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Executive Compensation And Capital Structure
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Book Synopsis Executive Compensation and Capital Structure by : Hernan Ortiz-Molina
Download or read book Executive Compensation and Capital Structure written by Hernan Ortiz-Molina and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: I examine how CEO compensation is related to firms' capital structures. My tests address the simultaneity of these decisions and distinguish between debt types with different theoretical implications for managerial incentives. Pay-performance sensitivity decreases in straight-debt leverage, but is higher in firms with convertible debt. Furthermore, stock option policy is the component of CEO pay that is most sensitive to differences in capital structure. The results strongly support the hypothesis that firms trade-off shareholder-manager incentive alignment in order to mitigate shareholder-bondholder conflicts of interest. The hypothesis that debt reduces manager-shareholder conflicts can explain some but not all of the results.
Book Synopsis Executive Compensation, Capital Structure, Payouts and Cash Holdings by : Adilah Azhari
Download or read book Executive Compensation, Capital Structure, Payouts and Cash Holdings written by Adilah Azhari and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The aim of this research is to examine the relationship between CEO pay and firm's financial policies. According to agency theory, manager-shareholder conflicts of interest can be alleviated (and managerial compensation can be influenced) by debt. Debt lowers the level of free cash flow which managers are able to obtain because monitoring increases. This means that when the risk of bankruptcy appears, managers must consider the best financial interests of shareholders. Under agency theory, pay-performance sensitivity is smaller for high-debt companies when alternatives are available for high alignment incentives and high debt. The research objectives focus on three empirical chapters to explore the association between CEO pay and firm's financial policies for UK firms. The first study investigates the relationship between pay-performance sensitivity and debt as the explanatory variables. In the second study, the link between CEO compensation and corporate payout policy by segregating between total payouts, dividends and share repurchases are explored. Finally, the last objective examines the interaction between CEO pay packages and cash holdings of the firm. The research sample consists of 183 publicly traded companies listed on the FTSE 350 from 1999 to 2008. The estimates in the pay-performance study show mixed support for pay-performance and leverage because the negative coefficients for market debt have weak significance overall when median regressions are employed. Thus, it can be concluded that a firm's leverage has little effect on pay-performance sensitivity as a mechanism to align the interests of the firm's CEO and debt holders. However, there is strong support for the hypothesis that CEO pay-performance sensitivity increases with a firm's growth opportunities, which suggests that firms award higher equity compensation to attract managers with more talent. The second study in this research investigates how corporate payout policy is influenced by CEO share ownership, CEO stock options and CEO long-term incentive plans (LTIPs) in UK firms from 1999 to 2008 using Tobit regressions (for total payouts, dividends and share repurchases) and logistic regressions for the propensity of firms paying out to shareholders. The results show that CEO share ownership LTIPs have positive effects on corporate payout policy. In contrast, corporate governance characteristics do not show conclusive results which affect changes in payout policy. Dividend payout is significantly influenced by CEO share ownership compared to share repurchase payout. The findings support the notion that CEOs' share equity ownership is used to align managerial interest with shareholders in terms of cash payouts to shareholders. In the final empirical chapter, the study focuses on the effect of CEO pay and corporate governance on cash holdings. The study investigates the determinants of cash holdings based on free cash flow and the agency model using cash ratios (cash to sales, cash to assets, cash to market value and log of cash) as dependent variables. The analysis documents that CEO ownership and log LTIPs both have positive and strong relationships with cash ratios. The results support the hypothesis that equity compensation can be used to align managers' interests with those of shareholders.
Book Synopsis Executive Compensation and Capital Structure by : Alison Hook
Download or read book Executive Compensation and Capital Structure written by Alison Hook and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page 61 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Top Executive Compensation, Corporate Ownership Structure and Capital Structure by : K. H. Chan
Download or read book Top Executive Compensation, Corporate Ownership Structure and Capital Structure written by K. H. Chan and published by . This book was released on 1997 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Capital Structure and Firm Performance by : Arvin Ghosh
Download or read book Capital Structure and Firm Performance written by Arvin Ghosh and published by Routledge. This book was released on 2017-07-05 with total page 140 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Capital structure theory is one of the most dynamic areas of finance and forms the basis for modern thinking on the capital structure of firms. Much controversy has resulted from comparisons of the theory of capital structure originally developed by Franco Modigliani and Merton Miller to real-world situations. Two competing theories have emerged over the years, the optimal capital structure theory and the pecking order theory.Arvin Ghosh begins with an overview of the controversies regarding capital structure theories, and then statistically tests both the optimal capital structure and pecking order theories. Using the binomial approach he analyzes the determinants of capital structure while discussing the role of market power in determining capital structure decisions. Ghosh probes the questions of new stock offerings and stockholders' returns, and analyzes capital structure and executive compensation. He then looks into debt financing ownership structure, and the controversal relationship between capital structure and firm profitability. Finally, he discusses the latest developments in the field of capital structure.A concise overview of a major issue in business economics and finance, this volume provides a fuller understanding of capital structure influence on the financial performance of firms, and will certainly stimulate further debate. While hundreds of scholarly articles have been written on the subject this is the first book to test competing theories against measurements of firms' performance and their underlying capital structure.
Book Synopsis Pay Without Performance by : Lucian A. Bebchuk
Download or read book Pay Without Performance written by Lucian A. Bebchuk and published by Harvard University Press. This book was released on 2004 with total page 308 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The company is under-performing, its share price is trailing, and the CEO gets...a multi-million-dollar raise. This story is familiar, for good reason: as this book clearly demonstrates, structural flaws in corporate governance have produced widespread distortions in executive pay. Pay without Performance presents a disconcerting portrait of managers' influence over their own pay--and of a governance system that must fundamentally change if firms are to be managed in the interest of shareholders. Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried demonstrate that corporate boards have persistently failed to negotiate at arm's length with the executives they are meant to oversee. They give a richly detailed account of how pay practices--from option plans to retirement benefits--have decoupled compensation from performance and have camouflaged both the amount and performance-insensitivity of pay. Executives' unwonted influence over their compensation has hurt shareholders by increasing pay levels and, even more importantly, by leading to practices that dilute and distort managers' incentives. This book identifies basic problems with our current reliance on boards as guardians of shareholder interests. And the solution, the authors argue, is not merely to make these boards more independent of executives as recent reforms attempt to do. Rather, boards should also be made more dependent on shareholders by eliminating the arrangements that entrench directors and insulate them from their shareholders. A powerful critique of executive compensation and corporate governance, Pay without Performance points the way to restoring corporate integrity and improving corporate performance.
Book Synopsis Executive Compensation and Business Policy Choices at U. S. Commercial Banks by : Robert DeYoung
Download or read book Executive Compensation and Business Policy Choices at U. S. Commercial Banks written by Robert DeYoung and published by DIANE Publishing. This book was released on 2010-08 with total page 57 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This study examines whether and how the terms of CEO compensation contracts at large commercial banks between 1994 and 2006 influenced, or were influenced by, the risky business policy decisions made by these firms. The authors find strong evidence that bank CEOs responded to contractual risk-taking incentives by taking more risk; bank boards altered CEO compensation to encourage executives to exploit new growth opportunities; and bank boards set CEO incentives in a manner designed to moderate excessive risk-taking. These relationships are strongest during the second half of the author¿s sample, after deregulation and technological change had expanded banks' capacities for risk-taking. Charts and tables.
Book Synopsis Research Handbook on Executive Pay by : John S. Beasley
Download or read book Research Handbook on Executive Pay written by John S. Beasley and published by Edward Elgar Publishing. This book was released on 2012-01-01 with total page 553 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Research on executive compensation has exploded in recent years, and this volume of specially commissioned essays brings the reader up-to-date on all of the latest developments in the field. Leading corporate governance scholars from a range of countries set out their views on four main areas of executive compensation: the history and theory of executive compensation, the structure of executive pay, corporate governance and executive compensation, and international perspectives on executive pay. The authors analyze the two dominant theoretical approaches – managerial power theory and optimal contracting theory – and examine their impact on executive pay levels and the practices of concentrated and dispersed share ownership in corporations. The effectiveness of government regulation of executive pay and international executive pay practices in Australia, the US, Europe, China, India and Japan are also discussed. A timely study of a controversial topic, the Handbook will be an essential resource for students, scholars and practitioners of law, finance, business and accounting.
Book Synopsis A Dynamic Theory of Optimal Capital Structure and Executive Compensation by : Andrew Atkeson
Download or read book A Dynamic Theory of Optimal Capital Structure and Executive Compensation written by Andrew Atkeson and published by . This book was released on 2005 with total page 42 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: "We put forward a theory of the optimal capital structure of the firm based on Jensen's (1986) hypothesis that a firm's choice of capital structure is determined by a trade-off between agency costs and monitoring costs. We model this tradeoff dynamically. We assume that early on in the production process, outside investors face an informational friction with respect to withdrawing funds from the firm which dissipates over time. We assume that they also face an agency friction which increases over time with respect to funds left inside the firm. The problem of determining the optimal capital structure of the firm as well as the optimal compensation of the manager is then a problem of choosing payments to outside investors and the manager at each stage of production to balance these two frictions"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Book Synopsis Two Essays on Executive Compensation and External Financing Decisions by : Eric Brisker
Download or read book Two Essays on Executive Compensation and External Financing Decisions written by Eric Brisker and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: ABSTRACT: My dissertation examines the impact that executive compensation has on external financing decisions. In my first essay I examine the long-run stock and operating performance of firms following seasoned equity offerings based on the level of equity-based compensation the top five managers receive. I find that firms paying high levels of equity-based compensation experience lower abnormal stock returns and less favorable changes in operating performance in the three-year period following the issue than firms paying low, or no, equity-based compensation. Moreover, in calendar-time regressions, post-issue stock returns of issuers who pay high equity-based compensation do not load significantly on an investment factor, suggesting that these issuers have non-investment motives. Overall the findings support the premise that managers receiving high equity-based compensation act in the interest of current shareholders by issuing equity when they believe their stock is overvalued, while managers receiving low equity-based compensation do not. My second essay examines to what extent executive stock options received by the top five executives affects capital structure decisions and the debt-equity choice, and whether these effects are strengthened when a firm is near, or has recently received, a credit rating change. I hypothesize that executives receiving higher levels of stock options, especially stock options held that are in-the-money, as a percentage of their overall compensation are more risk averse due to greater sensitivity of their personal wealth portfolios to firm stock performance. As a result, they reduce the riskiness of the firm by reducing the amount of debt in the capital structure of the firm and issuing equity rather than debt when raising external financing. I also expect that the risk reduction is more pronounced when the firm is near a credit rating upgrade or downgrade, or has recently received a credit rating downgrade.
Book Synopsis Executive Compensation and Shareholder Value by : Jennifer Carpenter
Download or read book Executive Compensation and Shareholder Value written by Jennifer Carpenter and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2013-04-17 with total page 159 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Executive compensation has gained widespread public attention in recent years, with the pay of top U.S. executives reaching unprecedented levels compared either with past levels, with the remuneration of top executives in other countries, or with the wages and salaries of typical employees. The extraordinary levels of executive compensation have been achieved at a time when U.S. public companies have realized substantial gains in stock market value. Many have cited this as evidence that U.S. executive compensation works well, rewarding managers who make difficult decisions that lead to higher shareholder values, while others have argued that the overly generous salaries and benefits bear little relation to company performance. Recent conceptual and empirical research permits for the first time a truly rigorous debate on these and related issues, which is the subject of this volume.
Book Synopsis Mergers and Acquisitions and Executive Compensation by : Virginia Bodolica
Download or read book Mergers and Acquisitions and Executive Compensation written by Virginia Bodolica and published by Routledge. This book was released on 2015-06-26 with total page 246 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Over the past decades, the total value of executive compensation packages has been rising dramatically, contributing to a wider pay gap between the chief executive officer and the average worker. In the midst of the financial turmoil that brought about a massive wave of corporate failures, the lavish executive compensation package has come under an intense spotlight. Public pressure has mounted to revise the levels and the structure of executive pay in a way that will tie more closely the executive wealth to that of shareholders. Merger and acquisition (M&A) activities represent an opportune setting for gauging whether shareholder value creation or managerial opportunism guides executive compensation. M&As constitute major examples of high-profile events prompted by managers who typically conceive them as a means for achieving higher levels of pay, even though they are frequently associated with disappointing returns to acquiring shareholders. Mergers and Acquisitions and Executive Compensation reviews the existing empirical evidence and provides an integrative framework for the growing body of literature that is situated at the intersection of two highly debated topics: M&A activities and executive compensation. The proposed framework structures the literature along two dimensions, such as M&A phases and firm’s role in a M&A deal, allowing readers to identify three main streams of research and five different conceptualizations of causal relationships between M&A transactions and executive compensation. The book makes a comprehensive review of empirical studies conducted to date, aiming to shed more light on the current and emerging knowledge in this field of investigation, discuss the inconsistencies encountered within each stream of research, and suggest promising directions for further exploration. This book will appeal to researchers and students alike in the fields of organizational behavior and governance as well as accounting and accountability.
Book Synopsis Executive Compensation Best Practices by : Frederick D. Lipman
Download or read book Executive Compensation Best Practices written by Frederick D. Lipman and published by John Wiley & Sons. This book was released on 2008-06-27 with total page 336 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Executive Compensation Best Practices demystifies the topic of executive compensation, with a hands-on guide providing comprehensive compensation guidance for all members of the board. Essential reading for board members, CEOs, and senior human resources leaders from companies of every size, this book is the most authoritative reference on executive compensation.
Book Synopsis Too Much Is Not Enough by : Robert W. Kolb
Download or read book Too Much Is Not Enough written by Robert W. Kolb and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 2012-08-23 with total page 231 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The scholarly literature on executive compensation is vast. As such, this literature provides an unparalleled resource for studying the interaction between the setting of incentives (or the attempted setting of incentives) and the behavior that is actually adduced. From this literature, there are several reasons for believing that one can set incentives in executive compensation with a high rate of success in guiding CEO behavior, and one might expect CEO compensation to be a textbook example of the successful use of incentives. Also, as executive compensation has been studied intensively in the academic literature, we might also expect the success of incentive compensation to be well-documented. Historically, however, this has been very far from the case. In Too Much Is Not Enough, Robert W. Kolb studies the performance of incentives in executive compensation across many dimensions of CEO performance. The book begins with an overview of incentives and unintended consequences. Then it focuses on the theory of incentives as applied to compensation generally, and as applied to executive compensation particularly. Subsequent chapters explore different facets of executive compensation and assess the evidence on how well incentive compensation performs in each arena. The book concludes with a final chapter that provides an overall assessment of the value of incentives in guiding executive behavior. In it, Kolb argues that incentive compensation for executives is so problematic and so prone to error that the social value of giving huge incentive compensation packages is likely to be negative on balance. In focusing on incentives, the book provides a much sought-after resource, for while there are a number of books on executive compensation, none focuses specifically on incentives. Given the recent fervor over executive compensation, this unique but logical perspective will garner much interest. And while the literature being considered and evaluated is technical, the book is written in a non-mathematical way accessible to any college-educated reader.
Book Synopsis Does Capital Structure Matter in Setting CEO Pay? by : Hernan Ortiz-Molina
Download or read book Does Capital Structure Matter in Setting CEO Pay? written by Hernan Ortiz-Molina and published by . This book was released on 2005 with total page 59 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: I examine how CEO compensation packages and pay-performance sensitivities are related to firms' capital structures. The results are fully consistent with shareholders designing compensation contracts not only to align incentives with managers, but also to mitigate stockholder-bondholder conflicts regarding risk-taking. The evidence is also weakly consistent with higher debt reducing manager-shareholder conflicts. Specifically, I find that CEOs in more levered firms have lower pay-performance sensitivities estimated by the empirical relation between changes in a CEO's firm-related wealth and changes in shareholder wealth. Closer examination reveals that pay-performance sensitivity decreases in straight-debt leverage, but is higher in firms with convertible debt. In addition, stock option policy is the component of CEO pay that is most sensitive to cross-sectional differences in capital structure.
Book Synopsis Passing the Baton by : Richard F. Vancil
Download or read book Passing the Baton written by Richard F. Vancil and published by Harvard Business Review Press. This book was released on 1987 with total page 352 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis The Handbook of the Economics of Corporate Governance by : Benjamin Hermalin
Download or read book The Handbook of the Economics of Corporate Governance written by Benjamin Hermalin and published by Elsevier. This book was released on 2017-09-18 with total page 762 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The Handbook of the Economics of Corporate Governance, Volume One, covers all issues important to economists. It is organized around fundamental principles, whereas multidisciplinary books on corporate governance often concentrate on specific topics. Specific topics include Relevant Theory and Methods, Organizational Economic Models as They Pertain to Governance, Managerial Career Concerns, Assessment & Monitoring, and Signal Jamming, The Institutions and Practice of Governance, The Law and Economics of Governance, Takeovers, Buyouts, and the Market for Control, Executive Compensation, Dominant Shareholders, and more. Providing excellent overviews and summaries of extant research, this book presents advanced students in graduate programs with details and perspectives that other books overlook. Concentrates on underlying principles that change little, even as the empirical literature moves on Helps readers see corporate governance systems as interrelated or even intertwined external (country-level) and internal (firm-level) forces Reviews the methodological tools of the field (theory and empirical), the most relevant models, and the field’s substantive findings, all of which help point the way forward
