Read Books Online and Download eBooks, EPub, PDF, Mobi, Kindle, Text Full Free.
Essays On Cooperation In Games
Download Essays On Cooperation In Games full books in PDF, epub, and Kindle. Read online Essays On Cooperation In Games ebook anywhere anytime directly on your device. Fast Download speed and no annoying ads. We cannot guarantee that every ebooks is available!
Book Synopsis Essay in Cooperative Games by : Gianfranco Gambarelli
Download or read book Essay in Cooperative Games written by Gianfranco Gambarelli and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2013-06-05 with total page 241 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Essays on Cooperative Games collates selected contributions on Cooperative Games. The papers cover both theoretical aspects (Coalition Formation, Values, Simple Games and Dynamic Games) and applied aspects (in Finance, Production, Transportation and Market Games). A contribution on Minimax Theorem (by Ken Binmore) and a brief history of early Game Theory (by Gianfranco Gambarelli and Guillermo Owen) are also enclosed.
Book Synopsis Essays on Cooperation in Games by : Sangwon Park
Download or read book Essays on Cooperation in Games written by Sangwon Park and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page 246 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Essays on Cooperative Games by : Toshiaki Suematsu
Download or read book Essays on Cooperative Games written by Toshiaki Suematsu and published by . This book was released on 1989 with total page 156 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Essays on Game Theory by : The late John F. Nash
Download or read book Essays on Game Theory written by The late John F. Nash and published by Edward Elgar Publishing. This book was released on 1996-01-01 with total page 116 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: 'This short volume is very welcome . . . Most importantly, on pages 32-33, the volume reprints as an appendix to the journal article based on Nash's Princeton doctoral dissertation on non-cooperative games a section of the thesis on "motivation and interpretation" that was omitted from the article. An editorial note remarks mildly that "The missing section is of considerable interest". This section, not available in any other published source, makes the present volume indispensable for research libraries . . . Nash's Essays on Game Theory, dating from his years as a Princeton graduate student . . . has a lasting impact on economics and related fields unmatched by any series of articles written in such a brief time . . . To economists, his name will always bring to mind his game theory papers of the early 1950s. It is good to have these conveniently reprinted in this volume.' - Robert W. Dimand, The Economic Journal 'The news that John Nash was to share the 1994 Nobel Prize for Economics with John Harsanyi and Reinhard Selten was doubly welcome. It signalled not only that the brilliant achievements of his youth were to be recognized in a manner consistent with their significance, but that the long illness that clouded his later years had fallen into remission. I hope that this collection of his economic papers will serve as another reminder that John Nash has rejoined the intellectual community to which he has contributed so much.' - From the introduction by Ken Binmore Essays on Game Theory is a unique collection of seven of John Nash's essays which highlight his pioneering contribution to game theory in economics. Featuring a comprehensive introduction by Ken Binmore which explains and summarizes John Nash's achievements in the field of non-cooperative and cooperative game theory, this book will be an indispensable reference for scholars and will be welcomed by those with an interest in game theory and its applications to the social sciences.
Book Synopsis Essays on Cooperation and Coordination by : Julian Romero
Download or read book Essays on Cooperation and Coordination written by Julian Romero and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: "This thesis examines questions related to game theory, and in particular cooperation and coordination among economic agents. In the first chapter (joint with Noah Myung) we propose a decision making process meant to mimic human behavior. This process is implemented with computational agents. We use these computational agents to run simulations of two coordination games, the minimum-effort coordination game and the Battle of the Sexes game. We find that the computational agents exhibit behavior similar to human subjects from previous experimental work. We then use the computational testbed to develop experimental hypotheses, which are then confirmed in the laboratory using human subjects. In particular, we show that higher cost may actually lead to higher average payoffs in the minimum-effort coordination game. The second chapter examines a model of infinitely repeated games in which agents are boundedly rational. I show that the number of equilibrium outcomes is smaller when agents are boundedly rational. Importantly, cooperative outcomes are still possible in equilibrium, even when players cannot use sophisticated strategies and are not able to perfectly monitor their opponents. The strategy that leads to cooperation is called "Win-Stay, Lose-Shift". Using this strategy, I show that cooperation is possible in equilibrium for a large class of 2x2 games. I also give necessary and sufficient conditions on equilibrium structure for Nx2 games. These conditions suggest that in equilibrium, players must be able to cooperate without getting caught in long periods of conflict. The final chapter focuses on a class of minimum-effort coordination games. I show that the symmetric quantal response equilibrium correspondence takes the shape of an s-shaped curve as long as players are sufficiently rational. Under certain assumptions, this s-shaped correspondence leads to hysteresis. Based on these theoretical results, I develop experiments with the minimum-effort coordination game, and test the hysteresis hypothesis in the laboratory. I find evidence that this hysteresis does occur when human subjects play the minimum-effort coordination game in the lab."
Book Synopsis Essays on Coordination, Cooperation, and Learning by : Sylvain Guillaume Chassang
Download or read book Essays on Coordination, Cooperation, and Learning written by Sylvain Guillaume Chassang and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page 149 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This thesis is a collection of essays on coordination and learning in dynamic cooperation games. Chapter One begins by establishing results which are required in order to extend the global games approach to settings where the game structure is endogenous. In particular it shows that the selection argument of Carlsson and van Damme (1993) holds uniformly over appropriately controlled families of games. It also discusses selection results when the game lacks dominance regions. Chapter Two uses these results to investigate the impact of miscoordination fear in a class of dynamic cooperation games with exit. More specifically, it explores the effect of small amounts of private information on a class of dynamic cooperation games with exit. It is shown that lack of common knowledge creates a fear of miscoordination which pushes players away from the full-information Pareto frontier. Unlike in one-shot two-by-two games, the global games information structure does not yield equilibrium uniqueness, however, by making it harder to coordinate, it does reduce the range of equilibria and gives bite to the notion of local dominance solvability.
Book Synopsis Essays on Cooperation and Coordination by : Julian Romero
Download or read book Essays on Cooperation and Coordination written by Julian Romero and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 312 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: "This thesis examines questions related to game theory, and in particular cooperation and coordination among economic agents. In the first chapter (joint with Noah Myung) we propose a decision making process meant to mimic human behavior. This process is implemented with computational agents. We use these computational agents to run simulations of two coordination games, the minimum-effort coordination game and the Battle of the Sexes game. We find that the computational agents exhibit behavior similar to human subjects from previous experimental work. We then use the computational testbed to develop experimental hypotheses, which are then confirmed in the laboratory using human subjects. In particular, we show that higher cost may actually lead to higher average payoffs in the minimum-effort coordination game. The second chapter examines a model of infinitely repeated games in which agents are boundedly rational. I show that the number of equilibrium outcomes is smaller when agents are boundedly rational. Importantly, cooperative outcomes are still possible in equilibrium, even when players cannot use sophisticated strategies and are not able to perfectly monitor their opponents. The strategy that leads to cooperation is called "Win-Stay, Lose-Shift". Using this strategy, I show that cooperation is possible in equilibrium for a large class of 2x2 games. I also give necessary and sufficient conditions on equilibrium structure for Nx2 games. These conditions suggest that in equilibrium, players must be able to cooperate without getting caught in long periods of conflict. The final chapter focuses on a class of minimum-effort coordination games. I show that the symmetric quantal response equilibrium correspondence takes the shape of an s-shaped curve as long as players are sufficiently rational. Under certain assumptions, this s-shaped correspondence leads to hysteresis. Based on these theoretical results, I develop experiments with the minimum-effort coordination game, and test the hysteresis hypothesis in the laboratory. I find evidence that this hysteresis does occur when human subjects play the minimum-effort coordination game in the lab. "
Book Synopsis Essays in Game Theory by : Nimrod Megiddo
Download or read book Essays in Game Theory written by Nimrod Megiddo and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2012-12-06 with total page 209 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This volume presents a collection of papers on game theory dedicated to Michael Maschler. Through his dedication and contributions to game theory, Maschler has become an important figure particularly in the area of cooperative games. Game theory has since become an important subject in operations research, economics and management science. As befits such a volume, the main themes covered are cooperative games, coalitions, repeated games, and a cost allocation games. All the contributions are authoritative surveys of a particular topic, so together they will present an invaluable overview of the field to all those working on game theory problems.
Book Synopsis Games and Human Behavior by : David V. Budescu
Download or read book Games and Human Behavior written by David V. Budescu and published by Psychology Press. This book was released on 2019-06-13 with total page 448 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Human behavior often violates the predictions of rational choice theory. This realization has caused many social psychologists and experimental economists to attempt to develop an experimentally-based variant of game theory as an alternative descriptive model. The impetus for this book is the interest in the development of such a theory that combines elements from both disciplines and appeals to both. The editors have brought together leading researchers in the fields of experimental economics, behavioral game theory, and social dilemmas to engage in constructive dialogue across disciplinary boundaries. This book offers a comprehensive overview of the new insights into the motivation of human behavior under a variety of naturally or artificially induced incentive structures that are emerging from their work. Amnon Rapoport--a pioneer and leader in experimental study and quantitative modeling of human decisions in social and interactive contexts--is honored.
Book Synopsis Essays in Cooperation and Repeated Games by : Daniel Vincent Barron
Download or read book Essays in Cooperation and Repeated Games written by Daniel Vincent Barron and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 149 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation explores cooperation when formal contracts and legal institutions are imperfect. The first chapter (co-authored with Isaiah Andrews) considers how a principal allocates business among a group of agents to motivate them in the context of a repeated game with imperfect private monitoring. If players are impatient, the optimal relational contract dynamically allocates future business among agents depending on past performance. An optimal allocation rule favors an agent who performs well, even if he later performs poorly. An agent loses favor only if he is unable to produce and his replacement performs well. The principal may allows some relationships to deteriorate into persistent shirking in order to better motivate other agents. We find conditions under which the principal either does or does not benefit by concealing information from the agents. The second chapter proves that approximately Pareto efficient outcomes can be sustained in a broad class of games with imperfect public monitoring and Markov adverse selection when players are patient. Consider a game in which one player's utility evolves according to an irreducible Markov process and actions are imperfectly observed. Then any payoff in the interior of the convex hull of all Pareto efficient and min-max payoffs can be approximated by an equilibrium payoff for sufficiently patient players. The proof of this result is partially constructive and uses an intuitive "quota mechanism" to ensure approximate truth-felling. Under stronger assumptions, the result partially extends to games where one player's private type determines every player's utility. The final chapter explores how firms might invest to facilitate their relationships with one another. Consider a downstream firm who uses relational contracts to motivate multiple suppliers. In an applied model with imperfect private monitoring, this chapter shows that the suppliers might "put the relationship first:" they invest to flexibly produce many of the products required by the downstream firm, rather than cutting costs by specializing. A downstream firm that relies on relational contracts tends to source from fewer suppliers, each of whom can inefficiently manufacture many different products required by that firm.
Book Synopsis Essays in Non-cooperative Game Theory by : Elchanan Ben-Porath
Download or read book Essays in Non-cooperative Game Theory written by Elchanan Ben-Porath and published by . This book was released on 1989 with total page 144 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Essays on Cooperative Games: Characterizations of Solutions and Design of Matching Rules by : 近鄉匠
Download or read book Essays on Cooperative Games: Characterizations of Solutions and Design of Matching Rules written by 近鄉匠 and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Essays in Cooperative Game Theory and Public Finance by : Akram Temimi
Download or read book Essays in Cooperative Game Theory and Public Finance written by Akram Temimi and published by . This book was released on 1996 with total page 118 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation is divided into three essays. The first essay focuses on the question of enfranchisement of groups of individuals. Existing research work in the area has not adequately addressed this question. Indeed, previous analyses have focused on the value of a vote for a single individual. We considered a totally different approach whereby the central players are groups of individuals rather than single individuals. Within this framework, we have provided an answer to the question as to why groups of individuals struggle to gain the right to vote. We also provided an explanation of why the group in power may voluntarily extend the franchise to groups which have conflicting preferences. The second essay introduces the concept of coalition structure value to differential information economies. This extends the work of Krasa and Yannelis (1994) who introduced the concept of private value allocation to measure the information superiority of agents in an economy with differential information. The coalition structure value allows us to analyze the implications of coalition structures on the value of information. Contrary to our expectations, we found that the bargaining strength of an agent with superior information does not decrease if the rest of the agents collude and bargain as a unit with him. This is in sharp contrast to the one seller and two buyers example in full information economies where the buyers are better off if they bargain as a unit with the seller. The third paper generalizes the crowding types model introduced by Conley and Wooders (1994a) by allowing variable usage of local public goods within jurisdictions. We investigate the possibility of anonymous decentralizations of core allocations. It turns out that it is possible to decentralize core allocations with anonymous admission prices. However these prices are infinite dimensional. This leads us to investigate Lindahl decentralization. While it is possible to get nonanonymous Lindahl decentralization, the core is generally larger than the set of anonymous Lindahl equilibria.
Book Synopsis Reputation and Cooperation in Repeated Games by : Joel Watson
Download or read book Reputation and Cooperation in Repeated Games written by Joel Watson and published by . This book was released on 1992 with total page 182 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Essays on Solution Concepts for Cooperative Games with Transferable Utility by : Frank Hüttner
Download or read book Essays on Solution Concepts for Cooperative Games with Transferable Utility written by Frank Hüttner and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page 144 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book PhD series written by Trine Tornøe Platz and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Essays in Game Theory by : Nimrod Megiddo
Download or read book Essays in Game Theory written by Nimrod Megiddo and published by . This book was released on 1994-03-29 with total page 220 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This volume presents a collection of papers on game theory dedicated to Michael Maschler. Through his dedication and contributions to game theory, Maschler has become an important figure particularly in the area of cooperative games. Game theory has since become an important subject in operations research, economics and management science. As befits such a volume, the main themes covered are cooperative games, coalitions, repeated games, and a cost allocation games. All the contributions are authoritative surveys of a particular topic, so together they will present an invaluable overview of the field to all those working on game theory problems.
