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Online And Matching Based Market Design
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Book Synopsis Online and Matching-Based Market Design by : Federico Echenique
Download or read book Online and Matching-Based Market Design written by Federico Echenique and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2023-05-31 with total page 721 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Written by more than fifty top researchers, this text comprehensively covers a major inter-disciplinary field and its important applications.
Book Synopsis Market Design by : Guillaume Haeringer
Download or read book Market Design written by Guillaume Haeringer and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 2018-03-02 with total page 393 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A broad overview of market mechanisms, with an emphasis on the interplay between theory and real-life applications; examples range from eBay auctions to school choice. This book offers an introduction to market design, providing students with a broad overview of issues related to the design and analysis of market mechanisms. It defines a market as a demand and a supply, without specifying a price system or mechanism. This allows the text to analyze a broad set of situations—including such unconventional markets as college admissions and organ donation—and forces readers to pay attention to details that might otherwise be overlooked. Students often complain that microeconomics is too abstract and disconnected from reality; the study of market design shows how theory can help solve existing, real-life problems. The book focuses on the interplay between theory and applications. To keep the text as accessible as possible, special effort has been made to minimize formal description of the models while emphasizing the intuitive, with detailed explanations and resolution of examples. Appendixes offer general reviews of elements of game theory and mechanism design that are related to the themes explored in the book, presenting the basic concepts with as many explanations and illustrations as possible. The book covers topics including the basics of simple auctions; eBay auctions; Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auctions; keyword auctions, with examples from Google and Facebook; spectrum auctions; financial markets, with discussions of treasury auctions and IPOs; trading on the stock market; the basic matching model; medical match; assignment problems; probabilistic assignments; school choice; course allocation, with examples from Harvard and Wharton; and kidney exchange.
Book Synopsis Online and Matching-Based Market Design by : Federico Echenique
Download or read book Online and Matching-Based Market Design written by Federico Echenique and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2023-04-30 with total page 722 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The rich, multi-faceted and multi-disciplinary field of matching-based market design is an active and important one due to its highly successful applications with economic and sociological impact. Its home is economics, but with intimate connections to algorithm design and operations research. With chapters contributed by over fifty top researchers from all three disciplines, this volume is unique in its breadth and depth, while still being a cohesive and unified picture of the field, suitable for the uninitiated as well as the expert. It explains the dominant ideas from computer science and economics underlying the most important results on market design and introduces the main algorithmic questions and combinatorial structures. Methodologies and applications from both the pre-Internet and post-Internet eras are covered in detail. Key chapters discuss the basic notions of efficiency, fairness and incentives, and the way market design seeks solutions guided by normative criteria borrowed from social choice theory.
Book Synopsis The Handbook of Market Design by : Nir Vulkan
Download or read book The Handbook of Market Design written by Nir Vulkan and published by OUP Oxford. This book was released on 2013-08-29 with total page 706 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Economists often look at markets as given, and try to make predictions about who will do what and what will happen in these markets. Market design, by contrast, does not take markets as given; instead, it combines insights from economic and game theory together with common sense and lessons learned from empirical work and experimental analysis to aid in the design and implementation of actual markets In recent years the field has grown dramatically, partially because of the successful wave of spectrum auctions in the US and in Europe, which have been designed by a number of prominent economists, and partially because of the increase use of the Internet as the platform over which markets are designed and run There is now a large number of applications and a growing theoretical literature. The Handbook of Market Design brings together the latest research from leading experts to provide a comprehensive description of applied market design over the last two decades In particular, it surveys matching markets: environments where there is a need to match large two-sided populations to one another, such as medical residents and hospitals, law clerks and judges, or patients and kidney donors It also examines a number of applications related to electronic markets, e-commerce, and the effect of the Internet on competition between exchanges.
Download or read book Market Design written by Martin Bichler and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2017-12-21 with total page 297 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The introduction to market design discusses the theory and empirical results relevant for the design of multi-object auctions and matching.
Book Synopsis Market Design by : Guillaume Haeringer
Download or read book Market Design written by Guillaume Haeringer and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 2018-03-02 with total page 393 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A broad overview of market mechanisms, with an emphasis on the interplay between theory and real-life applications; examples range from eBay auctions to school choice. This book offers an introduction to market design, providing students with a broad overview of issues related to the design and analysis of market mechanisms. It defines a market as a demand and a supply, without specifying a price system or mechanism. This allows the text to analyze a broad set of situations—including such unconventional markets as college admissions and organ donation—and forces readers to pay attention to details that might otherwise be overlooked. Students often complain that microeconomics is too abstract and disconnected from reality; the study of market design shows how theory can help solve existing, real-life problems. The book focuses on the interplay between theory and applications. To keep the text as accessible as possible, special effort has been made to minimize formal description of the models while emphasizing the intuitive, with detailed explanations and resolution of examples. Appendixes offer general reviews of elements of game theory and mechanism design that are related to the themes explored in the book, presenting the basic concepts with as many explanations and illustrations as possible. The book covers topics including the basics of simple auctions; eBay auctions; Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auctions; keyword auctions, with examples from Google and Facebook; spectrum auctions; financial markets, with discussions of treasury auctions and IPOs; trading on the stock market; the basic matching model; medical match; assignment problems; probabilistic assignments; school choice; course allocation, with examples from Harvard and Wharton; and kidney exchange.
Book Synopsis Who Gets What--and why by : Alvin E. Roth
Download or read book Who Gets What--and why written by Alvin E. Roth and published by Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. This book was released on 2015 with total page 275 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A Nobel laureate reveals the often surprising rules that govern a vast array of activities -- both mundane and life-changing -- in which money may play little or no role. If you've ever sought a job or hired someone, applied to college or guided your child into a good kindergarten, asked someone out on a date or been asked out, you've participated in a kind of market. Most of the study of economics deals with commodity markets, where the price of a good connects sellers and buyers. But what about other kinds of "goods," like a spot in the Yale freshman class or a position at Google? This is the territory of matching markets, where "sellers" and "buyers" must choose each other, and price isn't the only factor determining who gets what. Alvin E. Roth is one of the world's leading experts on matching markets. He has even designed several of them, including the exchange that places medical students in residencies and the system that increases the number of kidney transplants by better matching donors to patients. In Who Gets What -- And Why, Roth reveals the matching markets hidden around us and shows how to recognize a good match and make smarter, more confident decisions.
Book Synopsis Essays on Matching Theory and Behavioral Market Design by : Siqi Pan
Download or read book Essays on Matching Theory and Behavioral Market Design written by Siqi Pan and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page 112 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation focuses on the design and implementation of matching markets where transfers are not available, such as college admissions, school choice, and certain labor markets. The results contribute to the literature from both a theoretical and a behavioral perspective, and may have policy implications for the design of some real-life matching markets. Chapter 1, “Exploding Offers and Unraveling in Two-Sided Matching Markets,” studies the unraveling problem prevalent in many two-sided matching markets that occurs when transactions become inefficiently early. In a two-period decentralized model, I examine whether the use of exploding offers can affect agents' early moving incentives. The results show that when the culture of the market allows firms to make exploding offers, unraveling is more likely to occur, leading to a less socially desirable matching outcome. A market with an excess supply of labor is less vulnerable to the presence of exploding offers; yet the conclusion is ambiguous for a market with a greater degree of uncertainty in early stages, which depends on the specific information structure. While a policy banning exploding offers tends to be supported by high quality firms and workers, it can be opposed by those of lower quality. This explains the prevalence of exploding offers in practice. Chapter 2, “Constrained School Choice and Information Acquisition,” investigates a common practice of many school choice programs in the field, where the length of students' submitted preference lists are constrained. In an environment where students have incomplete information about others’ preferences, I theoretically study the effect of such a constraint under both a Deferred Acceptance mechanism (DA) and a Boston mechanism (BOS). The result shows that ex-ante stability can only be ensured under an unconstrained DA, but not under a constrained DA, an unconstrained BOS, or a constrained BOS. In a lab experiment, I find that the constraint also affects students’ information acquisition behavior. Specifically, when faced with a constraint, students tend to acquire less wasteful information and distribute more efforts to acquire relevant information under DA; such an effect is not significant under BOS. Overall, the constraint has a negative effect on efficiency and stability under both mechanisms. Chapter 3, “Targeted Advertising on Competing Platforms,” is jointly written with Huanxing Yang. We investigate targeted advertising in two-sided markets. Each of the two competing platforms has single-homing consumers on one side and multi-homing advertising firms on the other. We focus on how asymmetry in platforms’ targeting abilities translates into asymmetric equilibrium outcomes, and how changes in targeting ability affect the price and volume of ads, consumer welfare, and advertising firms' profits. We also compare social incentives and equilibrium incentives in investing in targeting ability. Chapter 4, “The Instability of Matching with Overconfident Agents: Laboratory and Field Investigations,” focuses on centralized college admissions markets where students are evaluated and allocated based on their performance on a standardized exam. A single exam’s measurement error causes the exam-based priorities to deviate from colleges' aptitude-based preferences: a student who underperforms in one exam may lose her placement at a preferred college to someone with a lower aptitude. The previous literature proposes a solution of combining a Boston algorithm with pre-exam preference submission. Under the assumption that students have perfect knowledge of their relative aptitudes before taking the exam, the suggested mechanism intends to trigger a self-sorting process, with students of higher (lower) aptitudes targeting more (less) preferred colleges. However, in a laboratory experiment, I find that such a self-sorting process is skewed by overconfidence, which leads to a welfare loss larger than the purported benefits. Moreover, the mechanism introduces unfairness by rewarding overconfidence and punishing underconfidence, thus serving as a gender penalty for women. I also analyze field data from Chinese high schools; the results suggest similar conclusions as in the lab.
Book Synopsis Two-Sided Matching by : Alvin E. Roth
Download or read book Two-Sided Matching written by Alvin E. Roth and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 1992-06-26 with total page 288 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Two-sided matching provides a model of search processes such as those between firms and workers in labor markets or between buyers and sellers in auctions. This book gives a comprehensive account of recent results concerning the game-theoretic analysis of two-sided matching. The focus of the book is on the stability of outcomes, on the incentives that different rules of organization give to agents, and on the constraints that these incentives impose on the ways such markets can be organized. The results for this wide range of related models and matching situations help clarify which conclusions depend on particular modeling assumptions and market conditions, and which are robust over a wide range of conditions. 'This book chronicles one of the outstanding success stories of the theory of games, a story in which the authors have played a major role: the theory and practice of matching markets ... The authors are to be warmly congratulated for this fine piece of work, which is quite unique in the game-theoretic literature.' From the Foreword by Robert Aumann
Book Synopsis Who Gets What--and why by : Alvin E. Roth
Download or read book Who Gets What--and why written by Alvin E. Roth and published by Harper Business. This book was released on 2016 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A Nobel laureate reveals the often surprising rules that govern a vast array of activities--both mundane and life-changing--where money plays little or no role.
Download or read book Matching Theory written by László Lovász and published by American Mathematical Soc.. This book was released on 2009 with total page 610 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book surveys matching theory, with an emphasis on connections with other areas of mathematics and on the role matching theory has played, and continues to play, in the development of some of these areas. Besides basic results on the existence of matchings and on the matching structure of graphs, the impact of matching theory is discussed by providing crucial special cases and nontrivial examples on matroid theory, algorithms, and polyhedral combinatorics. The new Appendix outlines how the theory and applications of matching theory have continued to develop since the book was first published in 1986, by launching (among other things) the Markov Chain Monte Carlo method.
Book Synopsis Discovering Prices by : Paul Milgrom
Download or read book Discovering Prices written by Paul Milgrom and published by Columbia University Press. This book was released on 2017-05-23 with total page 222 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Traditional economic theory studies idealized markets in which prices alone can guide efficient allocation, with no need for central organization. Such models build from Adam Smith’s famous concept of an invisible hand, which guides markets and renders regulation or interference largely unnecessary. Yet for many markets, prices alone are not enough to guide feasible and efficient outcomes, and regulation alone is not enough, either. Consider air traffic control at major airports. While prices could encourage airlines to take off and land at less congested times, prices alone do just part of the job; an air traffic control system is still indispensable to avoid disastrous consequences. With just an air traffic controller, however, limited resources can be wasted or poorly used. What’s needed in this and many other real-world cases is an auction system that can effectively reveal prices while still maintaining enough direct control to ensure that complex constraints are satisfied. In Discovering Prices, Paul Milgrom—the world’s most frequently cited academic expert on auction design—describes how auctions can be used to discover prices and guide efficient resource allocations, even when resources are diverse, constraints are critical, and market-clearing prices may not even exist. Economists have long understood that externalities and market power both necessitate market organization. In this book, Milgrom introduces complex constraints as another reason for market design. Both lively and technical, Milgrom roots his new theories in real-world examples (including the ambitious U.S. incentive auction of radio frequencies, whose design he led) and provides economists with crucial new tools for dealing with the world’s growing complex resource-allocation problems.
Book Synopsis Bargaining Theory with Applications by : Abhinay Muthoo
Download or read book Bargaining Theory with Applications written by Abhinay Muthoo and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 1999-08-19 with total page 378 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Graduate textbook presenting abstract models of bargaining in a unified framework with detailed applications involving economic, political and social situations.
Book Synopsis Putting Auction Theory to Work by : Paul Milgrom
Download or read book Putting Auction Theory to Work written by Paul Milgrom and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2004-01-12 with total page 378 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.
Book Synopsis Market Design by : Christoph Schwaiger
Download or read book Market Design written by Christoph Schwaiger and published by . This book was released on 2023 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Web Form Design by : Luke Wroblewski
Download or read book Web Form Design written by Luke Wroblewski and published by Rosenfeld Media. This book was released on 2008-05-01 with total page 374 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Forms make or break the most crucial online interactions: checkout (commerce), registration (community), data input (participation and sharing), and any task requiring information entry. In Web Form Design, Luke Wroblewski draws on original research, his considerable experience at Yahoo! and eBay, and the perspectives of many of the field's leading designers to show you everything you need to know about designing effective and engaging Web forms.
Book Synopsis Online Matching and Ad Allocation by : Aranyak Mehta
Download or read book Online Matching and Ad Allocation written by Aranyak Mehta and published by . This book was released on 2013-10-01 with total page 120 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Matching is a classic problem with a rich history and a significant impact on both the theory of algorithms and in practice. Recently, there has been a surge of interest in the online version of matching and its generalizations. This is due to the important new application domain of Internet advertising. The theory of online matching and allocation has played a critical role in designing algorithms for ad allocation. Online Matching and Ad Allocation surveys the key problems, models, and algorithms from online matchings, as well as their implication in the practice of ad allocation. It provides a classification of the problems in this area, an introduction into the techniques used, a glimpse into the practical impact, and ponders some of the open questions that will be of interest in the future. Matching continues to find core applications in diverse domains, and the advent of massive online and streaming data emphasizes the future applicability of the algorithms and techniques surveyed here. Online Matching and Ad Allocation is an ideal primer for anyone interested in matching, and particularly in the online version of the problem, in bipartite graphs.
