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Vertical Differentiation In Frictional Product Markets
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Book Synopsis Vertical Differentiation in Frictional Product Markets by : James Albrecht
Download or read book Vertical Differentiation in Frictional Product Markets written by James Albrecht and published by . This book was released on 2021 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We consider a version of the imperfect competition model of Butters (1977), Varian (1980) and Burdett and Judd (1983) in which sellers make an ex-ante investment in the quality of their variety of the product. Equilibrium exists, is unique and is efficient. In equilibrium, search frictions not only cause sellers to offer different surpluses to buyers but also cause sellers to choose different qualities for their varieties. That is, equilibrium involves endogenous vertical differentiation. As search frictions decline, the market becomes more and more unequal as a smaller and smaller fraction of sellers produces varieties of increasing quality, offers increasing surplus to their customers, and captures an increasing share of the market, while a growing fraction of sellers produces varieties of decreasing quality. Gains from trade and welfare grow. Under some conditions, the growth rate of gains from trade and welfare is constant.
Book Synopsis The Economic Theory of Product Differentiation by : John Beath
Download or read book The Economic Theory of Product Differentiation written by John Beath and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 1991-02-22 with total page 220 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: There are few industries in modern market economies that do not manufacture differentiated products. This book provides a systematic explanation and analysis of the widespread prevalence of this important category of products. The authors concentrate on models in which product selection is endogenous. In the first four chapters they consider models that try to predict the level of product differentiation that would emerge in situations of market equilibrium. These market equilibria with differentiated products are characterised and then compared with social welfare optima. Particular attention is paid to the distinction between horizontal and vertical differentiation as well as to the related issues of product quality and durability. This book brings together the most important theoretical contributions to these topics in a succinct and coherent manner. One of its major strengths is the way in which it carefully sets out the basic intuition behind the formal results. It will be useful to advanced undergraduate and graduate students taking courses in industrial economics and microeconomic theory.
Book Synopsis Entry and Vertical Differentiation by : Dirk Bergemann
Download or read book Entry and Vertical Differentiation written by Dirk Bergemann and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper analyzes the entry of new products into vertically differentiated markets where an entrant and an incumbent compete in quantities. The value of the new product is initially uncertain and new information is generated through purchases in the market. We derive the (unique) Markov perfect equilibrium of the infinite horizon game under the strong long run average payoff criterion. The qualitative features of the optimal entry strategy are shown to depend exclusively on the relative ranking of established and new products based on current beliefs. Superior products are launched relatively slowly and at high initial prices whereas substitutes for existing products are launched aggressively at low initial prices. The robustness of these results with respect to different model specifications is discussed.
Author :Mark B. Vandenbosch Publisher :London : Western Business School, University of Western Ontario ISBN 13 :9780771414244 Total Pages :44 pages Book Rating :4.4/5 (142 download)
Book Synopsis Product and Price Competition in a Two-dimensional Vertical Differentiation Model by : Mark B. Vandenbosch
Download or read book Product and Price Competition in a Two-dimensional Vertical Differentiation Model written by Mark B. Vandenbosch and published by London : Western Business School, University of Western Ontario. This book was released on 1992 with total page 44 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Essays on Vertical Product Differentiation by : Yong-Hwan Noh
Download or read book Essays on Vertical Product Differentiation written by Yong-Hwan Noh and published by . This book was released on 2005 with total page 218 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation explores models of heterogeneous product markets that rely on the "vertical product differentiation" formulation. The demand structure applied here is the covered-market configuration under the vertical product differentiation. With this specification, product market equilibria of the monopoly and duopoly market are derived. In particular, parameter restrictions on the degree of relative consumer heterogeneity associated with the covered-market setting are identified and used to interpret analytical results. Based on the specified demand structure, I revisit two industrial organization topics from the perspectives of vertical product differentiation. The first essay analyzes the entry of a new product into a vertically differentiated market where an entrant and an incumbent compete in prices. Many models on strategic entry deterrence deal with "limit quantities" as the established firm's strategic tool to deter or accommodate entry. Here, however, the entry-deterrence strategies of the incumbent firm rely on "limit qualities". With a sequential choice of quality, quality-dependent marginal production cost, and a fixed entry cost, I relate the entry-quality decision and the entry-deterrence strategies to the level of an entry cost and the degree of consumer heterogeneity. In particular, the incumbent influences the quality choice of the entrant by choosing its quality level before the entrant. This allows the incumbent to "limit" the entrant's entry decision and quality levels. Quality-dependent marginal production costs in the model entail the possibility of inferior-quality entry as well as the incumbent's aggressive entry-deterrence strategies by increasing its quality level towards potential entry. Welfare evaluation confirms that social welfare is not necessarily improved when entry is encouraged rather than deterred. The second essay is motivated by some specific economic questions that have arisen with the introduction of 'genetically modified' (GM) agricultural products. A duopoly market-entry model associated with the vertical product differentiation is developed to show how the existence of segregation costs biases the firm's quality choice behavior. Thus, the key factor of the model is the cost of segregation activities that are necessary to distinguish GM products from non-GM products. With an increasing and convex cost of quality, the model predicts that the entrant firm has an increased incentive to enter the market with a low-quality good to reduce production costs if segregation costs are sufficiently high. When consumers are homogeneous enough, however, entry may occur with the high-quality good.
Book Synopsis Structural Implications and Estimation of Vertical Product Differentiation by : Paul Richard Messinger
Download or read book Structural Implications and Estimation of Vertical Product Differentiation written by Paul Richard Messinger and published by . This book was released on 1988 with total page 402 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Product Differentiation and Market Segmentation of Information Goods by : Barrie R. Nault
Download or read book Product Differentiation and Market Segmentation of Information Goods written by Barrie R. Nault and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 44 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Large sunk costs of development, negligible costs of reproduction and distribution and substantial economies of scale make information goods distinct from physical goods. Consequently,how to take advantage of the specific characteristics of information goods is an important managerial problem. Price discrimination and product differentiation are common ways this issue has been addressed. In previous literature, vertical differentiation and related pricing strategies have been researched in contexts such as nonlinear utility functions,network externalities, competition and anti-piracy. Little attention has been paid to the relationship between market segmentation and product differentiation. In this paper, we emphasize the interaction of market segmentation and product differentiation as we believe that any product differentiation must be based on existing market segmentation. In our model, we treat vertical differentiation as a special case of horizontal differentiation, and we model the interaction between different market segments showing the differences in product differentiation strategies when moving from horizontal to vertical differentiation. We find that it is always sub-optimal to differentiate information goods if the market is not fully differentiated or if characteristics of the information goods are not specifically designed for certain market segments. We divide characteristics of information goods into four categories according to the ease of differentiation and design guidelines for firms to differentiate their goods based on these characteristics. We further provide guidance on whether to merge one or several versions when costs for versioning information goods are significant.
Book Synopsis Product Innovation Under Vertical Differentiation and the Persistence of Monopoly by :
Download or read book Product Innovation Under Vertical Differentiation and the Persistence of Monopoly written by and published by . This book was released on 1995 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The incentives to innovate for the incumbent and the entrant in a vertically differentiated market are analised, in the absence of uncertainty. It turns out that if consumers marginal willingness to pay for quality is sufficiently low, the efficiency effect observationally works so as to favour innovation by the entrant, i.e., competition. Otherwise, it operates to the advantage of the incumbent who acquire the right to innovate, preempting thus the rival.
Book Synopsis Product Differentiation and Industrial Structure by : Avner Shaked
Download or read book Product Differentiation and Industrial Structure written by Avner Shaked and published by . This book was released on 1985 with total page 52 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Product Line Competition in Vertically Differentiated Markets by : G. De Fraja
Download or read book Product Line Competition in Vertically Differentiated Markets written by G. De Fraja and published by . This book was released on 1989 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Entry and Innovation in Vertically Differentiated Markets by : Dirk Bergemann
Download or read book Entry and Innovation in Vertically Differentiated Markets written by Dirk Bergemann and published by . This book was released on 1999 with total page 58 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Strategic Vertical Differentiation and Durable Goods Monopoly by : Lisa N. Takeyama
Download or read book Strategic Vertical Differentiation and Durable Goods Monopoly written by Lisa N. Takeyama and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper considers a novel and strategic use of quality as a means for solving the durable-goods time inconsistency problem. It demonstrates how durable-goods producers can exploit the cannibalization of high-quality markets by low-quality goods. Relative to the static product line solution, this strategic dimension of quality choice implies higher quality levels of low-end goods and the production of some low-end products that would not otherwise be produced. In some cases, low-end goods may rationally be sold below cost. The paper, therefore, offers a purely Coasian explanation for vertical product differentiation.
Book Synopsis Modeling Vertical Markets of Differentiated Goods by : Brandon James Hoffman
Download or read book Modeling Vertical Markets of Differentiated Goods written by Brandon James Hoffman and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page 182 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This is a collection of essays on the topic of vertical markets and resellers. The first two chapters look at the effects of mandatory dealer laws on prices and profits in vertical markets with differentiated goods. The third chapter looks at the quality of products chosen when manufacturers use resellers compared to when they do not. All three chapters show that competition is lessened when mandatory dealer laws exist. Chapter 1 addresses the US automobile market which has laws in almost every state that require sales of new vehicles go through franchised dealers, and manufacturers are not allowed to sell directly to consumers. While vertical markets can provide many benefits to both producer and consumer alike, double-marginalization is often seen as a problem for producers and consumers with vertical markets; whereby firms on different levels both have market power and thus are both able to charge a markup over cost. Contracts and implicit agreements can mitigate or lessen the negative externality associated with double-marginalization, but I develop a model to show that double-marginalization can be a good thing for producers, while simultaneously being bad for consumers. The model has a single dimension on product differentiation and different levels of vertical markets. In this model, firms either sell to consumers or other firms. How far removed the manufacturer of the good is from the final consumer determines the number of vertical markets. A market with one level consists of a manufacturer who sells directly to consumers, while a market with two levels consists of a manufacturer who sells to a reseller who in turn sells to consumers. I find that the profits of the manufacturer of the good can be up to three times as high when there are two levels instead of one and that they will always be at least twice as high. This model also shows that manufacturers can benefit from the existence of a law that requires they use dealers, even though any one single manufacturer has an incentive to not use a dealer. Chapter 2 addresses mandatory dealer laws in a setting without perfectly inelastic demand. Under a certain set of circumstances, manufacturers can earn higher profits after the introduction of these mandatory dealer laws than they would be without them. In this chapter, I remove the perfectly inelastic total demand restriction, and instead show how the elasticity of total demand plays a role in a manufacturer's preference for a mandatory dealer law. For the model used in this paper, I find that total demand does not need to be very inelastic at all, and in fact, can be elastic at the equilibrium prices and quantities. The findings in this paper run contrary to expectation, where double-marginalization is something that hurts manufacture's profits. In chapter 3, I analyze the benefit of moving first in a vertically differentiated market with manufacturers and retailers. Both retailers and manufactures are assumed to be profit-maximizing entities. Here the choice of the incumbent manufacturer creates an indifference between entering with a higher quality or entering with a lower quality for the entering manufacturer. Entry-quality decisions and wholesale pricing are related to the competition of retailers selling the manufacturers product and the degree of consumers' taste for quality. I examine the indifference of the entering manufacturer and highlight the benefits of being able to set quality first as an incumbent manufacturer when pricing stages are simultaneous. Stackelberg competition in the quality stage allows for the possibility for inferior-quality entry as well as superior-quality entry. The first-mover advantage dominates the high-quality advantage in this setting which is consistent with my findings in the dock and boat-lift markets.
Book Synopsis Horizontal and Vertical Product Differentiation by : Mario Pezzino
Download or read book Horizontal and Vertical Product Differentiation written by Mario Pezzino and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 176 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Three Essays on Differentiated Product Markets and Competition Policy by : Abigail Britton Ferguson
Download or read book Three Essays on Differentiated Product Markets and Competition Policy written by Abigail Britton Ferguson and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 422 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: My dissertation features three essays in industrial organization. The first two investigate aspects of potentially anticompetitive firm behavior in differentiated product markets. Contrary to previous analyses, requirements tying and bundled rebates by a firm with a monopoly in one market that competes in another may increase total surplus when product differentiation in the competitive market is endogenous. This result is stronger for tying than for bundled rebates, and holds for both horizontal and vertical differentiation (essays 1 and 2, respectively). Under requirements tying or bundled rebates, a multiproduct firm (horizontally) differentiates its product less from its rival's product than it would under independent pricing, suggesting a new efficiency consideration for requirements tying: a reduction in transport costs. A similar result prevails under vertical differentiation: when the tying firm controls either quality niche, it reduces the quality of its tied product; however, the rival may invest in the quality of its competing product. Hence, the effect on total surplus is ambiguous when tying or bundled rebates arrangements are permitted. The second essay employs an empirical model typically used to analyze differentiated product markets analyze a different economic environment: parents' decision to home school their children. Home schooling has grown in popularity as an alternative to public or private schools; some estimates place growth at 15 to 40% per year in the U.S.I empirically estimate the demand for home schooling as an alternative to these other modes of education, focusing on potential network effects in household decisions to home-school. I find support for the hypothesis that home schooling 'support groups' mitigate the cost of home schooling relative to the alternatives, but only occur in areas with a critical mass of home-schooling households. The data also suggest that as interest in home schooling grows, the local community's school district spending per child declines, increasing the probability that more parents will take their children out of public schools. Both phenomena suggest the existence of network effects in the market for primary and secondary education.
Book Synopsis Vertical Product Differentiation in EU Markets by : Michael A. Landesmann
Download or read book Vertical Product Differentiation in EU Markets written by Michael A. Landesmann and published by . This book was released on 1997 with total page 52 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Bidimensional Vertical Differentiation by : Paolo G. Garella
Download or read book Bidimensional Vertical Differentiation written by Paolo G. Garella and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In markets where product quality is important, more than one characteristic is usually necessary to deጿine product quality. Standard models maintain that: (i) in a duopoly there will be a quality leader no matter whether the product can incorporate one or two vertical attributes; (ii) differentiation pertains only to one attribute. By contrast, in our set-up there are also equilibria where the quality leader is better in two attributes, and others where there is cross leadership, namely a situation where each ጿirm designs a product to dominate the other in one characteristic. The role of cost complementarities is also examined. Applications to Minimum Quality Standards, tax (subsidy) on quality products, and home bias effects are sketched, showing that welfare assessments and the related policy implications based on standard models may be incomplete.
