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Author : Yi Jiang
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 244 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (476 download)
Download or read book Essays on Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions written by Yi Jiang and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 244 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Hoang Van Vu
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 310 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (11 download)
Download or read book Essays in Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions written by Hoang Van Vu and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 310 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The evolution of corporate debt markets in recent decades, especially short-term debt facilities and bank debt, has made funding more accessible for corporate borrowers. On the other hand, the changing environment of debt markets also creates new challenges for corporate borrowers. First, as the debt maturity structure has become shorter, companies face higher liquidity pressure. Second, since banks also increasingly rely on short-term wholesale funding, the maturity mismatch of bank assets and liabilities has widened, further increasing economy-wide liquidity risk. These problems were illustrated by the most recent liquidity crisis that lasted from 2007 to 2009. Understanding the implications of borrowing using short-term debt therefore is crucial for the modern corporate finance. Moreover, the issues regarding the maturity mismatch of the banking sector imply that fluctuations in bank credit might increase, as banks become more sensitive to liquidity constraints. This thesis explores a number of issues regarding the use of short-term debt by non-financial companies, as well as the implications of fluctuations in bank credit for corporate financial and investment policies. The thesis contains three empirical research essays, presented individually in Chapters 2, 3 and 4. The first essay investigates the implications of debt maturity structure on corporate investment activities in the presence of firm specific default risk. The second and the third essays examine the implications of bank credit cycles on corporate activities. Essay 2 studies the effect of bank credit cycles on firms' choice of external financing issues, whereas Essay 3 examines the effect of bank credit on corporate liquidity management policies and the spending on different types of investment.
Author : Lin William Cong
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (881 download)
Download or read book Essays in Corporate Finance and Investment written by Lin William Cong and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This thesis consists of two essays that examine several problems in corporate finance and mechanism design. The central theme is endogenous agency conflicts and their impact on dynamic investment decisions. The first essay features auctions of assets and projects with embedded real options, and subsequent exercises of these investment options. The essay shows timing and security choice of auctions endogenously misalign incentives among agents and derives the optimal auction design and exercise strategy. The second essay studies implications of endogenous learning on irreversible investment decisions, in particular, how learning gives rise to asymmetric information between managers and shareholders in decentralized firms. Depending on the quality of the project, the optimal contract between principal and agent distorts investments in ways that has not been examined in the literature. Specifically, in Chapter 1 of the dissertation, I study how governments and corporations auction real investment options using both cash and contingent bids. Examples include sales of natural resource leases, real estate, patents and licenses, and start-up firms with growth options. I incorporate both endogenous auction initiation and post-auction option exercise into the traditional auctions framework, and show that common security bids create moral hazard because the winning bidder's real option differs from the seller's. Consequently, investment could be either accelerated or delayed depending on the security design. Strategic auction timing affects auction initiation, security ranking, equilibrium bidding, and investment; it should be considered jointly with security design and the seller's commitment level. Optimal auction design aligns investment incentives using a combination of down payment and royalty payment, but inefficiently delays sale and investment. I also characterize informal negotiations as timing and signaling games in which bidders can initiate an auction and determine the forms of bids. I show that post-auction investments are efficient and bidding equilibria are equivalent to those of cash auctions. However, in this setting, bidders always initiate the informal auctions inefficiently early. In addition, I provide suggestive evidence for model predictions using data from the leasing and exploration of oil and gas tracts, which leads to several ongoing empirical studies. Altogether, these results reconcile theory with several empirical puzzles and imply novel predictions with policy relevance. In Chapter 2, I examine learning as an important source of managerial flexibility and how it naturally induces information asymmetry in decentralized firms. Timing of learning is crucial for investment decisions, and optimal strategies involve sequential thresholds for learning and investing. Incentive contracts are needed for learning and truthful reporting. The inherent agency conflicts alter investment behavior significantly, and are costly to investors and welfare. But contracting on learning restores efficiency with low future uncertainty or sufficient liquidity. Unlike prior studies, the moral hazard of learning accelerates good projects and delays bad projects. Even the best type's investment is distorted, and only when learning is contractible can adverse selection dominate learning.
Author : Neill Killeen
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 147 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (129 download)
Download or read book Essays on Corporate Finance and Firms' Investment Decisions written by Neill Killeen and published by . This book was released on 2018 with total page 147 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Santo Centineo
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (99 download)
Download or read book Essays in Empirical Corporate Finance written by Santo Centineo and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Francis Blaise Roncagli
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 236 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (827 download)
Download or read book Three Essays on Financing and Investment Decisions in Small U.S. Firms written by Francis Blaise Roncagli and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page 236 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation consists of three essays related to the financing and investment decisions of small U.S. firms. Each of the essays presents interesting and original empirical research questions, with hypotheses well-grounded in finance and economic theories. The empirical methodology, data and models that are used to test the hypotheses are presented for each essay. The three empirical questions addressed are (1) Why don't small firms take every trade credit discount offered to them? (2) What determines the cash holdings of small firms? and (3) Why do small firms make investments unrelated to their core business? This dissertation answers these questions by analyzing the data available in the National Survey of Small Business Firms (NSSBF) conducted in 1998 and 2003.
Author : Hui Zheng
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 186 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (81 download)
Download or read book Essays in Behavioral Corporate Finance written by Hui Zheng and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page 186 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation explores the extent to which managerial overconfidence affects corporate decisions. This analysis includes three essays, which address a wide range of corporate decisions including financing, investment, acquisition, innovation, liquidity management and advertising decisions. The first essay introduces a fine-tuned test of the relationship between managerial overconfidence and corporate decisions by taking the chief financial officer (CFO) overconfidence effect into account. Ex-ante, I identify financial policies and non-financial policies such as investment, innovation and acquisition as the primary managerial duties of CFOs and chief executive officers (CEOs) respectively. I construct overconfidence measures for both CEOs and CFOs and test the impact of CEO and CFO overconfidence, both on financial decisions and on nonfinancial decisions. Based on a sample of 1,173 S & P 1500 firms, I find that financial policies are primarily affected by CFO overconfidence while only CEO overconfidence affects nonfinancial decisions. My findings demonstrate that managerial biases affect corporate decisions and managerial duties shape the ways in which top managers influence corporate policies. The second essay investigates how overconfident CEOs allocate resources toward innovation activities. It argues that overconfident CEOs tend to have greater innovation input. To finance innovation, they save more cash out of the cash flow and spend more on innovation when the cash flow is high. Results from an empirical analysis of 1,015 S & P 1500 firms support this argument. Moreover, based on a series of financial constraint measurements, the effect of CEO overconfidence on liquidity management is found to be more pronounced in financially constrained firms and in highly innovative firms, but not in firms without financial constraints. With regards to innovation performance, overconfident CEOs tend to have more patents, but the overall quality of their patents is not significantly better than that of rational CEOs. The third essay introduces a simple model of firm advertising behavior in monopolistic competition industries and applies it to the situation of managerial overconfidence. The model shows that the optimal advertising to sales ratio is determined by both firm advertising competency and consumer preference. Overconfident CEOs are more willing to use advertising as a means to convey the quality of their firms and products. Such overestimation of the effects of advertising by overconfident CEOs will result in overspending on advertising. When financially constrained, an overconfident CEO's tendency to overspend will be curbed to some extent, but his amount of advertising will increase with cash flows. An empirical analysis of 654 S & P 1500 firms supports these predictions. The distorted effect of managerial overconfidence is more prominent when firms are financially constrained and when the overconfidence measure is continuous.
Author : David Alan Crane
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 316 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (68 download)
Download or read book Essays on Corporate Finance written by David Alan Crane and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 316 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation addresses issues in corporate finance. Part I examines the litigation environment of a firm and its impact on financial policy. Chapter 1 discusses prior research, including theory and empirical results, related to firm performance, financial policy, and litigation. It provides the background to support the empirical analyses of Chapters 2 and 3. Chapter 2 examines the wealth effects of litigation events on the firms involved, as well as on their industry peers. I find that litigation events have a strong negative effect on both the firms sued, as well as their competitors. Chapter 3 examines whether managers use financial policy strategically when facing an increased risk of litigation claims. I find that greater litigation exposure leads firms to choose higher leverage. I show that this leverage increase is brought on by an active decision to repurchase shares. These repurchases appear to be financed with a combination of excess cash and short term debt as they coincide with a significant decrease in cash holdings and an increase in short term liabilities. These firms also increase their use of operating leases, which, due to their priority in bankruptcy, have similar characteristics as secured debt. Finally, the effects seem to be stronger for firms with a higher probability of bankruptcy. Part II asks whether there is a disposition effect in corporate investment decisions. Chapter 4 provides a summary of the existing literature related to the disposition effect and discusses both theoretical and empirical findings. In Chapter 5, I utilize the unique nature of Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) to test for the presence of the disposition effect in corporate investments. The results show strong statistical evidence that REIT managers tend to sell winners and hold losers, where winners and losers are defined using changes in properties' prices since they were acquired. In addition, I find evidence that this behavior is consistent with the disposition effect. REIT managers are significantly less likely to sell properties that have a loss relative to a reference point based on inflation or historical average returns, controlling for the properties' recent returns.
Author : Rita Biswas
Publisher : Emerald Group Publishing
ISBN 13 : 1789733898
Total Pages : 168 pages
Book Rating : 4.7/5 (897 download)
Download or read book Essays in Financial Economics written by Rita Biswas and published by Emerald Group Publishing. This book was released on 2019-10-24 with total page 168 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This volume, dedicated to John W. Kensinger, explores a variety of topics in financial economics, including firm growth, investment risks, and the profitability of the banking industry. With its global perspective, Essays in Financial Economics is a valuable addition to the bookshelf of any researcher in finance.
Author : Xiaoyun Yu
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 222 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (319 download)
Download or read book Two Essays on Corporate Decisions, Liquidity and Investment Efficiencies written by Xiaoyun Yu and published by . This book was released on 2001 with total page 222 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Pavel Zryumov
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (911 download)
Download or read book Essays in Corporate Finance written by Pavel Zryumov and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This thesis studies the investment and financing decisions of firms in dynamic markets with asymmetric information. In the first chapter I analyze the effects of time-varying market conditions and endogenous entry on the equilibrium dynamics of markets plagued by adverse selection. I show that variation in gains from trade, stemming from market conditions, creates an option value and distorts liquidity when gains from trade are low. An improvement in market conditions triggers a wave of high-quality deals due to the preceding illiquidity and lack of incentives to signal quality. When gains from trade are high, the market is fully liquid; high prices and no delay in trade attract low-grade assets, and the average quality deteriorates. My analysis also reveals that illiquidity can act as a remedy as well as a cause of inefficiency: partial illiquidity allows for screening of assets and restores efficient entry incentives. I demonstrate model implications using several applications: early stage financing, initial public offerings, and private equity buyouts. Chapter 2, which is a joint work with Ilya Strebulaev and Haoxiang Zhu, reexamines the classic yet static information asymmetry model of Myers and Majluf (1984) in a fully dynamic market. A firm has access to an investment project and can finance it by debt or equity. The market learns the quality of the firm over time by observing cash flows generated by the firm's assets in place. In the dynamic equilibrium, the firm optimally delays investment, but investment eventually takes place. In a ``two-threshold'' equilibrium, a high-quality firm invests only if the market's belief goes above an optimal upper threshold, while a low-quality firm invests if the market's belief goes above the upper threshold or below a lower threshold. However, a different ``four-threshold'' equilibrium can emerge if cash flows are sufficiently volatile. Relatively risky growth options are optimally financed with equity, whereas relatively safe projects are financed with debt, in line with stylized facts. Finally, Chapter 3, which is based on an ongoing work with Ilya Strebulaev and Haoxiang Zhu, extends the analysis of Chapter 2 by allowing cash accumulation within the firm. We consider a firm whose managers possess superior information about the firm's value relative to the rest of the market and analyze the optimal timing of equity issuance. We show that equilibrium features socially inefficient, but privately optimal, delay of investment and equity financing of positive NPV projects. Waiting allows high quality firms to accumulate internal cash and increase investors' beliefs, therefore, reducing the cost of adverse selection. In the dynamic equilibrium low quality firms delay investment as well in hope of being mistaken for the high quality ones. However, when market beliefs are sufficiently low and/or internally accumulated level of cash is sufficiently high the low quality firm prefers to reveal itself.
Author : Brian Gibbons
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (125 download)
Download or read book Essays on Corporate Finance and Disclosure written by Brian Gibbons and published by . This book was released on 2021 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation contains three essays. In the first essay, I document that disclosure of financially immaterial environmental and social (E&S) information has material effects on firms' investment and financing decisions using the staggered introduction of 87 country-level regulations that mandate firms report such information. Firms domiciled in countries that mandate E&S transparency increase R&D expenditures and patenting activity after disclosing. Transparent non-financial disclosure reduces financing frictions, resulting in more innovation for equity-dependent firms and increased reliance on external equity. It also improves shareholders' contracting and monitoring abilities, incentivizing managers to invest in innovation. Fixed capital investment, which is less sensitive to information frictions, does not change following E&S disclosure. Additionally, I only observe changes to investment and financing decisions when E&S disclosure is mandatory--highlighting the unique value of consistent and comparable disclosure. In the second essay, I study venture capital firms (VCs) use of public market information and how attention to this information relates to their private market investment outcomes. I link web traffic to public disclosure filings hosted on the Security and Exchange Commission's (SEC's) EDGAR server to individual VCs. VCs analyze public information before most deals. An increase in EDGAR filing views relates positively to the probability of an exit through acquisition, suggesting that public information helps identify paths to acquisition. The effect is stronger when the VC has less access to private information. I conclude that policymakers should consider spillover effects on private markets when setting public disclosure requirements. In the third essay, we identify analysts' information acquisition patterns by linking EDGAR server activity to analysts' brokerage houses. Analysts rely on EDGAR in 24% of their estimate updates, with an average of eight filings viewed. We document that analysts' attention to public disclosure is driven by the demand for information and the analysts' incentives and career concerns. We find that information acquisition via EDGAR is associated with a significant reduction in analysts' forecasting error relative to their peers. This relationship is likewise present when we focus on the intensity of analyst research. Attention to public information further enables analysts to provide forecasts for more time periods and more financial metrics. Informed recommendation updates are associated with substantial and persistent abnormal returns, even when the analyst accesses historical filings. Analysts' use of EDGAR is associated with longer and more informative analyses within recommendation reports.
Author : My Dieu CaoHuy
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 294 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (34 download)
Download or read book Essays on Corporate Financing Behavior written by My Dieu CaoHuy and published by . This book was released on 1996 with total page 294 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Tatiana Igorevna Salikhova
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 296 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (113 download)
Download or read book Essays on Networks and Corporate Finance written by Tatiana Igorevna Salikhova and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page 296 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In my dissertation I explore how personal networks affect firms' financial decisions. In the first essay, I study how social connections among divisional managers affect the capital allocation to divisions in diversified conglomerates. In contrast to the previous studies, I focus on the horizontal connections or connections formed among managers of the same level of corporate hierarchy. I show that connections among divisional managers lead to higher sensitivity of segment capital spending to segment's growth opportunities, higher firm-level allocation efficiency and higher firm value. Additionally, firms tend to strategically assign better-connected managers to these segments, and connections help to reduce internal information asymmetry. The results are consistent with the idea that connections facilitate interdivisional cooperation and better alignment of divisional and firm's incentives. In the second essay, I examine capital structure decisions of suppliers with social connections to major customers, which invest in relation-specific assets. Suppliers connected to major customers with relation-specific assets have higher debt ratios. The effect is more pronounced when intensity and duration of business relationship is high, and when information asymmetry between parties is high. In addition, building up debt helps suppliers to reduce underleverage and move faster toward target leverage ratios. Overall, the results are consistent with the view that connections help to strengthen implicit contracts through establishing trust between trading parties. In the third essay, I study the effect of divisional manager-CEO social connections on the scale and success of corporate innovation activities. Divisional managers who previously worked or studied with CEO file a greater number of patents during their tenure at the segment. These patents receive more citations in future and represent a greater scientific and economic value. These findings can imply that socials connections help to mitigate adverse selection problems associated with R&D investments.
Author : Shashwat Alok
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 151 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (859 download)
Download or read book Essays in Empirical Corporate Finance written by Shashwat Alok and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 151 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation evaluates the role of political incentives, conglomeration and bankruptcy on firm performance and executive compensation. The first analyzes the role of political influence on the investment behavior of firms with majority government stake. The second chapter explores the impact of various externalities that may arise in multi-divisional firm on managerial compensation. In the third chapter, we investigate the impact of relative bargaining power of firms over creditors during bankruptcy on ex-post firm performance, once the firm emerges out of bankruptcy. Political interference has long been considered a major source of inefficiency in state-owned enterprises. However, empirical evidence regarding the impact of political influence on non- financial firms has been limited. We evaluate the influence of political factors on corporate investment decisions using a unique database of new investment projects announced in India, matched with electoral data at the district level for the period of 1995-2009. We find that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) announce a greater number of projects during election years, especially in politically competitive districts. The number of investments announced by central (state) government firms in election years is on average 36% (58%) greater in districts in which the ruling party won or lost the previous election by a narrow margin (
Author : Ding Ding
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (13 download)
Download or read book Essays on Market Conditions and Corporate Investment Decisions written by Ding Ding and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Nomalia Manna
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 0 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (135 download)
Download or read book Essays in Corporate Finance written by Nomalia Manna and published by . This book was released on 2021 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Corporate strategies have always been an important part of the Finance literature. Firms and corporations constantly update their strategies and adopt new ways to combat the ever-changing market dynamics and reap benefits from various corporate activities. My thesis includes three essays that span over different strategies adopted by corporations and corporate boards to mitigate issues resulting from corporate deals, competition, and regulations. In the first essay, I examine if targets of serial acquirers retain or hire a specific type of financial advisors. Using pairwise matching between target firms and potential financial advisors, I find that 41% of firms targeted by serial acquirers use the financial advisor of a previous target of the same acquirer. After controlling for prior relations and reputation, I find that targets hire these advisors with a significantly higher likelihood than others. These targets earn higher returns and can complete deals sooner. On the other hand, serial acquirers suffer from lower returns. The results suggest that targets adopting this strategy of hiring "repeated advisors" gain an information advantage. The "repeated advisors" collect knowledge about the acquirers from prior deal negotiations and can transfer this information to the later targets. The results also provide a potential explanation for why serial acquirers perform poorly in their later deals. The second essay (with Sungjoung Kwon) studies the choices of corporate venturing by public corporations. While existing literature on corporate venture capital (CVC) primarily focuses on investments through CVC units, corporations frequently make investments in startups directly. We document that between 2000 and 2019, approximately 42% of deals made by U.S. public firms were through direct investments, and 90% of public firms with CVC units also made direct investments in startups. The agency hypothesis predicts that managers use direct investments to entrench themselves. In contrast, the organizational friction hypothesis posits that firms rely on direct investments to address immediate strategic goals. Our findings provide strong support for the organization friction hypothesis. Firms directly invest in startups whose operations are highly correlated with theirs and which are less likely to be potential investment targets of their CVC units. Using a difference-in-differences design around the introduction of Amazon Elastic Computer Cloud, we find that firms increase direct investments (but not investments through their CVC units) when the entry of startups increases. Overall, our findings shed light on choices of corporate venturing under different firm strategies. The final essay investigates the effects of merger objection lawsuits on acquirers and deal outcomes. In recent years these lawsuits have significantly increased in numbers, and a majority of them usually settle with the addition of more information to the proxy statements and substantive attorney fees. Since these settlements do not benefit the shareholders, most merger litigations are deemed as frivolous lawsuits in recent years. In response to this, in January 2016, Delaware Chancery Court introduced In re Trulia ruling, which states that the court will dismiss all lawsuits leading to "disclosure-only" settlements. This phenomenon lowered the massive volume of merger lawsuits faced by firms. Using this quasi-natural shock to the settlements of litigations, I find that acquirers incorporated in the states that adopted this ruling perform more acquisitions post-2016 and complete deals faster. I also find that such deals do not result in negative acquirer returns or higher offer premiums. Overall, the results indicate that this ruling provided some relief for the acquirers from the nuisance of the frivolous lawsuits.
