The Change In Operating And Regulatory Environment And The Ceo Compensation Performance Sensitivity

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The Change in Operating and Regulatory Environment and the CEO Compensation-Performance Sensitivity

Author : Stephen Bryan
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (129 download)

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Book Synopsis The Change in Operating and Regulatory Environment and the CEO Compensation-Performance Sensitivity by : Stephen Bryan

Download or read book The Change in Operating and Regulatory Environment and the CEO Compensation-Performance Sensitivity written by Stephen Bryan and published by . This book was released on 1999 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This study tests whether firms in the electric utility industry alter their compensation policies in response to the recent and dramatic changes that the 1992 Energy Policy Act imposes on their operating and regulatory environment. The 1992 Act intensifies competition in the utility industry by opening up the generation and wholesale markets for electric power, thereby providing greater managerial incentives to improve utilities' operating efficiency. Our evidence shows that utilities significantly increased (by almost 70%) the CEO cash compensation-earnings performance sensitivity in the post-1992 period compared to the pre-1992 period. Additionally, an analysis for non-utility firms does not indicate such a high increase in the CEO cash compensation-earnings sensitivity over the same period. Further, electric utilities that diversify into unregulated operations and that operate in a less severe regulatory environment exhibit an even greater increase in the CEO cash compensation-earnings sensitivity over the same period of time. Unlike the generation and wholesale sectors of the utility industry, however, rate-setting, capital investments, and retail operations remain regulated, thereby limiting managerial discretion in exploiting future investment opportunities. Consequently, we find that the sensitivity of utility CEO stock-based compensation (stock option compensation and stock ownership) to stock performance does not increase in the post-1992 period relative to the pre-1992 period. Finally, our comparison of electric utilities to independent power producers (IPPs), which have less constrained investment opportunities, shows that the average proportion of CEO stock option compensation for IPPs is six times greater than that for electric utility CEOs.

CEO Pay and Firm Performance

Author : Paul L. Joskow
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 56 pages
Book Rating : 4.3/5 ( download)

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Book Synopsis CEO Pay and Firm Performance by : Paul L. Joskow

Download or read book CEO Pay and Firm Performance written by Paul L. Joskow and published by . This book was released on 1994 with total page 56 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This study explores the dynamic structure of the pay-for- performance relationship in CEO compensation and quantifies the effect of introducing a more complex model of firm financial performance on the estimated performance sensitivity of executive pay. The results suggest that current compensation responds to past performance outcomes, but that the effect decays considerably within two years. This contrasts sharply with models of infinitely persistent performance effects implicitly assumed in much of the empirical compensation literature. We find that both accounting and market performance measures influence compensation and that the salary and bonus component of pay as well as total compensation have become more sensitive to firm financial performance over the past two decades. There is no evidence that boards fail to penalize CEOs for poor financial performance or reward them disproportionately well for good performance. Finally, the data suggest that boards may discount extreme performance outcomes -both high and low - relative to performance that lies within some `normal' band in setting compensation.

Executive Compensation and Earnings Management Under Moral Hazard

Author : Bo Sun
Publisher : DIANE Publishing
ISBN 13 : 1437930980
Total Pages : 33 pages
Book Rating : 4.4/5 (379 download)

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Book Synopsis Executive Compensation and Earnings Management Under Moral Hazard by : Bo Sun

Download or read book Executive Compensation and Earnings Management Under Moral Hazard written by Bo Sun and published by DIANE Publishing. This book was released on 2010-08 with total page 33 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Analyzes executive compensation in a setting where managers may take a costly action to manipulate corporate performance, and whether managers do so is stochastic. Examines how the opportunity to manipulate affects the optimal pay contract, and establishes necessary and sufficient conditions under which earnings management occurs. The author¿s model provides a set of implications on the role earnings management plays in driving the time-series and cross-sectional variation of executive compensation. In addition, the model's predictions regarding the changes of earnings management and executive pay in response to corporate governance legislation are consistent with empirical observations. Charts and tables.

Executive Compensation Regulation and the Dynamics of the Pay-performance Sensitivity

Author : Ralf Sabiwalsky
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (837 download)

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Book Synopsis Executive Compensation Regulation and the Dynamics of the Pay-performance Sensitivity by : Ralf Sabiwalsky

Download or read book Executive Compensation Regulation and the Dynamics of the Pay-performance Sensitivity written by Ralf Sabiwalsky and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A substantial number of empirical studies on the linear relationship between executive compensation and firm performance for European firms suggest that the pay-performance sensitivity is not significantly positive. We argue that a nonlinear structure fits the data better, because compensation contracts provide for minimum performance benchmarks and an upper limit to the variable component of compensation. We test for such discontinuities in the pay performance relationship, and confirm their existence, using hand collected data from German Prime All Share firms' CEO bonus compensation. It turns out that there is a significant positive relationship between return on assets and CEO bonus for ROA between -3% and +20%. Performance sensitivity is then tested for changes over time between 2006 and 2009. Results reveal that during the first three years after the introduction of a statutory transparency rule in 2005 governing the disclosure of individual CEO compensation, significant changes to compensation contracts did not occur; but that in 2009 the pay-performance sensitivity exhibited a significant increase, which coincides with the passing of a law that requires supervisory boards to ensure that new CEO employment contracts provide for "reasonable" compensation. -- Executive Compensation ; Regulation ; Pay Performance Sensitivity

The Changing Regulatory Environment for Executive Compensation

Author : Andrew Katz
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 22 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (277 download)

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Book Synopsis The Changing Regulatory Environment for Executive Compensation by : Andrew Katz

Download or read book The Changing Regulatory Environment for Executive Compensation written by Andrew Katz and published by . This book was released on 1992 with total page 22 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Incentive Compensation and Incentive Regulation

Author : Carlo Cambini
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 45 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (13 download)

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Book Synopsis Incentive Compensation and Incentive Regulation by : Carlo Cambini

Download or read book Incentive Compensation and Incentive Regulation written by Carlo Cambini and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 45 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper examines the relationship between CEO pay and firm performance within a sample of European publicly listed energy utilities from 2000 to 2010, focusing on the differential responses that arise from being subject to different regulatory regimes. In particular, we investigate the difference in pay-performance sensitivity across regulated and unregulated firms as well as the impact of different regulatory schemes -- incentive vs. cost-based regulation -- on CEO monetary incentives. Using various measures of performance, we find that European energy utilities link CEO compensation to firm performance, but CEO pay-performance is higher for unregulated companies. When we focus on the effect of alternative regulatory schemes, our results show that pay-performance sensitivity is significantly higher for firms under incentive regulation than within firms under cost-based regulation. This result holds after controlling for firm -- private vs. state -- ownership and for varying degrees of market liberalization across countries.

Pay Without Performance

Author : Lucian A. Bebchuk
Publisher : Harvard University Press
ISBN 13 : 9780674020634
Total Pages : 308 pages
Book Rating : 4.0/5 (26 download)

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Book Synopsis Pay Without Performance by : Lucian A. Bebchuk

Download or read book Pay Without Performance written by Lucian A. Bebchuk and published by Harvard University Press. This book was released on 2004 with total page 308 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The company is under-performing, its share price is trailing, and the CEO gets...a multi-million-dollar raise. This story is familiar, for good reason: as this book clearly demonstrates, structural flaws in corporate governance have produced widespread distortions in executive pay. Pay without Performance presents a disconcerting portrait of managers' influence over their own pay--and of a governance system that must fundamentally change if firms are to be managed in the interest of shareholders. Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried demonstrate that corporate boards have persistently failed to negotiate at arm's length with the executives they are meant to oversee. They give a richly detailed account of how pay practices--from option plans to retirement benefits--have decoupled compensation from performance and have camouflaged both the amount and performance-insensitivity of pay. Executives' unwonted influence over their compensation has hurt shareholders by increasing pay levels and, even more importantly, by leading to practices that dilute and distort managers' incentives. This book identifies basic problems with our current reliance on boards as guardians of shareholder interests. And the solution, the authors argue, is not merely to make these boards more independent of executives as recent reforms attempt to do. Rather, boards should also be made more dependent on shareholders by eliminating the arrangements that entrench directors and insulate them from their shareholders. A powerful critique of executive compensation and corporate governance, Pay without Performance points the way to restoring corporate integrity and improving corporate performance.

An Introduction to Executive Compensation

Author : Steven Balsam
Publisher : Academic Press
ISBN 13 : 9780120771264
Total Pages : 410 pages
Book Rating : 4.7/5 (712 download)

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Book Synopsis An Introduction to Executive Compensation by : Steven Balsam

Download or read book An Introduction to Executive Compensation written by Steven Balsam and published by Academic Press. This book was released on 2002 with total page 410 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: General readers have no idea why people should care about what executives are paid and why they are paid the way they are. That's the reason that The Wall Street Journal, Fortune, Forbes, and other popular and practitioner publications have regular coverage on them. This book not only proposes a reason - executives need incentives in order to maximize firm value (economists call this agency theory) - it also describes the nature and design of executive compensation practices. Those incentives can take the form of benefits (salary, stock options), or prerquisites (reflecting the status of the executive within the organizational culture.

Effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on CEOs' Stock Ownership and Pay-Performance Sensitivity

Author : Hsihui Chang
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 52 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (129 download)

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Book Synopsis Effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on CEOs' Stock Ownership and Pay-Performance Sensitivity by : Hsihui Chang

Download or read book Effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on CEOs' Stock Ownership and Pay-Performance Sensitivity written by Hsihui Chang and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page 52 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) provides a natural experiment for examining how stock ownership and executive pay structure adapt to a change in regulatory environment. Using annual compensation data of Samp;P 1500 firms in 1994-2005, we examine the impact of SOX on stock ownership and pay-performance sensitivity of CEOs. Consistent with our expectations, we find that in light of SOX: (i) stock ownership and (ii) the total pay-performance sensitivity of CEOs have decreased substantially, indicating that SOX induces a weaker incentive alignment between shareholders and CEOs. In contrast, we find that after SOX stock ownership and the total pay-performance sensitivity of CEOs have remained unchanged in the regulated industries.

CEO Pay and Firm Performance

Author : Paul L. Joskow
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 41 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (129 download)

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Book Synopsis CEO Pay and Firm Performance by : Paul L. Joskow

Download or read book CEO Pay and Firm Performance written by Paul L. Joskow and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 41 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This study explores the dynamic structure of the pay-for- performance relationship in CEO compensation and quantifies the effect of introducing a more complex model of firm financial performance on the estimated performance sensitivity of executive pay. The results suggest that current compensation responds to past performance outcomes, but that the effect decays considerably within two years. This contrasts sharply with models of infinitely persistent performance effects implicitly assumed in much of the empirical compensation literature. We find that both accounting and market performance measures influence compensation and that the salary and bonus component of pay as well as total compensation have become more sensitive to firm financial performance over the past two decades. There is no evidence that boards fail to penalize CEOs for poor financial performance or reward them disproportionately well for good performance. Finally, the data suggest that boards may discount extreme performance outcomes -both high and low - relative to performance that lies within some `normal' band in setting compensation.

Changes in the Structure of CEO Compensation and the Firm's Pay- Performance Sensitivity Following CEO Turnover

Author : David W. Blackwell
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (129 download)

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Book Synopsis Changes in the Structure of CEO Compensation and the Firm's Pay- Performance Sensitivity Following CEO Turnover by : David W. Blackwell

Download or read book Changes in the Structure of CEO Compensation and the Firm's Pay- Performance Sensitivity Following CEO Turnover written by David W. Blackwell and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We document significant improvements in earnings and stock returns after CEO turnover. Compared to old CEOs, new CEOs derive more of their compensation from salary and bonus and option grants, but less from stock holdings. The sensitivity of pay to performance increases significantly after a change in CEO. The salary and bonus of the new CEO is much more sensitive to performance than that of the old CEO; stock holdings and option grants are less sensitive. Changes in pay-performance sensitivity are greater after exogenous turnover than after exogenous turnover.

Bank CEO Pay-Performance Relations and the Effects of Deregulation

Author : Anthony J. Crawford
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (129 download)

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Book Synopsis Bank CEO Pay-Performance Relations and the Effects of Deregulation by : Anthony J. Crawford

Download or read book Bank CEO Pay-Performance Relations and the Effects of Deregulation written by Anthony J. Crawford and published by . This book was released on 1999 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We test the deregulation hypothesis which posits that bank CEO compensation became more sensitive to performance as bank management became less regulated. We observe a significant increase in pay-performance sensitivities from our 1976-1981 regulation subsample to our 1982-1988 deregulation subsample. These increases in pay sensitivities after deregulation are observed for salary and bonus, stock options, and common stock holdings. We observe increases in the pay-performance relation associated with high capitalization ratio banks consistent with providing incentives for wealth creation while even larger increases in pay-performance sensitivity for lower-capitalization-ratio banks suggests an FDIC moral hazard problem.

Incentive Features in CEO Compensation

Author : Kose John
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 41 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (129 download)

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Book Synopsis Incentive Features in CEO Compensation by : Kose John

Download or read book Incentive Features in CEO Compensation written by Kose John and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 41 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We study CEO compensation in the banking industry by taking into account banks unique claim structure in the presence of two types of agency problems: the standard managerial agency problem as well as the risk-shifting problem between shareholders and debtholders. We empirically test two hypotheses derived from this framework: (1) the pay-for-performance sensitivity of bank CEO compensation decreases with the total leverage ratio; and (2) the pay-for-performance sensitivity of bank CEO compensation increases with the intensity of monitoring provided by regulators and nondepository (subordinated) debtholders. We construct an index of the intensity of outsider monitoring based on four variables: subordinated debt ratio, subordinated debt rating, non performing loan ratio and BOPEC rating assigned by regulators. We findsupporting evidence for both hypotheses. Our results hold after controlling for the endogeneity among compensation, leverage and monitoring. They are robust to various regression specifications and sample criteria.

Regulation, Subordinated Debt, and Incentive Features of CEO Compensation in the Banking Industry

Author : Kose John
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 0 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (137 download)

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Book Synopsis Regulation, Subordinated Debt, and Incentive Features of CEO Compensation in the Banking Industry by : Kose John

Download or read book Regulation, Subordinated Debt, and Incentive Features of CEO Compensation in the Banking Industry written by Kose John and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We study CEO compensation in the banking industry by considering banks' unique claim structure in the presence of two types of agency problems: the standard managerial agency problem and the risk-shifting problem between shareholders and debt holders. We empirically test two hypotheses derived from this framework: that the pay-for-performance sensitivity of bank CEO compensation (1) decreases with the total leverage ratio and (2) increases with the intensity of monitoring provided by regulators and non-depository (subordinated) debt holders. We construct an index of the intensity of outsider monitoring based on four variables: the subordinated debt ratio, subordinated debt rating, nonperforming loan ratio, and BOPEC rating (regulators' assessment of a bank's overall health and financial condition). We find supporting evidence for both hypotheses. Our results hold after controlling for the endogeneity among compensation, leverage, and monitoring; they are robust to various regression specifications and sample criteria.

Manipulation Effects of Managerial Discretion on Executive Compensation

Author : Changzheng Zhang
Publisher : Nova Science Publishers
ISBN 13 : 9781634846806
Total Pages : 225 pages
Book Rating : 4.8/5 (468 download)

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Book Synopsis Manipulation Effects of Managerial Discretion on Executive Compensation by : Changzheng Zhang

Download or read book Manipulation Effects of Managerial Discretion on Executive Compensation written by Changzheng Zhang and published by Nova Science Publishers. This book was released on 2016 with total page 225 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Facing with the ever increasing change of the business environment, the firms have recognized that their persistent competitive edge increasingly depends on whether or not they own the dedicated, experienced and capable CEOs. In the global practice, more and more firms have tried, or are trying, or will try to change their CEOs in order to get higher firm performance or just to get out of recession. Especially it is true in China. However, in theory, the literature in the related fields, such as the corporate governance, the strategic human resource management, the strategy management, the principal-agent theory and so on, has only addressed how to arrange managerial discretion and executive compensation reasonably under the normal circumstances, while ignoring the conditions of CEO change. Therefore, each stakeholder in the post-CEO change period has no clear theoretical guidances on how to reallocate managerial discretion and reset executive compensation for the fresh CEOs. Such a theoretical research gap has leaded to a large number of failures in the issue of CEO change. In order to make up this gap, this book tries to investigate the relationship between managerial discretion and executive compensation under the conditions of CEO change, which can not only practically guide the re-balancing of the corporate governance and further improve the success possibility of CEO change, but can theoretically enrich the contributions in managerial discretion approach and executive compensation theory. Based on the comparative study perspective, by drawing on the data from Chinese listed companies as the sample and adopting the Correlation Analysis, Multiple Linear Regression and Hierarchical Models as the statistical analysis methods, the book investigates how managerial discretion, respectively for the fresh CEOs and the senior CEOs, manipulates each dimension of executive compensation, i.e. executive compensation level, CEO pay-performance sensitivity, executive compensation gap and executive-employee compensation gap. The book makes two valuable new findings: First, the book confirms that both the fresh CEOs and the senior CEOs have the motives and capabilities to manipulate each dimension of executive compensation, but varying by intent and intention; Second, the book proves that the fresh CEOs show higher firm-serving motives when they manipulate each dimension of executive compensation by performing managerial discretion, while the senior CEOs show relatively higher self-serving motives. Based on the research results, the book builds the fresh-keeping mechanisms of firm-serving motives of the fresh CEOs during their whole CEO tenure, which are of great meanings for the government, the scholars and the practitioners and so on.

Executive Compensation and Business Policy Choices at U.S. Commercial Banks*

Author : Robert DeYoung
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 45 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (13 download)

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Book Synopsis Executive Compensation and Business Policy Choices at U.S. Commercial Banks* by : Robert DeYoung

Download or read book Executive Compensation and Business Policy Choices at U.S. Commercial Banks* written by Robert DeYoung and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page 45 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This study examines whether and how the terms of CEO compensation contracts at large, publicly traded commercial banks between 1994 and 2006 influenced, and were influenced by, the risk-profiles of these firms. We find evidence linking contractual risk-taking incentives, which we proxy with standard measures of vega and delta, to risk-increasing business policy choices. Moreover, these linkages became stronger after 1999, when financial industry deregulation created new growth opportunities for commercial banks. Our results suggest that compensation committees provided new incentives for bank CEOs to exploit these growth opportunities, and also to shift from traditional on-balance sheet portfolio lending to less traditional investments (e.g., private-issue mortgage-backed securities) and nontraditional fee-generating activities. Apart from these strategic reallocations, our results also suggest that bank boards designed CEO compensation contracts to limit excessive risk taking, especially after deregulation.

The Influence of Corporate Strategy, Maturity, and Change in the Competitive Environment on Executive Compensation Contracts

Author : Nathan vonSchilling Stuart
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 202 pages
Book Rating : 4.3/5 ( download)

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Book Synopsis The Influence of Corporate Strategy, Maturity, and Change in the Competitive Environment on Executive Compensation Contracts by : Nathan vonSchilling Stuart

Download or read book The Influence of Corporate Strategy, Maturity, and Change in the Competitive Environment on Executive Compensation Contracts written by Nathan vonSchilling Stuart and published by . This book was released on 2001 with total page 202 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: