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Author : Jinkeun Yu
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 302 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (42 download)
Download or read book Essays on Collusive Behavior in Auctions written by Jinkeun Yu and published by . This book was released on 1998 with total page 302 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Uma Kaplan
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 109 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (113 download)
Download or read book Three Essays on Collusion in English Auctions written by Uma Kaplan and published by . This book was released on 2018 with total page 109 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This thesis is composed of three chapters that examine topics related to collusion in English auctions. In the first chapter, we develop a fully nonparametric identification framework and a test of collusion in ascending bid auctions. Assuming efficient collusion, we show that the underlying distributions of values can be identified despite collusive behavior when there is at least one known competitive bidder. We propose a nonparametric estimation procedure for the distributions of values and a bootstrap test of the null hypothesis of competitive behavior against the alternative of collusion. In the second chapter, we adopt a copula-based approach to identification. We succeed in showing that joint distribution function of private valuations is identifiable under certain conditions. Finally, we propose a semiparametric strategy, based on Archimedean copulas, to identify and estimate the model primitives and analyze the dependence relation between bids in English auctions. One advantage this approach has is that it allows us to separate the estimation of the marginal distribution from the estimation of the joint distribution of underlying bidder values. The third chapter is an empirical study of the municipal GIC auctions, motivated by the theoretical frameworks developed in the first two chapters.
Author : Chaohai Shen
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (1 download)
Download or read book Essays on the Economics of Collusion written by Chaohai Shen and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The present dissertation consists of three essays on the economics of collusion. The first essay examines bidding in U.S. Forest Service first price timber auctions in the Northern Region, where the potential for collusive bidding has been recognized. I modify the empirical methods in Porter and Zona (1993) and find a group of potentially cooperative (PC) bidders, who can submit complementary bids. Benefiting from a striking feature of data, where sealed bid auctions and ascending bid auctions were used side by side, I find further corroboration for my findings by analyzing PC bidders bids in ascending bid auctions.The second essay, joint with Shigeki Isogai, follows the empirical regularity noted by Marshall and Marx (2015). We present a reputation model in which a long-lived multi-product firm that is sequentially engaged in explicit collusion with short-lived single product firms can exploit the cartel leniency policy offered byantitrust enforcement authorities. The long-lived firm may have incentive to seek leniency to build and protect its reputation as a tough firm, who never tolerates any deviant conduct. This may help the long-lived firm deter deviations in the cartels. Our model provides a new insight on cartel firms incentive to report their own cartel, a potential counterproductive effect of the leniency policy, and important policy implications to the design of the amnesty program.The third essay analyzes the effect of an antitrust leniency program on the decision to merge or, alternatively, explicitly collude. Buyers use procurements but the procurement will be re-conducted when the buyer is dissatisfied with the bids of the incumbent sellers or a cartel is discovered. Additionally, production costs ofthe sellers may change in each round of the procurement. If the production cost states in the first round are unprofitable, the sellers may switch to the re-conducted procurement by reporting the existence of the cartel and committing to act noncollusively through leniency applications. Thus, sellers that were indifferent between merging and forming a cartel with no leniency program may prefer colluding in the first round procurement in the presence of a leniency program. So a leniency program may induce both more discovery of cartels as well as more cartel formation.
Author : Vasily Korovkin
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 171 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (15 download)
Download or read book Essays on Firms and Institutions written by Vasily Korovkin and published by . This book was released on 2018 with total page 171 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: My dissertation contributes towards our understanding of firm behavior in weakly institutionalized environments. It consists of three chapters. The first, "Detecting Auctioneer Corruption: Evidence from Russian Procurement Auctions", develops a novel method for detecting auctioneer corruption in first-price sealed-bid auctions. I study the leakage of bid information by the auctioneer to a preferred bidder. I construct a formal test for the presence of bid-leakage corruption and apply it to a novel data set of 4.3 million procurement auctions in Russia that occurred between 2011 and 2016. With bid leakage, the preferred bidder gathers information on other bids and waits until the end of the auction to place a bid. Such behavior creates an abnormal correlation between winning and being (chronologically) the last bidder. Informed by this fact, I build several measures of corruption. I document that more than 10% of the auctions were affected by bid leakage. My results imply that the value of the contracts assigned through these auctions was $1.2 billion over the six-year study period. I build a model of bidding behavior to show that corruption exerts two effects on the expected prices of the contracts. The direct effect inflates the price of the contract. The indirect effect reduces the expected price since honest bidders are trying to undercut corrupt bidders. I find both effects in the data, with the direct effect being more pronounced. My second chapter, "Collusion in Auctions: Evidence from the Timing of Bids", documents collusion between firms using a unique feature of the same Russian procurement data: the timestamps of all bids. Timestamp data allows developing a new method of collusion detection based on the excessive share of simultaneous bids. My method shows that 8-23% of winner-runner-up pairs bid together, which provides a bound on the share of collusive auctions. Next, I document that simultaneous bidding is correlated with higher procurement prices and smaller bid margins in the auctions. We include a battery of controls to state that collusion leads to 8-9% increase in the final price of the contracts and makes joint bids up to 50% closer to each other. The chapter is the first to show how one can enhance methods of collusion detection by using the data on the timing of bids. In the third and last chapter, I study the effects of armed conflict on trade transactions between firms. The chapter examines trade in the aftermath of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict (2014). The geographic concentration of fighting in a few regions allows me to study the indirect effects of conflict on trade, as opposed to the direct effects of violence or trade embargoes. I employ a highly granular transaction-level dataset for the universe of import and export transactions in Ukraine and find that firms from more ethnolinguistically Ukrainian counties experienced a deeper drop in trade with Russia relative to the firms in more Russian counties. The richness of panel data allows looking beyond explanations unrelated to ethnicities, such as increased transportation costs and bans on certain products. Instead, I focus on two ethnic-specific explanations: a rise in animosity and a de- crease in trust. In a stylized model of trade with asymmetric information, I show that one can distinguish these two mechanisms based on whether the effect is more pronounced for homogeneous or non-homogeneous goods, the latter pointing to the trust mechanism. The intuition is that trust mitigates the uncertainty behind goods' quality. Empirically, I show that in contrast to homogeneous goods, the trade of relation-specific goods has not changed differentially across ethnic lines. Hence, I find little evidence in support of a shock to trust. I then use survey data to show that inter-ethnic animosity has indeed escalated in the aftermath of the conflict.
Author :
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 304 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (145 download)
Download or read book Befreiung zum Widerstand : Aufsatze uber Feminismus, Psychoanalyse und Politik written by and published by . This book was released on 1987 with total page 304 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Rao Fu
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 194 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (754 download)
Download or read book Essays on Multi-item Auctions written by Rao Fu and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page 194 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In this dissertation, I explore bidders' behavior in multiple auctions which are conducted sequentially or simultaneously. The first and the second chapters examine buyers' bidding behaviors in an environment of multiple simultaneous auctions and show that the wildly-used assumption of proxy bidding is inappropriate in the multiple auction setting. The first chapter proposes two models which try to describe online auction platforms. One model has a fixed ending time and the other does not. I show that incremental bidding strategy can arise out of equilibrium and weakly dominate the proxy bidding strategy. Late bidding is also discussed. I use the data I collect from eBay to test these theoretical predictions in the second chapter. The estimation results basically support the theory part. Incremental bidders who switch among different auctions are more likely to win and have higher payoffs than proxy bidders. The third essay studies the procurement auctions in the Texas school milk market. I define score functions to map the bids from multiple dimensions to one dimension and analyze the factors that may affect the bids of school milk suppliers. After considering the impacts of these factors including backlogs and cost synergies, I can still find some evidences for existence of collusion among the bidders.
Author : Kirill Chernomaz
Publisher :
ISBN 13 : 9781109984040
Total Pages : 183 pages
Book Rating : 4.9/5 (84 download)
Download or read book Behavior and Learning in Asymmetric Independent Private Values Auctions written by Kirill Chernomaz and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page 183 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation consists of three essays that employ experimental and computational methods to test theoretical models of asymmetric independent private value auctions.
Author : Parente, Diane H.
Publisher : IGI Global
ISBN 13 : 1599046385
Total Pages : 402 pages
Book Rating : 4.5/5 (99 download)
Download or read book Best Practices for Online Procurement Auctions written by Parente, Diane H. and published by IGI Global. This book was released on 2007-12-31 with total page 402 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Offers a systematic approach to the examination of online procurement auctions. Growth in online auctions reinforces the need for understanding the factors important in auctions and the caveats that both researchers and practitioners need to know in order to effectively study and use the auction tool.
Author : Daniel A. Graham
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 78 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (222 download)
Download or read book Collusive Bidder Behavior at a Single Object English Auction written by Daniel A. Graham and published by . This book was released on 1985 with total page 78 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Rebecca Catherine Elskamp
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (125 download)
Download or read book Bidding Behaviour in Multi-Unit Auctions written by Rebecca Catherine Elskamp and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This thesis contains three essays on the topic of bidding behaviour in multi-unit auctions. The first essay develops and experimentally tests multi-unit auction theory to identify the effects of "scaling up" multi-unit auction environments on individual bidding behaviour. A uniquely tractable environment is developed that leads to the construction of uniform auctions of different scales, where the prediction is that risk neutral bidders' bids on the last unit they demand are independent of scale. Two main effects were observed in the experimental data. Regardless of scale, bidders were found to bid more aggressively than predicted by the theory. Secondly, small scale effects were observed, as bids were more aggressive in the small scale relative to the larger scale treatment. The theoretical consequences of risk aversion, joy of winning, and anticipated regret are analyzed to explain these deviations from predictions. The second essay provides empirical evidence on how economic agents converge to optimality. Learning direction theory is applied to bidding behaviour from the Ontario dairy quota auction, following a change in pricing rule from uniform to discriminatory. Two dimensions of bidding behaviour are examined at the individual bidder level, bid prices and number of price-quantity bid pairs. Adjustments in bidding behaviour are broadly consistent with the ex-post rationality. Experience acquired under the discriminatory pricing rule is found to have diminishing effects on adjustments made to bidding behaviour, consistent with bidders converging towards optimality. The third essay examines the effect of two simultaneous policy changes, implemented in the Ontario dairy quota auction, to determine whether these changes were successful in achieving performance goals. Results of a series of regression models indicate that these two policy changes had no effect on clearing prices. Rather, these two policy changes were found to significantly reduce revenue from quantity purchased, total quantity transferred and total quantity offered. The combination of a significant reduction in bid prices and individual quantity demanded, paralleled by an increase in individual quantity offered appears to have been the underlying mechanisms, in terms of individual bidding/offering behaviour, through which the these two policies failed to meet performance goals.
Author : Youxin Hu
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 104 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (658 download)
Download or read book Auction Behavior written by Youxin Hu and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 104 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Abstract: Standard literature on auctions considers isolated markets with bidders that are ex ante identical and independent. My dissertation research considers the behavior of bidders and sellers when they take into account other auctions and bidders' relative roles outside of a given auction. I further extend this investigation through classroom experiments. In the first chapter, I study bidders' optimal strategies under negative externalities (i.e., the auction may incur losses (instead of zero payoffs) to the losing bidders). I construct a model of auction with three bidders. One bidder is special in the sense that if he wins, both of the other bidders will incur a loss; the other two bidders are regular in the sense that as in a traditional auction, if one of them wins, the losing bidders will receive zero payoffs. Intuitively one expects regular bidders to bid more aggressively than normal to avoid the loss. However, I find that in an ascending clock auction, in equilibrium regular bidders bid less aggressively and quit before reaching their private values. This occurs because a regular bidder may have to bid above his value in order to win against the special bidder and thus risks negative profit by bidding aggressively. Since both regular bidders avoid the externality if either wins, there is a free riding incentive. Despite free riding, in most cases the clock auction is ex post efficient However, in first-price sealed bid auctions free riding and aggressive bidding incentives are simultaneous, so ex post efficiency is less frequent. I also conducted classroom experiments which suggest that bidders more often exhibit aggressive bidding rather than free riding in an ascending clock auction; furthermore, I show that in first-price sealed bid auctions, regular bidders bid more aggressively than the special bidder, indicating aggressive bidding incentives dominate free riding incentives. In the second chapter, I construct an auction model in which both number of bidders and sellers' reserve prices are endogenously determined, and estimate the value distribution among eBay bidders. I assume each bidder has a choice of auctions with different reserve prices and other auction specific factors (seller's reputation, shipping cost, auction duration, etc.). I show that in equilibrium, 1) each bidder must be indifferent to entry in any auction, and 2) each seller's reserve price must maximize expected revenue given auction structure and bidder entry behavior, which jointly determines the equilibrium number of bidders in each auction. Few theoretical works have been done to find the positive optimal reserve price when the number of bidder is endogenous. And previous empirical work usually uses observed bids to estimate bidders' value distribution and take sellers' choice (e.g., reserve prices) as exogenous. Based on the equilibrium relationship described above, my model allows estimation of bidders' value distribution not only from observed bids, but also from the number of bidders and reserve prices. To apply this structural estimation method, I use eBay digital camera auction data to estimate bidders' value distribution from bid observations and reserve prices.
Author : Peter Lyk-Jensen
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 120 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (246 download)
Download or read book Essays in Collusive and Co-operative Auction Procedures written by Peter Lyk-Jensen and published by . This book was released on 1997 with total page 120 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Minbo Xu
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 232 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (867 download)
Download or read book Three Essays on All-pay Auctions written by Minbo Xu and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 232 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The dissertation includes three research papers on all-pay auctions. The first paper (Chapter 1) considers an all-pay auction for a product in which there is an option for bidders to guarantee purchases at a seller specified posted price P at any time. We find the symmetric pure-strategy equilibria in the first- and second-price all-pay auctions (also called war of attrition) with a buy-price option. Under these equilibria the buy-price option will affect high-value bidders' behavior, and improve their welfare. At the same time, the seller can select the optimal posted price to collect more revenue, and the Revenue Equivalence Theorem holds as well. The second paper (Chapter 2) conducts empirical analysis on online penny auctions, which are seen as an adaptation of the famous dollar auction and as "the evil stepchild of game theory and behavioral economics." We use the complete bid and bidder history at a website to study if penny auctions can sustain excessive profits over time. The overwhelming majority of new bidders lose money, but they quit quickly. A very small percentage of bidders are experienced and strategically sophisticated, but they earn substantial profits. Our evidence thus suggests that penny auctions cannot sustain excessive profits without attracting a revolving door of new customers who will lose money. The third paper (Chapter 3) proposes a nonparametric estimation approach to empirical analysis of the war of attrition. In order to construct a tractable model, we consider the uncertain competition and derive a structural model with a stochastic number of bidders. We admit the contamination from observables and introduce a deconvolution problem with heteroscedastic errors into the nonparametric approach. By a two-step nonparametric procedure, we can attain a consistent estimator of the distribution of bidders' private values from the observables. Finally, we apply the estimation procedure to field data from penny auctions.
Author : Emmanuel Lorenzon
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 0 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (115 download)
Download or read book Sponsored Search and Sequential Auctions written by Emmanuel Lorenzon and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This thesis is a collection of three essays in theoretical auction analysis. Chapter 1 considersbid delegation in the GSP auction mechanism. In a game involving side-contracts and a compensationpolicy set by an agency, the first-best collusive outcome is achieved. We offer a characterization of the implementablebid profiles for the two-position game with three players. Chapter 2 considers the sequentialsale of an object to two buyers: one knows his private information and the other buyer does not. Buyershave a multi-unit demand and private valuations for each unit are perfectly correlated. An asymmetricequilibrium exists when the uninformed player adopts an aggressive bidding strategy. Conversely, hisinformed opponent behaves more conservatively by using bid shading. The bidding behaviour of theuninformed bidder is driven by the opportunity to learn his private valuation for free. This dynamic is atthe root of the decline in the equilibrium price across both sales. In chapter 3, information is observableduring the first-stage auction in a sequential-move game in which the first-mover bidder is observed byhis opponent. A separating equilibrium exists in which the informed bidder bids aggressively when he isthe first-mover which entails a non-participation strategy from his uninformed competitor. Conversely,the latter adopts a conservative behaviour when he is the first-mover. A pooling equilibrium in which theinformed bidder blurs his valuation can only exist if his uninformed opponent adopts a non-participatingstrategy.
Author : Lyuba Ilieva
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 0 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (17 download)
Download or read book Essays on Bidding Behavior in Auctions written by Lyuba Ilieva and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Yumiko Baba
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 214 pages
Book Rating : 4.F/5 ( download)
Download or read book Three Essays on Auctions and Bargaining written by Yumiko Baba and published by . This book was released on 1997 with total page 214 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Lidia Kosenkova
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (15 download)
Download or read book Essays on Auction Inference with Non-equilibrium Beliefs written by Lidia Kosenkova and published by . This book was released on 2018 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In the dissertation I study bidding behavior in first-price sealed bid auctions with risk-neutral bidders. Instead of assuming that bids and beliefs correspond to a Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE), I only assume that they are consistent with k-steps of iterated elimination of dominated strategies (krationalizability). The focus of my dissertation is to provide econometric tests for whether k is finite and to identify the largest value of k that is consistent with the data. This is important because rejecting any finite k would immediately rule out BNE and (full) rationalizability and it allows to quantify deviations from (fully) rationalizable behavior and improve counterfactual predictions. My framework includes cognitive hierarchy or level-k models as special cases but, unlike those models, I make no assumptions about how beliefs are selected. My approach relies only on inequalities between functionals of conditional distributions that are implied by krationalizability. As an empirical illustrationI apply my tests to USFS timber auction data. The results show that values of k as low as 2 can be rejected in some auctions. Counterfactual exercises allow me to quantify the loss in expected payoff derived from the presence of incorrect beliefs.
