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Which Cooperative Strategies Are Evolutionarily Stable In Noisy In Nitely Repeated Prisoners Dilemma
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Book Synopsis Which Cooperative Strategies Are Evolutionarily Stable in Noisy In Nitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma? by : Jun-Sok Huhh
Download or read book Which Cooperative Strategies Are Evolutionarily Stable in Noisy In Nitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma? written by Jun-Sok Huhh and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 29 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In repeated games, reciprocity helps to sustain group cooperation. Using the Markovian strategy as a touchstone, we explore the evolution of cooperation in the infinitely repeated and noisy n-person Prisoner's Dilemma. With some modified game settings, we show that a class of cooperative strategies based on reciprocity may be evolutionarily stable. When a cooperative strategy satisfies some properties in our study, that strategy becomes evolutionarily stable if it outperforms the mutant permanent defector. We also argue that evolutionary stability in a noisy n-person setting implies the Markov perfect equilibrium.
Book Synopsis The Evolution of Cooperation by : Robert Axelrod
Download or read book The Evolution of Cooperation written by Robert Axelrod and published by Basic Books. This book was released on 2009-04-29 with total page 258 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A famed political scientist's classic argument for a more cooperative world We assume that, in a world ruled by natural selection, selfishness pays. So why cooperate? In The Evolution of Cooperation, political scientist Robert Axelrod seeks to answer this question. In 1980, he organized the famed Computer Prisoners Dilemma Tournament, which sought to find the optimal strategy for survival in a particular game. Over and over, the simplest strategy, a cooperative program called Tit for Tat, shut out the competition. In other words, cooperation, not unfettered competition, turns out to be our best chance for survival. A vital book for leaders and decision makers, The Evolution of Cooperation reveals how cooperative principles help us think better about everything from military strategy, to political elections, to family dynamics.
Book Synopsis The Complexity of Cooperation by : Robert Axelrod
Download or read book The Complexity of Cooperation written by Robert Axelrod and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 1997-08-18 with total page 247 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Robert Axelrod is widely known for his groundbreaking work in game theory and complexity theory. He is a leader in applying computer modeling to social science problems. His book The Evolution of Cooperation has been hailed as a seminal contribution and has been translated into eight languages since its initial publication. The Complexity of Cooperation is a sequel to that landmark book. It collects seven essays, originally published in a broad range of journals, and adds an extensive new introduction to the collection, along with new prefaces to each essay and a useful new appendix of additional resources. Written in Axelrod's acclaimed, accessible style, this collection serves as an introductory text on complexity theory and computer modeling in the social sciences and as an overview of the current state of the art in the field. The articles move beyond the basic paradigm of the Prisoner's Dilemma to study a rich set of issues, including how to cope with errors in perception or implementation, how norms emerge, and how new political actors and regions of shared culture can develop. They use the shared methodology of agent-based modeling, a powerful technique that specifies the rules of interaction between individuals and uses computer simulation to discover emergent properties of the social system. The Complexity of Cooperation is essential reading for all social scientists who are interested in issues of cooperation and complexity.
Book Synopsis The Evolution of Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma by : John H. Nachbar
Download or read book The Evolution of Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma written by John H. Nachbar and published by . This book was released on 1989 with total page 36 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Behavioral Diversity in Voluntarily Separable Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma by : Takako Fujiwara-Greve
Download or read book Behavioral Diversity in Voluntarily Separable Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma written by Takako Fujiwara-Greve and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In the literature of voluntarily repeated Prisoner's Dilemma type games with no information flow, the focus is on how long-term cooperation is established. In this paper we investigate how non-cooperative and cooperative players co-exist. In many incomplete information versions of a similar model, inherently non-cooperative players are assumed to exist in the society, but their long-run fitness has not been analyzed. In reality and in experiments, we also observe that some people are cooperative, while others never cooperate. We show that, although defect-and-run type strategies are vulnerable to invasion of trust-building strategies (which defect initially but cooperate later among themselves), distributions of both types of strategies can be evolutionarily stable under equilibrium entrants. Moreover, the bimorphic equilibrium of the most cooperative strategy and the most myopic strategy exists under any payoff parameter combination, while bimorphic equilibria consisting only of cooperative (trust-building) strategies may not exist. In terms of payoffs, the bimorphic equilibrium of contrary strategies is equivalent to the equilibrium of infinitely many trust-building strategies. Both equilibria confirm the persistent presence of defectors.
Book Synopsis The Iterated Prisoners' Dilemma by : Graham Kendall
Download or read book The Iterated Prisoners' Dilemma written by Graham Kendall and published by World Scientific. This book was released on 2007 with total page 273 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In 1984, Robert Axelrod published a book, relating the story of two competitions which he ran, where invited academics entered strategies for the Iterated PrisonersOCO Dilemma. The book, almost 20 years on, is still widely read and cited by academics and the general public. As a celebration of that landmark work, we have recreated those competitions to celebrate its 20th anniversary, by again inviting academics to submit prisonersOCO dilemma strategies. The first of these new competitions was run in July 2004, and the second in April 2005. Iterated PrisonersOCO Dilemma: 20 Years On essentially provides an update of the AxelrodOCOs book. Specifically, it. OCo Presents the prisonersOCO dilemma, its history and variants. OCo Highlights original Axelrod's work and its impact. OCo Discusses results of new competitions. OCo Showcases selected papers that reflect the latest researches in the area."
Book Synopsis The Calculus of Selfishness by : Karl Sigmund
Download or read book The Calculus of Selfishness written by Karl Sigmund and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 2016-05-31 with total page 184 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This volume looks at social dilemmas where cooperative motivations are subverted and self-interest becomes self-defeating. Sigmund, a pioneer in evolutionary game theory, uses simple and well-known game theory models to examine the foundations of collective action and the effects of reciprocity and reputation.
Book Synopsis Evolutionary Stable Strategy Distributions for the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma by : Miranda Mowbray
Download or read book Evolutionary Stable Strategy Distributions for the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma written by Miranda Mowbray and published by . This book was released on 1997 with total page 21 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Game Theory, Alive by : Anna R. Karlin
Download or read book Game Theory, Alive written by Anna R. Karlin and published by American Mathematical Soc.. This book was released on 2017-04-27 with total page 400 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We live in a highly connected world with multiple self-interested agents interacting and myriad opportunities for conflict and cooperation. The goal of game theory is to understand these opportunities. This book presents a rigorous introduction to the mathematics of game theory without losing sight of the joy of the subject. This is done by focusing on theoretical highlights (e.g., at least six Nobel Prize winning results are developed from scratch) and by presenting exciting connections of game theory to other fields such as computer science (algorithmic game theory), economics (auctions and matching markets), social choice (voting theory), biology (signaling and evolutionary stability), and learning theory. Both classical topics, such as zero-sum games, and modern topics, such as sponsored search auctions, are covered. Along the way, beautiful mathematical tools used in game theory are introduced, including convexity, fixed-point theorems, and probabilistic arguments. The book is appropriate for a first course in game theory at either the undergraduate or graduate level, whether in mathematics, economics, computer science, or statistics. The importance of game-theoretic thinking transcends the academic setting—for every action we take, we must consider not only its direct effects, but also how it influences the incentives of others.
Book Synopsis The Structure of Solutions in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma by : Bjørn Lomborg
Download or read book The Structure of Solutions in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma written by Bjørn Lomborg and published by . This book was released on 1993 with total page 38 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis The Evolution of Cooperative Strategies in the Prisoners' Dilemma by : Charles McMullan
Download or read book The Evolution of Cooperative Strategies in the Prisoners' Dilemma written by Charles McMullan and published by . This book was released on 2001 with total page 128 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Evolutionary Exploration of the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma - The Effect of Out-of-Equilibrium Play by : Kristian Lindgren
Download or read book Evolutionary Exploration of the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma - The Effect of Out-of-Equilibrium Play written by Kristian Lindgren and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The finitely repeated Prisoners' Dilemma is a good illustration of the discrepancy between the strategic behaviour suggested by a game-theoretic analysis and the behavior often observed among human players, where cooperation is maintained through most of the game. A game-theoretic reasoning based on backward induction eliminates strategies step by step until defection from the first round is the only remaining choice, reflecting the Nash equilibrium of the game. We investigate the Nash equilibrium solution for two different sets of strategies in an evolutionary context, using replicator-mutation dynamics. The first set consists of conditional cooperators, up to a certain round, while the second set in addition to these contains two strategy types that react differently on the first round action: The 'Convincer' strategies insist with two rounds of initial cooperation, trying to establish more cooperative play in the game, while the "Follower" strategies, although being first round defectors, have the capability to respond to an invite in the first round. For both of these strategy sets, iterated elimination of strategies shows that the only Nash equilibria are given by defection from the first round. We show that the evolutionary dynamics of the first set is always characterized by a stable fixed point, corresponding to the Nash equilibrium, if the mutation rate is sufficiently small (but still positive). The second strategy set is numerically investigated, and we find that there are regions of parameter space where fixed points become unstable and the dynamics exhibits cycles of different strategy compositions. The results indicate that, even in the limit of very small mutation rate, the replicator-mutation dynamics does not necessarily bring the system with Convincers and Followers to the fixed point corresponding to the Nash equilibrium of the game. We also perform a detailed analysis of how the evolutionary behavior depends on payoffs, game length, and mutation rate.
Book Synopsis Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science by :
Download or read book Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science written by and published by Springer. This book was released on 2009-06-26 with total page 10398 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This encyclopedia provides an authoritative single source for understanding and applying the concepts of complexity theory together with the tools and measures for analyzing complex systems in all fields of science and engineering. It links fundamental concepts of mathematics and computational sciences to applications in the physical sciences, engineering, biomedicine, economics and the social sciences.
Book Synopsis Breakdown of Will by : George Ainslie
Download or read book Breakdown of Will written by George Ainslie and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2001-03-19 with total page 274 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Ainslie argues that our responses to the threat of our own inconsistency determine the basic fabric of human culture. He suggests that individuals are more like populations of bargaining agents than like the hierarchical command structures envisaged by cognitive psychologists. The forces that create and constrain these populations help us understand so much that is puzzling in human action and interaction: from addictions and other self-defeating behaviors to the experience of willfulness, from pathological over-control and self-deception to subtler forms of behavior such as altruism, sadism, gambling, and the 'social construction' of belief. This book integrates approaches from experimental psychology, philosophy of mind, microeconomics, and decision science to present one of the most profound and expert accounts of human irrationality available. It will be of great interest to philosophers and an important resource for professionals and students in psychology, economics and political science.
Book Synopsis Game Theory for Applied Economists by : Robert Gibbons
Download or read book Game Theory for Applied Economists written by Robert Gibbons and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 1992-07-13 with total page 284 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: An introduction to one of the most powerful tools in modern economics Game Theory for Applied Economists introduces one of the most powerful tools of modern economics to a wide audience: those who will later construct or consume game-theoretic models. Robert Gibbons addresses scholars in applied fields within economics who want a serious and thorough discussion of game theory but who may have found other works too abstract. Gibbons emphasizes the economic applications of the theory at least as much as the pure theory itself; formal arguments about abstract games play a minor role. The applications illustrate the process of model building—of translating an informal description of a multi-person decision situation into a formal game-theoretic problem to be analyzed. Also, the variety of applications shows that similar issues arise in different areas of economics, and that the same game-theoretic tools can be applied in each setting. In order to emphasize the broad potential scope of the theory, conventional applications from industrial organization have been largely replaced by applications from labor, macro, and other applied fields in economics. The book covers four classes of games, and four corresponding notions of equilibrium: static games of complete information and Nash equilibrium, dynamic games of complete information and subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium, static games of incomplete information and Bayesian Nash equilibrium, and dynamic games of incomplete information and perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Book Synopsis Game Theory and Economic Modelling by : David M. Kreps
Download or read book Game Theory and Economic Modelling written by David M. Kreps and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 1990 with total page 204 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Comprises lectures given at Tel Aviv University and Oxford University in 1990.
Book Synopsis A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games by : John C. Harsanyi
Download or read book A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games written by John C. Harsanyi and published by Mit Press. This book was released on 1988 with total page 378 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The authors, two of the most prominent game theorists of this generation, have devoted a number of years to the development of the theory presented here, and to its economic applications. They propose rational criteria for selecting one particular uniformly perfect equilibrium point as the solution of any noncooperative game. And, because any cooperative game can be remodelled as a noncooperative bargaining game, their theory defines a one-point solution for any cooperative game as well.By providing solutions - based on the same principles of rational behavior - for all classes of games, both cooperative and noncooperative, both those with complete and with incomplete information, Harsanyi and Selten's approach achieves a remarkable degree of theoretical unification for game theory as a whole and provides a deeper insight into the nature of game-theoretic rationality.The book applies this theory to a number of specific game classes, such as unanimity games; bargaining with transaction costs; trade involving one seller and several buyers; two-person bargaining with incomplete information on one side, and on both sides. The last chapter discusses the relationship of the authors' theory to other recently proposed solution concepts, particularly the Kohberg-Mertens stability theory.John C. Harsanyi is Flood Research Professor in Business Administration and Professor of Economics, University of California, Berkeley. Reinhard Selten is Professor of Economics Institute of Social and Economic Sciences: University of Bonn, Federal Republic of Germany.
