Read Books Online and Download eBooks, EPub, PDF, Mobi, Kindle, Text Full Free.
Download Agency Problems And Financial Contracting full books in PDF, epub, and Kindle. Read online Agency Problems And Financial Contracting ebook anywhere anytime directly on your device. Fast Download speed and no annoying ads. We cannot guarantee that every ebooks is available!
Author : Amir Barnea
Publisher : Prentice Hall
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 184 pages
Book Rating : 4.3/5 ( download)
Download or read book Agency Problems and Financial Contracting written by Amir Barnea and published by Prentice Hall. This book was released on 1985 with total page 184 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Patrick Bolton
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 32 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (178 download)
Download or read book Agency Problems, Financial Contracting, and Predation written by Patrick Bolton and published by . This book was released on 1988 with total page 32 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Patrick Bolton
Publisher : Forgotten Books
ISBN 13 : 9780666208293
Total Pages : 44 pages
Book Rating : 4.2/5 (82 download)
Download or read book Agency Problems, Financial Contracting, and Predation (Classic Reprint) written by Patrick Bolton and published by Forgotten Books. This book was released on 2018-02-23 with total page 44 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Excerpt from Agency Problems, Financial Contracting, and Predation We conclude these introductory remarks by contrasting our paper to three related literatures. The first is the recent game-theoretic work on predation.4 This literature shares with ours the feature that predation is rational. It differs, however, in that predation is viewed as an attempt to convince rivals that it would be unprofitable to remain in the industry; predation changes rivals' beliefs about industry demand or the predator's costs. In our paper, there is common knowledge that production in each period is a positive net present value investment.5 Thus, predation does not work by changing rivals' beliefs. Rather, predation adversely affects the agency relationship between the firm and its creditors. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works.
Author : Subramanyam Venkataraman
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 488 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (89 download)
Download or read book Multiperiod Agency Problems and Financial Contracting written by Subramanyam Venkataraman and published by . This book was released on 1988 with total page 488 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Günter Bamberg
Publisher : Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN 13 : 3642750605
Total Pages : 538 pages
Book Rating : 4.6/5 (427 download)
Download or read book Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives written by Günter Bamberg and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2012-12-06 with total page 538 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Agency Theory is a new branch of economics which focusses on the roles of information and of incentives when individuals cooperate with respect to the utilisation of resources. Basic approaches are coming from microeco nomic theory as well as from risk analysis. Among the broad variety of ap plications are: the many designs of contractual arrangements, organiza tions, and institutions as well as the manifold aspects of the separation of ownership and control so fundamental for business finance. After some twenty years of intensive research in the field of information economics it might be timely to present the most basic issues, questions, models, and applications. This volume Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives offers introductory surveys as well as results of individual rese arch that seem to shape that field of information economics appropriately. Some 30 authors were invited to present their subjects in such a way that students could easily become acquainted with the main ideas of informa tion economics. So the aim of Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives is to introduce students at an intermediate level and to accompany their work in classes on microeconomics, information economics, organization, management theory, and business finance. The topics selected form the eight sections of the book: 1. Agency Theory and Risk Sharing 2. Information and Incentives 3. Capital Markets and Moral Hazard 4. Financial Contracting and Dividends 5. External Accounting and Auditing 6. Coordination in Groups 7. Property Rights and Fairness 8. Agency Costs.
Author : G. Constantinides
Publisher : Elsevier
ISBN 13 : 9780444513632
Total Pages : 698 pages
Book Rating : 4.5/5 (136 download)
Download or read book Handbook of the Economics of Finance written by G. Constantinides and published by Elsevier. This book was released on 2003-11-04 with total page 698 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Arbitrage, State Prices and Portfolio Theory / Philip h. Dybvig and Stephen a. Ross / - Intertemporal Asset Pricing Theory / Darrell Duffle / - Tests of Multifactor Pricing Models, Volatility Bounds and Portfolio Performance / Wayne E. Ferson / - Consumption-Based Asset Pricing / John y Campbell / - The Equity Premium in Retrospect / Rainish Mehra and Edward c. Prescott / - Anomalies and Market Efficiency / William Schwert / - Are Financial Assets Priced Locally or Globally? / G. Andrew Karolyi and Rene M. Stuli / - Microstructure and Asset Pricing / David Easley and Maureen O'hara / - A Survey of Behavioral Finance / Nicholas Barberis and Richard Thaler / - Derivatives / Robert E. Whaley / - Fixed-Income Pricing / Qiang Dai and Kenneth J. Singleton.
Author : Huiyan Qiu
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 272 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (319 download)
Download or read book Role of Financial Contracts and Managerial Compensation in Resolving Agency Problems written by Huiyan Qiu and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 272 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Joris Petrus Josephus Franciscus Scheepens
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 152 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (691 download)
Download or read book Financial intermediation and corporate finance : an analysis of agency problems and optimal contracts written by Joris Petrus Josephus Franciscus Scheepens and published by . This book was released on 1995 with total page 152 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : John S. Walker
Publisher : Lehigh University Press
ISBN 13 : 9780934223447
Total Pages : 276 pages
Book Rating : 4.2/5 (234 download)
Download or read book A Financial-agency Analysis of Privatization written by John S. Walker and published by Lehigh University Press. This book was released on 1997 with total page 276 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The authors argue that resolution of the CEO selection and financial-contracting problems can accelerate efficiency gains realized by the enterprise.
Author : Oliver Hart
Publisher : Clarendon Press
ISBN 13 : 0191521728
Total Pages : 244 pages
Book Rating : 4.1/5 (915 download)
Download or read book Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure written by Oliver Hart and published by Clarendon Press. This book was released on 1995-10-05 with total page 244 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book provides a framework for thinking about economic instiutions such as firms. The basic idea is that institutions arise in situations where people write incomplete contracts and where the allocation of power or control is therefore important. Power and control are not standard concepts in economic theory. The book begins by pointing out that traditional approaches cannot explain on the one hand why all transactions do not take place in one huge firm and on the other hand why firms matter at all. An incomplete contracting or property rights approach is then developed. It is argued that this approach can throw light on the boundaries of firms and on the meaning of asset ownership. In the remainder of the book, incomplete contacting ideas are applied to understand firms' financial decisions, in particular, the nature of debt and equity (why equity has votes and creditors have foreclosure rights); the capital structure decisions of public companies; optimal bankruptcy procedure; and the allocation of voting rights across a company's shares. The book is written in a fairly non-technical style and includes many examples. It is aimed at advanced undergraduate and graduate students, academic and business economists, and lawyers as well as those with an interest in corporate finance, privatization and regulation, and transitional issues in Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and China. Little background knowledge is required, since the concepts are developed as the book progresses and the existing literature is fully reviewed.
Author : J. L. Ford
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (847 download)
Download or read book Identifying Agency Problems in Mudaraba Contracts written by J. L. Ford and published by . This book was released on 1998 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Lei Mao
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 156 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (829 download)
Download or read book Two Essays on Agency Problems and Contracting written by Lei Mao and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page 156 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Paul David Calvin
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 122 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (145 download)
Download or read book Financial contracts and classified stock agency problems written by Paul David Calvin and published by . This book was released on 1986 with total page 122 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Aaron S. Edlin
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 33 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (373 download)
Download or read book Contract Renegotiation in Agency Problems written by Aaron S. Edlin and published by . This book was released on 1997 with total page 33 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper studies the ability of an agent and a principal to achieve the first-best outcome when the agent invests in an asset that has greater value if owned by the principal than by the agent. When contracts can be renegotiated, a well-known danger is that the principal can hold up the agent, undermining the agent's investment incentives. We begin by identifying a countervailing effect: Investment by the agent can increase his value for the asset, thus improving his bargaining position in renegotiation. We show that option contracts will achieve the first best whenever this threat-point effect dominates the holdup effect. Otherwise, achieving the first best is difficult and, in many cases, impossible. In such cases, we show that if parties have an appropriate signal available, then the first best is still attainable for a wide class of bargaining procedures. A noisy signal, however, means that the optimal contract will involve terms that courts might view as punitive and so refuse to enforce
Author : Aaron S. Edlin
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 0 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (137 download)
Download or read book Contract Renegotiation and Options in Agency Problems written by Aaron S. Edlin and published by . This book was released on 1998 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper studies the ability of an agent and a principal to achieve the first-best outcome when the agent invests in an asset that has greater value if owned by the principal than by the agent. When contracts can be renegotiated, a well-known danger is that the principal can holdup the agent, undermining the agent's investment incentives. We begin by identifying a countervailing effect: Investment by the agent can increase his value for the asset, thus improving his bargaining position in renegotiation. We show that option contracts will achieve the first best whenever this threat-point effect dominates the holdup effect. Otherwise, achieving the first best is difficult and, in many cases, impossible.
Author : Christopher A. Hennessy
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 248 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (493 download)
Download or read book Agency Problems Under Debt Finance written by Christopher A. Hennessy and published by . This book was released on 2001 with total page 248 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Peter M. DeMarzo
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (129 download)
Download or read book Agency and Optimal Investment Dynamics written by Peter M. DeMarzo and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Agency problems limit firms' access to capital markets, curbing investment. Firms and investors seek contractual ways to mitigate these problems. What are the implications for investment? We present a theory of a firm's investment dynamics in the presence of agency problems and optimal long-term financial contracts. We derive results relating firms' investment decisions, current and past cash flows, firm size, capital structure, and dividends. Among the results, optimal investment is increasing in current and past cash flow; and optimal investment is positively serially correlated over time (after controlling for investment opportunities). These results hold for a range of agency problems. (JEL G30, G31, G32, G35, D82, D86, D92).
