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Author : Albertus Johannes Dur
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 29 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (249 download)
Download or read book Optimal Incentive Contracts when Workers Envy Their Boss written by Albertus Johannes Dur and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page 29 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Robert A. J. Dur
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 0 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (249 download)
Download or read book Optimal Incentive Contracts when Workers Envy Their Boss written by Robert A. J. Dur and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Robert A. J. Dur
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 30 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (249 download)
Download or read book Optimal Incentive Contracts for a Worker who Envies His Boss written by Robert A. J. Dur and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page 30 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Optimal Incentive Contracts For a Worker Who Envies His Boss written by and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Robert Gibbons
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 70 pages
Book Rating : 4.3/5 ( download)
Download or read book Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns written by Robert Gibbons and published by . This book was released on 1991 with total page 70 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper studies career concerns -- concerns about the effects of current performance on future compensation -- and describes how optimal incentive contracts are affected when career concerns are taken into account. Career concerns arise frequently: they occur whenever the market uses a worker's current output to update its belief about the worker's ability and competition then forces future wages (or wage contracts) to reflect these updated beliefs. Career concerns are stronger when a worker is further from retirement, because a longer prospective career increases the return to changing the market's belief. In the presence of career concerns, the optimal compensation contract optimizes total incentives -- the combination of the implicit incentives from career concerns and the explicit incentives from the compensation contract. Thus, the explicit incentives from the optimal compensation contract should be strongest when a worker is close to retirement. We find empirical support for this prediction in the relation between chief-executive compensation and stock-market performance.
Author : Robert Dur
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (129 download)
Download or read book Optimal Contracts When a Worker Envies His Boss written by Robert Dur and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A worker's utility may increase with his income, but envy can make his utility decline with his employer's income. This article uses a principal-agent model to study profit-maximizing contracts when a worker envies his employer. Envy tightens the worker's participation constraint and so calls for higher pay and/or a softer effort requirement. Moreover, a firm with an envious worker can benefit from profit sharing, even when the worker's effort is fully contractible. We discuss several applications of our theoretical work: envy can explain why a lower-level worker is awarded stock options, why incentive pay is lower in nonprofit organizations, and how governmental production of a good can be cheaper than private production.
Author : Anjan V. Thakor
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 51 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (129 download)
Download or read book Optimal Contracts When Agents Envy Each Other written by Anjan V. Thakor and published by . This book was released on 2005 with total page 51 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We examine the characteristics of endogenously-determined optimal incentive contracts for agents who envy each other and work for a risk-neutral (non-envious) principal. Envy makes each agent care not only about absolute consumption but also about relative consumption. Incentive contracts in this setting display properties strikingly different from those associated with optimal contracts in standard principal-agent theory. We derive results that help explain some of the discrepancies between the predictions of principal-agent theory and the stylized facts about real-world contracts.
Author : Björn Bartling
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 0 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (137 download)
Download or read book The Intensity of Incentives in Firms and Markets written by Björn Bartling and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: While most market transactions are subject to strong incentives, transactions within firms are often not explicitly incentivized. This paper offers an explanation for this observation based on the assumption that agents are envious and suffer utility losses if others receive higher wages. We analyze the impact of envy on optimal incentive contracts in a general moral hazard model and isolate the countervailing effects of envy on the costs of providing incentives. We show that envy creates a tendency towards flat-wage contracts if agents are risk-averse and there is no limited liability. Empirical evidence suggests that social comparisons are more pronounced among employees within firms than among individuals that interact in markets. Flat-wage contracts are then more likely to be optimal in firms.
Author : B. Agarwal
Publisher : Springer
ISBN 13 : 0230522343
Total Pages : 281 pages
Book Rating : 4.2/5 (35 download)
Download or read book Psychology, Rationality and Economic Behaviour written by B. Agarwal and published by Springer. This book was released on 2005-08-03 with total page 281 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Economics has paid little attention to the psychology of economic behaviour, leading to somewhat simplistic assumptions about human nature. The psychological aspects have typically been reduced to standard utility theory, based on a narrow conception of rationality and self-interest maximization. The contributions in this volume, some focused on analytical models and methodology, others on laboratory and field experiments, challenge these assumptions, and provide novel and complex understandings of human motivation and economic decision-making. With a pioneering introduction by the book's two editors, this volume brings together exciting contributions to a field that is rapidly growing in influence and reach.
Author : Richard H. Smith
Publisher : Oxford University Press
ISBN 13 : 0190228059
Total Pages : 545 pages
Book Rating : 4.1/5 (92 download)
Download or read book Envy at Work and in Organizations written by Richard H. Smith and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 2017 with total page 545 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Competition for resources, recognition, and favorable outcomes are all facts of life in professional settings. When one falls short in comparison to colleagues or subordinates, feelings of envy may arise. Fueled by inferiority, hostility and resentment, envy is both ubiquitous and painful. Will employees "level up" with their envied counterpart through self-improvement behaviors? Or will they "level down" through sabotage and undermine their peers and subordinates in the process?Envy at Work and in Organizations aims to determine the direction workplace envy takes. Contributors are drawn from many countries and from an extraordinary range of disciplines to share their insight: experimental social psychologists offer insights from lab studies, psychoanalytical scholars emphasize unconscious processes, organizational psychologists describe groundbreaking research from disparate work settings, and cross-cultural psychologists reveal the variety of ways that envy can emerge as a function of cultures as wide-ranging as the Japanese school system to the fascinating structure of the Israeli kibbutzim. Work and insight from behavioral economists and organizational consultants is also included.Envy at Work and in Organizations is a valuable, distinctive resource for both scholars and practitioners looking to grasp the nature of envy. Edited by Richard H. Smith, Ugo Merlone, and Michelle K. Duffy, this volume will help readers understand the factors that help individuals and organizations overcome envy and transform it into something positive to promote workplace well-being.
Author : Robert Gibbons
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 48 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (129 download)
Download or read book Optimal incentive contracts in the presence of career concerns written by Robert Gibbons and published by . This book was released on 1991 with total page 48 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author :
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 48 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (923 download)
Download or read book Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concepts written by and published by . This book was released on 1991 with total page 48 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Robert Puelz
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (129 download)
Download or read book Optimal Incentive Contracting with Ex Ante and Ex Post Moral Hazards written by Robert Puelz and published by . This book was released on 1998 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Predictions concerning structure and performance for managerial incentive contracts designed to prevent accidents are developed and tested. The model predicts a step-function penalty with more costly, more reliable audits used for higher loss reports to control ex post exaggeration of the loss. In addition, the penalty induces nonreporting that is imperfectly controlled through random audits. An empirical contract implemented to control workers' compensation medical losses provides evidence consistent with these predictions. The contract reduces both accident frequency and total losses, but increases reported loss severity as managers evade approximately 40 percent of the accident penalty by underreporting small losses.
Author : George Baker
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 31 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (339 download)
Download or read book Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts written by George Baker and published by . This book was released on 1993 with total page 31 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Incentive contracts often include important subjective components that mitigate incentive distortions caused by imperfect objective measures. This paper explores the combined used of subjective and objective performance measures in implicit and explicit incentive contracts. It shows that the presence of sufficiently effective explicit contracts can render all implicit contracts infeasible, even those that would otherwise yield the first-best. It also shows, however, that in some circumstances objective and subjective measures are complements: neither an explicit nor an implicit contract alone yields positive profit, but an appropriate combination of the two does. Finally, subjective weights on objective measures are considered.
Author : Pierre Chaigneau
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 35 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (772 download)
Download or read book Aversion to the Variability of Pay and Optimal Incentive Contracts written by Pierre Chaigneau and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 35 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Veikko Thiele
Publisher : VDM Publishing
ISBN 13 : 9783836422253
Total Pages : 132 pages
Book Rating : 4.4/5 (222 download)
Download or read book Multitasking and Incentive Contracts written by Veikko Thiele and published by VDM Publishing. This book was released on 2007 with total page 132 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Employees are generally charged with performing a collection of various tasks that contribute to firm value differently. The accountability for multiple tasks implies that employees can not only decide on their effort intensity, but also on how to allocate their effort across these tasks. To motivate employees, firms often utilize incentive contracts on the basis of objective performance measures. However, if individual performance evaluations do not accurately reflect employees' contributions to firm value, the application of such incongruent performance measures induces employees to place more emphasis on less valuable tasks relative to those with greater contributions to firm value. The author, Veikko Thiele, investigates and explicates the optimal design of incentive contracts in situations where employees are charged with multiple tasks (multitasking). He identifies and explores potential mechanisms aimed at motivating employees to implement more efficient effort allocations from a firm's perspective. This book specifically targets economists, executives, consultants, and companies.
Author : Christian Ewerhart
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 0 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (137 download)
Download or read book 'Yes Men,' Integrity, and the Optimal Design of Incentive Contracts written by Christian Ewerhart and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In a pioneering approach towards the explanation of the phenomenon of 'yes man' behavior in organizations, Prendergast (1993) argued that incentive contracts in employment relationships generally make a worker distort his privately acquired information. This would imply that there is a trade-off between inducing a worker to exert costly effort and inducing him to tell the truth. In contrast, we show that with optimally designed contracts, which we term integrity contracts, the worker will both exert effort and report his information truthfully, and that hence the first best can be achieved.
