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Author : M. Weverbergh
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (91 download)
Download or read book Competitive Bidding with Asymmetric Information Reanalysed written by M. Weverbergh and published by . This book was released on 1978 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Rafael Rob
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 17 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (248 download)
Download or read book A Note on Competitive Bidding with Asymmetric Information written by Rafael Rob and published by . This book was released on 1984 with total page 17 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Walter J. Mead
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 166 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (96 download)
Download or read book Competitive Bidding Under Asymmetric Information written by Walter J. Mead and published by . This book was released on 1982 with total page 166 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Asbjorn Moseidjord
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 376 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (96 download)
Download or read book Competitive Bidding Under Asymmetric Information written by Asbjorn Moseidjord and published by . This book was released on 1981 with total page 376 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Leonid Hurwicz
Publisher : Cambridge University Press
ISBN 13 : 9780521262040
Total Pages : 398 pages
Book Rating : 4.2/5 (62 download)
Download or read book Social Goals and Social Organization written by Leonid Hurwicz and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 1985-12-27 with total page 398 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book contains a collection of essays providing a comprehensive view of the design and evaluation of economic mechanisms.
Author : Paul Robert Milgrom
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 196 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (224 download)
Download or read book The Structure of Information in Competitive Bidding written by Paul Robert Milgrom and published by . This book was released on 1978 with total page 196 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Robert Wilson
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 0 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (844 download)
Download or read book Competitive Bidding with Asymmetrical Information written by Robert Wilson and published by . This book was released on 1966 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Riccardo Calcagno
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 33 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (476 download)
Download or read book Bid-ask Price Competition with Asymmetric Information Between Market Makers written by Riccardo Calcagno and published by . This book was released on 1998 with total page 33 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Riccardo Calcagno
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 33 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (476 download)
Download or read book Bid-ask Price Competition with Asymmetric Information Between Market Makers written by Riccardo Calcagno and published by . This book was released on 1998 with total page 33 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Paul Robert Milgrom
Publisher : Cambridge University Press
ISBN 13 : 9780521536721
Total Pages : 396 pages
Book Rating : 4.5/5 (367 download)
Download or read book Putting Auction Theory to Work written by Paul Robert Milgrom and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2004-01-12 with total page 396 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Table of contents
Author : Lucas A. Rentschler
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (76 download)
Download or read book Asymmetric Information in Common-value Auctions and Contests written by Lucas A. Rentschler and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In common-value auctions and contests economic agents often have varying levels of information regarding the value of the good to be allocated. Using theoretical and experimental analysis, I examine the effect of such information asymmetry on behavior. Chapter II considers a model in which players compete in two sequential contests. The winner of the first contest (the incumbent) privately observes the value of the prize, which provides private information if the prizes are related. Relative to the case where the prizes are independent, the incumbent is strictly better off, and the other contestants (the challengers) are strictly worse off. This increases the incentive to win the first contest such that the sum of expected effort over both contests increases relative to the case of independent prizes. Chapter III experimentally considers the role of asymmetric information in first-price, sealed-bid, common-value auctions. Bidders who observe a private signal tend to overbid relative to Nash equilibrium predictions. Uninformed bidders, however, tend to underbid relative to the Nash equilibrium. Chapter IV examines asymmetric information in one-shot common-value all-pay auctions and lottery contests from both experimental and theoretical perspectives As predicted by theory, asymmetric information yields information rents for the informed bidder in both all-pay auctions and lottery contests.
Author : John Sutton
Publisher : MIT Press
ISBN 13 : 9780262692793
Total Pages : 148 pages
Book Rating : 4.6/5 (927 download)
Download or read book Marshall's Tendencies written by John Sutton and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 2000 with total page 148 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: I started to read idly, and soon found myself hooked. An intelligent insider's thoughts on research strategies will do that to you.Robert M. Solow, Institute Professor of Economics, Emeritus, MIT, and Nobel Laureate in Economics (1987)
Author : John Asker
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 41 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (962 download)
Download or read book The Competitive Effects of Information Sharing written by John Asker and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page 41 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Abstract: We investigate the impact of information sharing between rivals in a dynamic auction with asymmetric information. Firms bid in sequential auctions to obtain inputs. Their inventory of inputs, determined by the results of past auctions, are privately known state variables that determine bidding incentives. The model is analyzed numerically under different information sharing rules. The analysis uses the restricted experience based equilibrium concept of Fershtman and Pakes (2012) which we refine to mitigate multiplicity issues. We find that increased information about competitors' states increases participation and inventories, as the firms are more able to avoid the intense competition in low inventory states. While average bids are lower, social welfare is unchanged and output is increased. Implications for the posture of antitrust regulation toward information sharing agreements are discussed
Author : Vijay Krishna
Publisher : Academic Press
ISBN 13 : 012426297X
Total Pages : 319 pages
Book Rating : 4.1/5 (242 download)
Download or read book Auction Theory written by Vijay Krishna and published by Academic Press. This book was released on 2002-03-13 with total page 319 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: "Vijay Krishna's book provides a very thorough and patient presentation of auction theory, starting from the most basic analysis and graduating to sophisticated, state of the art theory, including multi-unit auctions. This book covers a very wide range of auction topics, providing a clear and accessible treatment. The theory is presented in a careful and easily understood style accessible to honors undergraduates as well as all economics graduate students. Krishna's book will certainly become the central book on auction theory." --R. Preston McAfee, Murray S. Johnson Chair in Economics, University of Texas "This book not only sets out much of the theoretical literature on auctions-including results that are very recent-but does so with a clarity, elegance, and rigor that is characteristic of Vijay Krishna's work." --Eric Maskin, A.O. Hirschman Professor of Social Science, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, New Jersey "The book gives a superb presentation of auction theory, with clear and concise proofs of all results. It is essential reading for any serious student of auctions." --Peter Cramton, Professor of Economics, University of Maryland "This is the book we have been waiting for: a high level treatment of auction theory that carefully presents the technical details necessary for an in depth understanding of the main themes of auction theory, ideal as a basis for a graduate course, and by an author who has himself made important contributions to the subject." --Paul Klemperer, Edgeworth Professor of Economics, Nuffield College, University of Oxford, United Kingdom Through accessible, detailed examinations of themes central to auction theory, Vijay Krishna explores auctions and competitive bidding as games of incomplete information. His results on bidding strategies, efficiency, and revenue maximization and his clear proofs for each proposition make this book both the standard reference on auctions and the first source of authoritative information about multiunit auctions. Well organized and featuring straightforward intuition, Auction Theory's depth and breadth lay bare the complexity and utility of this growing field.
Author : John H. Kagel
Publisher : Princeton University Press
ISBN 13 : 0691218951
Total Pages : 419 pages
Book Rating : 4.6/5 (912 download)
Download or read book Common Value Auctions and the Winner's Curse written by John H. Kagel and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 2021-04-13 with total page 419 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: An invaluable account of how auctions work—and how to make them work Few forms of market exchange intrigue economists as do auctions, whose theoretical and practical implications are enormous. John Kagel and Dan Levin, complementing their own distinguished research with papers written with other specialists, provide a new focus on common value auctions and the "winner's curse." In such auctions the value of each item is about the same to all bidders, but different bidders have different information about the underlying value. Virtually all auctions have a common value element; among the burgeoning modern-day examples are those organized by Internet companies such as eBay. Winners end up cursing when they realize that they won because their estimates were overly optimistic, which led them to bid too much and lose money as a result. The authors first unveil a fresh survey of experimental data on the winner's curse. Melding theory with the econometric analysis of field data, they assess the design of government auctions, such as the spectrum rights (air wave) auctions that continue to be conducted around the world. The remaining chapters gauge the impact on sellers' revenue of the type of auction used and of inside information, show how bidders learn to avoid the winner's curse, and present comparisons of sophisticated bidders with college sophomores, the usual guinea pigs used in laboratory experiments. Appendixes refine theoretical arguments and, in some cases, present entirely new data. This book is an invaluable, impeccably up-to-date resource on how auctions work--and how to make them work.
Author : Joel O. Wooten
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 0 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (137 download)
Download or read book To Thine Own Self Be True written by Joel O. Wooten and published by . This book was released on 2020 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: As procurement auctions increasingly move to digital platforms, more data and information is available (or can be made available) to bidders. Despite this trend, relatively little is known about the impact of information asymmetries in these settings. We investigate two such differences in first-price sealed-bid reverse auctions with a common value. In a design that mirrors real construction procurement auctions, our laboratory experiment tests the impact of the precision of a bidder's cost estimate and the degree to which bidders know the inherent cost estimate precisions in the auction. We find that more understanding of estimate precision decreases bidder profit, counter to our expectation; however, we also find evidence of strategic behavior from those bidders that ratchets up pressure on competitors and pushes competitors toward bankruptcy. Most notably, understanding just one's own precision can help avoid the winner's curse in some settings. The same result does not apply if bidders also know their competitor's precision; more information does not help. The implication from our realistic setting - that reduced uncertainty may not help - raises important questions about the degree of transparency that is optimal in procurement auctions.
Author : Guillaume R. Fréchette
Publisher :
ISBN 13 : 0195328329
Total Pages : 491 pages
Book Rating : 4.1/5 (953 download)
Download or read book Handbook of Experimental Economic Methodology written by Guillaume R. Fréchette and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 491 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The Handbook of Experimental Economic Methodology, edited by Guillaume R. Fr chette and Andrew Schotter, aims to confront and debate the issues faced by the growing field of experimental economics. For example, as experimental work attempts to test theory, it raises questions about the proper relationship between theory and experiments. As experimental results are used to inform policy, the utility of these results outside the lab is questioned, and finally, as experimental economics tries to integrate ideas from other disciplines like psychology and neuroscience, the question of their proper place in the discipline of economics becomes less clear. This book contains papers written by some of the most accomplished scholars working at the intersection of experimental, behavioral, and theoretical economics talking about methodology. It is divided into four sections, each of which features a set of papers and a set of comments on those papers. The intention of the volume is to offer a place where ideas about methodology could be discussed and even argued. Some of the papers are contentious---a healthy sign of a dynamic discipline---while others lay out a vision for how the authors think experimental economics should be pursued. This exciting and illuminating collection of papers brings light to a topic at the core of experimental economics. Researchers from a broad range of fields will benefit from the exploration of these important questions.
