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Author : Jan Boone
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (664 download)
Download or read book Optimal Privatization Using Qualifying Auctions written by Jan Boone and published by . This book was released on 2005 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Paul Milgrom
Publisher : Cambridge University Press
ISBN 13 : 1139449168
Total Pages : 378 pages
Book Rating : 4.1/5 (394 download)
Download or read book Putting Auction Theory to Work written by Paul Milgrom and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2004-01-12 with total page 378 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.
Author : Maria Angeles de Frutos
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 28 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (131 download)
Download or read book Auctioning Off with a Split Mind written by Maria Angeles de Frutos and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 28 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: When privatizing, governments have conflicting objectives, like raising revenues and minimizing induced unemployment. We construct two mechanisms that take into account both criteria: a first-score auction in which bidders bid both in terms of price and retained excess labor, and a first-price auction in which bidders bid only over price but they also commit to keep a predetermined by the government number of employees. When bidders differ in their costs of accommodating excess labor, the resulting competition softens, and governments may optimally want to appear strong against labor redundancies. In the first auction this is done by setting a scoring rule that does not correspond to their genuine preferences, and in the second by announcing a smaller labor requirement. Nonetheless, such policies require strong commitment ability.
Author : Anant R. Negandhi
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 680 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (31 download)
Download or read book Optimal Auctions written by Anant R. Negandhi and published by . This book was released on 1986 with total page 680 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Francesca Cornelli
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 48 pages
Book Rating : 4.X/5 (2 download)
Download or read book Large Shareholders, Private Benefits of Control and Optimal Schemes for Privatization written by Francesca Cornelli and published by . This book was released on 1994 with total page 48 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Zsuzsanna Fluck
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 0 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (137 download)
Download or read book Privatization with Political Constraints written by Zsuzsanna Fluck and published by . This book was released on 2002 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper investigates the design of privatization mechanisms in emerging market economies. We identify an emerging market economy by the political constraints that limit the set of viable privatization mechanisms. Our objective is to explain the striking diversity of privatization mechanisms observed in practice and the frequent use of an apparently suboptimal privatization mechanism: private negotiation. We develop a simple model wherein privatization is to be carried out by a government agent who plays favorites among bidders and is potentially disciplined by forthcoming elections. We find that it is the degree of political constraints that determines which mechanism is more successful in raising funds. If the political environment is such that the privatization agent himself aims at raising the fair value for the company, then privatization auctions and private negotiations are equally successful in raising public revenues. If, however, political constraints distort the agent's incentives, then one mechanism outperforms the other. In particular, if the distortion is moderate, then private negotiations can raise more value for a successful enterprise than privatization auctions. In this case the agent may play favorites among the bidders, but to the extent he cares about the price, he will use his bargaining power to negotiate his target price. If, however, the distortion is severe so that the agent lacks sufficient motivation to raise a fair price for the company, then privatization auctions will outperform private negotiations. Even though the agent may play favorites among the bidders, he would not put pressure on the bidders to raise the price during negotiations. In a privatization auction, in contrast, the presence of other bidders, regardless of how informed they are, induces competition and places a lower bound on the equilibrium winning bid. We further find that information disclosure laws may have negative welfare implications: they may help the privatization agent to collude with some of the bidders to the disadvantage of noncolluding bidders. Our theory provides further regulatory implications for privatization procedures in emerging market economies.
Author : Dan Quint
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (836 download)
Download or read book Optimal Second Price Auctions with Positively Correlated Private Values and Limited Information written by Dan Quint and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Zsuzsanna Fluck
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 46 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (129 download)
Download or read book Privatization with Political Constraint written by Zsuzsanna Fluck and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 46 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper investigates the design of privatization mechanisms in emerging market economies. We identify an emerging market economy by the political constraints that limit the set of viable privatization mechanisms. Our objective is to explain the striking diversity of privatization mechanisms observed in practice and the frequent use of an apparantly suboptimal privatization mechanism: private negotiation. We develop a simple model wherein privatization is to be carried out by a government agent who plays favorites among bidders and is potentially disciplined by forthcoming elections. We find that it is the degree of political constraints that determines which mechanism is more successful in raising funds. If the political environment is such that the privatization agent himself aims at raising the fair value for the company, the privatization auctions and private negotiations are equally successful in raising public revenues. If, however, political constraints distort the agent's incentives, then one mechanism outperforms the other. In particular, if the distortion is moderate, then private negotiations can raise more value for a successful enterprise than privatization auctions. In this case the agent may play favorites among bidders, but to the extent he cares about price, he will use his bargaining power to negotiate his target price. If, however, the distortion is severe so that the agent lacks sufficient motivation to raise a fair price for the company, then privatization auctions will outperform private negotiations. Even though the agent may play favorites among the bidders, he would not put pressure on the bidders to raise the price during negotiations. In a privatization auction, in contrast, the presence of other bidders, regardless how informed they are, induces competition and places a lower bound on the equilibrium winning bid. We further find that information disclosure laws may have negative welfare implications: they may help the privatization agent to collude with some of the bidders to the disadvantage of noncolluding bidders. Our theory provides further regulatory implications for privatization procedures in emerging market economies.
Author : Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 27 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (747 download)
Download or read book Optimal Auctions written by Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans and published by . This book was released on 1987 with total page 27 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Zsuzsanna Fluck
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 40 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (129 download)
Download or read book Privatization with Political Constraints written by Zsuzsanna Fluck and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 40 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper investigates the design of privatization mechanisms in emerging marketeconomies characterized by political constraints that limit the set of viable privatization mechanisms. Our objective is to explain the striking diversity of privatization mechanisms observed in practice and the frequent use of an apparently suboptimal privatization mechanism: private negotiations. We develop a simple model wherein privatization is to be carried out by a government agent who plays favorites among bidders and is potentially disciplined by forthcoming elections. We find that it is the degree of political constraints that determines which mechanism is more successful in raising funds. If the political environment is such that the privatization agent himself aims at raising the fair value for the company, then privatization auctions and privatenegotiations are equally successful in raising public revenues. If, however, political constraints distort the agent s incentives, then one mechanism outperforms the other. In particular, if the distortion is moderate, then private negotiations can raise more value for a successful enterprisethan privatization auctions. In this case the agent may play favorites among the bidders, but to the extent he cares about the price, he will use his bargaining power to negotiate his target price. If, however, the distortion is severe so that the agent lacks sufficient motivation to raise a fairprice for the company, then privatization auctions will outperform private egotiations. Even though the agent may play favorites among the bidders, he would not put pressure on the bidders to raise the price during negotiations. In an auction, in contrast, the presence of other bidders,regardless how informed they are, induces competition and places a lower bound on theequilibrium winning bid. We also show that information disclosure laws may have negative welfare implications: they may help the privatization agent to collude with some of the bidders to the disadvantage of non-colluding bidders. Our theory provides further regulatory implications for privatization procedures in emerging market economies.
Author :
Publisher : Deutscher Universitätsverlag
ISBN 13 : 9783824467778
Total Pages : 0 pages
Book Rating : 4.4/5 (677 download)
Download or read book Large-scale Privatization via Auctions written by and published by Deutscher Universitätsverlag. This book was released on 1998-07-15 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: On the basis of a game-theoretic framework of analysis, Jocelyn Braun shows that the mechanism of auctioning is an efficient and equitable alternative to many privatization methods that have so far been implemented with disappointing results.
Author : Enrico Camillo Perotti
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 37 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (261 download)
Download or read book Optimal Privatization Plans Policy Credibility and the Sale of Government-owned Firms written by Enrico Camillo Perotti and published by . This book was released on 1990 with total page 37 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Jocelyn Braun
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 172 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (832 download)
Download or read book Auctions in Privatization written by Jocelyn Braun and published by . This book was released on 1997 with total page 172 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : International Labour Office
Publisher : International Labour Organization
ISBN 13 : 9789221091981
Total Pages : 330 pages
Book Rating : 4.0/5 (919 download)
Download or read book Management for Privatization written by International Labour Office and published by International Labour Organization. This book was released on 1995 with total page 330 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This work traces the impact of privatization of state-owned enterprises on management practices and strategies. It covers methods of privatization and the barriers faced by managers, includes case studies of industry and public services in industrialized, developing and former socialist countries, and identifies training needs. It aims to build management development capacity and to prepare managers for the challenges of privatization and a new competitive environment.; The book is divided into four parts. Part One covers: the reasons for, and main methods of privatization; the environmental,
Author : Dieter Bös
Publisher : International Monetary Fund
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 26 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (318 download)
Download or read book Privatization and Restructuring written by Dieter Bös and published by International Monetary Fund. This book was released on 1996-09 with total page 26 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper deals with restructuring and privatizing industrial enterprises in a transition economy. As was the case in East Germany, a government privatization agency sells the firms to private investors on the basis of bilateral negotiations. Since the government wants to privatize quickly, the contract between agency and investor was signed before the net value of the firm is known.
Author : Bo Chen
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 0 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (137 download)
Download or read book Optimal Disclosure in All-pay Auctions with Interdependent Valuations written by Bo Chen and published by . This book was released on 2023 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We study all-pay auctions with one-sided private information and interdependent valuations. To sharpen the competition and maximize revenue, the auction organizer can design an information disclosure policy through Bayesian persuasion about the bidder with private information. We characterize optimal disclosure and find that optimal disclosure exhibits almost full disclosure, where the uninformed bidder can narrow the informed bidder's private information down to at most two types. We also illustrate our characterization in a simple binary-type setting and investigate issues such as comparative statics, welfare, and efficiency.
Author : George K. Yarrow
Publisher : Taylor & Francis
ISBN 13 : 9780415143257
Total Pages : 568 pages
Book Rating : 4.1/5 (432 download)
Download or read book Privatization written by George K. Yarrow and published by Taylor & Francis. This book was released on 1996 with total page 568 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
