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Author : Jonathan David Levin
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 133 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (438 download)
Download or read book Relational Contracts, Incentives and Information written by Jonathan David Levin and published by . This book was released on 1999 with total page 133 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : James M. Malcomson
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (931 download)
Download or read book Relational Incentive Contracts with Private Information written by James M. Malcomson and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Arijit Mukherjee
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 42 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (129 download)
Download or read book Sustaining Implicit Contracts When Agents Have Career Concerns written by Arijit Mukherjee and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page 42 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Firms often combine career concerns based incentives with incentives created through relational performance contracts. In this context, disclosure of worker's productivity information enhances career concerns based incentives, but may reduce the firm's ability to sustain relational contracts. The latter effect originates as upon reneging on the relational contract the firm can continue to rely on the career concerns based incentives. Thus, stronger is this incentive the larger is the punishment payoff of the firm. I consider an environment where a long-run firm faces a sequence of short-run workers, who can subsequently get raided (poached). The disclosure policy of the firm determines how much information about the worker's productivity it will share with the potential raiders. I provide a characterization of the optimal disclosure policy. When relational contracts substitutes career concern incentives, the optimal disclosure policy follows a cut-off rule where the more patient firms always opt for opaqueness. Also, the firm never combines the two forms of incentives when they are substitutes. Both of these results need not hold if the incentives are complements. I further show that in presence of firm specific matching gains, the set of discount factor that supports transparency is increasing in the size of the matching gain.
Author : Marina Cynthia Halac
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 322 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (35 download)
Download or read book Essays on Relational Contracts written by Marina Cynthia Halac and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 322 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Chang-Koo Chi
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 35 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (13 download)
Download or read book Relational Incentive Contracts and Performance Measurement written by Chang-Koo Chi and published by . This book was released on 2018 with total page 35 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper analyzes relational contracts under moral hazard. We first show that if the available information (signal) about effort satisfies a generalized monotone likelihood ratio property, then irrespective of whether the first-order approach (FOA) is valid or not, the optimal bonus scheme takes a simple form. The scheme rewards the agent a fixed bonus if his performance index xceeds a threshold, like the FOA contract of Levin (2003), but the threshold can be set differently. We next derive a sufficient and necessary condition for non-verifiable information to improve a relational contract. Our new informativeness criterion sheds light on the nature of an ideal performance measure in relational contracting.
Author : James M. Malcomson
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (931 download)
Download or read book Relational Incentive Contracts with Persistent Private Information written by James M. Malcomson and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Robert S. Gibbons
Publisher : Princeton University Press
ISBN 13 : 0691132798
Total Pages : 1248 pages
Book Rating : 4.6/5 (911 download)
Download or read book The Handbook of Organizational Economics written by Robert S. Gibbons and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 2013 with total page 1248 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: (E-book available via MyiLibrary) In even the most market-oriented economies, most economic transactions occur not in markets but inside managed organizations, particularly business firms. Organizational economics seeks to understand the nature and workings of such organizations and their impact on economic performance. The Handbook of Organizational Economics surveys the major theories, evidence, and methods used in the field. It displays the breadth of topics in organizational economics, including the roles of individuals and groups in organizations, organizational structures and processes, the boundaries of the firm, contracts between and within firms, and more.
Author : Rocco Macchiavello
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 0 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (137 download)
Download or read book Relational Contracts written by Rocco Macchiavello and published by . This book was released on 2023 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Relational contracts -- informal self-enforcing agreements sustained by repeated interactions -- are ubiquitous both within and across organizational boundaries. This review highlights recent empirical contributions in selected areas. We begin by reviewing some recent work that explicitly takes the dynamic incentive compatibility constraints that underpin relational contract models to the data. We then discuss the relationship between relational contracting and firms' performance. We conclude pointing in directions that we consider to be particularly ripe for future work.
Author : Akifumi Ishihara
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (16 download)
Download or read book Essays on Relational Contracts written by Akifumi Ishihara and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation contains three essays on self-enforcing implicit contracts in economic transactions and politics. Chapter 2 studies a repeated agency model with two tasks where the agent has private information on the first task and there is no verifiable performance signal for the second task. The equilibrium level of the first task is determined so as to guarantee the credibility of the relational contracts to provide incentives for the second task. It implies interesting economic results including non-monotonic relation between the discount factor and the total surplus, social desirability of unverifiability, and implications for organization design. Chapter 3 studies a model of political contribution of dynamic common agency where state-contingent agreements must be self-enforced. First, we investigate the punishment strategy for supporting the self-enforcing mechanism. The most severe punishment strategy on the principals takes the form of a two-phase scheme in general. Second, we characterize the payoff set of the equilibria on which the same decision is chosen by the agent through implicit agreements and examine whether it can achieve the same payoff as in the standard static menu auction model. It implies that there could be an equilibrium outcome in a static menu auction that cannot be supported in our model for any discount factor. Chapter 4 studies repeated political competition with policy-motivated citizen candidates. The dynamic relationship could cause strategic candidacy in two-candidate competition, such as in circumstances where two candidates stand for election and one of them has no chance to win. The candidate can choose her implementing policy depending on the set of the rival candidates in the election and the rival candidate actually has an incentive to stand even with no chance to win since it can induce policy compromises from the winning candidate.
Author : David Frydlinger
Publisher : Springer Nature
ISBN 13 : 3030650995
Total Pages : 327 pages
Book Rating : 4.0/5 (36 download)
Download or read book Contracting in the New Economy written by David Frydlinger and published by Springer Nature. This book was released on 2021-05-24 with total page 327 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Today’s business environment is constantly evolving, filled with volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity and driven by digital transformation, globalization, and the need to creating value through innovation. These shifts demand that organizations view contracting through a different lens. Since it is impossible to predict every what-if scenario in a transactional contract, organizations in strategic and complex partnerships must shift to a mindset of shared goals and objectives built upon a strong foundation of transparency and trust, working together to mitigate risk much better than merely shifting risk to the weaker party. Contracting in the New Economy helps you to not only develop this mindset – but also offers the practical tools needed to embrace the social side of contracting, enabling your organization to harness the value creating potential of formal relational contracts. Briefly sharing the theoretical foundations that prove relational contracting works, it goes well beyond theory by providing powerful examples of relational contracting principles in practice. In addition, the authors provide a practical and proven approach for helping you to put relational contracting theory into practice for your own relationships. First by providing a framework for approaching any contracting situation and helping organizations finding the best contract model for each situation. And then by sharing five proven steps you can take to create an effective relational contract for you own strategic and complex business relationships. For anyone involved in developing contracts —lawyers, in-house counsels, contract managers, C-level managers, procurement officers, and so on — this book will empower you to create powerful cooperative alliances that will help you reach —and surpass — your business goals in today’s dynamic new environment.
Author : Michaela Isabel Höhn
Publisher : Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN 13 : 3642027911
Total Pages : 134 pages
Book Rating : 4.6/5 (42 download)
Download or read book Relational Supply Contracts written by Michaela Isabel Höhn and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2009-10-03 with total page 134 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Supply relations are often governed by so-called relational contracts. These are informal agreements sustained by the value of future cooperation. Although relational contracts persist in practice, research on these types of contract is only emerging in Operations and Supply Chain Management. This book studies a two-firm supply chain, where repeated transactions via well-established supply contracts and continued quality-improvement efforts are governed by a relational contract. We are able to characterize an optimal relational contract, i.e., to develop policies for supplier and buyer that structure investments in quality and flexibility in a way that no other self-enforcing contract generates higher expected joint surplus. A second goal is to compare the performance of different returns mechanisms in the context of relational contracting (quantity flexibility and buy-back contracts). Industry studies motivate the presented model.
Author : Ola Kvaloy
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 0 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (137 download)
Download or read book Team Incentives in Relational Employment Contracts written by Ola Kvaloy and published by . This book was released on 2005 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The paper analyzes conditions for implementing incentive schemes based on, respectively joint, relative and indendent performance, in a relational contract between a principal and a team of two agents. A main result is that the optimal incentive regime depends on the productivity of the agents, or more preciseley on the returns from high effort. This occurs because agents' productivites affect the principal's temptation to renege on the relational contract. The analysis suggests that we will see a higher frequency of relative performance evaluation (RPE) - and schemes that lie close to independent performance evaluation - as we move from low-productive to high-productive environments. In particular, it is shown that if effort-productivity is sufficently high, the optimal scheme for the principal is (for a range of discount factors) a collusion-proof RPE scheme, even if there is no common shock that affects the agents' output.
Author : George Pierce Baker
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 35 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (131 download)
Download or read book From Incentives to Control to Adaptation written by George Pierce Baker and published by . This book was released on 2022 with total page 35 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In 1991 we began to model interactions between formal and relational incentive contracts. We were motivated by a case study on compensation, and we saw this work as a contribution to agency theory. By the time the paper was published (QJE, 1994), we had begun to view the research agenda more broadly -- with connections to organizational culture (Kreps, 1990), the theory of firms' boundaries (Coase, 1937), and more. Eventually, we built from this initial work, analyzing delegation within organizations as necessarily informal (JLEO, 1999), and moving beyond relational agency (where a principal motivates an agent through various promises, not limited to compensation) to structuring relationships (where parties choose their formal governance structure to facilitate their relational contract). The latter led to our relational analysis of when classic buyer-supplier interactions should be governed under integration and when under non-integration (QJE, 2002) and to our working paper (last revised in 2011) on how formal contracts between firms might facilitate "relational adaptation" as events unfold. In this essay we sketch theoretical, empirical, and methodological lessons we learned during this twenty-year journey.
Author : Robert Dur
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 30 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (795 download)
Download or read book Social Relations and Relational Incentives written by Robert Dur and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page 30 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Ola Kvaloy
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 48 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (13 download)
Download or read book Teams in Relational Contracts written by Ola Kvaloy and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page 48 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We analyze relational contracting between a principal and a team of agents where only aggregate output is observable. We deduce optimal team incentive contracts under different set of assumptions, and show that the principal can use team size and team composition as instruments in order to improve incentives. In particular, the principal can strengthen the agents' incentives by composing teams that utilize stochastic dependencies between the agents' outputs. We also show that more agents in the team may under certain conditions increase each team member's effort incentives, in particular if outputs are negatively correlated.
Author : Sara Bormann
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 51 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (13 download)
Download or read book Strategic Priorities, Relational Contracting Clarity and the Use of Subjectivity in Incentive Contracts written by Sara Bormann and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 51 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper examines a potential problem associated with the use of subjectivity in incentive contracts: Relational contracting clarity. Clarity refers to the extent to which the terms of a relational contract, or subjective assessment can be communicated and an employee and his superior are able to build a shared understanding on which behavior is desirable and how it translates into rewards (Gibbons and Henderson 2012a, 2012b). If the terms of a subjective assessment are difficult to communicate, contracting clarity and hence the incentive effect of subjectivity diminish. Accordingly, firms should reduce their reliance on subjectivity. It has been argued that this is the case in complex and multidimensional settings, which arise, for instance, when firms pursue a joint strategy (i.e. follow a differentiation and a low- cost strategy simultaneously). Following a joint strategy has been associated with increased complexity and multidimensionality in the decision making process due to potentially conflicting strategic goals (Dekker et al. 2013; Lillis 2002; Lillis and van Veen-Dirks 2008). My results based on the analysis of survey data of 153 firms are consistent with my expectations. That is, pursuing a joint strategy is associated with a reduced use of subjectivity. However, this relation is not prevalent for all forms of subjectivity. In particular, following a joint strategy is associated with a reduced reliance on subjective formulas, while there is no relation to the use of subjective performance measures.
Author : James M. Malcomson
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (697 download)
Download or read book Relational Incentive Contracts written by James M. Malcomson and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
