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Robust Mechanism Design The Role Of Private Information And Higher Order Beliefs
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Book Synopsis Robust Mechanism Design: The Role Of Private Information And Higher Order Beliefs by : Dirk Bergemann
Download or read book Robust Mechanism Design: The Role Of Private Information And Higher Order Beliefs written by Dirk Bergemann and published by World Scientific. This book was released on 2012-03-22 with total page 471 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Foreword by Eric Maskin (Nobel Laureate in Economics, 2007)This volume brings together the collected contributions on the theme of robust mechanism design and robust implementation that Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris have been working on for the past decade. The collection is preceded by a comprehensive introductory essay, specifically written for this volume with the aim of providing the readers with an overview of the research agenda pursued in the collected papers.The introduction selectively presents the main results of the papers, and attempts to illustrate many of them in terms of a common and canonical example, namely a single unit auction with interdependent values. It is our hope that the use of this example facilitates the presentation of the results and that it brings the main insights within the context of an important economic mechanism, namely the generalized second price auction.
Book Synopsis Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Volume 1 by : Bo Honoré
Download or read book Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Volume 1 written by Bo Honoré and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2017-11-02 with total page 350 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This is the first of two volumes containing papers and commentaries presented at the Eleventh World Congress of the Econometric Society, held in Montreal, Canada in August 2015. These papers provide state-of-the-art guides to the most important recent research in economics. The book includes surveys and interpretations of key developments in economics and econometrics, and discussion of future directions for a wide variety of topics, covering both theory and application. These volumes provide a unique, accessible survey of progress on the discipline, written by leading specialists in their fields. The first volume includes theoretical and applied papers addressing topics such as dynamic mechanism design, agency problems, and networks.
Book Synopsis Models of Bounded Rationality and Mechanism Design by : Jacob Glazer
Download or read book Models of Bounded Rationality and Mechanism Design written by Jacob Glazer and published by World Scientific Publishing Company. This book was released on 2016-08-22 with total page 153 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book brings together the authors' joint papers from over a period of more than twenty years. The collection includes seven papers, each of which presents a novel and rigorous model in Economic Theory. All of the models are within the domain of implementation and mechanism design theories. These theories attempt to explain how incentive schemes and organizations can be designed with the goal of inducing agents to behave according to the designer's (principal's) objectives. Most of the literature assumes that agents are fully rational. In contrast, the authors inject into each model an element which conflicts with the standard notion of full rationality, demonstrating how such elements can dramatically change the mechanism design problem. Although all of the models presented in this volume touch on mechanism design issues, it is the formal modeling of bounded rationality that the authors are most interested in. A model of bounded rationality signifies a model that contains a procedural element of reasoning that is not consistent with full rationality. Rather than looking for a canonical model of bounded rationality, the articles introduce a variety of modeling devices that will capture procedural elements not previously considered, and which alter the analysis of the model. The book is a journey into the modeling of bounded rationality. It is a collection of modeling ideas rather than a general alternative theory of implementation.
Book Synopsis Climate Health Risks in Megacities by : Cesar Marolla
Download or read book Climate Health Risks in Megacities written by Cesar Marolla and published by CRC Press. This book was released on 2016-12-01 with total page 370 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Includes universal frameworks and processes to provide a structured approach to cope with climate change impacts in megacities Features detail-oriented research and analysis of climate change health risks Discusses seven megacities' case studies in developed and developing countries Uses a risk management system approach that deals with climate variability and its impacts before and after the severe weather event hits the city Helps readers understand the actual policies and adopt them more speedily and efficiently as climate change impacts on health become more evident
Author :Econometric Society. World Congress Publisher :Cambridge University Press ISBN 13 :0521871522 Total Pages :431 pages Book Rating :4.5/5 (218 download)
Book Synopsis Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Volume 1 by : Econometric Society. World Congress
Download or read book Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Volume 1 written by Econometric Society. World Congress and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2006-08-14 with total page 431 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Publisher description
Book Synopsis An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design by : Tilman Borgers
Download or read book An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design written by Tilman Borgers and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 2015-05-01 with total page 263 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: What is the best way to auction an asset? How should a group of people organize themselves to ensure the best provision of public goods? How should exchanges be organized? In An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Tilman Börgers addresses these questions and more through an exploration of the economic theory of mechanism design. Mechanism design is reverse game theory. Whereas game theory takes the rules of the game as a given and makes predictions about the behavior of strategic players, the theory of mechanism design goes a step further and selects the optimal rules of the game. A relatively new economic theory, mechanism design studies the instrument itself as well as the results of the instrument. An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design provides rigorous but accessible explanations of classic results in the theory of mechanism design, such as Myerson's theorem on expected revenue maximizing auctions, Myerson and Satterthwaite's theorem on the impossibility of ex post efficient bilateral trade with asymmetric information, and Gibbard and Satterthwaite's theorem on the non-existence of dominant strategy voting mechanisms. Börgers also provides an examination of the frontiers of current research in the area with an original and unified perspective that will appeal to advanced students of economics.
Book Synopsis Essays on Prior-Free Mechanism Design by : Pavel Andreyanov
Download or read book Essays on Prior-Free Mechanism Design written by Pavel Andreyanov and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page 169 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: My dissertation contributes to the literature on prior-free (robust) mechanism design. Prior-freeness can be interpreted differently, but a common feature is that certain mechanisms can be ranked above the others without the exact knowledge of distributions and/or utilities. According to the Wilson critique, the knowledge of fine details of the setting such as distributions and utilities is an unrealistic assumption and, moreover, optimal mechanisms in the classic (Bayesian) sense are often too complex to be implemented in reality. In the first chapter I study a scoring auction and the welfare implications of switching between the two leading designs of the scoring rule: linear (``weighted bid'') and log-linear (``adjusted bid''), when the designer's preferences for quality and money are unknown. Motivated by the empirical application, I formulate a new model of scoring auctions, with two key elements: exogenous quality and a reserve price, and characterize the equilibrium for a rich set of scoring rules. The data is drawn from the Russian public procurement sector in which the linear scoring rule was applied from 2011 to 2013. I estimate the underlying distribution of firms' types nonparametrically and simulate the equilibria for both scoring rules with different weights. The empirical results show that for any log-linear scoring rule, there exists a linear one, yielding a higher expected quality and rebate. Hence, at least with risk-neutral preferences, the linear design is superior to the log-linear. In the second chapter (Co-authored with Jernej Copic and Byeong-hyeon Jeong, UCLA) I study robust allocation of a divisible public good among n agents with quasi-linear utilities, when the budget is exactly balanced. Under several additional assumptions, we prove that such mechanism is equivalent to a distribution over simple posted prices. A robustly optimal mechanism minimizes expected welfare loss among robust divisible ones. For any prior belief, I show that a simple posted prices is robustly optimal. This justifies a restriction to binary allocations commonly found in the mechanism design literature. Robustness comes at a high cost. For certain beliefs, we show that the expected welfare loss of an optimal posted price is as big as 1/2 of the expected welfare in the corresponding optimal Bayesian mechanism, independently of the size of the economy. This bound is tight for the special case of two agents. In the third chapter (Co-authored with Tomasz Sadzik, UCLA) I provide mechanisms for exchange economies with private information and interdependent values, which are ex-post individually rational, incentive compatible, generate budget surplus and are ex-post nearly efficient, when there are many agents. Our framework is entirely prior-free, and I make no symmetry restrictions. The mechanisms can be implemented using a novel discriminatory conditional double auction, without knowledge of information structure or utility functions. I also show that no other mechanism satisfying the constraints can generate inefficiency of smaller order.
Book Synopsis Putting Auction Theory to Work by : Paul Milgrom
Download or read book Putting Auction Theory to Work written by Paul Milgrom and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2004-01-12 with total page 378 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.
Book Synopsis Essays on Information in Dynamic Games and Mechanism Design by : Daehyun Kim
Download or read book Essays on Information in Dynamic Games and Mechanism Design written by Daehyun Kim and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page 153 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation studies how asymmetric information between economic agents interacts with their incentive in dynamic games and mechanism design. Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 study this in mechanism design, especially focusing on robustness of mechanisms when a mechanism designer's knowledge on agents' belief and higher order beliefs is not perfect. In Chapter 1 we introduce a novel robustness notion into mechanism design, which we term confident implementation; and characterize confidently implementable social choice correspondences. In Chapter 2, we introduce another robust notion, p-dominant implementation where p [0, 1]N and N N is the number of agents, and fully characterize p-dominant implementable allocations in the quasilinear environment. Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 are related in the following way: for some range of p, a p-dominant implementable social choice correspondence is confidently implementable. In Chapter 3, we study information disclosure problem to manage reputation. To study this, we consider a repeated game in which there are a long-run player and a stream of short-run players; and the long-run player has private information about her type, which is either commitment or normal. We assume that the shot-run player only can observe the past K N periods of information disclosed by the long-run player. In this environment, we characterize the information disclosure behavior of the long-run player and also equilibrium dynamics whose shape critically depends on the prior.
Book Synopsis The Mechanism Design Approach to Optimality in Repeated Games with Private Information by : David Aaron Miller
Download or read book The Mechanism Design Approach to Optimality in Repeated Games with Private Information written by David Aaron Miller and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page 158 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Robustness written by Lars Peter Hansen and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 2016-06-28 with total page 453 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The standard theory of decision making under uncertainty advises the decision maker to form a statistical model linking outcomes to decisions and then to choose the optimal distribution of outcomes. This assumes that the decision maker trusts the model completely. But what should a decision maker do if the model cannot be trusted? Lars Hansen and Thomas Sargent, two leading macroeconomists, push the field forward as they set about answering this question. They adapt robust control techniques and apply them to economics. By using this theory to let decision makers acknowledge misspecification in economic modeling, the authors develop applications to a variety of problems in dynamic macroeconomics. Technical, rigorous, and self-contained, this book will be useful for macroeconomists who seek to improve the robustness of decision-making processes.
Book Synopsis Macroeconomic Fluctuations and Policies by : Edouard Challe
Download or read book Macroeconomic Fluctuations and Policies written by Edouard Challe and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 2023-09-19 with total page 361 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The basic tools for analyzing macroeconomic fluctuations and policies, applied to concrete issues and presented within an integrated New Keynesian framework. This textbook presents the basic tools for analyzing macroeconomic fluctuations and policies and applies them to contemporary issues. It employs a unified New Keynesian framework for understanding business cycles, major crises, and macroeconomic policies, introducing students to the approach most often used in academic macroeconomic analysis and by central banks and international institutions. The book addresses such topics as how recessions and crises spread; what instruments central banks and governments have to stimulate activity when private demand is weak; and what “unconventional” macroeconomic policies might work when conventional monetary policy loses its effectiveness (as has happened in many countries in the aftermath of the Great Recession.). The text introduces the foundations of modern business cycle theory through the notions of aggregate demand and aggregate supply, and then applies the theory to the study of regular business-cycle fluctuations in output, inflation, and employment. It considers conventional monetary and fiscal policies aimed at stabilizing the business cycle, and examines unconventional macroeconomic policies, including forward guidance and quantitative easing, in situations of “liquidity trap”—deep crises in which conventional policies are either ineffective or have very different effects than in normal time. This book is the first to use the New Keynesian framework at the advanced undergraduate level, connecting undergraduate learning not only with the more advanced tools taught at the graduate level but also with the large body of policy-oriented research in academic journals. End-of-chapter problems help students master the materials presented.
Book Synopsis The Future of Economic Design by : Jean-François Laslier
Download or read book The Future of Economic Design written by Jean-François Laslier and published by Springer Nature. This book was released on 2019-11-15 with total page 507 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This collection of essays represents responses by over eighty scholars to an unusual request: give your high level assessment of the field of economic design, as broadly construed. Where do we come from? Where do we go from here? The book editors invited short, informal reflections expressing deeply felt but hard to demonstrate opinions, unsupported speculation, and controversial views of a kind one might not normally risk submitting for review. The contributors – both senior researchers who have shaped the field and promising, younger researchers – responded with a diverse collection of provocative pieces, including: retrospective assessments or surveys of the field; opinion papers; reflections on critical points for the development of the discipline; proposals for the immediate future; "science fiction"; and many more. The readers should have fun reading these unusual pieces – as much as the contributors enjoyed writing them.
Book Synopsis The Relevance of Private Information in Mechanism Design by : Zvika Neeman
Download or read book The Relevance of Private Information in Mechanism Design written by Zvika Neeman and published by . This book was released on 1998 with total page 64 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Learning and Intertemporal Incentives by : Dirk Bergemann
Download or read book Learning and Intertemporal Incentives written by Dirk Bergemann and published by World Scientific Economic Theo. This book was released on 2020 with total page 470 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This volume brings together the collected contributions of Dirk Bergemann and Juuso V�lim�ki, on the theme of learning, experimentation and intertemporal incentives, spanning over two decades of thought (1996 to 2019).The collection starts with a comprehensive introduction to the recent developments of dynamic mechanism design with a primary focus on the quasilinear case. The authors describe socially optimal and revenue optimal dynamic mechanism. They cover models of sequential screening and revenue maximizing auctions with dynamically changing bidder types, and also discuss models of information management where the mechanism designer can control (at least partially) the stochastic process governing the agent's types.Consolidating the research agenda on learning, experimentation, and dynamic mechanism design, which has been prominent in the area of economic theory, the authors present for the first time the main results of the research agenda in this volume.
Book Synopsis The Theory of Linear Economic Models by : David Gale
Download or read book The Theory of Linear Economic Models written by David Gale and published by University of Chicago Press. This book was released on 1989-02-10 with total page 353 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Reprint of the edition of 1960. Gale (math, economics, operations research, U. of Cal. Berkeley) provides a complete and systematic treatment of the topic. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR
Author :National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine Publisher :National Academies Press ISBN 13 :0309452961 Total Pages :583 pages Book Rating :4.3/5 (94 download)
Book Synopsis Communities in Action by : National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine
Download or read book Communities in Action written by National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine and published by National Academies Press. This book was released on 2017-04-27 with total page 583 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In the United States, some populations suffer from far greater disparities in health than others. Those disparities are caused not only by fundamental differences in health status across segments of the population, but also because of inequities in factors that impact health status, so-called determinants of health. Only part of an individual's health status depends on his or her behavior and choice; community-wide problems like poverty, unemployment, poor education, inadequate housing, poor public transportation, interpersonal violence, and decaying neighborhoods also contribute to health inequities, as well as the historic and ongoing interplay of structures, policies, and norms that shape lives. When these factors are not optimal in a community, it does not mean they are intractable: such inequities can be mitigated by social policies that can shape health in powerful ways. Communities in Action: Pathways to Health Equity seeks to delineate the causes of and the solutions to health inequities in the United States. This report focuses on what communities can do to promote health equity, what actions are needed by the many and varied stakeholders that are part of communities or support them, as well as the root causes and structural barriers that need to be overcome.
