of Insurance Economics by : Georges Dionne
Download or read book Foundations of Insurance Economics written by Georges Dionne and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 1992 with total page 748 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Economic and financial research on insurance markets has undergone dramatic growth since its infancy in the early 1960s. Our main objective in compiling this volume was to achieve a wider dissemination of key papers in this literature. Their significance is highlighted in the introduction, which surveys major areas in insurance economics. While it was not possible to provide comprehensive coverage of insurance economics in this book, these readings provide an essential foundation to those who desire to conduct research and teach in the field. In particular, we hope that this compilation and our introduction will be useful to graduate students and to researchers in economics, finance, and insurance. Our criteria for selecting articles included significance, representativeness, pedagogical value, and our desire to include theoretical and empirical work. While the focus of the applied papers is on property-liability insurance, they illustrate issues, concepts, and methods that are applicable in many areas of insurance. The S. S. Huebner Foundation for Insurance Education at the University of Pennsylvania's Wharton School made this book possible by financing publication costs. We are grateful for this assistance and to J. David Cummins, Executive Director of the Foundation, for his efforts and helpful advice on the contents. We also wish to thank all of the authors and editors who provided permission to reprint articles and our respective institutions for technical and financial support.
Book Synopsis The Economics of Contracts, second edition by : Bernard Salanie
Download or read book The Economics of Contracts, second edition written by Bernard Salanie and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 2017-02-17 with total page 257 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A concise introduction to the theory of contracts, emphasizing basic tools that allow the reader to understand the main theoretical models; revised and updated throughout for this edition. The theory of contracts grew out of the failure of the general equilibrium model to account for the strategic interactions among agents that arise from informational asymmetries. This popular text, revised and updated throughout for the second edition, serves as a concise and rigorous introduction to the theory of contracts for graduate students and professional economists. The book presents the main models of the theory of contracts, particularly the basic models of adverse selection, signaling, and moral hazard. It emphasizes the methods used to analyze the models, but also includes brief introductions to many of the applications in different fields of economics. The goal is to give readers the tools to understand the basic models and create their own. For the second edition, major changes have been made to chapter 3, on examples and extensions for the adverse selection model, which now includes more thorough discussions of multiprincipals, collusion, and multidimensional adverse selection, and to chapter 5, on moral hazard, with the limited liability model, career concerns, and common agency added to its topics. Two chapters have been completely rewritten: chapter 7, on the theory of incomplete contracts, and chapter 8, on the empirical literature in the theory of contracts. An appendix presents concepts of noncooperative game theory to supplement chapters 4 and 6. Exercises follow chapters 2 through 5. Praise for the previous edition: “The Economics of Contracts offers an excellent introduction to agency models. Written by one of the leading young researchers in contact theory, it is rigorous, clear, concise, and up-to-date. Researchers and students who want to learn about the economics of incentives will want to read this primer.”—Jean Tirole, Institut D'Économie Industrielle, Universite des Sciences Sociales, France “Students will find this a very useful introduction to the ideas of contract theory. Salanié has managed to summarize a large amount of material in a relatively short number of pages in a highly accessible and readable manner.”—Oliver Hart, Professor of Economics, Harvard University
Book Synopsis Investment and Financing Decisions Under Moral Hazard by : Richard Carleton Green
Download or read book Investment and Financing Decisions Under Moral Hazard written by Richard Carleton Green and published by . This book was released on 1982 with total page 486 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: