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Executive Compensation And The Susceptibility Of Firms To Hostile Takeovers
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Book Synopsis Executive Compensation and the Susceptibility of Firms to Hostile Takeovers - an Empirical Investigation of the U.S. Oil Industry by : Michael H. Haid
Download or read book Executive Compensation and the Susceptibility of Firms to Hostile Takeovers - an Empirical Investigation of the U.S. Oil Industry written by Michael H. Haid and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page 72 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We investigate the suggested substitutive relation between executive compensation and the disciplinary threat of takeover imposed by the market for corporate control. We complement other empirical studies on managerial compensation and corporate control mechanisms in three distinct ways. First, we concentrate on firms in the oil industry for which agency problems were especially severe in the 1980s. Due to the extensive generation of excess cash flow, product and factor market discipline was ineffective. Second, we obtain a unique data set drawn directly from proxy statements which accounts not only for salary and bonus but for the value of all stock-market based compensation held in the portfolio of a CEO. Our data set consists of 51 firms in the U.S. oil industry from 1977 to 1994. Third, we employ ex ante measures of the threat of takeover at the individual firm level which are superior to ex post measures like actual takeover occurrence or past incidence of takeovers in an industry. Results show that annual compensation and, to a much higher degree, stock-based managerial compensation increase after a firm becomes protected from a hostile takeover. However, clear-cut evidence that CEOs of protected firms receive higher compensation than those of firms considered susceptible to a takeover cannot be found.
Book Synopsis Executive Compensation and the Susceptibility of Firms to Hostile Takeovers by : Michael H. Haid
Download or read book Executive Compensation and the Susceptibility of Firms to Hostile Takeovers written by Michael H. Haid and published by . This book was released on 1999 with total page 60 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Executive Compensation and the Susceptibility of Firms to Hostile Takeovers by : Michael H. Haid
Download or read book Executive Compensation and the Susceptibility of Firms to Hostile Takeovers written by Michael H. Haid and published by . This book was released on 2005 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Mergers and Acquisitions and Executive Compensation by : Virginia Bodolica
Download or read book Mergers and Acquisitions and Executive Compensation written by Virginia Bodolica and published by Routledge. This book was released on 2015-06-26 with total page 246 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Over the past decades, the total value of executive compensation packages has been rising dramatically, contributing to a wider pay gap between the chief executive officer and the average worker. In the midst of the financial turmoil that brought about a massive wave of corporate failures, the lavish executive compensation package has come under an intense spotlight. Public pressure has mounted to revise the levels and the structure of executive pay in a way that will tie more closely the executive wealth to that of shareholders. Merger and acquisition (M&A) activities represent an opportune setting for gauging whether shareholder value creation or managerial opportunism guides executive compensation. M&As constitute major examples of high-profile events prompted by managers who typically conceive them as a means for achieving higher levels of pay, even though they are frequently associated with disappointing returns to acquiring shareholders. Mergers and Acquisitions and Executive Compensation reviews the existing empirical evidence and provides an integrative framework for the growing body of literature that is situated at the intersection of two highly debated topics: M&A activities and executive compensation. The proposed framework structures the literature along two dimensions, such as M&A phases and firm’s role in a M&A deal, allowing readers to identify three main streams of research and five different conceptualizations of causal relationships between M&A transactions and executive compensation. The book makes a comprehensive review of empirical studies conducted to date, aiming to shed more light on the current and emerging knowledge in this field of investigation, discuss the inconsistencies encountered within each stream of research, and suggest promising directions for further exploration. This book will appeal to researchers and students alike in the fields of organizational behavior and governance as well as accounting and accountability.
Book Synopsis Pay Without Performance by : Lucian A. Bebchuk
Download or read book Pay Without Performance written by Lucian A. Bebchuk and published by Harvard University Press. This book was released on 2004 with total page 308 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The company is under-performing, its share price is trailing, and the CEO gets...a multi-million-dollar raise. This story is familiar, for good reason: as this book clearly demonstrates, structural flaws in corporate governance have produced widespread distortions in executive pay. Pay without Performance presents a disconcerting portrait of managers' influence over their own pay--and of a governance system that must fundamentally change if firms are to be managed in the interest of shareholders. Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried demonstrate that corporate boards have persistently failed to negotiate at arm's length with the executives they are meant to oversee. They give a richly detailed account of how pay practices--from option plans to retirement benefits--have decoupled compensation from performance and have camouflaged both the amount and performance-insensitivity of pay. Executives' unwonted influence over their compensation has hurt shareholders by increasing pay levels and, even more importantly, by leading to practices that dilute and distort managers' incentives. This book identifies basic problems with our current reliance on boards as guardians of shareholder interests. And the solution, the authors argue, is not merely to make these boards more independent of executives as recent reforms attempt to do. Rather, boards should also be made more dependent on shareholders by eliminating the arrangements that entrench directors and insulate them from their shareholders. A powerful critique of executive compensation and corporate governance, Pay without Performance points the way to restoring corporate integrity and improving corporate performance.
Book Synopsis Executive Compensation and the Susceptibity of Firms to Hostile Takeovers by : Michael H. Haid
Download or read book Executive Compensation and the Susceptibity of Firms to Hostile Takeovers written by Michael H. Haid and published by . This book was released on 1999 with total page 60 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Pay without Performance by : Lucian Bebchuk
Download or read book Pay without Performance written by Lucian Bebchuk and published by Harvard University Press. This book was released on 2006-09-30 with total page 293 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The company is under-performing, its share price is trailing, and the CEO gets...a multi-million-dollar raise. This story is familiar, for good reason: as this book clearly demonstrates, structural flaws in corporate governance have produced widespread distortions in executive pay. Pay without Performance presents a disconcerting portrait of managers' influence over their own pay--and of a governance system that must fundamentally change if firms are to be managed in the interest of shareholders. Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried demonstrate that corporate boards have persistently failed to negotiate at arm's length with the executives they are meant to oversee. They give a richly detailed account of how pay practices--from option plans to retirement benefits--have decoupled compensation from performance and have camouflaged both the amount and performance-insensitivity of pay. Executives' unwonted influence over their compensation has hurt shareholders by increasing pay levels and, even more importantly, by leading to practices that dilute and distort managers' incentives. This book identifies basic problems with our current reliance on boards as guardians of shareholder interests. And the solution, the authors argue, is not merely to make these boards more independent of executives as recent reforms attempt to do. Rather, boards should also be made more dependent on shareholders by eliminating the arrangements that entrench directors and insulate them from their shareholders. A powerful critique of executive compensation and corporate governance, Pay without Performance points the way to restoring corporate integrity and improving corporate performance.
Book Synopsis Executive Compensation and Earnings Management Under Moral Hazard by : Bo Sun
Download or read book Executive Compensation and Earnings Management Under Moral Hazard written by Bo Sun and published by DIANE Publishing. This book was released on 2010-08 with total page 33 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Analyzes executive compensation in a setting where managers may take a costly action to manipulate corporate performance, and whether managers do so is stochastic. Examines how the opportunity to manipulate affects the optimal pay contract, and establishes necessary and sufficient conditions under which earnings management occurs. The author¿s model provides a set of implications on the role earnings management plays in driving the time-series and cross-sectional variation of executive compensation. In addition, the model's predictions regarding the changes of earnings management and executive pay in response to corporate governance legislation are consistent with empirical observations. Charts and tables.
Book Synopsis Research Handbook on Executive Pay by : John S. Beasley
Download or read book Research Handbook on Executive Pay written by John S. Beasley and published by Edward Elgar Publishing. This book was released on 2012-01-01 with total page 553 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Research on executive compensation has exploded in recent years, and this volume of specially commissioned essays brings the reader up-to-date on all of the latest developments in the field. Leading corporate governance scholars from a range of countries set out their views on four main areas of executive compensation: the history and theory of executive compensation, the structure of executive pay, corporate governance and executive compensation, and international perspectives on executive pay. The authors analyze the two dominant theoretical approaches – managerial power theory and optimal contracting theory – and examine their impact on executive pay levels and the practices of concentrated and dispersed share ownership in corporations. The effectiveness of government regulation of executive pay and international executive pay practices in Australia, the US, Europe, China, India and Japan are also discussed. A timely study of a controversial topic, the Handbook will be an essential resource for students, scholars and practitioners of law, finance, business and accounting.
Book Synopsis Executive Compensation Best Practices by : Frederick D. Lipman
Download or read book Executive Compensation Best Practices written by Frederick D. Lipman and published by John Wiley & Sons. This book was released on 2008-06-27 with total page 336 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Executive Compensation Best Practices demystifies the topic of executive compensation, with a hands-on guide providing comprehensive compensation guidance for all members of the board. Essential reading for board members, CEOs, and senior human resources leaders from companies of every size, this book is the most authoritative reference on executive compensation.
Book Synopsis Determinants of Executive Compensation by : Ellen Pavlik
Download or read book Determinants of Executive Compensation written by Ellen Pavlik and published by Praeger. This book was released on 1991-06-21 with total page 182 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book is a thorough study of what determines executive compensation levels, challenging prior research which tended to focus solely on the influence of corporate financial performance.
Book Synopsis Corporate Strategy and Top Executive Compensation by : K. R. Srinivasa Murthy
Download or read book Corporate Strategy and Top Executive Compensation written by K. R. Srinivasa Murthy and published by . This book was released on 1977 with total page 168 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Executive Compensation for Emerging Companies by : Daniel Niehans
Download or read book Executive Compensation for Emerging Companies written by Daniel Niehans and published by West Legalworks. This book was released on 1998-01-01 with total page 978 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Executive Compensation by : Raghavendra Rau
Download or read book Executive Compensation written by Raghavendra Rau and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page 181 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The optimal design of executive compensation is one of the primary issues in the area of corporate governance and has been investigated in considerable detail in the academic literature over the past three decades. The underlying assumption behind the design of optimal compensation schemes is that the executives of the firm have more information on the firm's projects and cash flows than the shareholders. In the presence of symmetric information, since the shareholders can completely distinguish the executive's effort from bad luck or other extraneous factors, there is little need to motivate the executive beyond a flat salary. In the presence of asymmetric information, the shareholder faces two problems: One, to select the right type of agent (the adverse selection problem) and two, to motivate the agent to work hard once selected (the moral hazard problem). All executive compensation schemes represent trade-offs between these two agency problems. In this survey, in the first section, I start by discussing the theory of executive compensation. Why do firms pay executives? I distinguish two major approaches. The first arises from the theory of optimal compensation contracting and focuses on the composition of pay. It argues that the composition of pay is set to attract good executives (to solve the adverse selection problem) and motivate them to work hard (the moral hazard problem). The second approach focuses on the level of pay. It argues that managers have a considerable degree of power in setting their own wages, and in particular, use their power to extract excessive pay or rents from the shareholders. In the second section, I discuss the evidence on both the composition and level of pay and how it has changed over time, treating each component pay separately. I also discuss the composition of pay in countries around the world and in specific industries. In the third section, I describe who decides pay composition and levels. Finally, in the fourth section, I conclude by examining how the structure of pay has real consequences for firms.
Book Synopsis Executive Compensation and Incentives by : Marianne Bertrand
Download or read book Executive Compensation and Incentives written by Marianne Bertrand and published by . This book was released on 1998 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We investigate the impact of changes in states' anti-takeover legislation on executive compensation. We find both pay for performance sensitivities and mean pay increase for the firms affected by the legislation (relative to a control group). These findings are partially consistent with an optimal contracting model of CEO pay as well as with a skimming model in which reduced takeover fears allow CEO's to skim more. We compute lower bounds on the relative risk aversion coefficients implied by our findings. These lower bounds are relatively high, indicating that the increase in mean pay may have been more than needed to maintain CEO's individual rationality constraints. Under both models however, our evidence shows that the increased pay for performance offsets some of the incentive reduction caused by lower takeover threats.
Book Synopsis Regulating Executive Pay by : Nancy L. Rose
Download or read book Regulating Executive Pay written by Nancy L. Rose and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This study explores corporate responses to 1993 legislation, implemented as section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code, that capped the corporate tax deductibility of top management compensation at $1 million per executive unless it qualified as substantially "performance-based." We detail the provisions of this regulation, describe its possible effects, and test its impact on U.S. CEO compensation during the 1990s. Data on nearly 1400 publicly-traded U.S. corporations are used to explore the determinants of section 162(m) compensation plan qualification and the effect of section 162(m) on CEO pay. Our analysis suggests that section 162(m) may have created a "focal point" for salary compensation, leading some salary compression close to the deductibility cap. There is weak evidence that compensation plan qualification is associated with higher growth rates, as would be the case if qualification relaxed some political constraints on executive pay. There is little evidence that the deductibility cap has had significant effects on overall executive compensation levels or growth rates at firms likely to be affected by the deductibility cap, however, nor is there evidence that it has increased the performance sensitivity of CEO pay at these firms. We conclude that corporate pay decisions seem to be relatively insulated from this type of blunt policy intervention.
Book Synopsis University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform by : University of Michigan. Law School
Download or read book University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform written by University of Michigan. Law School and published by . This book was released on 2002 with total page 1068 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
