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Author : Nicolás Andrés Figueroa González
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 146 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (319 download)
Download or read book Two Essays in Mechanism Design written by Nicolás Andrés Figueroa González and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 146 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author :
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 0 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (14 download)
Download or read book Essays on mechanism design in two-sided markets written by and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Levent Ulku
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 71 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (53 download)
Download or read book Essays in Mechanism Design written by Levent Ulku and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 71 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation consists of three essays in the theory of mechanism design under incomplete information. In the first essay, we analyze an implementation problem in which monetary transfers are feasible, valuations are interdependent and the set of available choices lies in a product space of lattices. This framework is general enough to subsume many interesting examples, including allocation problems with multiple objects. We identify a class of social choice rules which can be implemented in ex post equilibrium. We identify conditions under which ex post efficient social choice rules are implementable using monotone selection theory. The key conditions are extensions of the single crossing property and supermodularity. These conditions can be replaced with more tractable conditions in multiobject allocation problems with either two objects or two agents. I also show that the payments which implement monotone social decision rules coincide with the payments of (1) the classical Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism with private values, and (2) the generalized Vickrey auction introduced by Ausubel [1999] in multiunit allocation problems. The second essay generalizes the analysis of optimal (revenue maximizing) mechanism design for the seller of a single object introduced by Myerson [1981]. We consider a problem in which the seller has several heterogeneous objects and buyers' valuations depend on each other's private information. We analyze two nonnested environments in which incentive constraints can be replaced with more tractable monotonicity conditions. We establish conditions under which these monotonicity conditions can be ignored, and show that several earlier analyses of the optimal mechanism design problem can be unified and generalized. In particular, problems with two complementary goods in Levin [1997] and multiunit auction problems in Maskin and Riley [1989] and Branco [1996] are special cases. The third essay considers the problem of selling internet advertising slots to advertisers. Under suitable conditions, we solve for the payments imposed by an optimal mechanism and show that it can be decentralized via prices using a linear assignment approach. At every configuration of private information, optimal mechanism can be interpreted as a menu consisting of a price for every slot.
Author : Yunan Li
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 594 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (129 download)
Download or read book Essays in Mechanism Design written by Yunan Li and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page 594 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In this thesis, I study mechanism design problems in environments where the information necessary to make decisions is affected by the actions of principal or agents.The first chapter considers the problem of a principal who must allocate a good among a finite number of agents, each of whom values the good. Each agent has private information about the principal's payoff if he receives the good. There are no monetary transfers. The principal can inspect agents' reports at a cost and punish them, but punishments are limited because verification is imperfect or information arrives only after the good has been allocated for a while. I characterize an optimal mechanism featuring two thresholds. Agents whose values are below the lower threshold and above the upper threshold are pooled, respectively. If the number of agents is small, then the pooling area at the top of value distribution disappears. If the number of agents is large, then the two pooling areas meet and the optimal mechanism can be implemented via a shortlisting procedure. The fact that the optimal mechanism depends on the number of agents implies that small and large organizations should behave differently. The second chapter considers the problem of a principal who wishes to distribute an indivisible good to a population of budget-constrained agents. Both valuation and budget are an agent's private information. The principal can inspect an agent's budget through a costly verification process and punish an agent who makes a false statement. I characterize the direct surplus-maximizing mechanism. This direct mechanism can be implemented by a two-stage mechanism in which agents only report their budgets. Specifically, all agents report their budgets in the first stage. The principal then provides budget-dependent cash subsidies to agents and assigns the goods randomly (with uniform probability) at budget-dependent prices. In the second stage, a resale market opens, but is regulated with budget-dependent sales taxes. Agents who report low budgets receive more subsidies in their initial purchases (the first stage), face higher taxes in the resale market (the second stage) and are inspected randomly. This implementation exhibits some of the features of some welfare programs, such as Singapore's housing and development board.The third chapter studies the design of ex-ante efficient mechanisms in situations where a single item is for sale, and agents have positively interdependent values and can covertly acquire information at a cost before participating in a mechanism. I find that when interdependency is low or the number of agents is large, the ex-post efficient mechanism is also ex-ante efficient. In cases of high interdependency or a small number of agents, ex-ante efficient mechanisms discourage agents from acquiring excessive information by introducing randomization to the ex-post efficient allocation rule in areas where the information's precision increases most rapidly.
Author : Min Ho Shin
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 294 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (33 download)
Download or read book Essays on Mechanism Design written by Min Ho Shin and published by . This book was released on 1993 with total page 294 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Weixin Chen (Researcher in microeconomic theory)
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (119 download)
Download or read book Essays in Mechanism Design written by Weixin Chen (Researcher in microeconomic theory) and published by . This book was released on 2020 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This thesis consists of three papers in mechanism design. Chapter 1 is based on a paper of mine entitled "Quality Disclosure and Price Discrimination". Chapter 2 is based on "Penalty, Voting, and Collusion: a Common Agency Approach to Industrial Regulation and Political Power". Chapter 3 is based on "Partitional Information Revelation under Renegotiation". A key framework in mechanism design is screening: a principal who designs the contract induces agents with private information to select certain action(s) or bundle(s). Classical results are second-best distortion and Myerson ironing, which are derived when the agency involves a single task (or tasks independent across agents), an agent's information is privately known by himself, and there is full commitment. Chapter 1 considers incentivizing tasks that are related through a resource constraint. It studies the second-degree price discrimination when the supply quality follows some exogenous distribution, or more specifically, the design of information and pricing in a monopolistic market with product quality dispersion. The main message is that optimality requires a partial disclosure, and finer results on the allocation distortion depend on the heterogeneity of the buyers' preference. When such preference over assignment, i.e., quality distribution, has a uni-dimensional sufficient statistics in the quality space, the optimal distortion resembles Myerson's ironing and the optimal disclosure takes a partitional form. For more general preference, the optimal distortion departs from Myerson's result. Chapter 2 considers eliciting signals informative of the agent's private information from multiple sources. An interesting case is by considering a voting committee as the principal, where voting aggregates welfare-relevant information but faces corruptive incentives. The key insights are that the optimal rule is a binary verdict, resembling the principle of maximum deterrence, and the corruptive incentives typically push the optimal voting rule towards unanimity. Chapter 3 considers commitment with renegotiation: the counterparties can stick to the previously signed long-term contract or revise it with mutual consent. More specifically, it studies a long-term relationship between a seller and a buyer whose valuation (for a per-period service or a rental good) is private. In such a dynamic game, a new dimension of mechanism design, namely intertemporal type separation, arises as its induced belief-updating affects the rent extraction--efficiency tradeoff. The main message is that all PBE share the following property in the progressive screening process: at each history, the seller partitions the posterior support into countable intervals and offers a pooling contract to each of these intervals.
Author : Biung-Ghi Ju
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 378 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (483 download)
Download or read book Essays in Mechanism Design written by Biung-Ghi Ju and published by . This book was released on 2001 with total page 378 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Gregory Pavlov
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 151 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (663 download)
Download or read book Essays on Mechanism Design written by Gregory Pavlov and published by . This book was released on 2005 with total page 151 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In this dissertation we address several open problems in the theory of mechanism design: (i) optimal mechanism design when agents collude; (ii) multidimensional mechanism design problem of the multiproduct monopolist; (iii) robust predictions of the relative revenue loss from the bidders' collusion in the optimal auctions.
Author : Ritesh Jain (Ph. D. in economics)
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 119 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (18 download)
Download or read book Essays in Mechanism Design and Implementation Theory written by Ritesh Jain (Ph. D. in economics) and published by . This book was released on 2018 with total page 119 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In Chapter 2 titled "Symmetric Mechanism Design," (Jointly with Yaron Azrieli) we study the extent to which regulators can guarantee fair outcomes by a policy requiring mechanisms to treat agents symmetrically. This is an exercise in mechanism design. Our main result is a characterization of the class of social choice functions that can be implemented under this constraint. In many environments, extremely discriminatory social choice functions can be implemented by symmetric mechanisms, but there are also cases in which symmetry is binding. Our characterization is based on a `revelation principle' type of result, where we show that a social choice function can be symmetrically implemented if and only if a particular kind of (indirect) symmetric mechanism implements it. We illustrate the result in environments of voting with private values, voting with a common value, and assignment of indivisible goods.
Author : D. Condorelli
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (894 download)
Download or read book Essays in Mechanism Design written by D. Condorelli and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Abhishek Bapna
Publisher :
ISBN 13 : 9780542892059
Total Pages : 136 pages
Book Rating : 4.8/5 (92 download)
Download or read book Essays in Mechanism Design written by Abhishek Bapna and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 136 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This thesis is about two contributions to the theory of mechanism design and one application of this theory to the banking industry.
Author : Frank Rosar
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 0 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (32 download)
Download or read book Essays in Mechanism Design written by Frank Rosar and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Alia Gizatulina
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 0 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (649 download)
Download or read book Essays in Mechanism Design written by Alia Gizatulina and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Essays in Mechanism Design written by and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This thesis consists of three self-contained essays on mechanism design problems: a collective decision problem, a theoretical auction problem, and an applied auction problem. Chapter 1 contains an introduction. In Chapter 2 I consider a problem where a group has to take a collective decision. I study how the decision mechanism should be designed when the information relevant for the decision is dispersed among the group members and when the group members' preferences over decisions might be in conflict. Observed mechanisms differ in whether the most extreme positions are disregarded or not. I find that the designer should never disregard the most extreme positions, but that he should limit the amount by which single group members can affect the decision. In Chapter 3 I analyze a seller's problem to design an optimal first-price auction. Normally the design problem reduces to the problem of determining the lowest admissible bid. I show that the structure of the optimal first-price auction may be non-standard when the seller cannot commit to sell to the highest bidder after observing the bids, and when he is able to fix the auction rules already at a time at which he is still uncertain about his own use value. In this case the seller might allow high and low bids, but forbid intermediate ones. In the last chapter I am interested in the problem of a procurer to organize his procurement process. I compare two procurement systems resembling stylized facts from American and Japanese procurement. In the first system the procurer exerts as much competitive pressure on his incumbent supplier as possible, while in the second system he protects his incumbent supplier by looking only for possible replacements after bilateral negotiations with him break down. I show that either system may induce higher relationship-specific investments and I describe under which conditions which of the two systems is preferable from the procurer's point of view.
Author : Mingjun Xiao
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (91 download)
Download or read book Essays in Mechanism Design with Semi-exclusive Information and Wrong Beliefs written by Mingjun Xiao and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Mechanism design theories have established basic framework in studying economic problems where agents have private information and behave in their own interests. This framework provides a workhorse for exploring how to implement social choice rules in general. One typical issue is to analyze the decision-making by a social planner or a designer who aims to achieve efficient outcomes that maximize the joint welfare of all agents. Not surprisingly, efficiency essentially requires that the designer know the agents' private information and then choose the corresponding socially optimal outcome. However, the difficulty of mechanism design problem is to characterize these incentive constraints where agents find it optimal to reveal their private information truthfully. Specifically, sufficiently rich private information could entail non-implementability of efficient social choice rules. To overcome this difficulty, this dissertation considers a class of semi-exclusive information structures where agents may observe signals about payoff signals, and a class of problems where agents may have wrong beliefs or the mechanism designer is not informed about the agents' valuation functions, and proposes mechanisms that implement efficient allocations.
Author : Maria Goltsman
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 116 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (838 download)
Download or read book Essays on Mechanism Design and Implementation written by Maria Goltsman and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 116 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Guilherme Pereira de Freitas
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 0 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (98 download)
Download or read book Essays in Mechanism Design written by Guilherme Pereira de Freitas and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation contains three essays on mechanism design. The common goal of these essays is to assist in the solution of different resource allocation problems where asymmetric information creates obstacles to the efficient allocation of resources. In each essay, we present a mechanism that satisfactorily solves the resource allocation problem and study some of its properties. In our first essay, "Combinatorial Assignment under Dichotomous Preferences", we present a class of problems akin to time scheduling without a pre-existing time grid, and propose a mechanism that is efficient, strategy-proof and envy-free. Our second essay, "Monitoring Costs and the Management of Common-Pool Resources", studies what can happen to an existing mechanism - the individual tradable quotas (ITQ) mechanism, also known as the cap-and-trade mechanism - when quota enforcement is imperfect and costly. Our third essay, "Vessel Buyback", coauthored with John O. Ledyard, presents an auction design that can be used to buy back excess capital in overcapitalized industries.
