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The Stability And Effectiveness Of Climate Coalitions
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Book Synopsis The Stability and Effectiveness of Climate Coalitions by : Kai Lessmann
Download or read book The Stability and Effectiveness of Climate Coalitions written by Kai Lessmann and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In this paper we report results from a comparison of numerically calibrated game theoretic integrated assessment models that explore stability and performance of international coalitions for climate change mitigation. Specifically, by means of this ensemble of models we are able to identify robust results concerning incentives of nations to commit themselves to a climate agreement, and to estimate what stable agreements can achieve in terms of greenhouse gas mitigation. We also assess the potential of transfers that redistribute the surplus of cooperation in order to foster stability of climate coalitions. In contrast to much of the existing analytical game theoretical literature, we find substantial scope for self-enforcing climate coalitions in most models that close much of the abatement and welfare gap between complete absence of cooperation and full cooperation. This more positive message follows from the use of transfer schemes that are designed to counteract free riding incentives.
Book Synopsis Incentives and Stability of International Climate Coalitions by :
Download or read book Incentives and Stability of International Climate Coalitions written by and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper analyses the incentives to participate in and the stability of international climate coalitions. Using the integrated assessment model WITCH, the analysis of coalitions' profitability and stability is performed under alternative assumptions concerning the pure rate of time preference, the social welfare aggregator and the extent of climate damages. We focus on the profitability, stability, and 'potential stability' of a number of coalitions which are 'potentially effective' in reducing emissions. We find that only the grand coalition under a specific sets of assumptions finds it optimal to stabilise GHG concentration below 550 ppm CO2-eq. However, the grand coalition is found not to be stable, not even 'potentially stable' even through an adequate set of transfers. However, there exist potentially stable coalitions, but of smaller size, which are also potentially environmentally effective. Depending on the assumptions made, they could achieve up to 600 ppm CO2-eq. More ambitious targets lead to the collapse of the coalition.
Book Synopsis The Impact of Surplus Sharing on the Stability of International Climate Coalitions by : Hans-Peter Weikard
Download or read book The Impact of Surplus Sharing on the Stability of International Climate Coalitions written by Hans-Peter Weikard and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page 18 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Stability of cooperation in the international climate negotiations - An analysis using cooperative game theory by : Kersting, Jan
Download or read book Stability of cooperation in the international climate negotiations - An analysis using cooperative game theory written by Kersting, Jan and published by KIT Scientific Publishing. This book was released on 2017-09-25 with total page 254 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: International cooperation on greenhouse gas emission reductions is needed to avoid dangerous climate change. This work analyses the stability of global cooperation on climate change using cooperative game theory. Numerical and theoretical models are applied to evaluate the impact of several real-world properties. It is shown that the introduction of these properties into the game-theoretical model substantially affects the results and can make global climate cooperation unstable.
Book Synopsis The Incentives to Participate in and the Stability of International Climate Coalitions by : Valentina Bosetti
Download or read book The Incentives to Participate in and the Stability of International Climate Coalitions written by Valentina Bosetti and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper uses WITCH, an integrated assessment model with a game-theoretic structure, to explore the prospects for, and the stability of broad coalitions to achieve ambitious climate change mitigation action. Only coalitions including all large emitting regions are found to be technically able to meet a concentration stabilisation target below 550 ppm CO2eq by 2100. Once the free-riding incentives of non-participants are taken into account, only a “grand coalition” including virtually all regions can be successful. This grand coalition is profitable as a whole, implying that all countries can gain from participation provided appropriate transfers are made across them. However, neither the grand coalition nor smaller but still environmentally significant coalitions appear to be stable. This is because the collective welfare surplus from cooperation is not found to be large enough for transfers to offset the free-riding incentives of all countries simultaneously. Some factors omitted from the analysis, which might improve coalition stability, include the co-benefits from mitigation action, the costless removal of fossil fuel subsidies, as well as alternative assumptions regarding countries' bargaining behaviour.
Book Synopsis Coalition Formation Under Uncertainty by : Rob Dellink
Download or read book Coalition Formation Under Uncertainty written by Rob Dellink and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Results derived from empirical analyses on the stability of climate coalitions are usually very sensitive to the large uncertainties associated with the benefits and costs of climate policies. This paper provides the methodology of Stability Likelihood that links uncertainty about benefits and costs of climate change to the stability analysis of coalitions in a stochastic, empirical setting. We show that the concept of Stability Likelihood improves upon the robustness and interpretation of stability analysis. Our numerical application is based on a modified version of the climate model STACO. It turns out that the only non-trivial coalition structure with a relatively high Stability Likelihood (around 25 percent) is a coalition between the European Union and Japan, though quantitative results depend especially on the variance in regional benefits from abatement.
Book Synopsis Incentives to Participate in and the Stability of International Climate Coalitions by :
Download or read book Incentives to Participate in and the Stability of International Climate Coalitions written by and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Stable Climate Coalitions (Nash) and International Trade by : Thomas Eichner
Download or read book Stable Climate Coalitions (Nash) and International Trade written by Thomas Eichner and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page 35 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis International Climate Agreements under Review by : Anja Zenker
Download or read book International Climate Agreements under Review written by Anja Zenker and published by Springer Nature. This book was released on 2019-10-10 with total page 189 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Given the shortcomings of the Paris Agreement, Anja Zenker examines the potential of free trade benefits as an incentive mechanism for an effective and stable climate change cooperation of states. She addresses the question of how the specific policy design affects the success of the agreement, market and trade outcomes, as well as the compatibility with multilateral WTO obligations.
Book Synopsis Technology Diffusion and the Stability of Climate Coalitions by : Richard S. J. Tol
Download or read book Technology Diffusion and the Stability of Climate Coalitions written by Richard S. J. Tol and published by . This book was released on 2000 with total page 19 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Climate Coalitions by : Thierry Bréchet
Download or read book Climate Coalitions written by Thierry Bréchet and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 26 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Using an updated version of the CWS model (introduced by Eyckmans and Tulkens in Resource and Energy Economics 2003), this paper intends to evaluate with numbers the respective merits of two competing notions of coalition stability in the standard global public goods model as customarily applied to the climate change problem. After a reminder of the model structure and of the definition of the two game theoretical stability notions involved - namely, core stability and internal-external stability, the former property is shown to hold for the grand coalition in the CWS model only if resource transfers of a specific form between countries are introduced. It is further shown that while the latter property holds neither for the grand coalition nor for most large coalitions, it is nevertheless verified in a weak sense that involves transfers (dubbed quot;potential internal stabilityquot;) for most small coalitions. The reason for this difference is brought to light, namely the differing rationale that inspires the transfers in either case. Finally, it is shown that the stable coalitions that perform best (in terms of carbon concentration and global welfare) are always composed of both industrialized and developing countries. Two sensitivity analyses confirm the robustness of all these results.
Book Synopsis The Impact of Surplus Sharing on the Stability of International Climate Agreements by : Hans-Peter Weikard
Download or read book The Impact of Surplus Sharing on the Stability of International Climate Agreements written by Hans-Peter Weikard and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper analyses stability of coalitions for greenhouse gas abatement under different sharing rules applied to the gains from cooperation. We use a 12-region model to examine internal and external stability of coalitions. We determine and compare stable coalitions under different surplus sharing rules; for example, grandfathering (sharing proportional to current emissions) and a number of equitable rules, i.e. sharing according to historical responsibilities for past emissions. Due to strong free-rider incentives we find only small stable coalitions for all sharing rules examined. We observe that stable coalitions consist of regions with low marginal abatement costs that are attractive partners in any coalition and regions receiving the highest shares of the surplus from cooperation under a particular sharing rule. We find that equitable rules may not be conducive to success: in fact, a grandfathering scheme leads to the most successful coalition in terms of global abatement and global welfare.
Book Synopsis Stability of Climate Coalitions in a Cartel Formation Game by : Michael Finus
Download or read book Stability of Climate Coalitions in a Cartel Formation Game written by Michael Finus and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page 28 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Technology Spillovers and Stability of International Climate Coalitions by : Miyuki Nagashima
Download or read book Technology Spillovers and Stability of International Climate Coalitions written by Miyuki Nagashima and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Cooperation in international environmental agreements appears difficult to attain because of strong free riding incentives. This paper explores how different technology spillover mechanisms among regions can influence the incentive structures to join and stabilize an international agreement. We use an applied modeling framework (STACO) that enables us to investigate stability of partial climate coalitions. Technology spillovers to coalition members increase their incentives to stay in the coalition and reduce abatement costs, which leads to larger global payoffs and a lower global CO2 stock. Several theories on the impact of technology spillovers are evaluated by simulating a range of alternative specifications. We find that while spillovers are a good instrument to improve stability of bilateral agreements, they cannot overcome the strong free rider incentives that are present in larger coalitions. This conclusion is robust against the specification of technology spillovers.
Book Synopsis Technology Spillovers and Stability of International Climate Coalitions by :
Download or read book Technology Spillovers and Stability of International Climate Coalitions written by and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Cooperation in international environmental agreements appears difficult to attain because of strong free-riding incentives. This paper explores how different technology spillover mechanisms among regions can influence the incentive structures to join and stabilise an international agreement. We use an applied modelling framework (STACO) that enables us to investigate stability of partial climate coalitions. Technology spillovers to coalition members increase their incentives to stay in the coalition and reduce abatement costs, which leads to larger global payoffs and a lower global CO2 stock. Several theories on the impact of technology spillovers are evaluated by simulating a range of alternative specifcations. We find that while spillovers are a good instrument to improve stability of bilateral agreements, they cannot overcome the strong free rider incentives that are present in larger coalitions. This conclusion is robust against the specification of technology spillovers.
Book Synopsis International Climate Agreements Under Induced Technological Change by : Miyuki Nagashima
Download or read book International Climate Agreements Under Induced Technological Change written by Miyuki Nagashima and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We examine the impact of technological change on the stability of climate coalitions and explore how international cooperation on abatement affects the incentives of signatories to invest in R&D to reduce emissions. We compare the case of no technological change with exogenous technological change and induced technological change. In the latter case R&D investments are endogenous. We find that the highest equilibrium pay-offs are achieved in the case of induced technological change. Furthermore, the formation of a climate coalition boosts R&D investments in carbon abatement technologies in signatory countries.
Book Synopsis The Stability and Effectiveness of International Climate Agreements by :
Download or read book The Stability and Effectiveness of International Climate Agreements written by and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page 146 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
