Multi-unit Auctions in which Almost Every Bid Wins

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ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (535 download)

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Book Synopsis Multi-unit Auctions in which Almost Every Bid Wins by : Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans

Download or read book Multi-unit Auctions in which Almost Every Bid Wins written by Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans and published by . This book was released on 1998 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Multi-unit Auctions with Uncertain Supply and Single-unit Demand

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Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 0 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (138 download)

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Book Synopsis Multi-unit Auctions with Uncertain Supply and Single-unit Demand by : Edward J. Anderson

Download or read book Multi-unit Auctions with Uncertain Supply and Single-unit Demand written by Edward J. Anderson and published by . This book was released on 2023 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We study multi-unit auctions where bidders have single-unit demand and asymmetric information. For symmetric equilibria, we identify circumstances where uniform-pricing is better for the auctioneer than pay-as-bid pricing, and where transparency improves the revenue of the auctioneer. An issue with the uniform-price auction is that seemingly collusive equilibria can exist. We show that such outcomes are less likely if the traded volume of the auctioneer is uncertain. But if bidders are asymmetric ex-ante, then both a price áoor and a price cap are normally needed to get a unique equilibrium, which is well behaved.

Multi-unit Auctions with Uniform Prices

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ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (535 download)

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Book Synopsis Multi-unit Auctions with Uniform Prices by : Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans

Download or read book Multi-unit Auctions with Uniform Prices written by Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans and published by . This book was released on 1995 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Handbook of Spectrum Auction Design

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Publisher : Cambridge University Press
ISBN 13 : 1107135346
Total Pages : 935 pages
Book Rating : 4.1/5 (71 download)

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Book Synopsis Handbook of Spectrum Auction Design by : Martin Bichler

Download or read book Handbook of Spectrum Auction Design written by Martin Bichler and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2017-10-26 with total page 935 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: An international team of experts covers the pros and cons of different auction formats and lessons learned in the field.

Efficient Multi-Unit Auctions for Normal Goods

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ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 66 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (13 download)

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Book Synopsis Efficient Multi-Unit Auctions for Normal Goods by : Brian Baisa

Download or read book Efficient Multi-Unit Auctions for Normal Goods written by Brian Baisa and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page 66 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: I study multi-unit auction design when bidders have private values, multi-unit demands, and non-quasilinear preferences. Without quasilinearity, the Vickrey auction loses its desired incentive and efficiency properties. I give conditions under which we can design a mechanism that retains the Vickrey auction's desirable incentive and efficiency properties: (1) individual rationality, (2) dominant strategy incentive compatibility, and (3) Pareto efficiency. I show that there is a mechanism that retains the desired properties of the Vickrey auction if there are two bidders who have single-dimensional types. I also present an impossibility theorem that shows that there is no mechanism that satisfies Vickrey's desired properties and weak budget balance when bidders have multi-dimensional types.

An Example of Multi-unit Auctions with Atypically Many Equilibria

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Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 0 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (246 download)

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Book Synopsis An Example of Multi-unit Auctions with Atypically Many Equilibria by : Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans

Download or read book An Example of Multi-unit Auctions with Atypically Many Equilibria written by Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans and published by . This book was released on 1999 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Multi-unit Auctions with Incomplete Information

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Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (249 download)

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Book Synopsis Multi-unit Auctions with Incomplete Information by : Brett E. Katzman

Download or read book Multi-unit Auctions with Incomplete Information written by Brett E. Katzman and published by . This book was released on 1995 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Multi-unit Auctions with Budget-constrained Bidders

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Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 81 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (818 download)

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Book Synopsis Multi-unit Auctions with Budget-constrained Bidders by : Gagan Pratap Ghosh

Download or read book Multi-unit Auctions with Budget-constrained Bidders written by Gagan Pratap Ghosh and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page 81 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: I derive various qualitative features of this equilibrium, among which are: (1) under mild assumptions, there always exist bidder-types who submit unequal bids in equilibrium, (2) the equilibrium is monotonic in the sense that bidders with higher valuations prefer more unequal splits of their budgets than bidders with lower valuations and the same budget-level. With a formal theory in place, I carry out a quantitative exercise, using data from the 1970 OCS auction. I show that the model is able to match many aspects of the data. (1) In the data, the number of tracts bidders submit bids on is positively correlated with budgets (an R2 of 0.84), even though this relationship is non-monotonic; my model is able to capture this non-monotonicity, while producing an R2 of 0.89 (2) In the data, the average number of bids per tract is 8.21; for the model, this number is 10.09. (3) Auction revenue in the data was $1.927 billion; the model produced a mean revenue of $1.944 billion.

Large Multi-Unit Auctions with a Large Bidder

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ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 30 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (13 download)

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Book Synopsis Large Multi-Unit Auctions with a Large Bidder by : Brian Baisa

Download or read book Large Multi-Unit Auctions with a Large Bidder written by Brian Baisa and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page 30 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We compare equilibrium bidding in uniform-price and discriminatory auctions when a single large bidder (i.e., with multi-unit demand) competes against many small bidders, each with single-unit demands. We show that the large bidder prefers the discriminatory auction over the uniform-price auction, and we provide general conditions under which small bidders have the reverse preference. We also show that the discriminatory auction provides greater incentives for the large bidder to invest in increased capacity, while the uniform-price auction provides greater incentives for small bidders to enter the auction. We use examples to show that the efficiency and revenue rankings of the two auctions are ambiguous.

The Multiple Unit Auction with Variable Suppy

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ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 0 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (137 download)

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Book Synopsis The Multiple Unit Auction with Variable Suppy by : Yvan Lengwiler

Download or read book The Multiple Unit Auction with Variable Suppy written by Yvan Lengwiler and published by . This book was released on 2001 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The theory of multiple unit auctions traditionally assumes that the offered quantity is fixed. I argue that this assumption is not appropriate for many applications because the seller may be able and willing to adjust the supply to the bidding. In this paper I address this shortcoming by analyzing a multi-unit auction game between a monopolistic seller who can produce arbitrary quantities at constant unit cost, and oligopolistic bidders. I establish the existence of a subgame-perfect equilibrium for price discriminating and for uniform price auctions. I also show that bidders have an incentive to misreport their true demand in both auction formats, but they do that in different ways and for different reasons. Furthermore, both auction formats are inefficient, but there is no unambiguous ordering among them. Finally, the more competitive the bidders are, the more likely the seller is to prefer uniform pricing over price discrimination, yet increased competition among bidders may or may not enhance efficiency.

Equilibria in multi-unit auctions

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Publisher :
ISBN 13 : 9788086288154
Total Pages : 48 pages
Book Rating : 4.2/5 (881 download)

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Book Synopsis Equilibria in multi-unit auctions by : Michal Břeský

Download or read book Equilibria in multi-unit auctions written by Michal Břeský and published by . This book was released on 1999 with total page 48 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Pure Equilibrium Strategies in Multi-unit Auctions with Private Value Bidders

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Publisher :
ISBN 13 : 9788073441661
Total Pages : 44 pages
Book Rating : 4.4/5 (416 download)

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Book Synopsis Pure Equilibrium Strategies in Multi-unit Auctions with Private Value Bidders by : Michal Břeský

Download or read book Pure Equilibrium Strategies in Multi-unit Auctions with Private Value Bidders written by Michal Břeský and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 44 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Multi-unit Auctions

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ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (931 download)

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Book Synopsis Multi-unit Auctions by : Anthony M. Kwasnica

Download or read book Multi-unit Auctions written by Anthony M. Kwasnica and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Monotone Equilibrium in Multi-unit Auctions

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ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 30 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (531 download)

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Book Synopsis Monotone Equilibrium in Multi-unit Auctions by : David McAdams

Download or read book Monotone Equilibrium in Multi-unit Auctions written by David McAdams and published by . This book was released on 2002 with total page 30 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In a large class of multi-unit auctions of identical objects that includes the uniform-price, as-bid (or discriminatory), and Vickrey auctions, a Bayesian Nash equilibrium exists in monotone pure strategies whenever there is a finite price / quantity grid and each bidder's interim expected payoff function satisfies single-crossing in own bid and type. A stronger condition, non-decreasing differences in own bid and type, is satisfied in this class of auctions given (a) independent types and (b) risk-neutral bidders with marginal values that are (c) nondecreasing in own type and have (d) non-increasing differences in own type and others' quantities. A key observation behind this analysis is that each bidder's valuation for what he wins is always modular in own bid in any multi-unit auction in which the allocation is determined by market-clearing. This paper also provides the first proof of pure strategy equilibrium existence in the uniform-price auction when bidders have multi-unit demand and values that are not private. Keywords: Autions, Multi-unit Auctions, Uniform-price Auction, Vickrey Auctions Bidders, Bayesian Nash Equilibrium.

Auction Theory

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Publisher : Elsevier
ISBN 13 : 0080475965
Total Pages : 318 pages
Book Rating : 4.0/5 (84 download)

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Book Synopsis Auction Theory by : Vijay Krishna

Download or read book Auction Theory written by Vijay Krishna and published by Elsevier. This book was released on 2002-04-25 with total page 318 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Auction Theory is the standard reference on auctions and the first source of authoritative information about multi-unit auctions. The book develops the main concepts of auction theory from scratch in a self-contained and theoretically rigorous manner. It explores auctions and competitive bidding as games of incomplete information through detailed examinations of themes central to auction theory. This book complements its superb presentation of auction theory with clear and concise proofs of all results on bidding strategies, efficiency, and revenue maximization. It provides discussions on auction-related subjects, including private value auctions; the Revenue Equivalence Principle; auctions with interdependent values; the Revenue Ranking (Linkage) Principle; mechanism design with interdependent values; bidding rings; multiple object auctions; equilibrium and efficiency with private values; and nonidentical objects. This book is essential reading for graduate students taking courses on auction theory, the economics of information, or the economics of incentives, as well as for any serious student of auctions. It will also appeal to professional economists or business analysts working in contract theory, experimental economics, industrial organization, and microeconomic theory. *The standard reference on auctions and the first source of authoritative information about multi-unit auctions*Explores auctions and competitive bidding as games of incomplete information*Uses accessible, detailed examinations of themes central to auction theory

Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-unit Auctions

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Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 36 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (377 download)

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Book Synopsis Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-unit Auctions by : Lawrence Marc Ausubel

Download or read book Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-unit Auctions written by Lawrence Marc Ausubel and published by . This book was released on 1996 with total page 36 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Optimal Bids in Multi-unit Auctions when Demand is Price Elastic

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ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 30 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (258 download)

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Book Synopsis Optimal Bids in Multi-unit Auctions when Demand is Price Elastic by : Dieter Nautz

Download or read book Optimal Bids in Multi-unit Auctions when Demand is Price Elastic written by Dieter Nautz and published by . This book was released on 1996 with total page 30 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: