Read Books Online and Download eBooks, EPub, PDF, Mobi, Kindle, Text Full Free.
Contract Renegotiation And Options In Agency Problems
Download Contract Renegotiation And Options In Agency Problems full books in PDF, epub, and Kindle. Read online Contract Renegotiation And Options In Agency Problems ebook anywhere anytime directly on your device. Fast Download speed and no annoying ads. We cannot guarantee that every ebooks is available!
Book Synopsis Contract Renegotiation and Options in Agency Problems by : Aaron S. Edlin
Download or read book Contract Renegotiation and Options in Agency Problems written by Aaron S. Edlin and published by . This book was released on 1998 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper studies the ability of an agent and a principal to achieve the first-best outcome when the agent invests in an asset that has greater value if owned by the principal than by the agent. When contracts can be renegotiated, a well-known danger is that the principal can holdup the agent, undermining the agent's investment incentives. We begin by identifying a countervailing effect: Investment by the agent can increase his value for the asset, thus improving his bargaining position in renegotiation. We show that option contracts will achieve the first best whenever this threat-point effect dominates the holdup effect. Otherwise, achieving the first best is difficult and, in many cases, impossible.
Book Synopsis Contract Renegotiation in Agency Problems by : Aaron S. Edlin
Download or read book Contract Renegotiation in Agency Problems written by Aaron S. Edlin and published by . This book was released on 1997 with total page 33 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper studies the ability of an agent and a principal to achieve the first-best outcome when the agent invests in an asset that has greater value if owned by the principal than by the agent. When contracts can be renegotiated, a well-known danger is that the principal can hold up the agent, undermining the agent's investment incentives. We begin by identifying a countervailing effect: Investment by the agent can increase his value for the asset, thus improving his bargaining position in renegotiation. We show that option contracts will achieve the first best whenever this threat-point effect dominates the holdup effect. Otherwise, achieving the first best is difficult and, in many cases, impossible. In such cases, we show that if parties have an appropriate signal available, then the first best is still attainable for a wide class of bargaining procedures. A noisy signal, however, means that the optimal contract will involve terms that courts might view as punitive and so refuse to enforce
Book Synopsis Agency Problems and Financial Contracting by : Amir Barnea
Download or read book Agency Problems and Financial Contracting written by Amir Barnea and published by Prentice Hall. This book was released on 1985 with total page 184 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Renegotiation-proof Contracts with Moral Hazard and Persistent Private Information by : Bruno Strulovici
Download or read book Renegotiation-proof Contracts with Moral Hazard and Persistent Private Information written by Bruno Strulovici and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: How does renegotiation affect contracts between a principal and an agent subject to persistent private information and moral hazard? This paper introduces a concept of renegotiationproofness, which adapts to stochastic games the concepts of weak renegotiation-proofness and internal consistency by exploiting natural comparisons across states. When the agent has exponential utility and cost of effort, each separating renegotiation-proof contract is characterized by a single "sensitivity" parameter, which determines how the agent's promised utility varies with reported cash flows. The optimal contract among those always causes immiserization. Reducing the agent's cost of effort can harm the principal by increasing the tension between moral hazard and reporting problems. Truthfulness of the constructed contracts is obtained by allowing jumps in cash flow reports and turning the agent's reporting problem into an impulse control problem. This approach shows that self-correcting reports are optimal of the equilibrium path. The paper also discusses the case of partially pooling contracts and of permanent outside options for the agent, illustrating the interaction between cash-flow persistence, renegotiation, moral hazard, and information revelation. -- Repeated Agency ; Asymmetric Information ; Persistent Information ; Contract Theory ; Principal Agent ; Limited Commitment ; Renegotiation ; Recursive Contracts
Book Synopsis Agency Theory by : Alexander Stremitzer
Download or read book Agency Theory written by Alexander Stremitzer and published by Peter Lang Publishing. This book was released on 2005 with total page 252 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Designing a contract is often more of an economic than a legal problem. A good contract protects parties against opportunistic behavior while providing motivation to cooperate. This is where economics and, especially contract theory, may prove helpful by enhancing our understanding of incentive issues. The purpose of this book is to provide specific tools which will help to write better contracts in real world environments. Concentrating on moral hazard literature, this book derives a tentative checklist for drafting contracts. As an economic contribution to a field traditionally considered an art rather than a science, this treatment also gives much attention to methodological issues.
Book Synopsis Renegotiation, what it Is, how it Works by : Renegotiation Board
Download or read book Renegotiation, what it Is, how it Works written by Renegotiation Board and published by . This book was released on 1960 with total page 8 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Advanced Microeconomics for Contract, Institutional, and Organizational Economics by : W. Bentley MacLeod
Download or read book Advanced Microeconomics for Contract, Institutional, and Organizational Economics written by W. Bentley MacLeod and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 2022-04-05 with total page 417 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A graduate textbook on microeconomics, covering decision theory, game theory, and the foundations of contract theory, with a unique focus on the empirical. This graduate-level text on microeconomics, covering such topics as decision theory, game theory, bargaining theory, contract theory, trade under asymmetric information, and relational contract theory, is unique in its emphasis on the interplay between theory and evidence. It reviews the microeconomic theory of exchange “from the ground up,” aiming to produce a set of models and hypotheses amenable to empirical exploration, with particular focus on models that are useful for the study of contracts, institutions, and organizations. It explores research that extends price theory to the exchange of commodities when markets are incomplete, discussing recent developments in the field. Topics covered include the relationship between theory and evidence; decision theory as it is used in contract theory and institutional design; game theory; axiomatic and strategic bargaining theory; agency theory and the class of models that are considered to constitute contract theory, with discussions of moral hazard and trade with asymmetric information; and the theory of relational contracts. The final chapter offers a nontechnical review that provides a guide to which model is the most appropriate for a particular application. End-of-chapter exercises help students expand their understanding of the material, and an appendix provides brief introduction to optimization theory and the welfare theorem of general equilibrium theory. Students are assumed to be familiar with general equilibrium theory and basic constrained optimization theory.
Book Synopsis Agency Problems, Financial Contracting, and Predation (Classic Reprint) by : Patrick Bolton
Download or read book Agency Problems, Financial Contracting, and Predation (Classic Reprint) written by Patrick Bolton and published by Forgotten Books. This book was released on 2018-02-23 with total page 44 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Excerpt from Agency Problems, Financial Contracting, and Predation We conclude these introductory remarks by contrasting our paper to three related literatures. The first is the recent game-theoretic work on predation.4 This literature shares with ours the feature that predation is rational. It differs, however, in that predation is viewed as an attempt to convince rivals that it would be unprofitable to remain in the industry; predation changes rivals' beliefs about industry demand or the predator's costs. In our paper, there is common knowledge that production in each period is a positive net present value investment.5 Thus, predation does not work by changing rivals' beliefs. Rather, predation adversely affects the agency relationship between the firm and its creditors. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works.
Book Synopsis Handbook of the Economics of Risk and Uncertainty by : Mark Machina
Download or read book Handbook of the Economics of Risk and Uncertainty written by Mark Machina and published by Newnes. This book was released on 2013-11-14 with total page 897 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The need to understand the theories and applications of economic and finance risk has been clear to everyone since the financial crisis, and this collection of original essays proffers broad, high-level explanations of risk and uncertainty. The economics of risk and uncertainty is unlike most branches of economics in spanning from the individual decision-maker to the market (and indeed, social decisions), and ranging from purely theoretical analysis through individual experimentation, empirical analysis, and applied and policy decisions. It also has close and sometimes conflicting relationships with theoretical and applied statistics, and psychology. The aim of this volume is to provide an overview of diverse aspects of this field, ranging from classical and foundational work through current developments. Presents coherent summaries of risk and uncertainty that inform major areas in economics and finance Divides coverage between theoretical, empirical, and experimental findings Makes the economics of risk and uncertainty accessible to scholars in fields outside economics
Book Synopsis Contract Law and Economics by : Gerrit de Geest
Download or read book Contract Law and Economics written by Gerrit de Geest and published by Edward Elgar Publishing. This book was released on 2010-10 with total page 497 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This unique and timely book offers an up-to-date, clear and comprehensive review of the economic literature on contract law. The topical chapters written by leading international scholars include: precontractual liability, misrepresentation, duress, gratuitous promises, gifts, standard form contracts, interpretation, contract remedies, penalty clauses, impracticability and foreseeability. Option contracts, warranties, long-term contracts, marriage contracts, franchise contracts, quasi-contracts, behavioral approaches, and civil contract law are also discussed. This excellent resource on contract law and economics will be particularly suited to contract law scholars, law teachers, policy makers, and judges. For experts in and practitioners of contract law this will be a key book to buy.
Book Synopsis The Handbook of the Economics of Corporate Governance by : Benjamin Hermalin
Download or read book The Handbook of the Economics of Corporate Governance written by Benjamin Hermalin and published by Elsevier. This book was released on 2017-09-18 with total page 762 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The Handbook of the Economics of Corporate Governance, Volume One, covers all issues important to economists. It is organized around fundamental principles, whereas multidisciplinary books on corporate governance often concentrate on specific topics. Specific topics include Relevant Theory and Methods, Organizational Economic Models as They Pertain to Governance, Managerial Career Concerns, Assessment & Monitoring, and Signal Jamming, The Institutions and Practice of Governance, The Law and Economics of Governance, Takeovers, Buyouts, and the Market for Control, Executive Compensation, Dominant Shareholders, and more. Providing excellent overviews and summaries of extant research, this book presents advanced students in graduate programs with details and perspectives that other books overlook. Concentrates on underlying principles that change little, even as the empirical literature moves on Helps readers see corporate governance systems as interrelated or even intertwined external (country-level) and internal (firm-level) forces Reviews the methodological tools of the field (theory and empirical), the most relevant models, and the field’s substantive findings, all of which help point the way forward
Book Synopsis Buyer-Option Contracts Restored by : Thomas Patrick Lyons
Download or read book Buyer-Option Contracts Restored written by Thomas Patrick Lyons and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Quot;Buyer-optionquot; contracts, in which the buyer selects the product variant to be traded and chooses whether to accept delivery, are often used to solve holdup problems. We present a simple game that focuses sharply on subgames in which the buyer proposes inefficient actions in order to improve his bargaining position. We argue for one of several alternative ways to model this situation. We then apply that modeling choice to recent models of the foundations of incomplete contracts and show that a buyer-option contract is sufficient to induce first-best outcomes.
Book Synopsis Economic Analysis of Contract Law by : Sugata Bag
Download or read book Economic Analysis of Contract Law written by Sugata Bag and published by Springer. This book was released on 2018-01-24 with total page 215 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book examines the main issues arising in economic analysis of contract law with special attention given to the incomplete contracts. It discusses both the main features of contract law as they relate to the problem of economic exchange, and how the relevant legal rules and the institutions can be analysed from an economic perspective. Evaluate the welfare impacts, analyses the effects and the desirability of different breach remedies and examines the optimal incentive structure of party-designed liquidated damages under the different dimensions of informational asymmetry. Overall the book aims to contribute to the legal debate over the adoption of the specific breach remedies when the breach victim’s expectation interest is difficult to assess, and to the debate over courts' reluctance to implement large penalties in the event of breach of contracts.
Book Synopsis Applied Economic Analysis of Information and Risk by : Moriki Hosoe
Download or read book Applied Economic Analysis of Information and Risk written by Moriki Hosoe and published by Springer Nature. This book was released on 2020-03-25 with total page 201 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book examines interesting new topics in applied economics from the perspectives of the economics of information and risk, two fields of economics that address the consequences of asymmetric information, environmental risk and uncertainty for the nature and efficiency of interactions between individuals and organizations. In the economics of information, the essential task is to examine the condition of asymmetric information under which the information gap is exploited. For the economics of risk, it is important to investigate types of behavior including risk aversion, risk sharing, and risk prevention, and to reexamine the classical expected utility approach and the relationships among several types of the changes in risk. Few books have ever analyzed topics in applied economics with regard to information and risk. This book provides a comprehensive collection of applied analyses, while also revisiting certain basic concepts in the economics of information and risk. The book consists of two parts. In Part I, several aspects of applied economics are investigated, including public policy, labor economics, and political economics, from the standpoint of the economics of (asymmetric) information. First, several basic frameworks of the incentive mechanism with regard to transaction-specific investment are assessed, then various tools for market design and organization design are explored. In Part II, mathematical measures of risk and risk aversion are examined in more detail, and readers are introduced to stochastic selection rules governing choice behavior under uncertainty. Several types of change in the random variable for the cumulative distribution function (CDF) and probability distribution function (PDF) are discussed. In closing, the part investigates the comparative static results of these changes in CDF or PDF on the general decision model, incorporating uncertain situations in applied economics.
Book Synopsis The Theory of Corporate Finance by : Jean Tirole
Download or read book The Theory of Corporate Finance written by Jean Tirole and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 2010-08-26 with total page 657 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: "Magnificent."—The Economist From the Nobel Prize–winning economist, a groundbreaking and comprehensive account of corporate finance Recent decades have seen great theoretical and empirical advances in the field of corporate finance. Whereas once the subject addressed mainly the financing of corporations—equity, debt, and valuation—today it also embraces crucial issues of governance, liquidity, risk management, relationships between banks and corporations, and the macroeconomic impact of corporations. However, this progress has left in its wake a jumbled array of concepts and models that students are often hard put to make sense of. Here, one of the world's leading economists offers a lucid, unified, and comprehensive introduction to modern corporate finance theory. Jean Tirole builds his landmark book around a single model, using an incentive or contract theory approach. Filling a major gap in the field, The Theory of Corporate Finance is an indispensable resource for graduate and advanced undergraduate students as well as researchers of corporate finance, industrial organization, political economy, development, and macroeconomics. Tirole conveys the organizing principles that structure the analysis of today's key management and public policy issues, such as the reform of corporate governance and auditing; the role of private equity, financial markets, and takeovers; the efficient determination of leverage, dividends, liquidity, and risk management; and the design of managerial incentive packages. He weaves empirical studies into the book's theoretical analysis. And he places the corporation in its broader environment, both microeconomic and macroeconomic, and examines the two-way interaction between the corporate environment and institutions. Setting a new milestone in the field, The Theory of Corporate Finance will be the authoritative text for years to come.
Book Synopsis Default and Renegotiation by : I-Tsung Tsai
Download or read book Default and Renegotiation written by I-Tsung Tsai and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page 102 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: (Cont.) (3) For any given initial capital investment, the agent's optimal cost-reducing effort decreases with the magnitude of debt. (4) For any given initial capital investment, the agent's optimal cost-reducing effort increases with the magnitude of a performance bond when the contract is one with no positive self-enforcement effect. The theoretical result is consistent with the conventional wisdom that internal equity and performance bond generally enhance the agent's devotion to a PPP contractual relationship. This research also contributes a (subjective) PPP contract valuation method that takes into account the underlying agency problem.
Book Synopsis IOCB 2010 Industrial Organization: a Contract Based approach by :
Download or read book IOCB 2010 Industrial Organization: a Contract Based approach written by and published by Nicolas Boccard. This book was released on with total page 806 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
