Read Books Online and Download eBooks, EPub, PDF, Mobi, Kindle, Text Full Free.
Health Insurance And Ex Ante Moral Hazard
Download Health Insurance And Ex Ante Moral Hazard full books in PDF, epub, and Kindle. Read online Health Insurance And Ex Ante Moral Hazard ebook anywhere anytime directly on your device. Fast Download speed and no annoying ads. We cannot guarantee that every ebooks is available!
Book Synopsis Health Insurance and Ex Ante Moral Hazard by : Dhaval Dave
Download or read book Health Insurance and Ex Ante Moral Hazard written by Dhaval Dave and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 58 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: "Basic economic theory suggests that health insurance coverage may cause a reduction in prevention activities, but empirical studies have yet to provide evidence to support this prediction. However, in other insurance contexts that involve adverse health events, evidence of ex ante moral hazard is more consistent. In this paper, we extend the analysis of the effect of health insurance on health behaviors by allowing for the possibility that health insurance has a direct (ex ante moral hazard) and indirect effect on health behaviors. The indirect effect works through changes in health promotion information and the probability of illness that may be a byproduct of insurance-induced greater contact with medical professionals. We identify these two effects and in doing so identify the pure ex ante moral hazard effect. This study exploits the plausibly exogenous variation in health insurance as a result of obtaining Medicare coverage at age 65. We find limited evidence that obtaining health insurance reduces prevention and increases unhealthy behaviors among elderly persons. There is more robust evidence that physician counseling is successful in changing health behaviors"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Book Synopsis Moral Hazard Effects in Health Insurance by : Olesya Kazantseva
Download or read book Moral Hazard Effects in Health Insurance written by Olesya Kazantseva and published by GRIN Verlag. This book was released on 2014-07-18 with total page 20 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Seminar paper from the year 2014 in the subject Business economics - Economic Policy, grade: 1,3, University of Kassel, language: English, abstract: Within the discussion about the increasing expenditures in health insurance, the overutilization of medical care is often attributed to the existence of a moral hazard problem. Since moral hazard has a great impact on health insurance policies, there is a growing interest in the economic literature to identify and to measure its effects. Although the problem of overconsumption of medical care does not mean moral hazard per se, the determination of the latter may reduce its scope and help to mitigate the problem of overutilization. The main objective of this paper is an empirical evidence of the moral hazard phenomenon. By analysing the economic literature on moral hazard in health insurance this paper seeks for examples of its empirical evidence, whereby the emphasis lies on distinguishing between the demand-oriented (especially ex-post) and the supply-oriented (external) moral hazard.
Book Synopsis Moral Hazard Effects in Health Insurance. An Empirical Perspective by : Anke Höhmann
Download or read book Moral Hazard Effects in Health Insurance. An Empirical Perspective written by Anke Höhmann and published by GRIN Verlag. This book was released on 2017-06-12 with total page 26 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Seminar paper from the year 2016 in the subject Business economics - Banking, Stock Exchanges, Insurance, Accounting, grade: 1,3, University of Kassel, language: English, abstract: In the discussion about cost increase for German health care, the existence of a moral hazard problem is often mentioned. A bigger part of the costs are ascribed to the insured persons ́ behavior or lifestyle. The insured person is led to an increased demand of medical services than without an insurance. But also doctors or pharmacists may be evidenced „unethical“ behavior on the part of supply-induced demand. Is it really an unethical or rather a rational behavior? Which experiences have been made with a higher self-participation of the insured people? In which context stay health care services and price elasticity? And how can you reduce the problem of moral hazard? These are just a few questions which will be examined in this paper. The first chapter begins with health insurance in general and explains the benefits and the risks of being insured. The second chapter gives a generally valid definition of moral hazard as well as in terms of health insurance in particular. The third chapter shows the empirical perspective from the point of view of insured people and doctors. Thereby, it will enlarge on the RAND experiment and the price elasticity in the German market. The fourth chapter gives a few solutions for moral hazard effects, whereby solutions for insured people and for alternative financing are here in the focus. The last chapter will give a conclusion to the discussed topic.
Book Synopsis The Other Ex-ante Moral Hazard in Health by : Jay Bhattacharya
Download or read book The Other Ex-ante Moral Hazard in Health written by Jay Bhattacharya and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 26 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: It is well known that public or pooled insurance coverage can induce a form of ex-ante moral hazard: people make inefficiently low investments in self-protective activities. This paper points out another ex-ante moral hazard that arises through an induced innovation externality. This alternative mechanism, by contrast, causes people to devote an inefficiently high level of self-protection. As an empirical example of this externality, we analyze the innovation induced by the obesity epidemic. Obesity is associated with an increase in the incidence of many diseases. The induced innovation hypothesis is that an increase in the incidence of a disease will increase technological innovation specific to that disease. The empirical economics literature has produced substantial evidence in favor of the induced innovation hypothesis. We first estimate the associations between obesity and disease incidence. We then show that if these associations are causal and the pharmaceutical reward system is optimal the magnitude of the induced innovation externality of obesity roughly coincides with the Medicare-induced health insurance externality of obesity. The current Medicare subsidy for obesity therefore appears to be approximately optimal. We also show that the pattern of diseases for obese and normal weight individuals are similar enough that the induced innovation externality of obesity on normal weight individuals is positive as well.
Book Synopsis Moral Hazard in Health Insurance by : Amy Finkelstein
Download or read book Moral Hazard in Health Insurance written by Amy Finkelstein and published by Columbia University Press. This book was released on 2014-12-02 with total page 161 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Addressing the challenge of covering heath care expenses—while minimizing economic risks. Moral hazard—the tendency to change behavior when the cost of that behavior will be borne by others—is a particularly tricky question when considering health care. Kenneth J. Arrow’s seminal 1963 paper on this topic (included in this volume) was one of the first to explore the implication of moral hazard for health care, and Amy Finkelstein—recognized as one of the world’s foremost experts on the topic—here examines this issue in the context of contemporary American health care policy. Drawing on research from both the original RAND Health Insurance Experiment and her own research, including a 2008 Health Insurance Experiment in Oregon, Finkelstein presents compelling evidence that health insurance does indeed affect medical spending and encourages policy solutions that acknowledge and account for this. The volume also features commentaries and insights from other renowned economists, including an introduction by Joseph P. Newhouse that provides context for the discussion, a commentary from Jonathan Gruber that considers provider-side moral hazard, and reflections from Joseph E. Stiglitz and Kenneth J. Arrow. “Reads like a fireside chat among a group of distinguished, articulate health economists.” —Choice
Book Synopsis The Theory of Social Health Insurance by : Peter Zweifel
Download or read book The Theory of Social Health Insurance written by Peter Zweifel and published by Now Publishers Inc. This book was released on 2007 with total page 104 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The Theory of Social Health Insurance develops the theory of social health insurance also known as public health insurance. While a good deal is known about the demand and supply of private insurance, the theoretical basis of social health insurance is much more fragile. The Theory of Social Health Insurance examines questions including why does social health insurance exist and even dominate private health insurance in most developed countries? What are the objectives and constraints of social health insurance managers? What is the likely outcome or "performance" of social health insurance? The Theory of Social Health Insurance reviews the conventional theory of demand for insurance and health insurance, the supply of health insurance in general and social health insurance in particular, the properties of the optimal health insurance contract, and whether there are factors limiting the growth of social health insurance.
Book Synopsis Moral Hazard in Health Insurance by : Amy Finkelstein
Download or read book Moral Hazard in Health Insurance written by Amy Finkelstein and published by Kenneth J. Arrow Lecture. This book was released on 2014 with total page 146 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Drawing on research from both the original RAND Health Insurance Experiment and her own research, the author presents compelling evidence that health insurance does indeed affect medical spending and encourages policy solutions that acknowledge and account for this.
Book Synopsis Helath Insurance and Ex Ante Moral Hazard by : Dhaval M. Dave
Download or read book Helath Insurance and Ex Ante Moral Hazard written by Dhaval M. Dave and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 57 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Health Insurance: The Trade-Off Between Risk Pooling and Moral Hazard by :
Download or read book Health Insurance: The Trade-Off Between Risk Pooling and Moral Hazard written by and published by . This book was released on 1989 with total page 67 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Choosing economically optimal health insurance coverage involves a trade-off between risk reduction and the overuse of health care. The economic purpose of insurance is to reduce financial uncertainty or risk - the more health insurance lowers the risk, the greater will be the increase in social well-being. But increases in health insurance also increase the amount of medical care demand, because insurance lowers the out-of-pocket cost of health care - the larger the demand response of medical care to cost sharing, the greater the decrease in social well-being, due to the purchase of too much health care. This study examines this trade-off empirically by estimating both the demand for health insurance and the demand for health services. It relies on data from a randomized controlled trial of the cost sharing's effects on the use of health services and on the health status for a general, nonelderly (under age 65) population.
Book Synopsis Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets with Ex Ante Adverse Selection and Ex Post Moral Hazard by : William Jack
Download or read book Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets with Ex Ante Adverse Selection and Ex Post Moral Hazard written by William Jack and published by . This book was released on 1998 with total page 48 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Exposed by : Christopher T. Robertson
Download or read book Exposed written by Christopher T. Robertson and published by Harvard University Press. This book was released on 2019-12-17 with total page 257 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A sharp exposé of the roots of the cost-exposure consensus in American health care that shows how the next wave of reform can secure real access and efficiency. The toxic battle over how to reshape American health care has overshadowed the underlying bipartisan agreement that health insurance coverage should be incomplete. Both Democrats and Republicans expect patients to bear a substantial portion of health care costs through deductibles, copayments, and coinsurance. In theory this strategy empowers patients to make cost-benefit tradeoffs, encourages thrift and efficiency in a system rife with waste, and defends against the moral hazard that can arise from insurance. But in fact, as Christopher T. Robertson reveals, this cost-exposure consensus keeps people from valuable care, causes widespread anxiety, and drives many patients and their families into bankruptcy and foreclosure. Marshalling a decade of research, Exposed offers an alternative framework that takes us back to the core purpose of insurance: pooling resources to provide individuals access to care that would otherwise be unaffordable. Robertson shows how the cost-exposure consensus has changed the meaning and experience of health care and exchanged one form of moral hazard for another. He also provides avenues of reform. If cost exposure remains a primary strategy, physicians, hospitals, and other providers must be held legally responsible for communicating those costs to patients, and insurance companies should scale cost exposure to individuals’ ability to pay. New and more promising models are on the horizon, if only we would let go our misguided embrace of incomplete insurance.
Book Synopsis Moral Hazard and Selection Among the Poor by : Jörg L. Spenkuch
Download or read book Moral Hazard and Selection Among the Poor written by Jörg L. Spenkuch and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Not only does economic theory predict high-risk individuals to be more likely to buy insurance, but insurance coverage is also thought to crowd out precautionary activities. In spite of stark theoretical predictions, there is conflicting empirical evidence on adverse selection, and evidence on ex ante moral hazard is very scarce. Using data from the Seguro Popular Experiment in Mexico, this paper documents patterns of adverse selection into health insurance as well as the existence of non-negligible ex ante moral hazard. More specifically, the findings indicate that (i) agents in poor self-assessed health prior to the intervention have, all else equal, a higher propensity to take up insurance; and (ii) insurance coverage reduces the demand for self-protection in the form of preventive care. Curiously, however, individuals do not sort based on objective measures of their health.
Book Synopsis Adverse Selection in Health Insurance by : David M. Cutler
Download or read book Adverse Selection in Health Insurance written by David M. Cutler and published by . This book was released on 1997 with total page 58 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Individual choice over health insurance policies may result in risk-based sorting across plans. Such adverse selection induces three types of losses: efficiency losses from individuals being allocated to the wrong plans; risk sharing losses since premium variability is increased; and losses from insurers distorting their policies to improve their mix of insureds. We discuss the potential for these losses, and present empirical evidence on adverse selection in two groups of employees: Harvard University, and the Group Insurance Commission of Massachusetts (serving state and local employees). In both groups, adverse selection is a significant concern. At Harvard, the University's decision to contribute an equal amount to all insurance plans led to the disappearance of the most generous policy within 3 years. At the GIC, adverse selection has been contained by subsidizing premiums on a proportional basis and managing the most generous policy very tightly. A combination of prospective or retrospective risk adjustment, coupled with reinsurance for high cost cases, seems promising as a way to provide appropriate incentives for enrollees and to reduce losses from adverse selection.
Book Synopsis Health Insurance by : Willard G. Manning
Download or read book Health Insurance written by Willard G. Manning and published by . This book was released on 1997 with total page 639 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Choosing optimal health insurance coverage involves a trade-off between the gain from risk reduction and the deadweight loss from moral hazard. This paper examines this trade-off empirically by estimating both the demand for health insurance and the demand for health services. It relies on data from a randomized controlled trial of cost-sharing's effects on the use of health services and on the health status for a general, non-elderly population.
Book Synopsis Selection on moral hazard in health insurance by : Liran Einav
Download or read book Selection on moral hazard in health insurance written by Liran Einav and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page 68 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Abstract: In this paper we explore the possibility that individuals may select insurance coverage in part based on their anticipated behavioral response to the insurance contract. Such "selection on moral hazard" can have important implications for attempts to combat either selection or moral hazard. We explore these issues using individual-level panel data from a single firm, which contain information about health insurance options, choices, and subsequent claims. To identify the behavioral response to health insurance coverage and the heterogeneity in it, we take advantage of a change in the health insurance options offered to some, but not all of the firm's employees. We begin with descriptive evidence that is suggestive of both heterogeneous moral hazard as well as selection on it, with individuals who select more coverage also appearing to exhibit greater behavioral response to that coverage. To formalize this analysis and explore its implications, we develop and estimate a model of plan choice and medical utilization. The results from the modeling exercise echo the descriptive evidence, and allow for further explorations of the interaction between selection and moral hazard. For example, one implication of our estimates is that abstracting from selection on moral hazard could lead one to substantially over-estimate the spending reduction associated with introducing a high deductible health insurance option
Book Synopsis Moral Hazard in Health Insurance by : Aviva Aron-Dine
Download or read book Moral Hazard in Health Insurance written by Aviva Aron-Dine and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page 57 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We investigate whether individuals exhibit forward looking behavior in their response to the non-linear pricing common in health insurance contracts. Our empirical strategy exploits the fact that employees who join an employer-provided health insurance plan later in the calendar year face the same initial ("spot") price of medical care but a higher expected end-of-year ("future") price than employees who join the same plan earlier in the year. Our results reject the null of completely myopic behavior; medical utilization appears to respond to the future price, with a statistically significant elasticity of medical utilization with respect to the future price of -0.4 to -0.6. To try to quantify the extent of forward looking behavior, we develop a stylized dynamic model of individual behavior and calibrate it using our estimated behavioral response and additional data from the RAND Health Insurance Experiment. Our calibration suggests that the elasticity estimate may be substantially smaller than the one implied by fully forward-looking behavior, yet it is sufficiently high to have an economically significant effect on the response of annual medical utilization to a non-linear health insurance contract. Overall, our results point to the empirical importance of accounting for dynamic incentives in analyses of the impact of health insurance on medical utilization.
Book Synopsis Moral Hazard in Health Insurance by : Liran Einav
Download or read book Moral Hazard in Health Insurance written by Liran Einav and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page 34 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We describe research on the impact of health insurance on healthcare spending ("moral hazard"), and use this context to illustrate the value of and important complementarities between different empirical approaches. One common approach is to emphasize a credible research design; we review results from two randomized experiments, as well as some quasi-experimental studies. This work has produced compelling evidence that moral hazard in health insurance exists – that is, individuals, on average, consume less healthcare when they are required to pay more for it out of pocket – as well as qualitative evidence about its nature. These studies alone, however, provide little guidance for forecasting healthcare spending under contracts not directly observed in the data. Therefore, a second and complementary approach is to develop an economic model that can be used out of sample. We note that modeling choices can be consequential: different economic models may fit the reduced form but deliver different counterfactual predictions. An additional role of the more descriptive analyses is therefore to provide guidance regarding model choice.
