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Author : Ichiro Obara
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 121 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (244 download)
Download or read book Private Information in Repeated Games written by Ichiro Obara and published by . This book was released on 2001 with total page 121 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : George J. Mailath
Publisher : Oxford University Press
ISBN 13 : 0198041217
Total Pages : 664 pages
Book Rating : 4.1/5 (98 download)
Download or read book Repeated Games and Reputations written by George J. Mailath and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 2006-09-28 with total page 664 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Personalized and continuing relationships play a central role in any society. Economists have built upon the theories of repeated games and reputations to make important advances in understanding such relationships. Repeated Games and Reputations begins with a careful development of the fundamental concepts in these theories, including the notions of a repeated game, strategy, and equilibrium. Mailath and Samuelson then present the classic folk theorem and reputation results for games of perfect and imperfect public monitoring, with the benefit of the modern analytical tools of decomposability and self-generation. They also present more recent developments, including results beyond folk theorems and recent work in games of private monitoring and alternative approaches to reputations. Repeated Games and Reputations synthesizes and unifies the vast body of work in this area, bringing the reader to the research frontier. Detailed arguments and proofs are given throughout, interwoven with examples, discussions of how the theory is to be used in the study of relationships, and economic applications. The book will be useful to those doing basic research in the theory of repeated games and reputations as well as those using these tools in more applied research.
Author : Massimiliano Amarante
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 118 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (438 download)
Download or read book Repeated Games with Private Information written by Massimiliano Amarante and published by . This book was released on 1999 with total page 118 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Robert J. Aumann
Publisher : MIT Press
ISBN 13 : 9780262011471
Total Pages : 372 pages
Book Rating : 4.0/5 (114 download)
Download or read book Repeated Games with Incomplete Information written by Robert J. Aumann and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 1995 with total page 372 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The basic model studied throughout the book is one in which players ignorant about the game being played must learn what they can from the actions of the others.
Author : Jean-François Mertens
Publisher : Cambridge University Press
ISBN 13 : 110703020X
Total Pages : 597 pages
Book Rating : 4.1/5 (7 download)
Download or read book Repeated Games written by Jean-François Mertens and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2015-02-09 with total page 597 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This landmark work significantly advances the literature on game theory with a masterful conceptual presentation of the CORE working papers published in 1994.
Author : George J. Mailath
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 40 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (318 download)
Download or read book Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring written by George J. Mailath and published by . This book was released on 1998 with total page 40 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : George R. Feiwel
Publisher : SUNY Press
ISBN 13 : 9780873959421
Total Pages : 512 pages
Book Rating : 4.9/5 (594 download)
Download or read book Issues in Contemporary Macroeconomics and Distribution written by George R. Feiwel and published by SUNY Press. This book was released on 1985-01-01 with total page 512 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This important book and its companion volume, Issues in Contemporary Microeconomics and Welfare, capture and convey the spirit, fundamental issues, underlying tensions, rich variety, accomplishments, and failures in contemporary economics. It presents economics as a dynamic subject, showing its strengths and limitations, exploring alternative approaches, and tracing the sources of differences. The essays include original contributions by the theorists themselves; major interpretations, reflections, and assessments by leading economists, and evaluations of particular areas by rising young scholars.
Author : Olivier Compte
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 226 pages
Book Rating : 4.F/5 ( download)
Download or read book Private Observations, Communication and Coordination in Repeated Games written by Olivier Compte and published by . This book was released on 1994 with total page 226 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : George J. Mailath
Publisher : Oxford University Press
ISBN 13 : 0195300793
Total Pages : 664 pages
Book Rating : 4.1/5 (953 download)
Download or read book Repeated Games and Reputations written by George J. Mailath and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 2006-09-28 with total page 664 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Personalized and continuing relationships play a central role in any society. Economists have built upon the theories of repeated games and reputations to make important advances in understanding such relationships. Repeated Games and Reputations begins with a careful development of the fundamental concepts in these theories, including the notions of a repeated game, strategy, and equilibrium. Mailath and Samuelson then present the classic folk theorem and reputation results for games of perfect and imperfect public monitoring, with the benefit of the modern analytical tools of decomposability and self-generation. They also present more recent developments, including results beyond folk theorems and recent work in games of private monitoring and alternative approaches to reputations. Repeated Games and Reputations synthesizes and unifies the vast body of work in this area, bringing the reader to the research frontier. Detailed arguments and proofs are given throughout, interwoven with examples, discussions of how the theory is to be used in the study of relationships, and economic applications. The book will be useful to those doing basic research in the theory of repeated games and reputations as well as those using these tools in more applied research.
Author : David Aaron Miller
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 158 pages
Book Rating : 4.F/5 ( download)
Download or read book The Mechanism Design Approach to Optimality in Repeated Games with Private Information written by David Aaron Miller and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page 158 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Drew Fudenberg
Publisher : World Scientific
ISBN 13 : 9812818464
Total Pages : 417 pages
Book Rating : 4.8/5 (128 download)
Download or read book A Long-run Collaboration on Long-run Games written by Drew Fudenberg and published by World Scientific. This book was released on 2009 with total page 417 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book brings together the joint work of Drew Fudenberg and David Levine (through 2008) on the closely connected topics of repeated games and reputation effects, along with related papers on more general issues in game theory and dynamic games. The unified presentation highlights the recurring themes of their work.
Author : Drew Fudenberg
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 0 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (137 download)
Download or read book Learning from Private Information in Noisy Repeated Games written by Drew Fudenberg and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We study the perfect type-contingently public ex-post equilibrium (PTXE) of repeated games with incomplete information where players observe imperfect public signals of the actions and the map from actions to signal distributions is itself unknown. The PTXE payoffs when players are patient are determined by the intersection of the maximal half spaces in various directions; we focus on the "cross-state" directions that consider payoffs in two or more states. We develop conditions under which the maximal half spaces in these directions impose no constraints on the equilibrium set, so that equilibrium play can be as if the players have learned the state. We use these conditions to provide a sufficient condition for the folk theorem, and a characterization of the PTXE payoffs in games with a known monitoring structure.
Author : George J Mailath
Publisher : World Scientific
ISBN 13 : 9813239956
Total Pages : 364 pages
Book Rating : 4.8/5 (132 download)
Download or read book Modeling Strategic Behavior: A Graduate Introduction To Game Theory And Mechanism Design written by George J Mailath and published by World Scientific. This book was released on 2018-12-18 with total page 364 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: It is impossible to understand modern economics without knowledge of the basic tools of gametheory and mechanism design. This book provides a graduate-level introduction to the economic modeling of strategic behavior. The goal is to teach Economics doctoral students the tools of game theory and mechanism design that all economists should know.
Author :
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 250 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (248 download)
Download or read book Repeated Games with Private Monitoring written by and published by . This book was released on 2002 with total page 250 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Tim Roughgarden
Publisher : MIT Press
ISBN 13 : 0262549328
Total Pages : 207 pages
Book Rating : 4.2/5 (625 download)
Download or read book Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy written by Tim Roughgarden and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 2023-09-19 with total page 207 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: An analysis of the loss in performance caused by selfish, uncoordinated behavior in networks. Most of us prefer to commute by the shortest route available, without taking into account the traffic congestion that we cause for others. Many networks, including computer networks, suffer from some type of this "selfish routing." In Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy, Tim Roughgarden studies the loss of social welfare caused by selfish, uncoordinated behavior in networks. He quantifies the price of anarchy—the worst-possible loss of social welfare from selfish routing—and also discusses several methods for improving the price of anarchy with centralized control. Roughgarden begins with a relatively nontechnical introduction to selfish routing, describing two important examples that motivate the problems that follow. The first, Pigou's Example, demonstrates that selfish behavior need not generate a socially optimal outcome. The second, the counterintiuitve Braess's Paradox, shows that network improvements can degrade network performance. He then develops techniques for quantifying the price of anarchy (with Pigou's Example playing a central role). Next, he analyzes Braess's Paradox and the computational complexity of detecting it algorithmically, and he describes Stackelberg routing, which improves the price of anarchy using a modest degree of central control. Finally, he defines several open problems that may inspire further research. Roughgarden's work will be of interest not only to researchers and graduate students in theoretical computer science and optimization but also to other computer scientists, as well as to economists, electrical engineers, and mathematicians.
Author : George J. Mailath
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 19 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (248 download)
Download or read book Private Strategies in Finitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring written by George J. Mailath and published by . This book was released on 2001 with total page 19 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Lei Gao
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 81 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (13 download)
Download or read book Equilibrium Characterization of Repeated Games with Private Monitoring written by Lei Gao and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page 81 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper examines sequential equilibria of repeated games with private monitoring where signals are generally distributed. Assuming full dimensionality of payoffs and identifiability conditions of signals, we focus on games with finite stage-game actions and signals. We can construct a sequence of Bayesian stage games from any strategy profile of a private monitoring game, so that the sequential rationality of the strategy is straightforward to verify. In each such game, beliefs are over opponents' upcoming action choices, while payoffs are continuation promises for those action profiles and they define value functions. Identified by each player's actions, the value functions satisfy a system of functional equations given by a recursive structure. We solve the equations for the value functions and the continuation promises therein. After introducing matrix representation of strategy profiles, we can explore every sequential equilibrium of the original repeated game. We have characterized the set of equilibrium values for 2-player games and studied the sequential strategy profiles of N-player games involving Nash-threat. The folk theorem is partial and the equilibrium values are strictly bounded away from efficiency.
