The impact of the likelihood of turnover on executive compensation

Download The impact of the likelihood of turnover on executive compensation PDF Online Free

Author :
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 312 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (425 download)

DOWNLOAD NOW!


Book Synopsis The impact of the likelihood of turnover on executive compensation by : Jay Carter Hartzell

Download or read book The impact of the likelihood of turnover on executive compensation written by Jay Carter Hartzell and published by . This book was released on 1998 with total page 312 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

The Impact of the Likelihood of Turnover on Executive Compensation

Download The Impact of the Likelihood of Turnover on Executive Compensation PDF Online Free

Author :
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 53 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (129 download)

DOWNLOAD NOW!


Book Synopsis The Impact of the Likelihood of Turnover on Executive Compensation by : Jay C. Hartzell

Download or read book The Impact of the Likelihood of Turnover on Executive Compensation written by Jay C. Hartzell and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 53 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This study analyzes the role of three incentive devices in managerial compensation: pay for performance, termination, and career concerns. A model is derived which shows that the three incentives are substitutes; where the termination (or career concerns) incentive is low, the optimal contract contains stronger pay-for-performance incentives. The empirical implication, then, is that the pay-for-performance sensitivity of managers should be decreasing (increasing) in the probability of termination (retirement). To test the model s predictions, I first use a sample of CEOs to estimate the probabilities of forced and voluntary turnover. Then, these estimated probabilities are compared to the CEOs estimated pay-for-performance sensitivity. The evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that boards consider the likelihood of termination when setting the compensation contract; the relationship between changes in CEO compensation and firm performance is decreasing in the estimated probability of forced turnover. While CEOs nearing retirement do not appear to have compensation that is increasingly sensitive to performance, their wealth does have increased sensitivity. Consistent with the model s intuition, the sensitivity of total CEO firm-related wealth to performance is positively related to the probability of voluntary turnover.

An Introduction to Executive Compensation

Download An Introduction to Executive Compensation PDF Online Free

Author :
Publisher : Academic Press
ISBN 13 : 9780120771264
Total Pages : 410 pages
Book Rating : 4.7/5 (712 download)

DOWNLOAD NOW!


Book Synopsis An Introduction to Executive Compensation by : Steven Balsam

Download or read book An Introduction to Executive Compensation written by Steven Balsam and published by Academic Press. This book was released on 2002 with total page 410 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: General readers have no idea why people should care about what executives are paid and why they are paid the way they are. That's the reason that The Wall Street Journal, Fortune, Forbes, and other popular and practitioner publications have regular coverage on them. This book not only proposes a reason - executives need incentives in order to maximize firm value (economists call this agency theory) - it also describes the nature and design of executive compensation practices. Those incentives can take the form of benefits (salary, stock options), or prerquisites (reflecting the status of the executive within the organizational culture.

Complex Compensation: Empirical Essays on the Impact of Compensation Design on Firm Performance, Turnover, and Organizational Justice

Download Complex Compensation: Empirical Essays on the Impact of Compensation Design on Firm Performance, Turnover, and Organizational Justice PDF Online Free

Author :
Publisher : BoD – Books on Demand
ISBN 13 : 3947095112
Total Pages : 202 pages
Book Rating : 4.9/5 (47 download)

DOWNLOAD NOW!


Book Synopsis Complex Compensation: Empirical Essays on the Impact of Compensation Design on Firm Performance, Turnover, and Organizational Justice by : Tobias Oberpaul

Download or read book Complex Compensation: Empirical Essays on the Impact of Compensation Design on Firm Performance, Turnover, and Organizational Justice written by Tobias Oberpaul and published by BoD – Books on Demand. This book was released on 2024-01-19 with total page 202 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Compensation contracts have become ever more complex and individualized, particularly in the executive compensation domain, where increasingly diverse stakeholder demands and governance requirements have led to the inclusion of more and increasingly interrelated components into compensation contracts. Even the compensation of lower-level employees has become complex as firms individualize employee compensation and use many different rewards simultaneously. Research has examined elements of compensation in isolation but has attempted to avoid the complexities of compensation. This dissertation examines the consequences of compensation complexity and compensation design dispersion and contributes to a better understanding of compensation and its consequences for firms and employees. The first study examines how the complexity of executive compensation contracts affects firm performance. It finds that CEO compensation complexity negatively affects accounting, market, and ESG (i.e., environmental, social, and governance) metrics of firm performance and explores mechanisms that help explain the relationships. The second study examines the effect of compensation design dispersion within top management teams and its impact on executive turnover. The results show that compensation design dispersion affects executive turnover, both directly and in interaction with relative pay level. The third study addresses the role of compensation design dispersion in the development of procedural justice perceptions. Using two experiments, this study shows that compensation design dispersion causes lower procedural justice perceptions, which appears to be less problematic for participants with relatively easier to understand contracts. In summary, this dissertation provides a nuanced overview of complex compensation design and compensation design dispersion. The findings contribute to a better understanding of the effectiveness of compensation as an incentive and sorting tool for organizations, and of the implications of compensation design for the functioning of teams.

Individual and Organizational Factors Surrounding Top Executive Turnover

Download Individual and Organizational Factors Surrounding Top Executive Turnover PDF Online Free

Author :
Publisher : Logos Verlag Berlin GmbH
ISBN 13 : 3832546731
Total Pages : 226 pages
Book Rating : 4.8/5 (325 download)

DOWNLOAD NOW!


Book Synopsis Individual and Organizational Factors Surrounding Top Executive Turnover by : Stephanie Brecht-Bergen

Download or read book Individual and Organizational Factors Surrounding Top Executive Turnover written by Stephanie Brecht-Bergen and published by Logos Verlag Berlin GmbH. This book was released on 2018 with total page 226 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The author analyzes the multi-faceted phenomenon of top executive turnover from various theoretical angles and empirically shows how individual and organizational factors such as performance, compensation and gender relate to it. Managerial implications on how to deal with turnover in times of talent shortage are derived. The book contributes to turnover research in three distinct ways. From a corporate governance perspective, it inspects potential antecedents and consequences of top executive dismissal with a focus on firm performance consequences. Taking a labor economics view, it scrutinizes compensation structure as a likely antecedent of voluntary turnover. From an OB and HRM angle, it examines gender as a characteristic of top executives and possible antecedent of turnover.

Research Handbook on Executive Pay

Download Research Handbook on Executive Pay PDF Online Free

Author :
Publisher : Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN 13 : 1781005109
Total Pages : 553 pages
Book Rating : 4.7/5 (81 download)

DOWNLOAD NOW!


Book Synopsis Research Handbook on Executive Pay by : John S. Beasley

Download or read book Research Handbook on Executive Pay written by John S. Beasley and published by Edward Elgar Publishing. This book was released on 2012-01-01 with total page 553 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Research on executive compensation has exploded in recent years, and this volume of specially commissioned essays brings the reader up-to-date on all of the latest developments in the field. Leading corporate governance scholars from a range of countries set out their views on four main areas of executive compensation: the history and theory of executive compensation, the structure of executive pay, corporate governance and executive compensation, and international perspectives on executive pay. The authors analyze the two dominant theoretical approaches – managerial power theory and optimal contracting theory – and examine their impact on executive pay levels and the practices of concentrated and dispersed share ownership in corporations. The effectiveness of government regulation of executive pay and international executive pay practices in Australia, the US, Europe, China, India and Japan are also discussed. A timely study of a controversial topic, the Handbook will be an essential resource for students, scholars and practitioners of law, finance, business and accounting.

Compensation and Organizational Performance

Download Compensation and Organizational Performance PDF Online Free

Author :
Publisher : Routledge
ISBN 13 : 1317473957
Total Pages : 366 pages
Book Rating : 4.3/5 (174 download)

DOWNLOAD NOW!


Book Synopsis Compensation and Organizational Performance by : Luis R. Gomez-Mejia

Download or read book Compensation and Organizational Performance written by Luis R. Gomez-Mejia and published by Routledge. This book was released on 2014-12-18 with total page 366 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This up-to-date, research-oriented textbook focuses on the relationship between compensation systems and firm overall performance. In contrast to more traditional compensation texts, it provides a strategic perspective to compensation administration rather than a functional viewpoint. The text emphasizes the role of managerial pay, its importance, determinants, and impact on organizations. It analyzes recent topics in executive compensation, such as pay in high technology firms, managerial risk taking, rewards in family companies, and the link between compensation and social responsibility and ethical issues, among others. The authors provide a thorough and comprehensive review of the vast literatures relevant to compensation and revisit debates grounded in different theoretical perspectives. They provide insights from disciplines as diverse as management, economics, sociology, and psychology, and amplify previous discussions with the latest empirical findings on compensation, its dynamics, and its contribution to firm overall performance.

The Impact of the CEO's View of Risk on Turnover and the Value of Equity

Download The Impact of the CEO's View of Risk on Turnover and the Value of Equity PDF Online Free

Author :
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (76 download)

DOWNLOAD NOW!


Book Synopsis The Impact of the CEO's View of Risk on Turnover and the Value of Equity by : Timothy Colin Campbell

Download or read book The Impact of the CEO's View of Risk on Turnover and the Value of Equity written by Timothy Colin Campbell and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Recent theory predicts that two factors influencing the CEO's view of risk, overconfidence and debt-like compensation, have implications for CEO forced turnover and firm equity value, respectively. We test each of these predictions using large samples of CEOs from S & P 1500 firms, with statistical methods such as Cox proportional semi-parametric hazard models and Ordinary Least Squares regressions. Section 2 tests the theoretical prediction that CEOs with excessively low or excessively high overconfidence face a higher likelihood of forced turnover. We find empirical support for this prediction: excessively overconfident (diffident) CEOs have forced turnover hazard rates approximately 67% (97%) higher than moderately overconfident CEOs. To the extent that boards terminate non-value-maximizing CEOs, the results are broadly consistent with the view that there is an interior optimum level of managerial overconfidence that maximizes firm value. Section 3 tests the theoretical prediction that debt or debt-like compensation can be used as a part of optimal executive compensation, leading to an increase in the value of equity. We find weak evidence of positive abnormal returns in response to decreases in the deviation from optimal CEO debt-to-equity when the CEO's debt-to-equity was less than the firm's or when then firm had low institutional ownership. The results suggest that the optimal use of debt compensation can in fact be beneficial to equity holders.

Pay Without Performance

Download Pay Without Performance PDF Online Free

Author :
Publisher : Harvard University Press
ISBN 13 : 9780674020634
Total Pages : 308 pages
Book Rating : 4.0/5 (26 download)

DOWNLOAD NOW!


Book Synopsis Pay Without Performance by : Lucian A. Bebchuk

Download or read book Pay Without Performance written by Lucian A. Bebchuk and published by Harvard University Press. This book was released on 2004 with total page 308 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The company is under-performing, its share price is trailing, and the CEO gets...a multi-million-dollar raise. This story is familiar, for good reason: as this book clearly demonstrates, structural flaws in corporate governance have produced widespread distortions in executive pay. Pay without Performance presents a disconcerting portrait of managers' influence over their own pay--and of a governance system that must fundamentally change if firms are to be managed in the interest of shareholders. Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried demonstrate that corporate boards have persistently failed to negotiate at arm's length with the executives they are meant to oversee. They give a richly detailed account of how pay practices--from option plans to retirement benefits--have decoupled compensation from performance and have camouflaged both the amount and performance-insensitivity of pay. Executives' unwonted influence over their compensation has hurt shareholders by increasing pay levels and, even more importantly, by leading to practices that dilute and distort managers' incentives. This book identifies basic problems with our current reliance on boards as guardians of shareholder interests. And the solution, the authors argue, is not merely to make these boards more independent of executives as recent reforms attempt to do. Rather, boards should also be made more dependent on shareholders by eliminating the arrangements that entrench directors and insulate them from their shareholders. A powerful critique of executive compensation and corporate governance, Pay without Performance points the way to restoring corporate integrity and improving corporate performance.

Executive Compensation: Empirical Essays on the Antecedents and the Consequences, and the Role of Executive Personality

Download Executive Compensation: Empirical Essays on the Antecedents and the Consequences, and the Role of Executive Personality PDF Online Free

Author :
Publisher : BoD – Books on Demand
ISBN 13 : 3947095104
Total Pages : 233 pages
Book Rating : 4.9/5 (47 download)

DOWNLOAD NOW!


Book Synopsis Executive Compensation: Empirical Essays on the Antecedents and the Consequences, and the Role of Executive Personality by : Steffen Florian Burkert

Download or read book Executive Compensation: Empirical Essays on the Antecedents and the Consequences, and the Role of Executive Personality written by Steffen Florian Burkert and published by BoD – Books on Demand. This book was released on 2023-03-10 with total page 233 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Top managers have a significant impact on organizations because they are responsible for the formulation and implementation of corporate strategies, have the visibility and influence to shape the opinions of internal and external stakeholders, and coin the culture of their organizations, affecting employees at every level of the organization. Research has focused on the drivers and consequences of top managers' actions, with a particular focus on executive compensation, but important questions remain unanswered. This dissertation contributes to the literature on top executives by examining the antecedents of executive compensation, the influence of executive compensation on executive behavior, and the interplay of executive compensation and top executive personality. The first study introduces the role of compensation benchmarking for determining executive compensation to the management literature. It finds that benchmarking leads to compensation convergence. The second study examines the impact of executive compensation complexity on firm performance. The results show that compensation complexity is negatively related to accounting-based, market-based, and ESG-based metric of firm performance. The third study explores the implications of relative performance evaluation (RPE) on the imitation behavior of firms. It finds that the introduction of RPE is positively related to the imitation of the strategic actions of peer firms. The fourth study contributes to the growing literature on the impact of corporate social performance (CSP) goals in CEO contracts. Specifically, it examines how and when CSP incentives influence the CEO's attention to corporate social responsibility topics. The final essay examines the role of CEO personality; it finds that differences in CEO personality explain differences in the level of strategic conformity. Taken together, the essays in this dissertation make a significant contribution to the scholarly discourse on the influence of top managers on their companies. The empirical evidence presented expands the current understanding of how top executives affect strategic firm behaviors, and it provides insights for policymakers, managers, and investors.

An Analysis of CEO Equity Compensation in an Incomplete Contracting Framework

Download An Analysis of CEO Equity Compensation in an Incomplete Contracting Framework PDF Online Free

Author :
Publisher : Matthias Kiefer
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 262 pages
Book Rating : 4./5 ( download)

DOWNLOAD NOW!


Book Synopsis An Analysis of CEO Equity Compensation in an Incomplete Contracting Framework by : Matthias Kiefer

Download or read book An Analysis of CEO Equity Compensation in an Incomplete Contracting Framework written by Matthias Kiefer and published by Matthias Kiefer. This book was released on 2015-01-01 with total page 262 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: I investigate whether equity grants increase the costs of CEO dismissal or departure (Oyer, 2004; Almazan and Suarez, 2003). I argue that costs of dismissal are increased because equity grants become exercisable upon forced departure. Equity grants can increase the costs of leaving because voluntarily departing CEOs forfeit equity compensation upon departure. I follow Rajgopal, Shevlin and Zamora (2006) in linking CEO equity compensation to a measure of labor market competition in a sample of S&P1500 companies from 1996 to 2010. I find that the intensity of labor market competition measured by a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index across industries and states affects equity grants and that the correlation is reversed in the penultimate year of forced CEO departure. This is consistent with the view that CEOs are concerned about being replaced in competitive labor markets and therefore demand more compensation that converts into severance pay. Conversely, when a dismissal is anticipated, I argue that CEOs are concerned about finding new employment and are then insured against a lack of outside opportunities. In addition, I conduct an empirical investigation of the relationship between stock options, restricted stock grants and other long-term compensation between 2001 and 2006. I argue that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act did not increase managerial accountability (see for example Cohen, Dey and Lys, 2005) and that new accounting rules did not increase accounting costs of stock options (see for example Hayes, Lemmon and Qiu, 2012). Instead, I suggest that the effective prohibition of executive loans from firms and brokers made it prohibitively costly for CEOs to exercise stock options. I find that stock options began to be replaced with other long-term compensation as early as 2004. CEOs began to accumulate vested but unexercised stock options. I do not find evidence that CEOs sold vested stock to raise funds.In the final empirical chapter, I consider whether a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index across industries and states can be interpreted as a proxy for labor market competition. Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) argue that it is product market competition that affects CEO equity grants. My results are consistent with Rajgopal, Shevlin and Zamora (2006) who do not find evidence that product market competition has any significant impact on equity grants. Instead, I find that labor market competition retains a significant and positive impact in our tests, and notably holds for the largest single product market. The principal limitations of the project were found to be the difficulty of collecting data of intended turnover and classifying it into forced and voluntary turnover. With respect to loans to executives, loans by brokers are usually not disclosed. This study is the first to analyze equity compensation as severance arrangement. CEO cash constraints in exercising options is an unexplored explanation for their disappearance.

CEO Turnover

Download CEO Turnover PDF Online Free

Author :
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 152 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (31 download)

DOWNLOAD NOW!


Book Synopsis CEO Turnover by : Kathleen Anne Farrell

Download or read book CEO Turnover written by Kathleen Anne Farrell and published by . This book was released on 1994 with total page 152 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

How to Make Boards Work

Download How to Make Boards Work PDF Online Free

Author :
Publisher : Springer
ISBN 13 : 1137275707
Total Pages : 548 pages
Book Rating : 4.1/5 (372 download)

DOWNLOAD NOW!


Book Synopsis How to Make Boards Work by : A. Kakabadse

Download or read book How to Make Boards Work written by A. Kakabadse and published by Springer. This book was released on 2013-12-02 with total page 548 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: How to Make Boards Work offers a unique view of the thinking and doing of governance. The outside-in perspective offers a holistic framework highlighting how global cultural, social and political diversity impact boards of directors. The inside-out perspective emphasizes how governance and boards can effectively realize sustainable value creation.

CEO Compensation and Turnover

Download CEO Compensation and Turnover PDF Online Free

Author :
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (129 download)

DOWNLOAD NOW!


Book Synopsis CEO Compensation and Turnover by : Eliezer M. Fich

Download or read book CEO Compensation and Turnover written by Eliezer M. Fich and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The recent wave of revelations involving corporate governance problems has created significant interest in the relationships between chief executive officers (CEOs) and their boards of directors. In this paper we focus on one important but previously uninvestigated characteristic of boards: the tendency of many boards to have two (or more) directors who are also members of another company's board. We define this relationship as a mutual interlock. We explore the consequences of this phenomenon for CEO compensation and CEO turnover.Our empirical analyses - conducted for a sample of 366 large companies, in which 87% of the companies have at least one mutual interlock - show that CEO compensation tends to be higher and CEO turnover tends to be lower when the CEO's board has one or more pairs of board members who are mutually interlocked with another company's board. There are two possible interpretations of these results. One is that the mutual interlocks are an indication of and a contributor to CEO entrenchment, and the higher compensation and lower turnover follow from this entrenchment. The other is that the mutual interlocks are an indication of the strengthening of an important and valuable strategic alliance for the company, and the higher CEO compensation and lower turnover are the CEO's reward for arranging the alliance. We believe that the first interpretation is more accurate, for the reasons discussed in the paper.

The Effect of Equity Compensation on Voluntary Executive Turnover

Download The Effect of Equity Compensation on Voluntary Executive Turnover PDF Online Free

Author :
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (129 download)

DOWNLOAD NOW!


Book Synopsis The Effect of Equity Compensation on Voluntary Executive Turnover by : Steven Balsam

Download or read book The Effect of Equity Compensation on Voluntary Executive Turnover written by Steven Balsam and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Equity compensation provides incentives for executives to remain with the firm to avoid forfeiture of restricted shares and some or all of the value of stock options held. Empirically we show that the intrinsic value of unexercisable in-the-money options, the time value of unexercised options, and the value of restricted shares are inversely related to voluntary executive turnover. These findings which are most pronounced for strong performers, hold for CEOs and non-CEOs alike. While paying excess cash compensation also reduces turnover, the effect is less pronounced than that of equity compensation.

Performance, Compensation and Turnover

Download Performance, Compensation and Turnover PDF Online Free

Author :
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 108 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (891 download)

DOWNLOAD NOW!


Book Synopsis Performance, Compensation and Turnover by : Anthony J. Nyberg

Download or read book Performance, Compensation and Turnover written by Anthony J. Nyberg and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 108 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Executive Remuneration and Employee Performance-Related Pay

Download Executive Remuneration and Employee Performance-Related Pay PDF Online Free

Author :
Publisher : OUP Oxford
ISBN 13 : 0191648582
Total Pages : 311 pages
Book Rating : 4.1/5 (916 download)

DOWNLOAD NOW!


Book Synopsis Executive Remuneration and Employee Performance-Related Pay by : Tito Boeri

Download or read book Executive Remuneration and Employee Performance-Related Pay written by Tito Boeri and published by OUP Oxford. This book was released on 2013-03-28 with total page 311 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The recent financial crisis has created a public outcry over top-executive pay packages and has led to calls for reform of executive pay in Europe and the US. The current controversy is not the first - nor will it be the last - time that executive compensation has sparked outrage and led to regulation on both sides of the Atlantic. This volume compares US and European CEOs to trace the evolution of executive compensation, its controversies and its resulting regulations. It shows that many features of current executive compensation practices reflect the, often-unintended, consequences of regulatory responses to perceived abuses in top-executive pay, which frequently stem from relatively isolated events or situations. Regulation creates unintended (and usually costly) side effects and it is often driven by political agendas rather than shareholder value. Improvements in executive compensation are more likely to come from stronger corporate governance, and not through direct government intervention. The volume also examines the effects of incentive schemes and the patterns of performance related pay both within and across countries. It documents a number of empirical regularities and discusses whether government should intervene to support the implementation of incentive pay schemes. It argues that it makes little sense to undertake reform without detailed simulations of the effect on the economy under alternative economic scenarios, based on sound analysis and extensive discussion with labour, management, and government decision-makers.