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Optimal Contracts With Non Bayesian Agents
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Book Synopsis Optimal Contracts with Non-bayesian Agents by :
Download or read book Optimal Contracts with Non-bayesian Agents written by and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 71 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This thesis investigates how the theoretical predictions of traditional economic models change when the assumption of Bayesian decision making is relaxed. Bayesian decision theory assumes that decision makers are able to perfectly describe their state space and assign a single prior to every possible event. The theory of unawareness relaxes the rst assumption by allowing decision makers to be aware of some contingencies and unaware of others. The theory of ambiguity relaxes the second assumption and allows decision makers to prefer known risks over unknown risks. The rst chapter of this thesis analyzes the e ect of ambiguity on bilateral trade in the presence of private information. It demonstrates that in an environment with adverse selection as in Akerlof's (1970) market for lemons, screening the informed party hedges against ambiguity. It further shows that the presence of ambiguity can be both bene cial or harmful for trade. If the adverse selection problem is su ciently severe, more ambiguity surprisingly leads to more trade and thereby increase surplus. Using these results, a nancial market application demonstrates that ambiguity may help to explain why some assets are optimally traded over-the-counter rather than on traditional exchanges, and suggests that opacity may be essential to sustain such trade. The second chapter of this thesis introduces asymmetric awareness into a classical principal-agent model with moral hazard, and shows how unawareness can give rise to incomplete contracts.1 The paper investigates the optimal contract between a fully aware principal and an unaware agent, where the principal can enlarge the agent's awareness strategically. When proposing the contract, the principal faces a tradeo between participation and incentives: leaving the agent unaware allows the principal to exploit the agent's incomplete understanding of the world, relaxing the participation constraint, while making the agent aware enables the principal to use the revealed contingencies as signals about the agent's action choice, relaxing the incentive constraint. The optimal contract reveals.
Book Synopsis Optimal Contracting in Agency with Verifiable Ex Post Information by : Anke S. Kessler
Download or read book Optimal Contracting in Agency with Verifiable Ex Post Information written by Anke S. Kessler and published by . This book was released on 2002 with total page 40 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Economics of Scale in Optimal Contracts with Multiple Agents by : Keith J. Crocker
Download or read book Economics of Scale in Optimal Contracts with Multiple Agents written by Keith J. Crocker and published by . This book was released on 1985 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Social Norms, Bounded Rationality and Optimal Contracts by : Suren Basov
Download or read book Social Norms, Bounded Rationality and Optimal Contracts written by Suren Basov and published by Springer. This book was released on 2016-05-20 with total page 181 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book investigates the ways in which social norms and bounded rationality shape different contracts in the real world. It brings into focus existing research into optimal contracts, draws important lessons from that research, and outlines prospects for future investigation. Bounded rationality has acknowledged effects on the power of incentive provisions, such as deviations from sufficient statistic theorem, the power of optimal incentives, and the effects of optimal contracts in multicultural environments. The introduction of social norms to bounded rationality opens up new avenues of investigation into contracts and mechanism design. This book makes an important contribution to the study of bounded rationality by pulling together many separate strands of research in the area of mechanism design, and providing detailed analysis of the impact of societal values on contracts.
Book Synopsis Agency Theory by : Alexander Stremitzer
Download or read book Agency Theory written by Alexander Stremitzer and published by Peter Lang Publishing. This book was released on 2005 with total page 252 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Designing a contract is often more of an economic than a legal problem. A good contract protects parties against opportunistic behavior while providing motivation to cooperate. This is where economics and, especially contract theory, may prove helpful by enhancing our understanding of incentive issues. The purpose of this book is to provide specific tools which will help to write better contracts in real world environments. Concentrating on moral hazard literature, this book derives a tentative checklist for drafting contracts. As an economic contribution to a field traditionally considered an art rather than a science, this treatment also gives much attention to methodological issues.
Book Synopsis Case Studies in Bayesian Statistics by : Constantine Gatsonis
Download or read book Case Studies in Bayesian Statistics written by Constantine Gatsonis and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2012-12-06 with total page 483 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This third volume of case studies presents detailed applications of Bayesian statistical analysis, emphasising the scientific context. The papers were presented and discussed at a workshop held at Carnegie-Mellon University, and this volume - dedicated to the memory of Morrie Groot-reproduces six invited papers, each with accompanying invited discussion, and nine contributed papers with the focus on econometric applications.
Book Synopsis Optimal Contracting Between Agents with Different Planning Horizons in the Presence of Information Asymmetries by : Carlos Alberto de Mello-e-Souza
Download or read book Optimal Contracting Between Agents with Different Planning Horizons in the Presence of Information Asymmetries written by Carlos Alberto de Mello-e-Souza and published by . This book was released on 1989 with total page 308 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Bigdding for Contracts, Bunching and Duplication of Fixed Costs by : Jean-Paul Cresta
Download or read book Bigdding for Contracts, Bunching and Duplication of Fixed Costs written by Jean-Paul Cresta and published by . This book was released on 1990 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We consider a government who has a divisible public project of size q to realise. We are interested in a pincipal multiple agents problem with two negatively correlated adverse selection parameters. In the principal-single agent case, we show that, the 'pooling' may exist, even under the usual 'no bunching' hypothesis. In the multiple agents case, we shpw that, even when returns to scale are increasing, it may be optimal for the principal to divide the public project between several agents. Moreover, the optimal contract with the winner(s) of the bidding is not the same that what obtain a single agent having the same characteristics ; that is the bidding problem is not separable.
Book Synopsis Handbook of Behavioral Industrial Organization by : Victor J. Tremblay
Download or read book Handbook of Behavioral Industrial Organization written by Victor J. Tremblay and published by Edward Elgar Publishing. This book was released on 2018 with total page 483 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The Handbook of Behavioral Industrial Organization integrates behavioral economics into industrial organization. Chapters cover concepts such as relative thinking, salience, shrouded attributes, cognitive dissonance, motivated reasoning, confirmation bias, overconfidence, status quo bias, social cooperation and identity. Additional chapters consider industry issues, such as sports and gambling industries, neuroeconomic studies of brands and advertising, and behavioral antitrust law. The Handbook features a wide array of methods (literature surveys, experimental and econometric research, and theoretical modelling), facilitating accessibility to a wide audience.
Book Synopsis Contracting Over Actions by : Alexander Philip Frankel
Download or read book Contracting Over Actions written by Alexander Philip Frankel and published by Stanford University. This book was released on 2011 with total page 164 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: I consider models in which contracts are written over the verifiable actions taken by an agent in multiple decisions. The principal's preferences over actions depend on underlying states of the world, but only the agent observes the states. The principal cannot audit the agent's information or punish her ex post for having taken inappropriate actions. Moreover, the principal is uncertain about the agent's preferences conditional on the states. Chapter 2 extends the concept of a quota contract to account for discounting and for the possibility of infinitely many periods: a discounted quota fixes the number of expected discounted plays on each action. Discounted quotas are optimal contract forms, even if arbitrary dynamic transfer payments are available, if the agent is assumed to have state-independent preferences. I recursively characterize the optimal discounted quotas for an infinitely repeated problem with independent and identically distributed states. Then I give a more explicit description of these contracts in the limit as interactions become frequent, and when only two actions are available. In Chapter 3 I allow the agent's preferences to depend on the states of the world. Under a variety of assumptions on the timing of the game and on the set of possible agent utility functions, I solve for the max-min optimal mechanisms -- those which maximize the principal's payoff against the worst possible agent preference type. These mechanisms are characterized by a property which I call "aligned delegation." Max-min optimal mechanisms may take the simple forms of simultaneous ranking mechanisms, sequential quotas, or budgets.
Book Synopsis Bayesian Implementation by : Thomas R. Palfrey
Download or read book Bayesian Implementation written by Thomas R. Palfrey and published by CRC Press. This book was released on 2020-08-26 with total page 126 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The implementation problem lies at the heart of a theory of institutions. Simply stated, the aim of implementation theory is to investigate in a rigorous way the relationships between outcomes in a society and how those outcomes arise. The first part of "Bayesian Implementation" presents a basic model of the Bayesian implementation problem and summarizes and explains recent developments in this branch of implementation theory. Substantive problems of interest such as public goods provision, auctions and bargaining are special cases of the model, and these are addressed in subsequent chapters.
Book Synopsis Relational Contracts, Incentives and Information by : Jonathan David Levin
Download or read book Relational Contracts, Incentives and Information written by Jonathan David Levin and published by . This book was released on 1999 with total page 133 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics by :
Download or read book The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics written by and published by Springer. This book was released on 2016-05-18 with total page 7493 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The award-winning The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd edition is now available as a dynamic online resource. Consisting of over 1,900 articles written by leading figures in the field including Nobel prize winners, this is the definitive scholarly reference work for a new generation of economists. Regularly updated! This product is a subscription based product.
Book Synopsis Computational Complexity by : Robert A. Meyers
Download or read book Computational Complexity written by Robert A. Meyers and published by Springer. This book was released on 2011-10-19 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Complex systems are systems that comprise many interacting parts with the ability to generate a new quality of collective behavior through self-organization, e.g. the spontaneous formation of temporal, spatial or functional structures. These systems are often characterized by extreme sensitivity to initial conditions as well as emergent behavior that are not readily predictable or even completely deterministic. The recognition that the collective behavior of the whole system cannot be simply inferred from an understanding of the behavior of the individual components has led to the development of numerous sophisticated new computational and modeling tools with applications to a wide range of scientific, engineering, and societal phenomena. Computational Complexity: Theory, Techniques and Applications presents a detailed and integrated view of the theoretical basis, computational methods, and state-of-the-art approaches to investigating and modeling of inherently difficult problems whose solution requires extensive resources approaching the practical limits of present-day computer systems. This comprehensive and authoritative reference examines key components of computational complexity, including cellular automata, graph theory, data mining, granular computing, soft computing, wavelets, and more.
Download or read book Game Theory written by Drew Fudenberg and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 1991-08-29 with total page 616 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This advanced text introduces the principles of noncooperative game theory in a direct and uncomplicated style that will acquaint students with the broad spectrum of the field while highlighting and explaining what they need to know at any given point. This advanced text introduces the principles of noncooperative game theory—including strategic form games, Nash equilibria, subgame perfection, repeated games, and games of incomplete information—in a direct and uncomplicated style that will acquaint students with the broad spectrum of the field while highlighting and explaining what they need to know at any given point. The analytic material is accompanied by many applications, examples, and exercises. The theory of noncooperative games studies the behavior of agents in any situation where each agent's optimal choice may depend on a forecast of the opponents' choices. "Noncooperative" refers to choices that are based on the participant's perceived selfinterest. Although game theory has been applied to many fields, Fudenberg and Tirole focus on the kinds of game theory that have been most useful in the study of economic problems. They also include some applications to political science. The fourteen chapters are grouped in parts that cover static games of complete information, dynamic games of complete information, static games of incomplete information, dynamic games of incomplete information, and advanced topics.
Book Synopsis The Theory of Incentives by : Jean-Jacques Laffont
Download or read book The Theory of Incentives written by Jean-Jacques Laffont and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 2009-12-27 with total page 436 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Economics has much to do with incentives--not least, incentives to work hard, to produce quality products, to study, to invest, and to save. Although Adam Smith amply confirmed this more than two hundred years ago in his analysis of sharecropping contracts, only in recent decades has a theory begun to emerge to place the topic at the heart of economic thinking. In this book, Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort present the most thorough yet accessible introduction to incentives theory to date. Central to this theory is a simple question as pivotal to modern-day management as it is to economics research: What makes people act in a particular way in an economic or business situation? In seeking an answer, the authors provide the methodological tools to design institutions that can ensure good incentives for economic agents. This book focuses on the principal-agent model, the "simple" situation where a principal, or company, delegates a task to a single agent through a contract--the essence of management and contract theory. How does the owner or manager of a firm align the objectives of its various members to maximize profits? Following a brief historical overview showing how the problem of incentives has come to the fore in the past two centuries, the authors devote the bulk of their work to exploring principal-agent models and various extensions thereof in light of three types of information problems: adverse selection, moral hazard, and non-verifiability. Offering an unprecedented look at a subject vital to industrial organization, labor economics, and behavioral economics, this book is set to become the definitive resource for students, researchers, and others who might find themselves pondering what contracts, and the incentives they embody, are really all about.
Book Synopsis Optimal Contracts in Multitask Principal/agent Framework by : Valérie Rabassa
Download or read book Optimal Contracts in Multitask Principal/agent Framework written by Valérie Rabassa and published by . This book was released on 1995 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
