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Three Essays On Learning And Information In Games
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Book Synopsis Three Essays on Learning and Information in Games by : Robert Stuart Gazzale
Download or read book Three Essays on Learning and Information in Games written by Robert Stuart Gazzale and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page 334 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Three Essays in Game Theory by : Leslie McFarland Marx
Download or read book Three Essays in Game Theory written by Leslie McFarland Marx and published by . This book was released on 1994 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Three Essays on Bounded Rationality and Individual Learning in Repeated Games by : Duncan Whitehead
Download or read book Three Essays on Bounded Rationality and Individual Learning in Repeated Games written by Duncan Whitehead and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Three Essays on Bounded Rationality and Individual Learning in Repeated Games by : Duncan Whitehead
Download or read book Three Essays on Bounded Rationality and Individual Learning in Repeated Games written by Duncan Whitehead and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 303 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Three Essays on Repeated Games with Emperfect Information by : Vicente Madrigal
Download or read book Three Essays on Repeated Games with Emperfect Information written by Vicente Madrigal and published by . This book was released on 1989 with total page 126 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Three Essays on Sequential Learning in Search-pursuit Games and Jury Voting Problems by : Viciano Lee
Download or read book Three Essays on Sequential Learning in Search-pursuit Games and Jury Voting Problems written by Viciano Lee and published by . This book was released on 2021 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author :James Paul Gee Publisher :New Literacies and Digital Epistemologies ISBN 13 :9781433123931 Total Pages :0 pages Book Rating :4.1/5 (239 download)
Book Synopsis Good Video Games + Good Learning by : James Paul Gee
Download or read book Good Video Games + Good Learning written by James Paul Gee and published by New Literacies and Digital Epistemologies. This book was released on 2013 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The chapters in this book argue that good games teach through well-designed problem-solving experiences. In the end, the book offers a model of collaborative, interactive, and embodied learning centered on problem solving, a model that can be enhanced by games, but which can be accomplished in many different ways with or without games.
Book Synopsis Good Video Games + Good Learning by : James Paul Gee
Download or read book Good Video Games + Good Learning written by James Paul Gee and published by Peter Lang. This book was released on 2007 with total page 212 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Textbook
Book Synopsis Three Essays in Game Theory by : Doru C. Cojoc
Download or read book Three Essays in Game Theory written by Doru C. Cojoc and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page 188 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Three Essays on Learning and Experimentation by : Axel Z. Anderson
Download or read book Three Essays on Learning and Experimentation written by Axel Z. Anderson and published by . This book was released on 2002 with total page 228 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Three Essays on Game Theory and Computation by : Elham Nikram
Download or read book Three Essays on Game Theory and Computation written by Elham Nikram and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Games for Language Learning by : Andrew Wright
Download or read book Games for Language Learning written by Andrew Wright and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2006-02-13 with total page 195 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A fully updated and revised edition of this classic book which contains enjoyable games to practise language at any stage of the learning process.
Book Synopsis What Video Games Have to Teach Us About Learning and Literacy. Second Edition by : James Paul Gee
Download or read book What Video Games Have to Teach Us About Learning and Literacy. Second Edition written by James Paul Gee and published by Macmillan. This book was released on 2014-12-02 with total page 233 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Cognitive Development in a Digital Age James Paul Gee begins his classic book with "I want to talk about video games–yes, even violent video games–and say some positive things about them." With this simple but explosive statement, one of America's most well-respected educators looks seriously at the good that can come from playing video games. This revised edition expands beyond mere gaming, introducing readers to fresh perspectives based on games like World of Warcraft and Half-Life 2. It delves deeper into cognitive development, discussing how video games can shape our understanding of the world. An undisputed must-read for those interested in the intersection of education, technology, and pop culture, What Video Games Have to Teach Us About Learning and Literacy challenges traditional norms, examines the educational potential of video games, and opens up a discussion on the far-reaching impacts of this ubiquitous aspect of modern life.
Book Synopsis Three Essays on Tawheed 2 - الأصول الثلاثة لمحمد بن سليمان by : IslamKotob
Download or read book Three Essays on Tawheed 2 - الأصول الثلاثة لمحمد بن سليمان written by IslamKotob and published by IslamKotob. This book was released on with total page 11 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Three Essays on Renegotiation in Games by : Andreas Blume
Download or read book Three Essays on Renegotiation in Games written by Andreas Blume and published by . This book was released on 1989 with total page 292 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Essays on Reputations and Dynamic Games by : Ju Hu
Download or read book Essays on Reputations and Dynamic Games written by Ju Hu and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page 256 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation consists of three essays on reputations and dynamic games. I investigate how incomplete information, Bayesian Learning and strategic behavior interplay in different dynamic settings. In Chapter 1, I study reputation effects between a long-lived seller and different short-lived buyers where buyers enter the market at random times and only observe a coarse public signal about past transactions. The signal measures the difference between the number of good and bad outcomes in a biased way: a good outcome is more likely to increase the signal than a bad outcome to decrease it. The seller has a short-run incentive to shirk, but makes high profits if it were possible to commit to high effort. I show if there is a small but positive chance that the seller is a commitment type who always exerts high effort and if information bias is large, equilibrium behavior of the seller exhibits cyclic reputation building and milking. The seller exerts high effort at some values of the signals in order to increase the chance of reaching a higher signal and build reputation. Once the seller builds up his reputation through reaching a high enough signal, he exploits it by shirking. In chapter 2, I study the reputation effect in which a long-lived player faces a sequence of uninformed short-lived players and the uninformed players receive informative but noisy exogenous signals about the type of the long-lived player. I provide an explicit lower bound on all Nash equilibrium payoffs of the long-lived player. The lower bound shows when the exogenous signals are sufficiently noisy and the long-lived player is patient, he can be assured of a payoff strictly higher than his minmax payoff. In Chapter 3 I study optimal dynamic monopoly pricing when a monopolist sells a product with unknown quality to a sequence of short-lived buyers who have private information about the quality. Because past prices and buyers' purchase behavior convey information about private signals, they jointly determine the public belief about the quality of the monopolist's product. The monopolist is essentially doing experimentation in the market because every price charged generates not only current period profit but also additional information about the quality. I focus on information structures with a continuum of signals. Under a mild regularity condition on information structures, I show that in equilibrium, the optimal price is an increasing function of the public beliefs. In addition, I fully characterize information cascade sets in terms of information structure. I find that the standard characterization in terms of boundedness of information structure in the social learning literature no longer holds in the presence of a monopoly. In fact, whether herding occurs or not depends more on the values of the conditional densities of the signals at the lowest signal.
Book Synopsis The Sign-up Game, Sophisticated Learning and Learning Variable Demand by : Megha Weerakooon Watugala
Download or read book The Sign-up Game, Sophisticated Learning and Learning Variable Demand written by Megha Weerakooon Watugala and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation makes contributions in topics related to mechanism design and learning in game theoretic environments through three essays. The first essay deals with the question of mechanism design in the principal-agent model. The main contribution of this essay is in extending the work by Piketty (1993). It prescribes a mechanism in incomplete informational settings where the principal is able to implement first-best contracts while extracting the entire surplus. Importantly, the mechanism is such that the desired outcome can be uniquely obtained when agents play the action that survives iterative elimination of dominated strategies. Furthermore, given the mechanism, the desired outcome is shown to be a truth-revealing Nash equilibrium which is also Pareto-efficient. It is shown that the proposed mechanism also has the feature that none of the agents prefer any of the other possible Nash Equilibria to the status quo. It thus gives insights into possible mechanisms in finite agent settings that could improve upon the traditional second-best results. In the second essay, a model of sophisticated learning is developed where it assumes that a fraction of the population is sophisticated while the rest are adaptive learners. Sophisticated learners in the model try to maximize their cumulative payoff in the entire length of the repeated game and are aware of the way adaptive learners learn. Sophisticated learning contrasts other models of learning which typically tend to maximize the payoff for the next period by extrapolating the history of play. The sophisticated learning model is estimated on data of experiments on repeated coordination games where it provides evidence of such learning behavior. The third essay deals with the optimal pricing policy for a firm in an oligopoly that is uncertain about the demand it faces. The demand facing the oligopoly, which can be learned through their pricing policy, changes over time in a Markovian fashion. It also deduces the conditions in which learning (experimentation) is not achievable and outlines the different learning policies that are possible in other settings. The model combines the monopoly learning literature with that of the literature on pricing behavior of firms over business cycles. The model has interesting insights on the pricing behavior over business cycles. It predicts that prices jump as the belief of a possible future boom rises over a certain threshold. The model also predicts competition to be quite vigorous following a boom while firms are predicted not to experiment with their (pricing) policies for many periods following a bust.