Read Books Online and Download eBooks, EPub, PDF, Mobi, Kindle, Text Full Free.
Bid Coordination In Sponsored Search Auctions
Download Bid Coordination In Sponsored Search Auctions full books in PDF, epub, and Kindle. Read online Bid Coordination In Sponsored Search Auctions ebook anywhere anytime directly on your device. Fast Download speed and no annoying ads. We cannot guarantee that every ebooks is available!
Book Synopsis Bid Coordination in Sponsored Search Auctions by : Francesco Decarolis
Download or read book Bid Coordination in Sponsored Search Auctions written by Francesco Decarolis and published by . This book was released on 2023 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Bid delegation to specialized intermediaries is common in the auction systems used to sell internet advertising. When the same intermediary concentrates the demand for ad space from competing advertisers, its incentive to coordinate client bids might alter the functioning of the auctions. This study develops a methodology to detect bid coordination, and presents a strategy to estimate a bound on the search engine revenue losses imposed by coordination relative to a counterfactual benchmark of competitive bidding. Using proprietary data from auctions held on a major search engine, coordination is detected in 55 percent of the cases of delegated bidding that we observed, and the associated upper bound on the search engine’s revenue loss ranges between 5.3 and 10.4 percent.
Book Synopsis Common Agency and Coordinated Bids in Sponsored Search Auctions by : Francesco Decarolis
Download or read book Common Agency and Coordinated Bids in Sponsored Search Auctions written by Francesco Decarolis and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 19 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: As auctions are becoming the main mechanism for selling advertisement space on the web, marketing agencies specialized in bidding in online auctions are proliferating. We analyze theoretically how bidding delegation to a common marketing agency can undermine both revenues and efficiency of the generalized second price auction, the format used by Google and Microsoft-Yahoo!. Our characterization allows us to quantify the revenue losses relative to both the case of full competition and the case of agency bidding under an alternative auction format (specifically, the VCG mechanism). We propose a simple algorithm that a search engine can use to reduce efficiency and revenue losses.
Book Synopsis Sponsored Search Auctions by : Song Yao
Download or read book Sponsored Search Auctions written by Song Yao and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 57 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We systematically overview the literature in key word search and propose several promising research directions. The paper is organized by each agent in the search process: searchers, advertisers and the search engine, and reviews the key research issues for each. For each group, we outline the decision process involved in keyword search. For searchers, this involves what to search, where to search, which results to click, and when to exit search. For advertisers, this involves where to bid and which word or words to bid on, how much to bid and how searchers and auction mechanisms moderate these behaviors. The search engine faces choices on mechanism design, website design, and how much information to share with its advertisers and searchers. These choices have implications for customer lifetime value and the nature of competition between advertisers. Overall, we list a number of potential areas of future research arising from the decision processes of these various agents.
Book Synopsis Letś Talk about Bidding! by : Jeannette Brosig
Download or read book Letś Talk about Bidding! written by Jeannette Brosig and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 22 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Let's talk about bidding! written by and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 44 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis A 'Position Paradox' in Sponsored Search Auctions by : Kinshuk Jerath
Download or read book A 'Position Paradox' in Sponsored Search Auctions written by Kinshuk Jerath and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We study the bidding strategies of vertically differentiated firms that bid for sponsored search advertisement positions for a keyword at a search engine. We explicitly model how consumers navigate and click on sponsored links based on their knowledge and beliefs about firm qualities. Our model yields several interesting insights and a main counter-intuitive result we focus on is the position paradox." The paradox is that a superior firm may bid lower than an inferior firm and obtain a position below it, yet still obtain more clicks than the inferior firm. Under a pay-per- impression mechanism, the inferior firm wants to be at the top where more consumers click on its link, while the superior firm is better off by placing its link at a lower position as it pays a smaller advertising fee but some consumers will still reach it in the search of a higher-quality firm. Under a pay-per-click mechanism, the inferior firm has an even stronger incentive to be at the top since now it only has to pay for the consumers who do not know the firms' reputations and, therefore, can bid more aggressively. Interestingly, as the quality premium for the superior firm increases, and/or if more consumers know the identity of the superior firm, the incentive for the inferior firm to be at the top may increase. Contrary to conventional belief, we find that the search engine may have the incentive to over-weight the inferior firm's bid and strategically create the position paradox to increase overall clicks by consumers. To validate our model, we analyze a dataset from a popular Korean search engine firm and find that: (i) a large proportion of auction outcomes in the data show the position paradox, and (ii) sharp predictions from our model are validated in the data.
Book Synopsis Early, Late, and Multiple Bidding in Internet Auctions by : Radovan Vadovic
Download or read book Early, Late, and Multiple Bidding in Internet Auctions written by Radovan Vadovic and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 41 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In Internet auctions bidders frequently bid in one of three ways: either only early, or late, or they revise their early bids. This paper rationalizes all three bidding patterns within a single equilibrium. We consider a model of a dynamic auction in which bidders can search for outside prices during the auction. We find that in the equilibrium bidders with the low search costs bid only late and always search, while the bidders with high search costs bid early or multiple times and search only if they were previously outbid. An important feature of the equilibrium is that early bidding allows bidders to search in a coordinated manner. This means that everyone searches except the bidder with the highest early bid. We also compare the static and dynamic auction and conclude that dynamic auction is always more efficient but not always more profitable.
Book Synopsis Bidding Behavior in Internet Auction Markets by : Radovan Vadovic
Download or read book Bidding Behavior in Internet Auction Markets written by Radovan Vadovic and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 180 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In this dissertation I study bidding behavior in Internet Auction Markets. I focus on practice called"multiple bidding" which occurs when a single bidder places numerous bids throughout the same auction. Multiple bidding appears frequently in the data but the incentives that motivate it are not well understood. In the first chapter I develop a theoretical model in which multiple bidding is an equilibrium behavior by rational bidders. The model has a dynamic auction with two bidders who can search for outside prices while bidding in the auction. Each bidder has a search cost which is her private information. When outside prices are private (independently drawn and identically distributed), then, there is an equilibrium in which bidders with the lower search costs bid only late and always search, while the bidders with higher search costs bid both early and late and search as if they coordinated their search decisions, i.e., the bidder with the lower search cost searches and the other bidder does not. This equilibrium by itself provides an explanation of two frequently occurring bidding patterns (late and multiple bidding). In the second chapter I study experimentally the effect of early bids in dynamic auctions on how bidders search for outside prices. The design has two bidders participating in an ascending clock-auction during which any one of the bidders can pause the auction clock. This I interpret as placing an early bid. Once the auction is paused both bidders can simultaneously search for an alternative outside price. Results indicate that pausing decisions by subjects impact their subsequent searching for outside prices, i.e., whether a subject decides to search or not depends on whether she has paused the auction or not. Subjects behave as if they coordinated their searching decisions: the bidder who pauses the auction also searches with high frequency and the other bidder does not. Because this type of behavior increases both the efficiency and the profitability of the auction we favor the use of policies that promote early bidding inpractice, such as, longer auctions and lower public reserve prices.
Book Synopsis Modern Constructive Bidding by : Marshall Miles
Download or read book Modern Constructive Bidding written by Marshall Miles and published by Master Point Press. This book was released on 2005 with total page 226 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The logical follow-up to the author's best-selling Competitive Bidding in the 21st Century, this book deals with the latest expert thinking on constructive auctions at bridge. As usual, Miles' ideas are cutting edge, and not everything he recommends will appeal to everyone. However, through discussion, Miles challenges his readers to think about and question what they are currently doing, ultimately reinforcing their own confidence in the style they choose to play.
Book Synopsis Multi-Robot Systems. From Swarms to Intelligent Automata, Volume III by : Lynne E. Parker
Download or read book Multi-Robot Systems. From Swarms to Intelligent Automata, Volume III written by Lynne E. Parker and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2005-04 with total page 328 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This proceedings volume documents recent cutting-edge developments in multi-robot systems research. This volume is the result of the Third International workshop on Multi-Robot Systems that was held in March 2005 at the Naval Research Laboratory in Washington, D.C. This workshop brought together top researchers working in areas relevant to designing teams of autonomous vehicles, including robots and unmanned ground, air, surface, and undersea vehicles. The workshop focused on the challenging issues of team architectures, vehicle learning and adaptation, heterogeneous group control and cooperation, task selection, dynamic autonomy, mixed initiative, and human and robot team interaction. A broad range of applications of this technology are presented in this volume, including UCAVS (Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles), micro-air vehicles, UUVs (Unmanned Underwater Vehicles), UGVs (Unmanned Ground vehicles), planetary exploration, assembly in space, clean-up, and urban search and rescue. This proceedings volume represents the contributions of the top researchers in this field and serves as a valuable tool for professionals in this interdisciplinary field.
Book Synopsis Essays on Optimal Bidding Strategies in Sponsored Search Advertising Auctions by : Prabirendra Chatterjee
Download or read book Essays on Optimal Bidding Strategies in Sponsored Search Advertising Auctions written by Prabirendra Chatterjee and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 102 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In this dissertation, I model generalized second price (GSP) auction for keyword search to analyze the optimal bidding strategies of the participating advertisers. The results also apply to a more general setting where multiple goods are being auctioned off. The study in chapter 3 examines the bidding strategies of the advertisers in a complete information static GSP auction. The results show that unlike in standard second price auction, truthful bidding is never a dominant strategy in general second price auction. In chapter 4, I have developed a model of static incomplete information GSP auction. I characterize all possible pure strategy Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the game and show that the consideration of the click through rates ratio plays a key role in determining the equilibrium bidding strategies for the advertisers. Specifically, I find that when the click through rates ratio exceeds a critical value, there will be no pure strategy Bayes-Nash equilibrium. The analysis also reveals that in a game of static incomplete information no asymmetric bidding equilibrium would prevail. The study in chapter 5 analyzes a model of incomplete information dynamic GSP auction. I find that in a dynamic game, the existence of both separating strategy equilibrium and pooling strategy equilibrium would depend upon critical values of click through rates ratio. I also prove that the advertisers with high valuation for a keyword will either reveal their identities at the very beginning or at the very end of this dynamic game. The results also show that when search engines do not publish the bidding history (i.e. there is 'minimum disclosure of information'), the advertisers will never try to mimic each other or in other words, there will be no pooling strategy equilibrium.
Book Synopsis Putting Auction Theory to Work by : Paul Milgrom
Download or read book Putting Auction Theory to Work written by Paul Milgrom and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2004-01-12 with total page 378 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.
Download or read book Bid Management written by Emma Jaques and published by Kogan Page Publishers. This book was released on 2011-02-03 with total page 224 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: While it is becoming increasingly common for contracts to be awarded through formal procurement processes, smaller business are missing out. Without the training and confidence needed to write a successful bid or proposal valuable business can be lost. Bid Management is an easy-to-read practical guide which will teach the reader how to think like a professional bid manager. It covers the basics of how to find opportunities, understanding the rules of the game and how to get to know your customer. It also gives essential advice on how to compete with other bidders, present a deliverable and profitable bid, project manage your bid, work out a pricing strategy, clinch the deal and learn from success as well as failure. With an insightful interview with the Director behind the London 2012 Olympic bid, Bid Management uncovers the myths of bidding and teaches all the skills needed to get noticed, retain existing clients and win new ones.
Book Synopsis Sponsored Search and Sequential Auctions by : Emmanuel Lorenzon
Download or read book Sponsored Search and Sequential Auctions written by Emmanuel Lorenzon and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This thesis is a collection of three essays in theoretical auction analysis. Chapter 1 considersbid delegation in the GSP auction mechanism. In a game involving side-contracts and a compensationpolicy set by an agency, the first-best collusive outcome is achieved. We offer a characterization of the implementablebid profiles for the two-position game with three players. Chapter 2 considers the sequentialsale of an object to two buyers: one knows his private information and the other buyer does not. Buyershave a multi-unit demand and private valuations for each unit are perfectly correlated. An asymmetricequilibrium exists when the uninformed player adopts an aggressive bidding strategy. Conversely, hisinformed opponent behaves more conservatively by using bid shading. The bidding behaviour of theuninformed bidder is driven by the opportunity to learn his private valuation for free. This dynamic is atthe root of the decline in the equilibrium price across both sales. In chapter 3, information is observableduring the first-stage auction in a sequential-move game in which the first-mover bidder is observed byhis opponent. A separating equilibrium exists in which the informed bidder bids aggressively when he isthe first-mover which entails a non-participation strategy from his uninformed competitor. Conversely,the latter adopts a conservative behaviour when he is the first-mover. A pooling equilibrium in which theinformed bidder blurs his valuation can only exist if his uninformed opponent adopts a non-participatingstrategy.
Book Synopsis Bidding Strategies in Agent-Based Continuous Double Auctions by : Huiye Ma
Download or read book Bidding Strategies in Agent-Based Continuous Double Auctions written by Huiye Ma and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2008-09-15 with total page 142 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book provides a new bidding strategy for agents to adopt in continuous double auctions (CDAs) and proposes some generally used tools to enhance the performance of existing bidding strategies in CDAs. It is the first book to focus on CDAs where a limited amount of seller agents and buyer agents trade what they want. The superior performance of the new bidding strategy and the tools proposed by this book are illustrated through extensive experiments.
Book Synopsis Simplified Mechanisms With Applications To Sponsored Search and Package Auctions by : Paul R. Milgrom
Download or read book Simplified Mechanisms With Applications To Sponsored Search and Package Auctions written by Paul R. Milgrom and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A simplified mechanism is a direct mechanism modified by restricting the set of reports or bids. An example is the auction used to place ads on Internet search pages, in which each advertiser bids a single price to determine the allocation of eight or more ad positions on a page. If a simplified mechanism satisfies the quot;best-reply-closurequot; property, then all Nash equilibria of the simplified mechanism are also equilibria of the original direct mechanism. For search advertising auctions, suitable simplifications eliminate inefficient, low-revenue equilibria that are favored in the original direct mechanism when bidding costs are positive.
Book Synopsis To Score Or Not to Score? Estimates of a Sponsored Search Auction Model by : Yu-Wei Hsieh
Download or read book To Score Or Not to Score? Estimates of a Sponsored Search Auction Model written by Yu-Wei Hsieh and published by . This book was released on 2018 with total page 27 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Using data from "WebsiteX", one of the largest online marketplaces in the world, we estimate a structural model of sponsored search auctions where bidders have heterogeneous click-through curves. Unlike earlier studies, our model accommodates two stylized empirical facts: the advertiser prominence eff ect and the position paradox. Using our estimates, we simulate the e ffects of introducing bid-scoring to the auctions. We fi nd that scoring reduces equilibrium per-click prices, but boosts the number of clicks by sorting prestigious merchants to the top positions. Overall there is only a very modest reduction in total revenues from introducing bid-scoring, despite the intent to reward high-quality merchants with price discounts. Methodologically, this paper also illustrates an application of a novel "approximate Bayesian" estimation method to a structural multi-item auction model.
