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Author : Mie la Cour Sonne
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ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (9 download)
Download or read book PhD series written by Mie la Cour Sonne and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Mie la Cour Sonne
Publisher :
ISBN 13 : 9788791342820
Total Pages : 116 pages
Book Rating : 4.3/5 (428 download)
Download or read book Essays in Two-sided Markets and Optimal Contracting written by Mie la Cour Sonne and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 116 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Mie la Cour Sonne
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (868 download)
Download or read book Essaya in Two-sided Markets and Optimal Contracting written by Mie la Cour Sonne and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Andre Boik
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ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (13 download)
Download or read book Essays on Uniform Pricing and Vertical Contracts in Two-sided Markets written by Andre Boik and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Justin R. Downs
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ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 102 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (124 download)
Download or read book Essays on Optimal Contracts with Overconfidence written by Justin R. Downs and published by . This book was released on 2020 with total page 102 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation studies the effect of overconfidence on markets and organizations with asymmetric information. In the first chapter, I introduce overconfidence into a standard information gathering contracting model. A principal (she) hires an agent (he) to gather information about a project's cost before he implements the project, and the agent overestimates the probability of having a low implementation cost. The agent's overconfidence makes him more willing to sign the contract, but less willing to gather information, and increases in overconfidence may increase or decrease the principal's profit. In the second chapter, I study a labor market where firms hire overconfident workers who have private information about their productivity. I derive the optimal contracts for both a monopsonistic market, where one firm makes take-it-or-leave-it offers to the workers, as well as a competitive market, where many firms compete for the services of workers. Overconfidence causes the optimal contract to be distorted away from the efficient outcome in both markets, but a monopsonistic firm internalizes these distortions while a competitive firm does not. The main result is that monopsonistic markets can be more efficient than competitive markets. In the third chapter, I provide a review of several mathematical definitions of overconfidence used in the contract theory literature and apply them all to a generalized version of the information gathering model from Chapter 1. The effects overconfidence has on the agent's willingness to participate, to gather information, and on the principal's profit are all sensitive to the mathematical definition of overconfidence used in the model.
Author : Tim Brühn
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ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (915 download)
Download or read book Three Essays on the Economics of Two-sided Markets written by Tim Brühn and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Rui Zhao
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ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 224 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (319 download)
Download or read book Essays in Dynamic Contract Theory written by Rui Zhao and published by . This book was released on 2001 with total page 224 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Zenan Wu
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ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 252 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (951 download)
Download or read book Essays on Contracts written by Zenan Wu and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 252 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation consists of two essays on contract theory. I investigate contracts under different economics contexts. In the first chapter, I consider a two-period model in which the success of the firm depends on the effort of a first-period manager (the incumbent) and the ability of a second-period manager. At the end of the first period, the board receives a noisy signal of the incumbent manager's ability and decides whether to retain or replace the incumbent manager. I show that the information technology the board has to assess the incumbent manager's ability is an important determinant of the optimal contract and replacement policy. The contract must balance providing incentives for the incumbent manager to exert effort and ensuring that the second-period manager is of high ability. I show that severance pay in the contract serves as a costly commitment device to induce effort. Unlike existing models, I identify conditions on the information structure under which both entrenchment and anti-entrenchment emerge in the optimal contract. In the second chapter, I use a dynamic model of life insurance with one-sided commitment and bequest-driven lapsation, as in Daily, Hendel and Lizzeri (2008) and Fang and Kung (2010), but with policyholders who may underestimate the probability of losing their bequest motive, to analyze how the life settlement market--the secondary market for life insurance--may affect consumer welfare in equilibrium. I show that life settlement may increase consumer welfare in equilibrium when (i) policyholders are sufficiently overconfident; and (ii) the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption (IES) of policyholders is greater than one.
Author : Daniel Aaron Ripperger-Suhler
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ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 0 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (135 download)
Download or read book Essays on Two-Sided Matching with Contracts written by Daniel Aaron Ripperger-Suhler and published by . This book was released on 2022 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation consists of three chapters that examine contracting problems in two-sided matching models. The first chapter studies use of syndication contracts in the venture capital matching market, and the resulting impact on portfolio company outcomes. A novel empirical model is developed to account for endogeneity issues due to matching between venture capitalists (VCs) and companies as well as the simultaneous causality bias coming from contract choice. The estimates show that unobserved company heterogeneity can lead to biased company outcome estimates, which can change over time due to changes in preferences over unobserved company characteristics. The second chapter, joint with Kaniska Dam and Konstantinos Serfes, explores the effect of incentives on choice of organizational structure, and the implications for the output distribution in two-sided matching model. A novel condition guaranteeing positive assortative matching (PAM) is derived for two-sided matching models with non-smooth bargaining frontiers. In the model, the choice between integrating and remaining separate results in a non-differentiable bargaining frontier and produces equilibria in which some matched pairs integrate, and others do not integrate. These equilibria produce drastically different output distributions and provide researchers with predictions that can be tested empirically. The final chapter considers a principal-agent model in which the agent can choose and exclusive contract with a single principal, or a non-exclusive contract with two principals at the cost of additional effort. The two-sided matching model shows that the endogenous outside option absent in a standard principal-agent model is necessary in order to generate certain equilibrium contract patterns. Finally, the model shows that changes in the costliness of additional effort by the agents has a non-monotonic impact of agent utility.
Author : Alper Nakkas
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 119 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (654 download)
Download or read book Essays on Two-sided Markets with Externalities written by Alper Nakkas and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 119 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author :
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ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 532 pages
Book Rating : 4.F/5 ( download)
Download or read book Dissertation Abstracts International written by and published by . This book was released on 2009-09 with total page 532 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
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ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 121 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (912 download)
Download or read book Essays on Contracting Problems written by and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 121 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This thesis contains three chapters regarding applications of contracting problems to different topics. The first chapter studies the optimal joint design of disability insurance and unemployment insurance in an environment with moral hazard, when health status is private information, and cyclical fluctuations. I show how disability benefits and unemployment benefits vary with aggregate economic conditions in an optimal contract. I then consider a calibrated version of the full model and study the quantitative implications of both the current system and the optimal system. In the optimal system, disability benefits are designed such that the system punishes workers who stay unemployed for a long time. Finally, I consider the welfare impact of changing from the current system to the optimal one when both systems provide the same ex-ante utility to the worker. The cost savings incurred from handling the incentive problems are substantial, ranging from 45 percent to 101 percent for different workers, and the unemployment rate could be reduced by roughly 50 percent. The second chapter is about non-stationary two-sided learning in continuous time. This paper studies the multi-period contracting problem when actions of an agent are unobservable and both parties disagree on the agent's ability. The question being asked is how the actions would be affected when the amount of disagreement is another motivating factor. I derive the necessary and sufficient conditions for incentive compatibility of contracts. I then use results from stochastic analysis to transform the problem into one that can be solved numerically using Monte Carlo simulations. My results exhibit an interesting pattern: effort is no longer front-loaded as in the related work of Prat and Jovanovic (2013), and responses to incentives are significant when the terminal date approaches. The third chapter discusses anti-dumping duties and money burning. I show that with delegated decisions and private information, optimal trade agreements could consist of tariff caps as well as burning money before high tariff sanctions are used.
Author : Zhiguo He
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ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 154 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (951 download)
Download or read book Essays on Optimal Contracting written by Zhiguo He and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 154 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Aaron Miruri Thegeya
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ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 0 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (67 download)
Download or read book Essays in Optimal Contracting Under Asymmetric Information written by Aaron Miruri Thegeya and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Aaron Miruri Thegeya
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 438 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (67 download)
Download or read book Essays in Optimal Contracting Under Asymmetric Information written by Aaron Miruri Thegeya and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 438 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Nathan Yoder
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ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 358 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (1 download)
Download or read book Essays in Microeconomics and Market Design written by Nathan Yoder and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page 358 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Chapter 1: Designing Incentives for Academic Research I consider the problem faced by a research institution contracting with a researcher of unknown quality to gather verifiable information so that other agents can make better decisions. In keeping with current practice, the institution contracts based on the experiment's result instead of its methodology. This removes a degree of freedom from its design problem, but I show that there need not be loss from doing so. The optimal contract has two general characteristics. First, to discourage the production of false positive results, negative results supporting conventional wisdom must be rewarded. Second, the most informative results must be disproportionately rewarded. Chapter 2: Matching with Multilateral Contracts (with Marzena Rostek) The matching literature has focused on bilateral agreements. In this paper, we examine stability in environments where groups of agents interact. We do so by extending the matching with contracts (Hatfield and Milgrom (2005)) framework to allow for agreements among more than two agents and those which have externalities. This provides a unified framework that admits most of the matching, network formation, and coalition formation literatures as special cases. In both transferable and nontransferable utility environments, we give results on existence, uniqueness, and efficiency of stable outcomes in environments with substitutes and environments with complements. We also show how stable outcomes change when agreements are bundled together or become closer substitutes. Chapter 3: Core Selection in Auctions and Exchanges (with Marzena Rostek) It is well known that core implementation is possible in one-sided environments with the substitutes property. We characterize divisible good environments in which core-selecting design is possible, offering a unified treatment of auctions where trade is necessarily one-sided and those where agents and the auctioneer can both buy and sell. We show that heterogeneity in either pre-auction marginal utilities or substitution patterns can independently challenge core selection. We introduce a joint condition on preferences and equilibrium allocations which ensures that outcomes are in the core. Our results indicate that the key to core selection is the alignment between the bidders' incentives to substitute and the trades necessary to realize the available surplus.
Author : James W. Boudreau
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ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 0 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (392 download)
Download or read book Essays on the Analysis and Implications of Two-sided Matching Markets written by James W. Boudreau and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
